Crisis management in Russia: overcoming institutional rigidity and resource constraints by Svedin, Lina & Porfiriev, Boris
C r i s i s  M a n a g e m e n t  i n  R u s s i a :  
O v e r c o m i n g  I n s t i t u t i o n a l  R i g i d i t y  
R e s o u r c e  C o n s t r a i n t s
E d ite d  by B o r is  Po rfir ieu  an d  L in a  Sved in
Title: Crisis Management in Russia: Overcoming Institutional




Printer: Elanders Gotab, Stockholm 2002
Number of copies: 500 ex.
T a b l e  o f  C o n t e n t s
A ck n o w led g e m en ts  • 5
F o re w o rd  • 7
Serguei Shoigu -  Minister o f EM ERCOM
C h a p te r  1 -  In tro d u c t io n  • 1 1
Lina Svedin and Boris Porfiriev
P a r t  1  • 4 1  
C ris is  M a n a g e m e n t in  R u ss ia :
A  B r ie f  L o o k  at the  In s t itu t io n a l C o n te x t
C h a p te r  2 -  C ris is  M a n a g e m e n t P o lic y  in  R u ss ia : 
T h e  In s t itu t io n a l F ra m e w o rk  • 4 3
Mikhail Faleev, Valery Akimov and Boris Porfiriev
C h a p te r  3 -  Types o f C rises  and  C ris is  
M a n a g e m e n t M e ch a n ism s  in  the R u s s ia n  M e d ia  • 7 9
Alla Mozgovaia, Maya Darhovskaya, Marina Elimova, 
Kirill Gavrilov, Alla Gorodnitcheva, Alexander Tolmatch, 
and Elena Shlikova
P a r t  1 1  • 1 2 9  
C ris is  D e ve lo p m e n t an d  Response :
F o u r  C ase  Stud ies
C h a p te r  4 -  M a n a g in g  the A lle v ia t io n  
o f  the 1995 N e fte g o rsk  E a r th q u a k e  • 1 3 1
Boris Porfiriev
C h a p te r  5 -  S o c ia l W e lfa re  and  Ben e fits  fo r  the 
C h e rn o b y l L iq u id a to rs  • 1 7 3
Elena Shlikova
C h a p te r  6  -  C ris is  M a n a g e m e n t o f  the E co lo g ic a l 
D isa s te r in  the T o w n  o f  K a ra b a s h  • 2 0 5
Alla Mozgovaia
3
C h a p te r  7 -  T h e  K u rs k  Su b m a rin e  A cc id e n t: 
C o p in g  w ith  V a lu e  C o m p le x ity  an d  a C re d ib ility
C ris is  • 2 2 3  
Ludmila Minaeva and Daniel Nohrstedt
P a r t  i i i  • 2 6 1  
A  C o m p a ra t iv e  A n a ly s is  an d  C o n c lu s io n s
C h a p te r  8 -  T ra n s it io n a l C ris is  M a n a g e m e n  1 1  • 2 6 3
Boris Porfiriev and Lina Svedin
C o n tr ib u to rs  - 2 8 5
4
Acknowledgements
A c k n o w l e d g e m e n t s
T h e  ed ito rs  w o u ld  lik e  to  express th e ir  g ra titu d e  to  a n u m b er o f p e r ­
sons and  in s titu tio n s  fo r  m a k in g  th is b o o k  on  R u ss ia n  cris is  m a n ­
agem ent possib le . W e  are  g ra te fu l fo r  the generous f in a n c ia l su p p o rt 
fro m  the Sw e d ish  A g e n c y  fo r  C iv i l  E m e rg e n cy  P la n n in g  (O C B )  
w h ic h  has m ad e  the C M  E u ro p e  p ro g ra m  (o f  w h ic h  th is  vo lu m e  is a 
p a rt) possib le . Sp ec ia l th an ks  to  S tu re  E r ic s o n , B o  R ic h a rd  Lund- 
gren , and  H a ra ld  T o rn e r  o f  O C B  fo r  the ir he lp  in  lau n ch in g  th is  en ­
d e avo r and  b rin g in g  it to  fru it io n .
W e  w is h  to  th a n k  the co n tr ib u tin g  au th o rs , w h o  h ave  tau g h t us 
m u ch  ab o u t life  and  p o lit ic s  in  R u ss ia  and  its p ro u d  research  t ra d i­
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ence S u p p o rt in  R u ss ia  fo r  su p p o rtin g  his research .
A  ve ry  spec ia l th an ks  to  E M E R C O M  and  to  the R u s s ia n  M in is ­
ter o f  Em e rg e n c y  M a n a g e m e n t (Se rgue i Sh o ig u ) w h o  p ro v id e d  fa c il ­
ities fo r  m eetings and  w o rk sh o p s  am o n g  the au th o rs  an d  a lso  su p ­
p o rted  the research  in  va r io u s  w ays . T h e  Sw ed ish  In s titu te  o f In te r ­
n a t io n a l A ffa irs  in  S to ck h o lm  served  as the hom e base fo r  m u ch  o f 
th is  p ro je c t an d  p ro v id ed  a co n g en ia l w o rk in g  en v iro n m en t. T h e  ed ­
it in g  w as  com p le ted  at the N a t io n a l  C e n te r  fo r  C r is is  M a n a g e m e n t 
R e se a rch  and  T ra in in g  ( C R i S M A R T )  a t the Sw ed ish  N a t io n a l D e ­
fense C o llege . M a n y  o f o u r C R i S M A R T  co lleagues p ro v id ed  v a lu ­
ab le  in p u t as d iscussants and  resource  persons d u rin g  the course  o f 
the study. P ro fe sso r B e n g t Su n d e liu s  and  D r. E r ic  S te rn , in  p a r t ic u ­
lar, p ro v id e d  co n s tru c tive  c r it ic ism  as w e ll as usefu l ins igh t. D a n ie l 
N o h rs te d t  co-au thored  one o f  the case studies. L a s t  bu t n o t least, 
w e  w o u ld  lik e  to  express o u r g ra titu d e  to  S tep han ie  Y o u n g , w h o  
co p y  ed ited  the en tire  vo lum e.




F o r e w o r d
Prog ress in  science and  te ch n o lo g y  has s ig n if ica n tly  in creased  the 
e co n o m ic  and  in te lle c tu a l p o te n tia l b o th  in  q u a lita t iv e  and  q u a n tita ­
t ive  term s. T h is  progress has fa c ilita te d  in  so lv ing  m a n y  co m p lex  is ­
sues reg ard in g  g lo b a l, reg io n a l and  n a t io n a l d eve lop m en t. U n fo r tu ­
nate ly , th is p rogress has a lso  h ad  nega tive  consequences.
T h e  h is to ry  o f the last c e n tu ry  can  attest to  th is fact. R a p id  in ­
d u str ia liz a tio n , u rb a n iz a tio n  an d  the b oo m  in  in fo rm a t io n  te ch n o lo ­
gy w e re  escorted  b y  an  in creas ing  n u m b er o f  n a tu ra l and  te ch n o lo g ­
ica l d isasters, e n v iro n m e n ta l d eg rad a tio n  and  esca la ting  so c io p o lit i­
ca l co n flic ts  (te rro r ism , reg io n a l a rm ed  co n flic ts  and  so fo rth ). 
T h e re fo re , the w o r ld  co m m u n ity  considers  susta inab le  d eve lop m en t 
to  be the co rn e rs to n e  o f  long-term  eco n o m ic , soc ia l an d  p o lit ic a l de­
ve lo p m en t. T h e  co ncep t an d  p rin c ip le s  o f  susta inab le  d eve lop m en t 
in v o lv e  m eeting  the needs o f the ex isting  gen e ra tio n  w ith o u t  th re a t­
en ing  those o f the fu tu re  genera tion .
R u ss ia  strives to  fo llo w  this id eo lo g y  b y  red uc ing  the r isk  o f  m a ­
jo r  acc iden ts  and  ca tastrophes (b y  a lle v ia t in g  dam age p o te n t ia lly  o r 
a c tu a lly  in cu rred  b y  n a tu ra l o r te ch n o lo g ica l d isasters) and  m ak in g  
th is  a k e y  p r io r ity  in  n a t io n a l security. F o r  the firs t tim e  in  n a tio n a l 
h is to ry , R u ss ia  in  the last decade estab lished  a u n ified  and  co m p re ­
hens ive  o rg a n iz a tio n  fo r  p reven tin g  an d  resp o nd ing  to c iv il crises. 
T h e  U n if ie d  S ta te  System  fo r Em e rg e n cy  P re ve n t io n  and  E lim in a t io n  
(U S E P E )  w a s  o ff ic ia lly  estab lished  in  1994. D u e  to the fa c t th a t it 
w a s  b u ilt u p o n  the p re v io u s ly  ex isting  c iv il defense in s t itu t io n a l 
s tru ctu re , U S E P E  is co o rd in a te d  b y  the M in is t r y  fo r  C iv i l  D efense , 
Em ergenc ies  an d  N a tu r a l  D isaste rs  R esp o n se  ( E M E R C O M ) .  T h is  
n a t io n a l system  consists o f  va r io u s  h u m a n , in s t itu t io n a l, m an p o w er, 
m a te r ia l, te ch n ica l and  R & D  resources; a ll o f  w h ic h  are needed fo r  
successfu l d isaster m anag em en t.
A s  a resu lt, the a b ility  to  co n fro n t d iffe ren t k inds  o f  em ergencies 
has becom e a fu n d am en ta l p a rt o f  R u s s ia ’s p o lic y  on  n a t io n a l secu­
rity . Le g is la t iv e  and  n o rm a tive  bases h ave  been d eve loped . M o r e  ef­
f ic ien t in s t itu t io n a l m an ag em en t structu res and  team s o f  well-  
tra in ed  d isaster ana lysts  and  p ra c tit io n e rs  h ave  been organ ized . 
M o d e rn  search  an d  rescue techno log ies h ave  been in tro d u ce d  in  the 
fie ld . A l l  o f  these changes h ave  fa c ilita te d  in  q u a lita t iv e ly  up g rad in g  
d isaster p re ven tio n  and  cris is m it ig a t io n  activ it ie s . T h e  in crease  in
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recen t years  o f successfu l rescue and  h u m a n ita r ia n  o p e ra tio ns  co n ­
f irm  the ach ievem en ts  m ade in  th is area. O f  course, n o t a ll e fforts 
h ave  been t r iu m p h a n t ly  im p lem en ted . E M E R C O M  is n o t a s ta tic  
o rg an iz a tio n  an d  it c o n t in u a lly  w o rk s  h a rd  o n  w a y s  to  im p ro ve  
U S E P E .  T h is  p o lic y  im p lies  an  o n g o in g  process o f  d eve lo p in g  and  
in tro d u c in g  the la test te ch n o lo g y  and  n e w  p ro g ram s fo r  in creas ing  
resistance to  m u ltip le  th reats.
T h e  k e y  in  such  a p o lic y  is in te rn a t io n a l co o p e ra tio n , w h ic h  in ­
cludes ex tensive  in vestm en t in  R & D  in  d isaster p re ven tio n  and  c r i ­
sis m anag em en t. T h is  vo lu m e  on  the R u s s ia n  experience  is one good  
exam p le  o f  such  co lla b o ra t io n . T h e  b u lk  o f  studies h ave  been w r i t ­
ten  b y  w e ll- k n o w n  R u ss ia n  scho la rs  w ith  ac tive  su p p o rt fro m  the 
Sw e d ish  A g e n c y  fo r  C iv i l  Em e rg e n c y  P la n n in g  (O C B )  under the u m ­
b re lla  o f  the C o u n c il o f  the B a lt ic  Sea States (C B S S ) .  F u rth e rm o re , 
the C en te r fo r  C ris is  M a n a g e m e n t R e se a rch  and  T ra in in g  (C R iS -  
M A R T )  has d ire c t ly  been in vo lv e d  in  the c re a tio n  and  the p u b lic a ­
t io n  o f  th is  vo lu m e . Su ch  e ffo rts  are ex trem e ly  im p o rta n t fo r  a n u m ­
ber o f  reasons.
F irs tly , th is  b o o k  is R u s s ia ’s co n tr ib u t io n  to  the in te rn a t io n a l ef­
fo rts  on  E u ro p e a n  cris is m anag em en t. T h e  new ly-estab lished  co lla b ­
o ra t io n  betw een  E M E R C O M  and  O C B  w i l l  m ost l ik e ly  be a c ru c ia l 
e lem ent in  fu tu re  E u ro p e a n  effo rts  aga inst n a tu ra l and  te ch n o lo g ica l 
hazards. T h e  fac t th a t Sw e d e n  has he ld  the E U  P re s id e n cy  th is yea r 
adds to  the im p o rtan ce  o f  th is  co o p e ra tio n . I t  p ro v id es  a good  o p ­
p o r tu n ity  fo r  streng then ing  re la tio n s  an d  fo r  ex tend ing  them  be­
yo n d  the B a lt ic  Sea reg io n  o ve r in to  the E u ro p e a n  co n tin en t.
Second ly , th is b o o k  in trod u ces  E u ro p e a n  an d  o ther fo re ig n  re a d ­
ers to  scho la rs  fro m  the R u s s ia n  A c a d e m y  o f  Sc iences (p r im a r ily  
r isk  and  d isaster socio log ists  an d  researchers fro m  E M E R C O M ) .  
T h e ir  f ru it fu l co o p e ra t io n  he lped  to  fa c ilita te  a m u ltifa ce ted  and  
system atic  ana lys is  o f  the basic featu res o f U S E P E .  T h is  an a lys is  fo ­
cuses on  r isk  assessm ent, d isaster fo recasting , and  the o rg a n iz a tio n ­
a l and  so c ia l issues o f  resp o n d in g  to  and  re co ve r in g  fro m  a crisis. 
T h e  N e fte g o rsk  ea rth q u ak e  and  the C h e rn o b y l acc id en t serve as ex ­
am p le  cases o f  m a jo r  n a tu ra l and  te ch n o lo g ica l d isasters. T h is  v o l­
um e a lso  exp lo res in  d e ta il the p e rcep tio n  and  in te rp re ta t io n  o f  d if ­
fe ren t types o f  crises b y  the R u s s ia n  m ass m ed ia  (m a in ly  in  the n a ­
t io n a l n ew sp apers  and  in  a fe w  p ro fess io n a l jo u rn a ls ). T h e  m ass
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Foreword
m ed ia  is in c rea s in g ly  b ecom ing  a vo ca l o bserve r and  a s ig n ifican t 
a c to r in  cris is m anagem en t.
R e g re ttab ly , the au th o rs  h ave  been u n ab le  to  scru tin ize  e ve ry  as­
pect o f  R u s s ia n  cris is  m anag em en t. F o r  exam p le , the issues o f  em er­
gency ed u ca tio n  and  tra in in g  are  n o t cons idered  in  th is b o o k . L ik e ­
w ise , o th e r m atters  a re  o n ly  p a r t ia l ly  considered .
T h is  co lle c tio n  o f  R u s s ia n  case studies in  cris is m anag em en t w i l l  
be w a rm ly  rece ived  b y  in te rn a tio n a l readers serious a b o u t d isaster 
m itig a tio n , cris is  m anag em en t and  cris is  response b o th  in  R u ss ia  
and  in  E u ro p e  as a w h o le . I  co m m en d  the in it ia t iv e  o f  the Sw ed ish  
crisis research  c o m m u n ity  fo r  s ta rting  an d  n u rtu rin g  th is  series on  
crisis m anag em en t, w h ic h  in c ludes th is vo lu m e  on  the R u s s ia n  expe ­
rience. I  hope  in  tu rn  th a t th is R u ss ian -Sw ed ish  in it ia t iv e  w i l l  he lp  
fa c ilita te  the im p le m en ta tio n  o f  R u s s ia n  p ro p osa ls  to  o rgan ize  an  
in te rn a t io n a l em ergency  m anag em en t agency  to  co o rd in a te  c iv il 
p ro te c t io n  e ffo rts in  E u ro p e  and  in  the w o r ld  co m m u n ity .
Serguei K . Shoigu  





Ltna Svedtn and B orts Porftrtev
T h e  fa l l  o f  th e  B e r l in  W a l l  a n d  th e  q u ie t  r e v o lu t io n  o f  1 9 8 9  s y m b o l ­
ize f o r  m a n y  th e  r a d ic a l  t r a n s f o r m a t io n  o f  th e  s e c u r i ty  c o m p le x ,  n o t  
o n ly  in  E u r o p e  b u t  in  th e  re s t  o f  th e  w o r ld .  F o r  m a n y  o f  th e  fo r m e r  
S o v ie t  s ta te s  (su c h  as th e  th re e  B a l t i c  s ta te s ) ,  th e  en d  o f  th e  C o ld  
W a r  m e a n t  n e w  f r e e d o m s .  I t  m e a n t  th e  en d  o f  a n  era  o f  im p o s i t io n  
a n d  th e  fu tu re  w a s  p e rc e iv e d  as a c le a n  s la te  f o r  g o v e r n m e n ts  a n d  
p o l ic y  m a k e r s  to  w r i te  u p o n  a c c o r d in g  to  th e ir  o w n  p re fe r e n c e s  a n d  
n e w  e x p e r ie n c e s .
F o r  R u s s ia ,  h o w e v e r ,  th e  en d  o f  th e  C o ld  W a r  b r o u g h t  a b o u t  a 
n u m b e r  o f  n e g a t iv e  c h a n g e s .  F o r  e x a m p le ,  its  t e r r i to r ia l  s ta tu s  h a s  
b e e n  c h a l le n g e d  b y  s e c e s s io n is t  m o v e m e n t s .  Y e t  s o m e  o f  th e  c h a n g e s  
w e re  m o r e  m o d e s t  in  c o m p a r i s o n  to  s o m e  o f  th e  o th e r  S o v ie t  r e ­
p u b l ic s .  F o r  in s ta n c e ,  th e  B a l t i c  s ta te s  h a v e  e x p e r ie n c e d  d r a m a t ic  
a n d  ra p id  c h a n g e s  in  th e ir  b u r e a u c r a t i c  s y s te m s ,  w h e r e a s  R u s s ia  h a s  
d o n e  so  to  a le sser  e x te n t .  S in c e  1 9 9 1  th e  p e r s o n n e l  tu r n o v e r  in  th e  
p o l i t i c o - a d m in is t r a t iv e  b o d ie s  in  E s t o n ia ,  f o r  e x a m p le ,  h a s  b e e n  
c lo s e  to  o n e  h u n d re d  p e r c e n t .  T h is  t re n d  h a s  b e e n  less  d ra s t ic  in  
L a tv ia  s in c e  it h a d  s t r o n g e r  p o l i t i c a l  t ies  to  th e  S o v ie t  U n io n  th a n  
th e  o th e r  B a l t i c  c o u n tr ie s  (see  S te r n  a n d  H a n s e n ,  2 0 0 0 ) .
In  a d d i t io n  to  c a r r y in g  a lo t  o f  p o l i t i c a l  a n d  in s t i tu t io n a l  b a g ­
g a g e  f r o m  th e  S o v ie t  e ra ,  R u s s ia  h a s  e x p e r ie n c e d  s o m e  re c k le s s  e c o ­
n o m ic  t r a n s i t io n s .  T h e  in s t i tu t io n a l  r ig id ity  a n d  th e  r e s o u r c e  c o n ­
s tr a in ts  o f  c o n t e m p o r a r y  R u s s ia  in  c o m b i n a t i o n  w ith  th e  u n iq u e  p o ­
s i t io n  R u s s ia  h e ld  as th e  c e n te r  o f  th e  f o r m e r  S o v ie t  e m p ire  h a v e  
b e e n  s ig n if ic a n t  f a c t o r s .  T h e  d is m a n t le m e n t  o f  th e  S o v ie t  U n io n  le ft  
R u s s ia ,  l ik e  th e  o th e r  f o r m e r  S o v ie t  s ta te s ,  in  a p o s i t io n  to  re d e f in e  
its  o w n  id e n t i ty  a n d  its  r e la t io n s  w ith  o th e r  c o u n tr ie s .  A rg u a b ly ,  th e  
in c e n t iv e  f o r  c h a n g e  w a s  n o t  as s t r o n g  in  R u s s ia  as  it  w a s  in  th e  o t h ­
er f o r m e r  S o v ie t  s ta te s ,  w h ic h  c o n s id e r e d  th e m s e lv e s  v ic t im s  o f  S o v i ­
et  im p e r ia l is m . T o d a y  R u s s ia  fa c e s  th e  c h a l le n g e  o f  o v e r c o m in g
1 This chapter draws directly and expands upon the introduction found in Crisis Management in a 
Transitional Society: The Latvian Experience by Stern and Hansen (2000: 13-18).
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th e s e  in s t i tu t io n a l  a n d  r e s o u r c e  c o n s tr a in ts  a n d  m u s t  a lso  try  to  
t a c k le  a n u m b e r  o f  o th e r  c o m p le x  p r o b le m s .  In  s o m e  re s p e c ts ,  th is  
m a k e s  R u s s ia  o n e  o f  th e  m o s t  in te re s t in g  c o u n tr ie s  f o r  s tu d y in g  th e  
sp e c if ics  o f  t r a n s i t io n a l  c r is is  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  o n e  o f  th e  p o t e n t ia l ­
ly  m o s t  v a lu a b le  s o u rc e s  f o r  e x t r a c t in g  p r a c t i c a l  le s s o n s .
T h e  a im  o f  th is  v o lu m e  is to  id en tify , d e s c r ib e  a n d  a n a ly z e  s o m e  
o f  th e  m a n y  c h a l le n g e s  t h a t  R u s s ia  h a s  f a c e d  s in c e  th e  d is s o lu t io n  o f  
th e  S o v ie t  U n io n .  W e  h a v e  -  in  c o l l a b o r a t i o n  w ith  a g ro u p  o f  R u s s ­
ia n  s c h o la r s  a n d  p r a c t i t io n e r s  -  s o u g h t  to  p ro v id e  a n  i l lu s tra t iv e  
s a m p le  o f  th e  ty p es  o f  d is ru p tiv e  e v e n ts  ( t e c h n o lo g ic a l ,  n a t u r a l  a n d  
e n v ir o n m e n ta l  d isas ters )  a n d  p o l ic y  c h a l le n g e s  ta k in g  p la c e  in  R u s ­
sia to d a y . In  d o in g  s o ,  w e  h o p e  to  g e n e r a te  in s ig h t  n o t  o n ly  in to  th e  
d y n a m ic s  o f  cr is is  d e v e lo p m e n t  a n d  cr is is  p e r c e p t io n ,  b u t  a ls o  in to  
th e  p a r t i c u la r  c o n s t r a in t s  a n d  o p p o r tu n i t ie s  f a c in g  a t r a n s i t io n a l  
s ta te  as i t  w re s t le s  to  m a n a g e  c r ise s .
CRiSMART and the CM Baltic/Europe Research 
Program2
S in c e  1 9 9 7 ,  th e  S w e d is h  C e n te r  f o r  C ris is  M a n a g e m e n t  R e s e a r c h  
a n d  T r a in in g  ( C R i S M A R T )  in  c o l l a b o r a t i o n  w i th  re s e a r c h e r s  in  th e  
B a l t i c  Sea  a re a  h a v e  c a r r ie d  o u t  o v e r  h u n d r e d  c a s e  s tu d ies  o n  cr is is  
m a n a g e m e n t .  T h is  b o o k  is o n e  o f  s ix  c o u n tr y - b a s e d  v o lu m e s ,  w i th in  
th e  C R i S M A R T  se r ie s ,  f o c u s in g  o n  n a t io n a l  cr is is  m a n a g e m e n t .3 
T h e s e  c a s e  stu d ies  f o l lo w  th e  C R i S M A R T  m e t h o d o lo g y  a n d  a v a r i ­
e ty  o f  cr ises  in  d i f fe re n t  p o l ic y  s e c to rs  a n d  in  v a r io u s  c o u n tr ie s  a re  
a n a ly z e d .  In  th is  v o lu m e  w e  s e e k  to  e x a m in e  h o w  c r ise s  h a v e  b e e n  
m a n a g e d  b y  th e  R u s s ia n  g o v e r n m e n t  a n d  R u s s ia n  s o c ie ty  o v e r  th e  
p a s t  d e c a d e .
2 The CM Baltic research program was originally established in 1997. As of July 2000, it became 
known as the CM Europe program. Therefore all reports prior to July 2000 are thus cited as CM 
Baltic/Europe reports, and those after July 2000 as CM Europe reports.
3 The first two volumes (Sundelius, Stern, with Bynander, 1997; Stern and Bynander, 1998) focused 
primarily on Swedish crisis experiences. Volumes 3 and 12 explored crisis management in Estonia and 
Latvia, respectively (see Stern and Nohrstedt, 1999; Stern and Hansen, 2000). Country volumes focus­




In  th is  v o lu m e ,  th e  a n a ly t ic a l  a p p r o a c h  d e v e lo p e d  in  S u n d e liu s ,  
S te r n  a n d  B y n a n d e r  ( 1 9 9 7 )  a n d  u se d  in  th e  r e s e a r c h  p r o g r a m  C M  
B a lt ic /E u r o p e  R e s e a r c h  P r o g r a m : N a tio n a l C risis  M a n a g e m e n t  in 
a n  In te rn a t io n a l  P e rs p e c tiv e  (e .g . S te r n  a n d  B y n a n d e r ,  1 9 9 8 ;  S te rn ,  
1 9 9 9 )  is a p p l ie d .  T h is  m e t h o d o lo g y  e n ta i ls :
a) A  d e ta i le d  r e c o n s t r u c t io n  o f  th e  c r is is  e v e n ts  u s in g  th e  a v a i la b le  
g o v e r n m e n t  d o c u m e n ts  a n d  r e p o r ts ,  m a s s  m e d ia  s o u rc e s  (b r o a d c a s t  
a n d  p r in t ) ,  s c h o la r ly  in v e s t ig a t io n s ,  a n d  in te rv ie w s  w ith  th e  in ­
v o lv e d  d e c is io n - m a k e r s ,  s ta k e h o ld e r s  a n d  c it iz e n s .
b) A  d is s e c t io n  o f  th e  c a s e  in to  a series  o f  c r u c ia l  d e c is io n - m a k in g  
o c c a s io n s  (a series  o f  “ w h a t  d o  w e  d o  n o w ? ” p r o b le m s  w h ic h  a r ise  
t h r o u g h o u t  a cr is is )  w h ic h  c h a l le n g e  th e  c o p in g  c a p a c i ty  o f  th e  d e c i­
s io n -m a k e r s .  T h e  s e le c t io n  c r i te r ia  f o r  id e n t i fy in g  th e s e  d e c is io n ­
m a k in g  o c c a s io n s  in c lu d e :
• th e  p ro b le m s/ d ile m m a s  w h ic h  m o s t  o c c u p y  th e  d e c is io n ­
m a k e r s ,  issu es  w h ic h  in  r e t r o s p e c t  h a d  th e  p o t e n t ia l  to  
c h a n g e  th e  c o u r s e  o f  th e  c r is is  d e v e lo p m e n t ,  a n d
• th o s e  le s s o n s  le a rn e d  w ith  p a r t i c u la r  p e d a g o g ic a l  v a lu e  -  
th o s e  w h ic h  h ig h lig h t  th e  b e s t  o r  w o r s t  p r a c t ic e s .
c) T h e m a t i c  a n a ly s e s  o f  p h e n o m e n a  p e r t in e n t  to  cr is is  m a n a g e m e n t  
(see th e  f o l lo w in g  s e c t io n s  o n  a n a ly t ic a l  th e m e s  a n d  p r o p o s i t io n s ) .
d) C o m p a r in g  a n d  c o n t r a s t in g  c a s e  f in d in g s  w ith  o th e rs  d o c u m e n t ­
ed  in  th e  C R i S M A R T  c a s e  b a n k  a n d  in  th e  in te r n a t io n a l  l i te ra tu re .  
A ls o  th e  R u s s ia n  c a s e s  a re  c o m p a r e d  w ith  e a c h  o th e r  in  o rd e r  to  e x ­
p lo r e  th e  n a t io n a l  c r is is  m a n a g e m e n t  s ty le  o f  th e  c o u n tr y  (cf .  S u n ­
d e liu s ,  S te r n  a n d  B y n a n d e r ,  1 9 9 7 ;  S te r n  a n d  N o h r s t e d t ,  1 9 9 9 ;  S te rn  
a n d  H a n s e n ,  2 0 0 0 ) .
In  a d d i t io n ,  th e  R u s s ia n  f in d in g s  w ill  be  p u t  side  b y  side  w ith  
th o s e  f r o m  o th e r  t r a n s i t io n a l  s o c ie t ie s  in  E u r o p e  in  o r d e r  to  fu r th e r  
i l lu m in a te  th e  sp e c ia l  c r is is  m a n a g e m e n t  d i le m m a s  o f  th e s e  n e w  
d e m o c r a c ie s .  T h e r e  is a  r ic h  s o u r c e  o f  l i t e ra tu re  o n  t r a n s i t io n a l  
s ta te s  (e .g . E ls ter , 1 9 9 3 ;  L a w s o n ,  1 9 9 3 ;  P r id h a m  a n d  V a n h a n e n ,  
1 9 9 4 ;  E ls ter ,  O f f e ,  a n d  P re u s s ,  1 9 9 8 ;  M il le r ,  W h i t e  a n d  H e y w o o d ,
4 This section borrows from Stern and Hansen (2000: 8-9).
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1 9 9 8 ;  B r a u n  a n d  B a r a n y ,  1 9 9 9 ;  V o s k r e s s e n s k i ,  P o r f ir ie v  a n d  C o ­
lu m b u s ,  1 9 9 9 ;  K o p s t e in  a n d  R e i l ly ,  2 0 0 0 )  w h ic h  fo c u s e s  m o r e  o n  
th e  p r o c e s s e s  a n d  less o n  th e  s t ru c tu re s  a n d  s p e c if ic  a c to r s .  T h e  
C R i S M A R T  v o lu m e s  o n  n a t io n a l  c r is is  m a n a g e m e n t  c o m p le m e n t  
th e  c o n v e n t io n a l  l i t e r a tu r e  w ith  re a l  life  e x a m p le s  a n d  a n a ly s e s  o f  
th e  s t ru c tu re s .
CM Baltic/Europe Analytical Themes5
A s in  th e  o th e r  c o u n tr y  g ro u p s  w ith in  th e  C M  B a lt ic / E u ro p e  r e ­
s e a r c h  p r o g r a m ,  th e  c a s e  a u th o r s  in  th is  v o lu m e  h a v e  b e e n  a s k e d  to  
e x p lo r e  a n u m b e r  o f  th e m e s  w h e n  a n a ly z in g  th e ir  e m p ir ic a l  f in d ­
in gs. T h e  c a s e  s tu d ie s  fo c u s  to  a g r e a te r  o r  lesser  e x te n t  o n  a n u m b e r  
o f  th e se  th e m e s .  T h e s e  th e m e s 6 a re  e x p lo r e d  in  th e  p re v io u s  C R i S ­
M A R T  v o lu m e s  fo c u s in g  o n  cr is is  m a n a g e m e n t  in  E s to n ia  (S te rn  
a n d  N o h r s t e d t ,  1 9 9 9 )  a n d  L a tv ia  (S te rn  a n d  H a n s e n ,  2 0 0 0 ) .  T h e s e  
th e m e s  are :
• C r is is  P r e p a re d n e s s ,  P r e v e n t io n ,  a n d  M i t i g a t i o n
• L e a d e rs h ip
• D e c i s io n  U n its
• P r o b le m  P e r c e p t io n  a n d  F r a m in g
• V a lu e  C o n f l i c t
• P o l i t i c o - B u r e a u c r a t i c  C o o p e r a t i o n  a n d  C o n f l i c t
• C r is is  C o m m u n ic a t i o n  a n d  M e d ia  R e l a t io n s
• T r a n s n a t i o n a l i z a t io n  a n d  I n te r n a t io n a l iz a t io n
• T e m p o r a l  E f fe c ts
• L e a r n in g
In  th is  s e c t io n ,  e a c h  o f  th e  th e m e s  w ill  b e  p re s e n te d  in  tu rn .  R e f e r ­
e n c e  w ill  b e  m a d e  to  s e m in a l  a n d  r e c e n t  c o n t r ib u t io n s  to  th e  l i t e r a ­
tu re  f o r  th e  th e m e  in  q u e s t io n .
5 This section borrows from “CM Baltic/Europe Analytical Themes” in Stern and Hansen (2000: 
9-13) and “Crisis Management Europe: An Integrated Regional Research and Training Program” by 
Stern and Sundelius (February 2002).
6 This set of themes was first introduced in Sundelius, Stern and Bynander (1997: Chapter 6) and has 




P R E P A R E D N E S S , P R E V E N T IO N , A N D  M IT IG A T IO N
T h is  th e m e  fo c u s e s  o n  th e  e x te n t  to  w h ic h  cr is is  m a n a g e r s  a n d  th e ir  
o r g a n iz a t io n s  a re  p r e p a r e d  to  r e s p o n d  to  e x t r a o r d in a r y  ev en ts .  
H a v e  th e y  e x p e r ie n c e d  s e r io u s  c r ise s  b e fo r e ?  H a v e  th e y  c u l t iv a te d  
a n  ‘i t  c o u ld  h a p p e n  h e r e ’ m e n ta l i ty  a n d  p r e p a r e d  th e m s e lv e s  p s y ­
c h o lo g ic a l ly  f o r  th e  r ig o r o u s  d e m a n d s  f o r  cr is is  m a n a g e m e n t?  A re  
th e r e  s t ru c tu re s  a n d  p la n s  in  p la c e  f o r  c r is is  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  are  
th e s e  e as i ly  a d a p te d  to  a v a r ie ty  o f  s i tu a t io n s ?  A re  d e c is io n - m a k e r s  
a b le  to  id e n t i fy  p o t e n t ia l  th r e a t s  a n d  q u ic k ly  a c t  to  p re v e n t  th e m  
f r o m  e s c a la t in g ?  A re  w in d o w s  o f  o p p o r tu n i ty  fo r  l im it in g  d a m a g e  
a n d  c o n t a in in g  th e  s i tu a t io n  a t  a lo w e r  level in  th e  c r is is  m a n a g e ­
m e n t  s t r u c tu r e  e x p lo i t e d ? 7
L E A D E R S H IP
T h is  th e m e  fo c u s e s  o n  le a d e rs h ip  s ty les  e x h ib i te d  b y  k e y  a c to r s  in  
th e  cr is is .  L e a d e r s h ip  m a y  b e  o p e r a t iv e  -  in  th e  sen se  o f  ta k in g  a n  
a c t iv e  ro le  in  th e  d e c is io n s ,  e x e c u t in g  p r a c t i c a l  c r is is  m a n a g e m e n t  
a c t iv it ie s ,  a n d  c o o r d in a t in g  th e s e  a c t iv it ie s .  L e a d e r s h ip  m a y  a ls o  be  
s y m b o l ic  -  in  th e  sen se  th a t  le a d in g  f ig u res  sh o w , th r o u g h  w o r d  a n d  
a c t io n s ,  t h a t  th e y  a re  p a r t i c ip a t in g  in  th e  c r is is  a n d  a re  e m p a th iz in g  
w ith  th o s e  w h o  a re  a t  r is k  o r  w h o  a re  a lre a d y  v ic t im s  o f  th e  cr is is .  
L e a d e r s h ip  m a y  a ls o  b e  c o n c r e te  a n d  p e r s o n a l  ( fo c u s in g  o n  in d iv id ­
u a ls  as  a c t iv e  le a d e rs ) ,  o r  m o r e  a b s t r a c t  a n d  d is ta n t  (as a ‘p a r e n t a l ’ 
f ig u re ) .  In  d e l ib e r a t io n s ,  le a d e rs  m a y  ta k e  a d ire c t iv e / h ie ra rc h ic a l  o r  
a fa c i l i ta t iv e/ co lle g ia l  a p p r o a c h .  T h e  a c t  o f  e x e r t in g  le a d e rs h ip  
s h o u ld  b e  se en  as a r e la t io n a l  a c t iv ity  t h a t  is in e x t r i c a b ly  l in k e d  to  
th e  p e o p le  i t  is e x e r te d  over. L e a d e r s h ip  is m e d ia te d  b y  c o n t e x t u a l  
f a c t o r s  s u c h  as p o w e r ,  a f fe c t ,  c u l tu r e ,  o r g a n iz a t io n a l  s t r u c tu r e  a n d  
a c c e s s  to  e x p e r t is e .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  le a d e rs  te n d  to  v a ry  in  th e ir  
p r o p e n s i t ie s  to  m ic r o - m a n a g e  ( m a in ta in  a h ig h  level o f  p e r s o n a l  
c o n t r o l )  o r  d e le g a te  (a l lo w in g  o th e rs  to  a s s u m e  c o n t r o l )  w h e n  it 
c o m e s  to  c r i t i c a l  d e c is io n s  (see e .g . B a s s ,  1 9 9 7 ;  G a rd n e r ,  1 9 9 5 ;  H e r ­
m a n n  a n d  H a g e n ,  1 9 9 8 ) .
7For more information on crisis prevention and mitigation, see e.g. Fnder and Kim (1988), Waugh
(1988), and Lund (1996). For more skeptical examinations of the potential for risk elimination and
accident prevention, see Wildavsky (1988) and Perrow (1999).
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D E C IS IO N  U N IT S
T h is  th e m e  fo c u s e s  o n  th e  q u e s t io n s  o f  h o w  a n d  w h e r e  d e c is io n s  a re  
m a d e  in  th e  ty p e  o f  c o m p l e x  in s t i tu t io n a l  sy s te m s  w h ic h  a re  t y p ic a l ­
ly  e n g a g e d  in  m a n a g in g  a c r is is .  F o r  e x a m p le ,  c r u c ia l  d e c is io n s  m a y  
b e  ta k e n  b y  a v a r ie ty  o f  d e c is io n - m a k in g  g ro u p s  c o n s is t in g  o f  ju s t  
o n e  in d iv id u a l ,  t a n d e m s  o r  d y a d s ,  sm a l l  g ro u p s  o r  w h o le  o r g a n iz a ­
t io n a l  n e tw o r k s .  S im ila r ly ,  d e c is io n  u n its  a re  lo c a te d  in  d if fe re n t  p o ­
l i t ic a l/ a d m in is tra t iv e  (o r  c o r p o r a t e )  sy s te m s  a n d  p la y  d if fe re n t  ro le s  
w ith in  th o s e  sy s te m s . D e c i s io n  u n its  m a y  b e  s t r a te g ic  o r  o p e r a t iv e  in  
n a t u r e  a n d  m a y  b e  lo c a te d  a t  th e  lo c a l ,  r e g io n a l ,  n a t io n a l  o r  th e  in ­
t e r n a t io n a l  level (e .g . in  th e  E U  o r  th e  U N ) .  D e c i s io n  u n its  m a y  a lso  
v a ry  c o n s id e r a b ly  d u r in g  a g iv e n  cr is is  in  te rm s  o f  th e ir  c o m p o s i ­
t io n ,  m o d e  o f  o p e r a t io n  a n d  p la c e m e n t ;  it  is n o t  u n c o m m o n  t h a t  th e  
d e c is io n - m a k in g  a u th o r i ty  is s h if te d  e i th e r  u p w a r d  (u p -sc a lin g )  o r  
d o w n w a r d  ( d o w n -s c a l in g )  in  th e  m u lt i fa c e te d  p o l i t i c o - a d m in is t r a ­
t ive  e s c a la t io n  a n d  d e - e s c a la t io n  p r o c e s s e s  (see  e .g .  Sn y d er, B r u c k ,  
a n d  S a p in ,  1 9 6 3 ;  H e r m a n n ,  H e r m a n n ,  a n d  H a g e n ,  1 9 8 7 ;  R o s e n ­
th a l ,  H a r t ,  a n d  K o u z m in ,  1 9 9 1 ;  S te r n ,  1 9 9 9 ) .  A s  a c o n s e q u e n c e  
th e re  a re  a n u m b e r  o f  m o r e  o r  less e x p l ic i t  c r i te r ia  f o r  d e te rm in in g  
w h ic h  in d iv id u a ls  a n d  o r g a n iz a t io n s  w il l  b e  in c lu d e d  in  (o r  e x c lu d e d  
f r o m )  th e  d e c is io n - m a k in g  ‘l o o p ’ d u r in g  a cr is is .
P R O B L E M  P E R C E P T IO N  A N D  F R A M IN G
T h is  th e m e  fo c u s e s  o n  th e  s u b je c t iv e  a n d  s o c ia l ly  c o n s t r u c te d  a s p e c ts  
o f  cr is is  d e c is io n -m a k in g .  C r is is  d e c is io n - m a k e r s  d o  n o t  a c t  u p o n  th e  
u n c o n t e s ta b le  a n d  o b je c t iv e  p ic tu r e  o f  th e  s i tu a t io n  b u t  r a th e r  th e y  
m a k e  d e c is io n s  b a s e d  o n  th e ir  p e r c e p t io n s  a n d  in te r p r e ta t io n s  o f  w h a t  
is h a p p e n in g  (Snyd er, B r u c k  a n d  S a p in ,  1 9 6 3 ;  S y lv a n  a n d  V o s s ,  1 9 9 8 ;  
S te r n ,  1 9 9 9 ) .  W h i le  p r o b le m  f r a m in g  o f te n  ta k e s  p la c e  a t  a s e m i- c o n ­
s c io u s ,  in tu i t iv e  leve l (e s p e c ia l ly  b y  ‘n a iv e ’ d e c is io n - m a k e r s ) ,  p r o b ­
le m -f r a m in g  p r o c e s s e s  e x e r t  a p r o f o u n d  in f lu e n c e  u p o n  c h o ic e s .  In  
o th e r  w o r d s ,  w h e n  th e  p r o b le m  h a s  a lr e a d y  b e e n  id e n tif ie d  a n d  
f r a m e d ,  m a n y  p o s s ib le  a l te r n a t iv e  p r o s p e c ts  a n d  lin es  o f  a c t io n  h a v e  
a lre a d y  b e e n  d is c a rd e d  a n d  s t r o n g  p ro p e n s i t ie s  a n d  c o n s tr a in ts  u p o n  
a c t io n  c r e a te d .  F r a m in g  is h e a v ily  in f lu e n c e d  b y  c o g n it iv e  p ro c e s s e s  
s u c h  as (h is to r ic a l )  a n a lo g ic a l  a n d  m e t a p h o r i c  r e a s o n in g ,  a n d  s o c ia l  
s tru c tu re s  l ik e  c u l tu r e ,  in f o r m a t io n  f lo w  a n d  th e  o r g a n iz a t io n a l  c o n ­
te x t  (V e rtz b e rg e r ,  1 9 9 0 ;  L a r s o n ,  1 9 8 5 ;  K h o n g ,  1 9 9 2 ) .  T h e r e  a re  im ­
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p o r t a n t  q u e s t io n s  to  a s k .  W h y  d o  p a r t i c u la r  a c to r s  p e rc e iv e  a n d  f r a m e  
p r o b le m s  th e  w a y  th e y  d o  a t  v a r io u s  ju n c tu r e s  o f  a cr is is?  W h a t  m a k e s  
th e s e  p r o b le m  im a g e s  s h if t  (o r  r e m a in  s ta b le )  o v e r  th e  c o u r s e  o f  a c r i ­
sis a n d  th e  a f t e r m a t h  o f  a c r is is?
V A LU E C O N F L IC T
T h is  th e m e  fo c u s e s  o n  th e  p o t e n t ia l  te n s io n  a n d  c o n f l i c t  a m o n g  th e  
v a r io u s  v a lu es  a t  s ta k e  in  a c r is is  s i tu a t io n .  A n  in te g r a l  p a r t  o f  p r o b ­
le m  f r a m in g  is id e n t i fy in g  th e  v a lu es  p e rc e iv e d  to  b e  a t  s ta k e  in  a 
g iv e n  s i tu a t io n .  Id e n t i fy in g  th e  v a lu es  im p lic a te d  is o f te n  a d e m a n d ­
in g  a n a ly t ic a l  ta s k  a n d  it  is c o m m o n  f o r  d e c is io n - m a k e r s  to  o v e r ­
l o o k  v a lu es  e m b e d d e d  in  a c o m p le x  issu e , i f  th e y  d o  n o t  e n g a g e  in  
r ig o r o u s  c r i t i c a l  d e l ib e r a t io n s  (see e .g . S te in b ru n e r ,  1 9 7 4 : 1 6 - 1 7 ;  
K e e n e y , 1 9 9 2 ) .  C r is e s ,  b y  d e f in i t io n ,  h a v e  p r o f o u n d  im p l ic a t io n s  fo r  
f u n d a m e n ta l  v a lu es  s u c h  as p r e s e r v a t io n  o f  h u m a n  life ,  s o v e r e ig n ­
ty / au to n om y , e c o n o m ic  w ell  b e in g ,  d e m o c r a c y ,  ru le  o f  law , a n d  so 
f o r th .  M o r e  p a r o c h ia l  v a lu es  -  s u c h  as th e  p e r s o n a l  a n d  p o l i t ic a l  
fo r tu n e s  o f  in d iv id u a l  o f f ic ia ls  a n d  d e c is io n - m a k e r s  -  a re  a ls o  in ­
v o lv e d . G o o d  cr is is  p e r f o r m a n c e s  m a k e  c a re e rs  -  p o o r  o n e s  h a v e  th e  
p o t e n t ia l  to  b r e a k  th e m . I t  is c o m m o n  f o r  m u lt ip le  a n d  c o m p e t in g  
v a lu e s  a n d  p r io r i t ie s  to  b e  a t  s ta k e  in  c r ise s  a n d  th u s  d e c is io n  m a k ­
ers o f te n  f a c e  p a in fu l  a n d  s tre s s - in d u c in g  d i le m m a s  a n d  t r a g ic  c h o i c ­
es ( Ja n is  a n d  M a n n ,  1 9 7 7 ) .  D e c i s io n s - m a k e r s  m a y  ig n o r e  o r  d e n y  
v a lu e  c o n f l ic t s  (to  a v o id  s tre ss ) ,  w h ic h  te n d s  to  g e n e r a te  u n b a la n c e d  
p o l ic y -m a k in g .  D e c i s io n - m a k e r s  m a y  r e c o g n iz e  a n d  a c c e p t  v a lu e  
c o n f l i c t  -  f o l lo w in g  L e n i n ’s d ic tu m  th a t  “ Y o u  c a n ’t m a k e  a n  o m e le t  
w i th o u t  b r e a k in g  e g g s ,” s o m e  d if fe re n t  c o p in g  s tra te g ie s  a re  a v a i l ­
a b le  to  th e m . T h e y  m a y  c h o o s e  to  p r o c r a s t in a t e  a n d  h o p e  f o r  th e  
s i tu a t io n  to  im p r o v e .  A lte rn a t iv e ly ,  th e y  m a y  a c t iv e ly  s e e k  to  re s o lv e  
th e  c o n f l i c t  a n d  f in d  a t r a n s c e n d e n t  s o lu t io n  w h ic h  a d e q u a te ly  p r o ­
te c ts  th e  k e y  valu es  a t  s t a k e .8 I t  is in te re s t in g  to  see  h o w  th e s e  d y ­
n a m ic s  in f lu e n c e  a sp e c if ic  c r is is .  T h a t  is , h o w  d o  d if fe re n t  c r is is  a c ­
to r s  c o p e  w ith  th e  re a l  a n d  ta n g ib le  v a lu e  c o n f l ic t s  w h ic h  te n d  to  
e m e rg e  in  cr is is  s i tu a t io n s ?
8 For more about value conflict, see George (1980) and Farnham (1998:26-39).
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P O L IT IC A L  A N D  B U R E A U C R A T IC  C O O P E R A T IO N  A N D
C O N F L IC T
T h is  th e m e  fo c u s e s  o n  th e  issu e  o f  p a t te r n s  o f  c o n v e r g e n c e  a n d  d i­
v e rg e n c e ,  p a r o c h ia l i s m  a n d  s o l id a r i ty  -  a m o n g  th e  a c to r s  a n d  s t a k e ­
h o ld e rs  e n g a g e d  in  a cr is is .  T h e r e  a re  a n u m b e r  o f  w e l l  d o c u m e n te d  
d y n a m ic s  w h ic h  te n d  to  c r e a te  a n d  e x e r t  c e r ta in  p re ssu re s  u p o n  c o ­
o p e r a t i o n  a n d  s o l id a r i ty  in  a c r is is  (e .g . th e  ‘r a l ly  a r o u n d  th e  f la g ’ e f ­
fe c t ,  le a d e r  a t te n t iv e n e s s ,  a n d  ‘g r o u p t h in k ’ ) .9 H o w e v e r ,  th e r e  a re  a l ­
so  a n u m b e r  o f  c o u n te r v a i l in g  te n d e n c ie s .  C r is e s  o f te n  p re s e n t  p a r ­
t ic u la r is t ic  r isk s  w h ic h  m a y  in d u c e  p o l i t i c a l  o r  b u r e a u c r a t i c  a c to r s  
to  e n g a g e  in  d e fen s iv e  b e h a v io r s ,  w h ic h  in  tu r n  m a y  a n ta g o n iz e  o t h ­
er a c to r s  a n d  le a d  to  c o n f l ic t .  F o r  e x a m p le ,  f o l lo w in g  fa i lu re s  o r  s e t ­
b a c k s ,  it  is c o m m o n  f o r  a c to r s  to  p la y  a ‘b la m e  g a m e . ’ E q u a l ly  im ­
p o r t a n t  is th e  f a c t  t h a t  c r ise s  p re s e n t  o p p o r tu n i t ie s  as  w e ll  as  r isk s  
a n d  th e r e f o r e  a c to r s  m a y  e n d  u p  c o m p e t in g  f o r  c re d it  f o r  th e  o u t ­
c o m e  o f  e v e n ts  (a n d  d e n ig ra t in g  th e  c o n t r ib u t io n  o f  o th e r s ) .  F in a lly ,  
s i tu a t io n a l  a n d  c o n t e x t u a l  f a c t o r s  te n d  to  b e  m o d e r a te d  b y  th e  n a ­
tu re  o f  p e r s o n a l  re la t io n s h ip s  w ith in  p o l ic y  c o m m u n it ie s  a n d  b y  th e  
s t re n g th  o f  n a t io n a l  c u l tu r a l  n o r m s  o p p o s in g  o p p o r tu n is m  in  e x ­
t r a o r d in a r y  s i tu a t io n s  (see e .g . R o s e n t h a l ,  H a r t ,  a n d  K o u z m in ,  
1 9 9 1 ;  S t e m  a n d  V e r b e e k ,  1 9 9 8 ;  A l l i s o n  a n d  Z e l ik o w ,  1 9 9 9 ) .
C R IS IS  C O M M U N I C A T I O N  A N D  C R E D IB IL IT Y
T h is  th e m e  fo c u s e s  o n  th e  r e la t io n s h ip  b e t w e e n  cr is is  m a n a g e r s ,  th e  
m e d ia ,  a n d  th e  elite/m ass p u b l ic  (see e .g . N o h r s t e d t  a n d  T a sse w , 
1 9 9 3 ;  N o r d lu n d ,  1 9 9 4 ;  P e a r c e ,  1 9 9 5 ;  R e g e s te r  a n d  L a r k i n ,  1 9 9 8 ;  
H e n ry ,  2 0 0 0 ) .  In  d e m o c r a t i c  p o l i t ie s ,  m a in ta in in g  c r e d ib i l i ty  a n d  le ­
g i t im a c y  in  th e  m e d ia  a n d  in  th e  eyes  o f  th e  p u b l ic  is a n  e s se n t ia l  
t a s k  o f  s u c c e ss fu l  le a d e rs h ip  a n d  g o v e r n a n c e  in  c r ise s  as  w e ll  as  in  
m o r e  ‘n o r m a l ’ s i tu a t io n s .  C r is is  m a n a g e r s  e n te r  c r ise s  w i th  v a ry in g  
d eg rees  o f  c re d ib i l i ty ;  c re d ib i l i ty  w h ic h  th e y  m a y  g a in  o r  lo se  o v e r  
th e  c o u r s e  o f  th e  c r is is .  A c t o r s  v a ry  c o n s id e r a b ly  in  th e ir  a p p r o a c h  
to  c r is is  c o m m u n ic a t io n ,  w h ic h  is a  k e y  c o m p o n e n t  in  e s ta b l is h in g  
a n d  m a in ta in in g  cre d ib il i ty .  S o m e  ta k e  a d efen sive/ closed  s ta n c e ,  
w h ic h  c a n  e a s i ly  a n ta g o n iz e  th e  m e d ia  a n d  c o s t  a  d e c is io n - m a k e r
9 See for example Rosati (1981) and Janis (1982).
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cre d ib il i ty .  O t h e r s  ta k e  a m o r e  p ro a c t iv e/ o p e n  s ta n c e  a n d  se ek  to  
m a in ta in  th e  in it ia t iv e  in  p ro v id in g  in f o r m a t io n  a n d  in  e s ta b l is h in g  
fr ie n d ly  r e la t io n s  w ith  th e  m a s s  m e d ia .  A c t o r s  a ls o  v a ry  c o n s id e r ­
a b ly  in  th e  w a y s  a n d  th e  d eg ree  to  w h ic h  th e y  c o o r d in a t e  cr is is  c o m ­
m u n ic a t io n ,  th e ir  c h o ic e  o f  in f o r m a t io n  s tra te g ie s ,  a n d  th e  i n f o r m a ­
t io n  c h a n n e ls  th e y  u se . S im ila r ly , s o m e  a c to r s  c lo s e ly  m o n i t o r  h o w  
th e ir  m e s s a g e s  a re  b e in g  re c e iv e d  a n d  a c t  u p o n  th is  f e e d b a c k  in  o r ­
d er  c o u n t e r a c t  a n y  p e rc e iv e d  p r o b le m s .  O th e r s  fo c u s  h e a v ily  u p o n  
o th e r  a s p e c ts  o f  th e  cr is is  m a n a g e m e n t  e f f o r t  a n d  a re  d is tra c te d  b y  
s tress  u n a w a r e  o f  th e  g r o w in g  c re d ib i l i ty  p r o b le m s .  T h e r e  a re  a 
n u m b e r  o f  r e c u r r in g  c re d ib i l i ty  ‘t r a p s ’ -  w h ic h  in v o lv e  c r e a t in g  g ap s  
b e tw e e n  w o r d s  a n d  d eed s , e x p e c ta t io n s  a n d  p e r f o r m a n c e  -  w h ic h  
c a n  c o s t  c r is is  m a n a g e r s  d early . N e g le c t in g  th e  s y m b o l ic  a s p e c ts  o f  
c r is is  m a n a g e m e n t  is a n o th e r  im p o r t a n t  a s p e c t  o f  cr is is  c o m m u n i c a ­
t io n  t h a t  c a n  c o s t  p o l i t ic a l ly  (S te rn ,  1 9 9 9 :  2 0 1 - 2 0 2 ;  see a ls o  H a n s e n  
a n d  S te rn ,  2 0 0 1 ) .
T R A N S N A T IO N A L IZ A T IO N  A N D
IN T E R N A T IO N A L IZ A T IO N
T h is  th e m e  fo c u s e s  o n  th e  te n d e n c y  o f  c r ise s  to  sp ill o v e r  n a t io n a l  
b o u n d a r ie s  in  a n  in c re a s in g ly  p o l it ic a l ly ,  e c o n o m ic a l ly ,  s o c ia l ly  a n d  
n o t  le a s t  e c o lo g ic a l ly  in te r d e p e n d e n t  E u r o p e .  W h i le  s o m e  c r is is -g e n -  
e r a t io n  f a c t o r s  m a y  a r ise  w ith in  a s in g le  c o u n try ,  m a n y  a c tu a l  a n d  
p o t e n t ia l  th re a ts  d o  n o t  re s p e c t  n a t io n a l  b o r d e r s  (s o c ia l  o r  g e o ­
g r a p h ic a l ) .  In fe c t io n s  d ise a se s ,  n a t u r a l  a n d  te c h n ic a l  d is a s te rs ,  f in a n ­
c ia l  tu r b u le n c e ,  a n d  te r r o r is m  a re  ju s t  a f e w  e x a m p le s  o f  s u c h  
th r e a t s .  S im ila r ly , c o p in g  w ith  c o n t e m p o r a r y  c r ise s  o f te n  re q u ire  
t r a n s n a t io n a l  a n d  in te r n a t io n a l  c o l l a b o r a t i o n  in  o r d e r  to  d e a l  w ith  
th e s e  c r o s s - b o r d e r  th r e a ts  (B u z a n ,  1 9 9 1 ;  H a r t ,  S te rn ,  a n d  S u n d e liu s ,  
1 9 9 8 ;  B u z a n ,  W a e v e r ,  a n d  D e  W i ld e ,  1 9 9 8 ;  S te in b ru n e r ,  2 0 0 0 ) .  S u c h  
c o o p e r a t i o n  m a y  b e  e i th e r  a d  h o c  o r  in s t i tu t io n a l iz e d ,  b i la te r a l  o r  
m u lt i la te r a l .  A t  th e  s a m e  t im e ,  th e  in te r n a t io n a l  a re n a  c a n  a ls o  b e  a 
s o u r c e  f o r  ra l ly in g  s u p p o r t  f o r  n e w  p o l ic ie s .
T E M P O R A L  E F F E C T S
T h is  th e m e  fo c u s e s  u p o n  s e q u e n c in g  a n d  s y n c h r o n ic i t y  -  t e m p o r a l  
e f fe c ts  th a t  m a y  h a v e  p r o f o u n d  e ffe c ts  o n  cr is is  m a n a g e m e n t .  S e ­
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q u e n c in g  re fe rs  to  th e  p a th -d e p e n d e n t  n a tu r e  o f  c r is is  d e c is io n - m a k ­
in g . C h o ic e s  m a d e  e a r ly  o n  in  c r ise s  te n d  t o  c o n s t r a i n  th e  p o s s ib i l i ­
ties  a v a i la b le  f o r  la te r  a c t io n  a n d  s te e r  th e  c r is is  m a n a g e m e n t  a lo n g  
a p a r t i c u la r  t r a je c to r y ,  w h ic h  m a y  b e  d if f ic u lt  t o  c h a n g e  (see e .g . 
Levy, 1 9 9 1 ;  S u n d e liu s ,  S te r n  a n d  B y n a n d e r ,  1 9 9 7 ;  B il l in g s  a n d  H e r ­
m a n n ,  1 9 9 8 ) .  O f t e n  f e e d b a c k ,  e s p e c ia l ly  n e g a t iv e  f e e d b a c k ,  f r o m  
e a r ly  d e c is io n s  w il l  r e q u ir e  fu r th e r  d e c is io n s  -  w h ic h  to g e t h e r  f o r m  
a s e q u e n c e .  S y n c h r o n ic i ty  re fe rs  t o  th e  te n d e n c y  o f  s im u lta n e o u s  
ev en ts  to  in f lu e n c e  e a c h  o th e r  via  p s y c h o lo g ic a l  a n d  o r g a n iz a t io n a l  
m e c h a n is m s ,  s u c h  as a v a i la b i l i ty ,  o p p o r tu n i ty  c o s t ,  c u m u la t iv e  
s tre ss ,  a n d  d is t r a c t io n  (Snyder, B r u c k  a n d  S a p in ,  1 9 6 3 ;  H a n e y ,  
1 9 9 7 ;  S te r n ,  1 9 9 9 ) .  S y n c h r o n ic i ty  m a y  a p p e a r  w ith in  a s in g le  cr is is  
(w h e n  m u lt ip le  p r o b le m s  m u s t  b e  so lv e d  a t  th e  s a m e  t im e ) ,  b e tw e e n  
tw o  s im u lta n e o u s  c r ise s  (as in  th e  ca s e s  o f  H u n g ary / S u ez  in  1 9 5 6 ,  
a n d  W a te rg a te / W a r  in  th e  M id d le  E a s t  in  1 9 7 3 ) ,  o r  b e t w e e n  a cr is is  
a n d  o th e r  h ig h ly  p r io r i t iz e d  c o in c id e n t  a c t iv it ie s  s u c h  as e le c t io n s ,  
s ta te  v is its ,  c r u c ia l  le g is la t iv e  n e g o t ia t io n s ,  a n d  so  o n .
L E A R N IN G
T h is  th e m e  fo c u s e s  u p o n  th e  e x t e n t  to  w h ic h  a c to r s  a re  c a p a b le  o f  
a n a ly z in g  th e ir  e x p e r ie n c e s  a n d  u s in g  th e  resu lts  as b a s is  f o r  c h a n g e .  
A s n o te d  a b o v e  in  th e  d is c u s s io n  o f  p r o b le m  fr a m in g ,  a c to r s  m a y  a t ­
te m p t  t o  u se  ‘l e s s o n s ’ f r o m  p a s t  e x p e r ie n c e s  (e n c o d e d  as  h is to r ic a l  
a n a lo g ie s  o r  as  e x p e r ie n t ia l ly -b a s e d  ‘ru les  o f  t h u m b ’ as  a g u id e  fo r  
c u r r e n t  a c t io n ) .  S im ila r ly , a c to r s  m a y  r e s p o n d  to  p o s it iv e  o r  n e g a t iv e  
f e e d b a c k  r e g a r d in g  th e ir  p e r f o r m a n c e  d u r in g  a c r is is  b y  d r a w in g  le s ­
so n s  a n d  b y  m o d ify in g  th e ir  b e l ie fs  a n d  p r a c t ic e s .  A c to r s  c o m m o n ly  
a t te m p t  t o  r e f le c t  u p o n  cr is is  e x p e r ie n c e s  a f te r  th e  f a c t ,  d r a w  le sso n s  
f o r  th e  fu tu re ,  a n d  d e v e lo p  r e fo r m  p r o je c t s  o n  th e  b a s is  o f  in te r p r e ­
ta t io n s  o f  c r is is  e x p e r ie n c e s .  C r is e s  p re s e n t  c o n s id e r a b le  o p p o r t u n i ­
ties  f o r  le a rn in g ,  b u t  p o s t -c r is is  le a r n in g  a t te m p ts  a re  o f te n  d is to r te d  
o r  d e ra ile d  b y  a v a r ie ty  o f  ty p ic a l  s o c ia l  a n d  p s y c h o lo g ic a l  d y n a m ic s  
(see e .g . L e b o w , 1 9 8 1 ;  Levy , 1 9 9 4 ;  B r e s la u e r  a n d  T e t lo c k ,  1 9 9 1 ;  L a -  
g a d e c ,  1 9 9 7 ;  S te r n ,  1 9 9 7 b ) .
O n  th e  b a s is  o f  th e  f in d in g s  f r o m  th e  t h e m a t ic  a n a ly s is  o f  cr is is  
m a n a g e m e n t  in  L a tv ia ,  E s to n ia  a n d  te n ta t iv e ly  f r o m  P o la n d ,  w e  r e ­
v is it  S te r n  a n d  H a n s e n ’s p r o p o s i t io n s  f o r m u la te d  re g a rd in g  cr is is  
m a n a g e m e n t  in  t r a n s i t io n a l  p o l i t ie s  in  o rd e r  to  a d v a n c e  th e s e
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th o u g h ts .  S o m e  o f  S te r n  a n d  H a n s e n ’s p r o p o s i t io n s  h a v e  b e e n  r e ­
s ta te d ,  a n d  o th e rs  h a v e  b e e n  r e fo r m u la te d .  N e w ly  f o r m u la te d  h y ­
p o th e s e s  a re  d e v e lo p e d  in  th e  f o l lo w in g  s e c t io n  o f  th is  c h a p t e r  a n d  
th e y  a re  e m p ir ic a l ly  a ssesse d  in  th e  f in a l  c h a p t e r  o f  th is  v o lu m e .
Transitional Crisis Management: Developing 
Propositions10
T h e  v o lu m e  C risis  M a n a g e m e n t  in  E s t o n ia ; C a se  S tu d ies  a n d  C o m ­
p a ra tiv e  P e rs p e c tiv e s  (S te rn  a n d  N o h r s t e d t ,  1 9 9 9 )  in t r o d u c e d  th e  
f ir s t  in  a series  o f  c o m p a r a t iv e  a n a ly s e s  o f  cr is is  m a n a g e m e n t  in  
t r a n s i t io n a l  p o l i t ie s ,  b y  c o m p a r in g  a n d  c o n t r a s t in g  se v en  E s t o n ia n  
cr ise s  (a n d  q u a s i -c r is e s ) .  T h e  v o lu m e  C risis  M a n a g e m e n t  in  a T r a n ­
s itio n a l S o c ie ty ; T h e  L a tv ia n  E x p e r i e n c e  c o n t in u e d  th is  w o r k  b y  
c o m p a r in g  a n d  c o n t r a s t in g  se v en  c r ise s  in  L a tv ia .  T h e  L a tv ia n  v o l ­
u m e  t o o k  th e  c o m p a r a t iv e  a n d  th e o r e t ic a l  a m b i t io n s  a s tep  fu r th e r  
b y  f o r m u la t in g  a se t  o f  p r o p o s i t io n s  t h a t  e n a b le d  us to  th in k  a b o u t  
s o m e  p o s s ib le  p a t te r n s  a n d  p a r t ic u la r i t ie s  o f  c r is is  m a n a g e m e n t  in  
t r a n s i t io n a l  s o c ie t ie s  in  g e n e ra l  a n d  in  R u s s ia  in  p a r t icu la r .
T h is  v o lu m e  a t te m p ts  to  p u s h  th is  e f f o r t  e v e n  fu r th e r .  I t  w il l  c o m ­
p a r e  a n d  c o n t r a s t  f o u r  c a s e  stu d ies  o f  cr is is  m a n a g e m e n t  in  R u s s ia .  
T h is  v o lu m e  w il l  re v is it  th e  in it ia l  p r o p o s i t io n s  e x p lo r e d  in  th e  L a t ­
v ia n  v o lu m e  a n d  it  w il l  a t t e m p t ,  t h r o u g h  a series  o f  s te p s ,  to  m o v e  b e ­
y o n d  th e s e  in it ia l  th o u g h ts .  In  th e  c o n c lu d in g  c h a p t e r  o f  th is  v o lu m e  
th e s e  p r o p o s i t io n s  w il l  b e  c r i t ic a l ly  e x a m in e d  in  l ig h t  o f  th e  R u s s ia n  
c a s e s  p re s e n te d  in  th is  v o lu m e . R e f o r m u l a t io n s  w il l  b e  su g g e sted  f o r  
th o s e  p r o p o s i t io n s  w h ic h  d o  n o t  se e m  to  c o n f o r m  to  th e  f in d in g s  in  
th is  v o lu m e  o r  s u p p o r t  th e  p re v io u s  h y p o th e s e s  a b o u t  c r is is  m a n a g e ­
m e n t  in  t r a n s i t io n a l  c o u n tr ie s .  S o m e  n e w  id e a s  w il l  a ls o  b e  in t r o d u c e d  
in  th e  f in a l  c h a p t e r  b a s e d  o n  th e  R u s s ia n  c a s e  f in d in g s .
The Institutional Erosion Hypothesis11
P ro p o s it io n  1 : A s  tra n sitio n a l s o c ieties  m o v e  f r o m  o n e  crisis m a n ­
a g e m e n t  r e g im e  to a n o th e r , th e  e r o d e d  in stitu tio n a l f ra m e w o r k s  f o r
10 This section builds upon “Transitional Crisis Management: Developing Propositions” in Stern and 
Hansen (2000: 13).
“ The section builds in part upon the section “Crisis Development” in Stern and Hansen (2000:
14-15).
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crisis m itig a tio n  a n d  re s ilie n c e  a re  e x t re m e ly  s tra in e d . T h u s  civ il s o ­
ciety  a n d  p u b lic  in stitu tio n s  b e c o m e  in c re a s in g ly  m o r e  v u ln e ra b le  to  
u n p r e d ic t a b le  a n d  n e g a tiv e  ev en ts .
E a r l i e r  s tu d ie s  o n  cr is is  m a n a g e m e n t  in  t r a n s i t io n a l  s ta te s  h a v e  
led  us to  b e l ie v e  th a t  as  t r a n s i t io n a l  s o c ie t ie s  m o v e  f r o m  o n e  cr is is  
p r e v e n t io n  re g im e  to  a n o th e r ,  b o t h  th e  f r e q u e n c y  a n d  se v e r i ty  o f  
m a jo r  n e g a t iv e  e v e n ts  w il l  te n d  to  in c re a s e .
A s  S te r n  a n d  H a n s e n  p o in t  o u t  in  th e  L a tv ia n  v o lu m e  o n  cr is is  
m a n a g e m e n t ,  a ll  s o c ie t ie s  d e v e lo p  d o m e s t ic  re g im e s  -  in s t i tu t io n a l  
f r a m e w o r k s  c o n s is t in g  o f  ru le s ,  n o r m s ,  a n d  d e c is io n - m a k in g  p r o c e ­
d u res  a l lo c a t in g  re s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  in  a s t a t e ’s c o m p le x  w e b  o f  p u b l ic  
a n d  p r iv a te  a c to r s  (K ra s n e r ,  1 9 8 3 ;  K eg ley , 1 9 8 7 ) .  T h e s e  re g im e s  a im  
to  p re v e n t  c r ise s  a n d  c o p e  w ith  c r ise s  t h a t  c a n n o t  b e  p re v e n te d . 
N a tu r a l ly ,  s o c ie t ie s  v a ry  in  th e  d e g re e  to  w h ic h  th e y  e m p h a s iz e  p r e ­
v e n t io n  a n d  re s i l ie n c e  (W ild a v s k y , 1 9 8 8 ;  J C C M ,  1 9 9 6 ) .  T h e s e  r e ­
g im e s  a re  o rg a n iz e d  a c c o r d in g  to  d if fe re n t  p r in c ip le s  a n d  m a k e  use 
o f  a l te r n a t iv e  in c e n t iv e  s t r u c tu r e s ,  a n d  m o n i t o r in g  a n d  c o m p l ia n c e  
m e c h a n is m s  d e p e n d in g  o n  th e  ty p e  o f  p o l i t i c a l  s y s te m  a n d  c u l tu r a l  
c o n t e x t  in  w h ic h  th e  re g im e  is e m b e d d e d .  S o m e  s o c ie t ie s ,  f o r  e x a m ­
p le , a re  m o r e  w il l in g  to  g r a n t  c o n s id e r a b le  p o w e r s  o f  le g a l c o e r c io n  
to  th e  G o v e r n m e n t  (o r  th e  e x p e r t  c o m m u n it ie s )  w h e r e a s  o th e rs  re ly  
o n  th e  d is c r e t io n  o f  in d iv id u a ls  a n d  th e  p r iv a te  s e c t o r  to  a g re a te r  
e x te n t .  F u r th e r m o r e  s o m e  s o c ie t ie s  u se  r e g u la t io n  a n d  g o v e r n m e n ta l  
s u p e rv is io n  to  se t  m a n d a t o r y  s a fe ty  s ta n d a r d s ,  p u n is h in g  n o n c o m ­
p l ia n c e ,  w h i le  o th e r s  re ly  o n  e c o n o m ic  l ia b i l i ty  to  h o ld  n e g l ig e n t  a c ­
to r s  r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  n e g a t iv e  c o n s e q u e n c e s  a n d  to  m o t iv a te  in v e s t ­
m e n ts  in  safety . C r is is  p r e v e n t io n  re g im e s  m a y  a ls o  b e  a f fe c te d  b y  
r e g io n a l  o r  g lo b a l  t re n d s  -  s u c h  as th e  n e o - l ib e r a l  w a v e  o f  f in a n c ia l  
d e r e g u la t io n  w h ic h  s w e p t  a c r o s s  N o r t h  A m e r ic a ,  W e s te r n  E u r o p e ,  
A u s tr a l ia  a n d  N e w  Z e a la n d  in  th e  1 9 8 0 s .
T h is  h y p o th e s is  e x p a n d s  u p o n  th e  e a r l ie r  p r o p o s i t io n  (S te rn  a n d  
H a n s e n ,  2 0 0 0 ;  N o h r s t e d t  a n d  S te rn ,  1 9 9 9 )  w h ic h  s ta te s  t h a t  as 
t r a n s i t io n a l  s ta te s  s h if t  re g im e s  a g r e a te r  n u m b e r  o f  m o r e  sev ere  
c r ise s  te n d  to  o ccu r ,  d u e to  th e  in c r e a s e d  p re s s u re  o n  th e  e r o d in g  in ­
s t i tu t io n a l  f r a m e w o r k .  A s  a re su lt  o f  th is  d e c a y in g  in s t i tu t io n a l  
f r a m e w o r k ,  p u b l ic  in s t i tu t io n s  a n d  th e  p u b l ic  a re  e x p o s e d  to  in ­
c re a s e d  v u ln e r a b i l i ty  to  th e  n e g a t iv e  im p a c ts  o f  c r ise s .  T h is  su g gests  
th e  in c r e a s e d  l ik e l ih o o d  o f  c r ise s  o c c u r r in g  as th e  s y s te m  sh if ts  f r o m  
o n e  re g im e  to  a n o th e r  a n d  p e o p le  a re  u n s u re  o f  h o w  th e  sy s te m
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w o r k s .  T h e  s t r a in  o n  a n  e ro d in g  s y s te m  c a n  in c r e a s e  so  m u c h  t h a t  a 
s o c ie ty  slips in to  a p e rp e tu a l  c r is is .
In  th e  L a tv ia n  v o lu m e ,  th r e e  f a c t o r s  w e re  d iscu sse d  re g a rd in g  
w h y  t r a n s i t io n a l  re g im e s  a re  l ik e ly  to  h a v e  d if f ic u lt ie s  p re v e n t in g  
a n d  m it ig a t in g  c r is e s .  F irs t ly ,  th e  o ld  m e c h a n is m s  a re  d is m a n t le d  b e ­
fo r e  a d e q u a te  n e w  o n e s  a re  in  p la c e  a n d  th is  c r e a te s  v u ln e r a b i l i ty  in  
th e  s y s te m  (E lster , O f f e  a n d  P re u ss ,  1 9 9 8 :  1 8 - 1 9  a n d  2 8 - 3 1 ) .  T h is  
t r a n s i t io n  p e r io d  f r o m  th e  o ld  to  th e  n e w  is c r i t i c a l  a n d  c a n  re q u ire  
a lo t  o f  t im e .  F o r  e x a m p le ,  n e w ly  d e re g u la te d  f in a n c ia l  m a r k e ts  o f ­
te n  e x p e r ie n c e  c r a s h e s  a n d  o th e r  f o r m s  o f  tu r b u le n c e  b e c a u s e  d ire c t  
c o n t r o l  a n d  r e g u la t io n s  h a v e  b e e n  re m o v e d  b e f o r e  th e  a c to r s  h a v e  
le a rn e d  to  d is c ip l in e  th e m s e lv e s  and/or b e f o r e  a n e w  a n d  a d e q u a te  
le g a l  f r a m e w o r k  f o r  e n s u r in g  th is  c o m p l ia n c e  h a s  b e e n  p u t  in to  
p la c e .  T h is  is f u r th e r  e x p lo r e d  in  th e  s e c t io n  c a l le d  “ T h e  U n d e r - In ­
s t i tu t io n a l iz e d  H y p o t h e s i s ” la te r  in  th is  c h a p t e r  w h ic h  d iscu sses  th e  
th ird  h y p o th e s is .
S e c o n d ly ,  o p p o r tu n it ie s  to  m it ig a te  d e v e lo p in g  cr ise s  a re  l ik e ly  
to  b e  m is se d  b e c a u s e  o f  c o o r d i n a t io n  a n d  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  p r o b le m s  
a m o n g  th e  v a r io u s  p u b l ic  (a n d  p r iv a te )  s e c t o r  a c to r s .  I ro n ic a l ly ,  c r i ­
sis m it ig a t io n  is l ik e ly  to  b e  h in d e re d  b y  b o t h  s o c ia l  lo a f in g ,  w h e r e  
n o  a c t o r  is a d e q u a te ly  e n g a g e d  in  d e a lin g  w ith  th e  e m e rg in g  p r o b ­
le m  (L a ta n e ,  W i l l ia m s  a n d  H a r k in s ,  1 9 7 9 ) ,  a n d  b u r e a u p o l i t i s m  in  
w h ic h  m u lt ip le  a c to r s  a re  e n g a g e d  b u t  a re  a c t iv e ly  w o r k in g  a g a in s t  
e a c h  o th e r  ( R o s e n t h a l ,  H a r t ,  a n d  K o u z m in ,  1 9 9 1 ) .  T h is  issu e  is d is ­
c u sse d  m o r e  in  d e p th  in  th e  s e c t io n  c a l le d  “ B u r e a u - P o l i t i c s  H y p o t h ­
e s is ” la te r  in  th is  c h a p t e r  w h ic h  ta k e s  up th e  f i f th  p r o p o s i t io n .  F i ­
nally , th e  L a tv ia n  v o lu m e  b r o u g h t  a t t e n t io n  to  th e  f a c t  t h a t  t r a n s i ­
t io n a l  s o c ie t ie s  te n d  to  e x p e r ie n c e  se v ere  r e s o u r c e  c o n s t r a in t s  
a s s o c ia te d  w ith  p r o f o u n d  s o c io - e c o n o m ic  c h a n g e s  a n d  e c o n o m ic  r e ­
s t ra in ts ,  w h ic h  c o n t r ib u t e  to  th e  e r o s io n  o f  c r i t i c a l  in fr a s t r u c tu r e ,  
a n d  m a y  le a d  to  th e  d e te r io r a t io n  o f  th e  e n v ir o n m e n t  a n d  p u b l ic  
h e a l th .  T h e s e  e c o n o m ic  c o n s t r a in t s ,  it  w a s  p r o p o s e d ,  a ls o  m a k e  it 
m o r e  d if f ic u lt  to  re s p o n d  v ig o r o u s ly  to  w a r n in g s  t h a t  a c r is is  m a y  
s o o n  b e ,  o r  is a lre ad y , a t  h a n d .  F u r t h e r m o r e  a la c k  o f  m e a n s  f o r  
c o p in g  w ith  e m e rg in g  p r o b le m s  m a k e  p a th o lo g ic a l  c r is is  b e h a v io r  
( l ik e  d e n ia l  o r  w is h fu l  th in k in g )  a m o n g  d e c is io n - m a k e r s  m o r e  likely . 
T h e  r e la t io n s h ip  b e tw e e n  th e s e  f a c t o r s  a n d  th e ir  im p a c t  o n  cr is is  
m a n a g e m e n t  is d iscu sse d  in  th e  n e x t  s e c t io n  o n  in s t i tu t io n a l  rigidity .
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The Institutional Rigidity Hypothesis12
P ro p o s it io n  2 :  I n  tra n sitio n a l p o lities  th e  p e r s is t e n c e  o f  lo n g  e x is t in g  
in stitu tio n a l s tru c tu re s  a n d  in stitu tio n s  (at th e  m e s o -  a n d  m ic r o - le v ­
els o f  s o c ie ty  a n d  g o v e r n m e n t )  re su lt  in  a  res is ta n c e  to c h a n g e  to the  
b a sic  fo u n d a t io n s  o f  th e  m a c ro -p o lit ic a l  a n d  m a c r o - e c o n o m ic  a r e ­
n a s. T h is  p re c ip ita te s  crisis c o n d it io n s  a n d  restricts  th e  e ffe c t iv e n e s s  
o f  crisis p o licy . I n  a d d it io n , th e  p o lic ie s  a n d  in stitu tio n a l p ra c t ic e s  o f  
c e rta in  r e g io n a l  W estern  in stitu tio n s  (in  p a rticu la r, w ith in  th e  E U  
a n d  N A T O )  a re  lik ely  to c re a te  s t re s s - in d u c in g  te n s io n  b e t w e e n  d o ­
m es tic  a n d  W e s te rn  n o r m s  a n d  p ra c t ic e s .
T h e  u n d e r ly in g  id e a  b e h in d  th is  h y p o th e s is  is th e  p e rs is te n c e  o f  
in s t i tu t io n s  a n d  ‘o ld ’ in s t i tu t io n a l  p r a c t ic e s  in  s o c ie ty  a n d  in  g o v e r n ­
m e n t ,  p a r t i c u la r ly  a t  th e  m ic r o -  a n d  m e s o -  lev e ls ,  d e sp ite  e le m e n ts  
o f  c h a n g e .  T h is  is a n  e x p a n s i o n  u p o n  th e  p re v io u s  p r o p o s i t io n  in  
S t e m  a n d  H a n s e n  ( 2 0 0 0 ) o n  s tre s s - in d u c e d  te n s io n  b e t w e e n  d o m e s ­
t ic  a n d  W e s te r n  n o r m s .
O n e  o f  th e  a r g u m e n ts  in  n e o - l ib e r a l i s t  th o u g h t  is t h a t  w e  s h o u ld  
se t  u p  g o o d  in s t i tu t io n s  t o  m a n a g e  c o n f l ic t s  a t  th e  in te r n a t io n a l  le v ­
el. P a r t  o f  th e  u n d e r ly in g  lo g ic  o f  th e  in s t i tu t io n a l iz a t io n  a r g u m e n t  
is t h a t  o n c e  in  p la c e ,  in s t i tu t io n s  a re  h a r d  to  g e t  r id  o f .  T h e s e  in s t i ­
tu t io n s  are  p re v a le n t  a n d  w id e s p r e a d  a n d  th is  m a k e s  it  d if f ic u lt  to  
d is m a n t le  th e m .  O n e  o f  th e  f a c t o r s  t h a t  in f lu e n c e  th e  level o f  in s t i tu ­
t io n a l iz a t io n  in  a n  o r g a n iz a t io n  is p e r s o n n e l  tu rn o v e r .  P e r s o n n e l  
tu r n o v e r  in  th e  R u s s ia n  p o l i t i c o - a d m in is t r a t iv e  b o d ie s  h a s  n o t  b e e n  
as e x t r e m e  as in  th e  o th e r  t r a n s i t io n a l  c o u n tr ie s .  W i t h  th is  in  m in d ,  
w e  a rg u e  t h a t  a  s u b s ta n t ia l  p a r t  o f  th e  o ld  w a y s  o f  d o in g  th in g s  still  
e x is ts  in  th e  o ld  a n d  n e w  R u s s ia n  p u b l ic  in s t i tu t io n s .
T h is  re s id u e  h a s  in  tu r n  a n u m b e r  o f  s ig n if ic a n t  c o n s e q u e n c e s  
f o r  th e  d is c r e p a n c y  b e t w e e n  s o c ie ty  (as i t  ev o lv es  th r o u g h  th e  t r a n s i ­
t io n  p ro c e s s )  a n d  th e  s t ru c tu re s  a n d  p r a c t ic e s  o f  th e  p o l i t i c o - a d m in ­
is tra t iv e  b o d ie s .  T h e  k n o w le d g e  a n d  m e t h o d s  o f  th e  o r g a n iz a t io n s  
f o r m e d  u n d e r  th e  S o v ie t  s y s te m  a re  b e in g  p re s e rv e d  a n d  e m p lo y e d  
s in c e  th e  s a m e  p e o p le  m o r e  o r  less h o ld  th e  s a m e  (o r  s im ila r )  p o s i ­
t io n s  w ith in  th e  b u r e a u c r a c y .  T h e  o r g a n iz a t io n s ’ c o l le c t iv e  m e m o r y  
is s to r e d  in  its  f i les ,  m a n u a ls  a n d  s ta n d a r d  o p e r a t in g  p ro c e d u r e s .  
U n t i l  th o s e  c h a n g e  th e re  is a  s u b s ta n t ia l  r is k  t h a t  th e s e  o r g a n iz a -
12 This section builds upon parts on the sections “European Integration and Domestic Political Con­
flict” in Stem and Hansen (2000: 16-1 7).
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t io n s  w ill  ru n  in to  a v a lu e  c o n f l i c t  w ith  th e  c h a n g in g  so c ie ty . T h is  
c o u ld  e v e n  im p ly  d r a m a t ic  a t te m p ts  b y  th e  p r o p o n e n t s  o f  th e  o ld  
re g im e  to  c h a l le n g e  o r  d e s ta b i l iz e  th e  n e w  re g im e  in  th e  cr is is  m a n ­
a g e m e n t  s t ru c tu re .  I f  th e se  p e o p le  h a v e  g r e a t  p e r s o n a l  v a lu e s  a t ­
ta c h e d  to  a p a r t i c u la r  s y s te m  o r  a c e r ta in  w a y  o f  d o in g  th in g s ,  th e  
t r a n s i t io n  f r o m  o n e  n o r m  o r  v a lu e  w ill  b e  s lo w e r  th a n  i f  th e re  is n o  
s t r o n g  id e n t i f ic a t io n .
T h e  la t te r  p a r t  o f  th e  h y p o th e s is ,  r e f le c ts  o n e  o f  th e  m o r e  p r o m i ­
n e n t  f in d in g s  in  th e  E s t o n ia n  v o lu m e . T h is  f in d in g  su g gests  th a t  
p r e p a r a t io n s  f o r  E u r o p e a n  in te g r a t io n  a re  l ik e ly  to  b e  t r o u b le s o m e  
f o r  d o m e s t ic  p o l ic ie s ,  as w a s  e v id e n t  in  th e  K u r d is h  re fu g e e  ca se  
( K o k k ,  1 9 9 9 ) .  D o m e s t i c  n o r m s  a n d  p u b l ic  o p in io n  in  t r a n s i t io n a l  
s ta te s  re g a rd in g  m a t te r s  l ik e  th e  t r e a tm e n t  o f  a s y lu m  seekers/ 
re fu g e e s ,  c r im in a l  p u n is h m e n t  (e s p e c ia l ly  c a p i ta l  p u n is h m e n t ) ,  a n d  
c i t iz e n sh ip  c r i te r ia  h a v e  th e  p o t e n t ia l  to  b u d  h e a d s  w ith  W e s t  E u r o ­
p e a n  n o r m s  (cf.  R e i n ik a in e n ,  1 9 9 9 ;  K o k k  a n d  V a a r ik ,  f o r t h c o m in g ;  
B r ie d e ,  1 9 9 8 ) .  E U  a n d  N A T O  e x p a n s io n  c r e a te  s t r o n g  in c e n t iv e s  f o r  
c a n d id a te  s ta te s  to  c o n f o r m  to  th e s e  h ig h ly  p r io r i t iz e d  E u r o p e a n  
n o r m s  o n  h u m a n  r ig h ts  a n d  g o v e r n m e n t a l  p r a c t ic e s  ( B r a u n ,  1 9 9 9 :  
1 7 ;  K o v r ig ,  1 9 9 9 :  2 5 3 - 2 7 1 ;  c f .  R u b in ,  1 9 9 8 :  1 7 1 ) .
H o w e v e r ,  th e  tw o - le v e l  g a m e  (cf.  E v a n s ,  J a c o b s o n ,  a n d  P u tn a m , 
1 9 9 3 ) ,  w h ic h  g o v e r n m e n ts  in  s o m e  t r a n s i t io n a l  s ta te s  f in d  t h e m ­
selves h a v in g  to  p lay , c o m p l ic a te s  m a n a g e m e n t  w h e n  m a n y  valu es  
a re  a t  s ta k e .  T h e i r  d i le m m a  s te m s  f r o m  th e  f a c t  t h a t  r e fo r m s  d e ­
m a n d e d  b y  th e  s ta te s  c o n t r o l l in g  a c c e s s  to  N A T O  o r  to  th e  E U  m a y  
b e  q u ite  u n p o p u la r  a t  h o m e .  T h is  seem s to  c h a r a c te r iz e  t r a n s i t io n a l  
s ta te s  (c .f .  A r a t o ,  1 9 9 9 :  2 4 2 - 2 4 3 ;  B a ra n y ,  1 9 9 9 :  1 0 4 - 1 0 5 )  in  g e n e r ­
a l ,  a n d  it  is w o r th  e x p lo r in g  h o w  th is  p e r ta in s  to  R u s s ia  b y  in c lu d ­
in g  th is  d i le m m a  in  h y p o th e s is  n u m b e r  tw o .
The Under-Institutionalization Hypothesis13
P ro p o s it io n  3 :  A s  tra n sitio n a l s o c ieties  m o v e  to w a rd s  a W estern  
sty le  d e m o c r a c y  a n d  m a r k e t  e c o n o m y , th e re  w ill b e  a s t ru g g le  to  
o v e r c o m e  th e  e x is t in g  u n d er-in s titu tio n a liz a tio n  a n d  th e re  w ill b e  
in c re a s e d  p o litic iz a tio n  a n d  m ed ia tiz a tio n  o f  crises  a n d  crisis p o licy .
13 This section builds on the section “Politicization and Mediatization” in Stern and Hansen (2000:
15—16).
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T h e  C M  B a lt ic / E u ro p e  p r o je c t  h a s  a tw o - fo ld  a p p r o a c h  to  th e  
s tu d y  o f  c r is is  m a n a g e m e n t .  T h e  c o g n it iv e  in s t i tu t io n a l  a p p r o a c h  
e m p h a s iz e s  th e  s u b je c t iv e  a n d  c o n s t r u c te d  c h a r a c t e r  o f  c r ise s  a n d  
t a k e s  in to  a c c o u n t  th e  s t ru c tu re s  a n d  in s t i tu t io n s  in  w h ic h  th e  m a n ­
a g e m e n t  o f  th e s e  c r ise s  h a s  d e v e lo p e d . T h is  h y p o th e s is  e x p lo r e s  th e  
r e la t io n s h ip  b e tw e e n  c o g n it iv e  f a c t o r s  (m a n ife s te d  in  m e d ia t iz a t io n )  
a n d  p o l i t i c iz a t io n  ( th e  in s t i tu t io n a l  s ides  o f  c r is is  m a n a g e m e n t ) .
F r o m  a p s y c h o -p o l i t i c a l  p e rs p e c t iv e ,  th e  im p a c t  o f  a n e g a t iv e  
e v e n t  w ill  d e p e n d  la rg e ly  u p o n  h o w  i t  is d e p ic te d  a n d  p e rc e iv e d . I t  is 
v ery  c le a r  t h a t  th e  m e d ia  p la y s  a k e y  ro le  in  th e s e  p r o c e s s e s  (E d e l-  
m a n ,  1 9 8 8 ;  H e r m a n n ,  1 9 6 3 ) .  In  m a n y  e s ta b l is h e d  d e m o c r a c ie s ,  th e  
p o l i t i c a l  r o le  o f  th e  m e d ia  h a s  g r o w n  s ig n if ic a n t ly  in  th e  la s t  fe w  
d e c a d e s  ( R o s e n t h a l  a n d  B o in ,  2 0 0 1 ) .  O ld e r ,  r e la t iv e ly  d e fe re n t ia l  
n o r m s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  jo u r n a l i s m  (su c h  as re f r a in in g  f r o m  w r it in g  a b o u t  
th e  p r iv a te  lives o f  g o v e r n m e n t  o f f ic ia ls )  h a v e  g iv en  w a y  to  m o r e  
s e n s a t io n a l is t ic ,  a g g re ss iv e ,  a n d  in v e s t ig a t iv e  jo u r n a l i s m  t h a t  is c o m ­
p e t in g  f o r  n e w s  in  a n  in c r e a s in g ly  d iv erse , c o m p e t i t iv e ,  a n d  g lo b a l ­
ized  in f o r m a t io n  m a r k e t  (T ay lo r ,  1 9 9 7 ) .  L ik e w is e ,  th e  e x p e c ta t io n s  
o n  th e  p u b l ic  a n d  p o l i t i c a l  e lites ,  r e g a r d in g  th e  G o v e r n m e n t ’s a b i l i ty  
to  p r e v e n t  a n d  c o p e  w ith  c r ise s ,  se e m  to  be  in c r e a s in g  (B o v e n s  a n d  
H a r t ,  1 9 9 6 ;  B lu m e r  a n d  G u r e v i tc h ,  1 9 9 5 ) . 14
T h e  v o lu m e  o n  E s t o n ia n  cr is is  m a n a g e m e n t  su g g e sted  t h a t  a 
s im ilar ,  a n d  in  s o m e  re s p e c ts  ev en  m o r e  d r a m a t ic ,  t r e n d  is ta k in g  
p la c e  in  t r a n s i t io n a l  c o u n tr ie s .  In  se v e ra l  r e s p e c ts ,  c r is is  m a n a g e ­
m e n t  m a y  h a v e  b e e n  e a s ie r  f o r  d e c is io n - m a k e r s  d u r in g  th e  S o v ie t  
e ra .  In  a u t h o r i t a r ia n  sy s te m s  p o l i t i c a l  e lites  ty p ic a l ly  a re  a c c o u n t ­
a b le  o n ly  t o  o th e r  e lites  a n d  it  is r e la t iv e ly  e a s y  to  c o n c e a l  s h o r t c o m ­
in gs  f r o m  th e  p u b l ic  a n d  th e  d o c i le  s ta te - c o n t r o l le d  m e d ia .  In  th e  
y e a rs  f o l lo w in g  th e  d is s o lu t io n  o f  th e  S o v ie t  U n io n  a n d  th e  s u b s e ­
q u e n t  in d e p e n d e n c e  o f  th e  B a l t i c  s ta te s ,  c r is is  m a n a g e r s  in  th e s e  
t r a n s i t io n a l  s ta te s  h a v e  in c r e a s in g ly  b e e n  f o r c e d  to  fa c e  a m o r e  c r i t i ­
c a l  p u b l ic ,  o p p o r tu n is t ic  o p p o s i t io n  p a r t ie s ,  a n d  a n  in c r e a s in g ly  r e ­
s o u r c e fu l  a n d  in d e p e n d e n t  m a ss  m e d ia .  T h e  E s t o n ia n  c a s e  stu d ies  
s u g g e st  t h a t  th e  n e w  s i tu a t io n  in  th e  p o l i t i c a l  a n d  p u b l ic  a re n a  d e ­
m a n d s  m u c h  m o r e  o f  cr is is  c o m m u n ic a t o r s  a n d  re q u ire s  a h ig h e r  
d eg ree  o f  c o o r d i n a t io n  a m o n g  th e  v a r io u s  c r is is  a c to r s .  I t  is ju s t i f i ­
14 A contributing factor may be overselling -  to the extent that reform-oriented politicians promise too




a b le  to  s u g g e st  t h a t  th e  d e v e lo p m e n ts  in  th e  p u b l ic  a r e n a ,  in  g e n e ra l ,  
a n d  th e  g r o w t h  o f  a n  in d e p e n d e n t  m e d ia ,  in  p a r t ic u la r ,  h a v e  in ­
c r e a s e d  e x p e c ta t io n s  o n  th e  G o v e r n m e n t  to  a v o id  a n d  m it ig a te  n e g ­
a t iv e  e v e n ts  s u c h  as a c c id e n ts  a n d  n a t u r a l  d isa s te rs  (cf . B o v e n s  a n d  
H a r t ,  1 9 9 6 ) .  W h i le  m il i ta r y  t r a in in g  (a n d  m a n y  o th e r  ty p es  o f)  a c c i ­
d e n ts  w e re  c o m m o n  in  th e  S o v ie t  U n io n ,  i t  m a y  b e  t h a t  c it iz e n s  in  
th e  n e w  d e m o c r a c ie s  e x p e c t  m o r e  f r o m  th e ir  ‘n e w ’ a n d  m o r e  W e s t ­
e rn iz e d  g o v e r n m e n ts .
C o n s e q u e n t ly ,  th e  h y p o th e s is  p re s e n te d  h e re  su g g e sts  t h a t  th e  
p e r c e p t io n  o f  a c r is is  is in c re a s in g ly  (b u t  n o t  i r re v o c a b ly )  s h a p e d  b y  
th e  m e d ia  a n d  th u s  o f te n  b e c o m e s  a p o l i t i c a l  issue . I t  a ls o  im p lie s  
t h a t  w ith  m o r e  o p e n  a n d  e x te n s iv e  m e d ia  r e p o r t in g  (a n d  w ith  re a l  
o r  im a g in e d  sh if ts  in  th e  c r is is  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  s o c io - e c o n o m ic  
re g im e s ) ,  w e  m a y  see a n  in c r e a s e  in  th e  p u b l i c ’s e x p e c t a t io n s  o n  
g o v e r n m e n t  to  im p r o v e  th e ir  c r is is  m a n a g e m e n t  c a p a c ity .
Institutional Overstrain and Stalemate Hypothesis15
P ro p o s it io n  4 :  O v e rs t r a in e d  d e c is io n - m a k in g  u n its  in  tra n sitio n a l  
s o c ie t ies  in c re a s in g ly  e x p e r ie n c e  in stitu tio n a l s ta lem a te  r e s u lt in g  in  
p o o r  d e te c t io n  skills , d e la y e d  crisis  p r e v e n t io n  a n d  in e ffe c t iv e  crisis  
r e s p o n s e . I n  tu rn  this w ill c o n t r ib u t e  to  th e  in c re a s e  in  th e  n u m b e r  
a n d  sev e rity  o f  c rises . W ith m o u n t in g  crisis p o litic iz a tio n , crisis  
m a n a g e r s  w ill t e n d  to fo c u s  o n  a c u te  crises  ra th e r  th a n  o n  c r e e p in g  
crises , a n d  fo c u s  o n  s h o rt- te rm  p o litica l a n d  e c o n o m ic  issu es  a t th e  
e x p e n s e  o f  lo n g -te rm  so c ia l a n d  e n v ir o n m e n t a l  c o n c e r n s .
In s t i tu t io n a l  s ta le m a te  c a n  b e  c h a r a c te r iz e d  as a s i tu a t io n  w h e re  
i t  is r e c o g n iz e d  t h a t  a c t io n  is n e e d e d  b u t  n o th in g  is d o n e  a n d  n o  o n e  
ta k e s  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  f o r  th e  l a c k  o f  a c t io n .  In  p a r t  in s t i tu t io n a l  s ta le ­
m a te  c a n  b e  l in k e d  t o  th e  o r g a n iz a t io n a l  c u l tu r e  in h e r ite d  f r o m  th e  
S o v ie t  U n io n  w h e n  a m a jo r i t y  o f  d e c is io n s  w e re  s u b je c t  t o  t o p - d o w n  
m a n a g e m e n t  le a v in g  th e  in d iv id u a ls  in  th e s e  o r g a n iz a t io n s  w ith  th e  
fe e l in g  t h a t  th e y  did  n o t  n e e d  to  (o r  t h a t  i t  w a s  n o t  e v e n  n e c e s sa ry )  
to  ta k e  th e  in it ia t iv e .  T h e  p e rs is te n c e  o f  o r g a n iz a t io n a l  c u l tu r a l  h e r ­
ita g e  a n d  its e f fe c t  o n  c r is is  m a n a g e m e n t  is e x p lo r e d  in  h y p o th e s is  
tw o  in  th is  c h a p te r .  A n o th e r  c h a r a c te r i s t i c  o f  d e c is io n - m a k in g  a n d
15 This section builds upon the section “Transitional Regimes and Bureau-Politics” in Stem and
Hansen (2000: 17-18).
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p o l ic y  m a k in g  in  th e  S o v ie t  e ra  w a s  th e  l a c k  o f  a c c o u n ta b i l i ty ,  s o m e ­
th in g  t h a t  c o n t e m p o r a r y  R u s s ia  is w o r k in g  o n  e s ta b l is h in g  b u t  w ith  
v a ry in g  re su lts .  T h e s e  n o r m s  fa c i l i ta te  s o c ia l  lo a f in g ,  w h e re  n o  o n e  
ta k e s  in it ia t iv e  o r  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  f o r  th e  m a n a g e m e n t  o f  a n  e m e rg in g  
p r o b le m  ( L a ta n e ,  W i l l ia m s ,  a n d  H a r k in s ,  1 9 7 9 ) .  C e n tr a l iz e d  d e c i ­
s io n -m a k in g  a n d  p o o r  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  m e c h a n is m s  c o n t r ib u t e  to  c r e ­
a t in g  in s t i tu t io n a l  s ta le m a te  to  th e  e x t e n t  t h a t  th e y  are  still  p a r t  o f  
th e  o r g a n iz a t io n a l  c u l tu r e  o f  t r a n s i t io n a l  s ta te s .
A n o t h e r  c h a r a c te r i s t i c  o f  c o n t e m p o r a r y  t r a n s i t io n a l  s ta te s  is th e  
la c k  o f  m e a n s  f o r  c o p in g  w ith  e m e rg in g  p r o b le m s  w h ic h  m a k e  p a t h o ­
lo g ic a l  c r is is  b e h a v io r  l ik e  d e n ia l  o r  w is h fu l  th in k in g  a m o n g  d e c is io n ­
m a k e r s  m o r e  c o m m o n .  E v e n  in  s i tu a t io n s  w h e re  d e c is io n - m a k e r s  m a y  
b e  a b le  to  o v e r c o m e  in s t i tu t io n a l  c u l tu r a l  c o n s t r a in t s ,  th e y  m a y  n o t  b e  
a b le  to  ta k e  a c t io n  b e c a u s e  th e re  is a l a c k  o f  re s o u r c e s .  E n g a g in g  in  
w is h fu l  th in k in g  o r  d e n ia l  te n d s  to  so l id ify  in s t i tu t io n a l  s ta le m a te .
S u m m in g  u p , in s t i tu t io n a l  s t r a in  a n d  in s t i tu t io n a l  s ta le m a te  l im ­
it  th e  o p p o r tu n i t ie s  t o  m it ig a te  d e v e lo p in g  c r is e s ,  a n d  th u s  c o o r d i n a ­
t io n  a n d  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  m e c h a n is m s  r e m a in  w e a k .  C r ise s  c a n  p e r ­
h a p s  b e  n ip p e d  in  th e  b u d  w h e n  th e y  f i r s t  a p p e a r  w ith  e f fe c t iv e  e a r ­
ly  c r is is  m a n a g e m e n t  r a th e r  th a n  b e in g  d e v e lo p in g  in to  a f u l l -b lo w n  
c r is is .  B e c a u s e  o f  in s t i tu t io n a l  s ta le m a te  a t  v a r io u s  levels  o f  d e c i ­
s io n -m a k in g ,  th e s e  fu ll  b lo w n  c r ise s  te n d  t o  e s c a la te  t h r o u g h  th e  c r i ­
sis m a n a g e m e n t  s t r u c tu r e  up to  th e  h ig h e s t  d e c is io n - m a k in g  level.
The Bureau-Politics Hypothesis16
P ro p o s it io n  5 :  T ra n s it io n a l p o lities  a re  lik ely  to e x p e r ie n c e  a h ig h  
f r e q u e n c y  a n d  a h ig h  in ten sity  o f  b u re a u c r a tic  p o litica l b e h a v io r  in  
‘n o r m a l ’ a n d  crisis s itu a tio n s .17
A lth o u g h  c o m m o n ly  h e ld  n o t io n s  o f  cr is is  s o l id a r i ty  se e m  t o  ru le  
o u t  a p r o m in e n t  ro le  f o r  b u r e a u - o r g a n iz a t io n a l  p o l i t ic s  in  cr is is  s i tu a ­
t io n s ,  s u b s ta n t ia l  e m p ir ic a l  r e s e a r c h  su g g ests  t h a t  th e re  is a c lo s e  r e la ­
t io n s h ip  b e tw e e n  cr ise s  a n d  b u r e a u - o r g a n iz a t io n a l  p o l i t ic s  (A ll is o n ,  
1 9 7 1 ;  R o s e n t h a l ,  H a r t  a n d  K o u z m in ,  1 9 9 1 ;  V a n d e n b r o u c k e ,  1 9 9 3 ) .  
S u c h  in t r a -g o v e r n m e n ta l  p o l i t ic s  a n d  o r g a n iz a t io n a l  d isp u te s  m a y  b e -
16 This section follows quite closely the section “Transitional Regimes and Bureau-Politics” in Stern 
and Hansen (2000: 17-18).
17 This hypothesis is a reformulation of proposition five presented in the volume on Latvian crisis 
management (Stern and Hansen, 2000: 18).
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c o m e  im p o r t a n t  ‘s e c o n d  d im e n s io n ’ f a c t o r s  th a t  h a v e  th e  c a p a c i ty  to  
g e n e r a te  o r  e x a c e r b a t e  cr is is  s i tu a t io n s .  A  n u m b e r  o f  f a c t o r s  a s s o c i a t ­
ed  w ith  th e  t r a n s i t io n  f r o m  a n  a u t h o r i t a r ia n  re g im e  to  a m o r e  d e m o ­
c r a t i c  o n e  se e m  p a r t i c u la r ly  c o n d u c iv e  to  b u r e a u c r a t i c  p o l i t ic s .  I t  h a s  
b e e n  a rg u e d  t h a t  c lear , e f fe c t iv e ,  a n d  le g i t im a te  d iv is io n s  o f  la b o r  
w ith in  b u r e a u c r a c ie s  te n d  to  in h ib i t  b u r e a u c r a t i c  p o l i t ic s  (cf . R o s e n ­
th a l  a n d  H a r t ,  1 9 9 8 ) .  In  t r a n s i t io n a l  p o l i t ie s  th e  d is t r ib u t io n  o f  p o w ­
er  a n d  a u th o r i ty  is u n s e tt le d  a n d  th e r e f o r e  o r g a n iz a t io n a l  u n its  h a v e  
m o r e  o p p o r tu n i t ie s  f o r  g a in in g  n e w  te r r i to r y  a n d  s o l id ify in g  th e ir  
p o w e r  a n d  r e s o u r c e  b a s e  (cf .  H ig le y , 1 9 9 9 :  5 1 - 5 5 ) .  M a n y  c o m p le x  is ­
sues a re  b e in g  d e a lt  w i th  f o r  th e  f irs t  t im e  a n d  c o m p e l l in g  p re c e d e n ts  
a re  l ik e ly  to  b e  la c k in g ,  w h ic h  m e a n s  t h a t  se v era l  a g e n c ie s  a re  l ik e ly  to  
m a k e  a b id  f o r  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  a n d  in f lu e n c e .  B e c a u s e  c r ise s  te n d  to  
c o m e  as a su rp r ise  ( H e r m a n n ,  1 9 6 3 ) ,  r e s p o n s e  to  c r ise s  o f te n  o c c u r s  
o n  a n  ad  h o c  b a s is ,  w h ic h  (l ike  o th e r  f o r m s  o f  t r a n s i t io n )  c re a te s  s u b ­
s ta n t iv e  r o o m  f o r  b u r e a u c r a t i c  m a n e u v e r in g  -  e v en  in  a s ta te  s u c h  as 
E s to n ia  w h ic h  asp ire s  to  h a v e  a re la t iv e ly  in s t i tu t io n a l iz e d  cr is is  m a n ­
a g e m e n t  s y s te m  (K r o s s ,  1 9 9 8 ;  T r o s s ,  1 9 9 9 ) .  C r is is  m a n a g e m e n t  le g is ­
la t io n  te n d s  to  b e  u n e v e n  ( o b s o le te ,  l a c k in g ,  o r  in a d e q u a te  f o r  th e  sp e ­
c i f ic  cr is is  c i r c u m s ta n c e s  d e c is io n - m a k e r s  a re  fa c e d  w ith )  a n d  th e s e  
g a p s  c a n  b e  f i l led  b y  c o m p e t in g  o r g a n iz a t io n a l  a c to r s  (E lster , O f f e  a n d  
P re u s s ,  1 9 9 8 : 1 8 - 1 9 ) .  A s  m e n t io n e d  in  N o h r s t e d t  a n d  S t e r n ’s a n a ly s is  
( 1 9 9 9 ) ,  t r a n s i t io n a l  p o l i t ie s  te n d  to  b e  c h a r a c te r iz e d  b y  re la t iv e ly  s o f t  
p o l i t i c a l - a d m in is t r a t iv e  sy s te m s  w h ic h  a re  s u b je c t  to  f r e q u e n t  c h a n g e  
d e s ta b i l iz in g  e m e r g e n t  d iv is io n s  o f  l a b o r  a n d  r o u t in e s ,  p r a c t ic e s  f o r  
in te r a g e n c y  c o l la b o r a t i o n ,  a n d  c o o r d i n a t io n .  T h is  c re a te s  te n d e n c ie s  
p a ra l le l  to  s o -c a l le d  “ n e w  g r o u p  s y n d r o m e ” b u t  a t  th e  p o l ic y  re g im e  
level (S te rn ,  1 9 9 7 a )  -  a k in d  o f  n e w  o r g a n iz a t io n a l  s i tu a t io n  in  w h ic h  
c o n f l ic t s  c a n  e a s i ly  e s c a la te  in to  p o w e r  s tru g g le s .
Overlearning and Reflexive Institutional Change 
Hypotheses18
P ro p o s it io n  6 : T ra n s it io n a l s o c ieties  in  crisis c o n d it io n s  t e n d  to ­
w a rd s  re fle x iv e  in stitu tio n a l c h a n g e  a n d  in stitu tio n a l volatility.
18 This section builds on the section “Institutional Reform and the Learning Process” in Stern and
Hansen ( 2000:18-19).
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P ro p o s it io n  7 : I n  tra n sitio n a l (as o p p o s e d  to  e s ta b lish ed ) d e m o ­
c ra c ie s  t h e r e  is a h ig h  risk  th a t crises  w ill g e n e r a t e  so  c a lle d  ‘d o u b le  
l o o p ’ o r  ‘th ird  o r d e r ’ le a rn in g  b u t  th e r e  is e v e n  a g r e a t e r  risk  fo r  
o v e r- le a rn in g .
T h e s e  t w o  h y p o th e s e s  s te m  f r o m  a r e f o r m u la t io n  a n d  e x p a n s io n  
o f  th e  p r o p o s i t io n  f ir s t  in t r o d u c e d  in  S te r n  a n d  H a n s e n  ( 2 0 0 0 :  
1 8 - 1 9 )  th a t  c r is is -p r o n e  t r a n s i t io n a l  s o c ie t ie s  te n d  to w a r d s  h y p e r ­
le a r n in g  a n d  in s t i tu t io n a l  v o la t il ity .
R e f le x iv e  c h a n g e  re fe rs  to  in s t i tu t io n a l  o r  p o l ic y  c h a n g e s  w h ic h  
a re  in i t ia te d  as a n  im m e d ia te  r e a c t io n  to  a c r is is ;  th e  a c t io n  o f  
c h a n g e ,  n o t  n e c e s s a r i ly  th e  s u b s ta n c e  o f  i t ,  se e m s  m o s t  s ig n if ic a n t .  
T h is  r a p id  a n d  r e c u r r in g  in i t ia t io n  o f  c h a n g e  t r a n s la te s  in to  in s t i tu ­
t io n a l  v o la t i l i ty  as c h a n g e s  a re  im p le m e n te d .  O n e  o f  th e  m o s t  
p r o m in e n t  f in d in g s  f r o m  th e  E s t o n ia n  e x p e r ie n c e  w a s  th e  e n th u s i ­
a s m  a n d  p a c e  w i th  w h ic h  th e  E s t o n ia n  g o v e r n m e n t  e n g a g e d  its e lf  in  
in s t i tu t io n a l  a d ju s tm e n ts  f o l lo w in g  a series  o f  c r is is  e x p e r ie n c e s  
(T ro s s ,  1 9 9 9 ) .  T h e  e v a lu a t io n  p r o c e s s  s u f fe re d  as a re s u lt  o f  th e  r a p ­
id  e v o lu t io n  a n d  r e f o r m a t i o n  o f  th e  c r is is  m a n a g e m e n t  s y s te m . T h e  
E s t o n ia n  e x p e r ie n c e  g ives  us r e a s o n  t o  b e l ie v e  th a t  s o m e  o f  th e  p e r ­
f o r m a n c e  p r o b le m s  m a y  h a v e  h a d  as m u c h  to  d o  w i th  th e  d if f ic u lty  
th e  a c t o r s ’ f a c e d  in  k e e p in g  up w i th  th e  r a p id ly  e v o lv in g  cr is is  m a n ­
a g e m e n t  s t r u c tu r e  as w i th  th e  a c tu a l  d e s ig n  f la w s .  C h a n g e s  w e re  
m a d e  a f te r  a lm o s t  ev e ry  m a jo r  c r is is  e v e n t  (cf . B r a u n  a n d  B a ra n y ,  
1 9 9 9 :  1 5 ) ,  a n d  it is f r o m  th is  e x p e r ie n c e  th e  c o n c e p t  o f  re f le x iv e  
c h a n g e ,  as s ta te d  in  h y p o th e s is  s ix ,  ev o lv ed .
T h e  P o l is h  e x p e r ie n c e  a ls o  re v e a le d  t h a t  s ig n if ic a n t  in s t i tu t io n a l  
v o la t i l i ty  ev en  th o u g h  th e  p a c e  a n d  s c o p e  o f  in s t i tu t io n a l  c h a n g e  in  
th e  c r is is  m a n a g e m e n t  s e c to r  d id  n o t  s e e m  to  h a v e  b e e n  q u ite  as 
d r a m a t ic  in  P o la n d  as in  E s t o n ia  ( G o lc ,  1 9 9 9 ) .  T h e  a f t e r m a t h  o f  th e  
1 9 9 7  O d e r  f lo o d  c o n s t i tu te s  a n o t e w o r t h y  e x a m p le  o f  th e  P o l is h  e x ­
p e r ie n c e  re g a rd in g  in s t i tu t io n a l  v o la t i l i ty  s in c e  it o c c u r r e d  d u r in g  a 
c o m p r e h e n s iv e  r e s t r u c tu r in g  o f  th e  e m e r g e n c y  m a n a g e m e n t  sy s te m .
C r is e s  se e m  to  tr ig g e r  c h a n g e  b o t h  in  e s ta b l is h e d  a n d  t r a n s i t io n ­
al s o c ie t ie s  (S te rn ,  1 9 9 7 b ;  B r a u n  a n d  B a r a n y ,  1 9 9 9 :  1 5 - 1 6 ) .  A s s o c i ­
a t in g  th e  n o t io n  o f  a  c r is is  o n ly  w i th  th r e a t s  is m is le a d in g  s in c e  
c r ise s  a ls o  f r e q u e n t ly  ( if  n o t  a lw a y s)  o p e n  w in d o w s  o f  o p p o r tu n ity .  
D u r in g  th e s e  w in d o w s  o f  o p p o r tu n ity ,  o r g a n iz a t io n s  a n d  in d iv id u a ls  
c a n  a d v o c a te  c e r ta in  id e a s  o r  p o l ic ie s  w i th  m u c h  su c c e ss  a n d  s u d ­
d e n ly  f in d  th e ir  id eas  g a in in g  s tr e n g th  a n d  la n d in g  in  m o r e  fe r t i le
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s o i l  in  th e  w a k e  o f  a c r is is  ( K in g d o n ,  1 9 8 4 ) .  P a r t  o f  th e  r e a s o n  f o r  
th is  is t h a t  d e c is io n - m a k e r s  a re  l ik e ly  to  o v e rs e e  p r io r  p r a c t ic e s  s in ce  
th e y  a re  fa c e d  w ith  less  th a n  o p t im a l  p e r f o r m a n c e  (p o lic ie s  o r  w e a k ­
n e sse s  w h ic h  h a v e  le a d  to  o r  e x a c e r b a t e d  th e  cr is is )  a n d  d e v e lo p  a m ­
b i t io n  to  im p r o v e  it  f o r  th e  fu tu re .  T o  s o m e  d eg ree  th is  is r e la te d  to  
th e  p e rc e iv e d  e x p e c ta t io n s  a n d  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  issu es , a n d  m a y  h a v e  
v e ry  re a l  c o n s e q u e n c e s  f o r  th e  d e c is io n - m a k e r s ’ a s p ir a t io n s  to  r e ­
m a in  in  p o l i t i c a l  o f f ic e  o r  in  a n  a d m in is t r a t iv e  p o s i t io n .
O n e  o f  th e  m o s t  d e m a n d in g  c h a l le n g e s  f o r  c r is is  d e c is io n - m a k e r s  
in  d e m o c r a c ie s  is th e  f a c t  t h a t  r e g a rd le s s  o f  w h a t  h a p p e n s ,  th e y  w ill  be  
h e ld  a c c o u n t a b le  (V e rtz b e rg e r ,  1 9 9 0 ) .  W h i le  th e  s tre s s fu l  w e ig h t  o f  
a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  m a y  n a r r o w  th e  ra n g e  o f  v is io n  f o r  c r is is  c o p e r s  as 
c r ise s  w a x ,  i t  a lso  te n d s  to  p r o d u c e  p r o m is e s  a b o u t  th e  fu tu re  as  th e y  
w a n e .  I f  th e  a b o v e -m e n t io n e d  in d u c e m e n t  f o r  o r g a n iz a t io n a l  o r  p o l i ­
c y  c h a n g e  is m o r e  e n d o g e n o u s ly  o r ie n te d ,  th is  la t t e r  p o in ts  to  th e  r e ­
la t io n s h ip  b e t w e e n  th e  e n tru s te d  o f f ic ia ls  a n d  th e  p u b l ic ,  m e d ia  a n d  
e lite  o b s e rv e rs .  A rg u a b ly ,  th is  a s p e c t  o f  c r is is  m a n a g e m e n t  w a s  n o t  as 
p r o m in e n t  in  th e  a u t h o r i t a r ia n  S o v ie t  U n io n ,  w h e r e  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  to  
th e  p u b l ic  (a n d  th e  m e d ia )  w a s  l im ite d .
In  m o r e  e s ta b l is h e d  p o l i t ie s ,  th e  c a ta ly t ic  f u n c t io n  o f  c r ise s  a re  
te m p e r e d  b y  th e  g e n e ra l  in e r t ia  o f  re la t iv e ly  e n tr e n c h e d  p o l i t i c a l  a n d  
b u r e a u c r a t i c  in te re s ts  w h ic h  te n d  to  r e s is ta n t  th e  p re s s u re  to  c h a n g e .  
T h e r e  is r e a s o n  to  b e l ie v e  t h a t  s o m e  o f  th e s e  b r a k in g  m e c h a n is m s  
m a y  b e  w e a k e r  in  t r a n s i t io n a l  p o l i t ie s .  In  t r a n s i t io n a l  s ta te s ,  e s p e ­
c ia l ly  th o s e  w h e re  s ta te h o o d  h a s  n e w ly  b e e n  (re-) e s ta b l is h e d ,  g o v ­
e r n m e n ts  m a y  n o t  h a v e  h a d  e n o u g h  t im e  o r  e x p e r ie n c e  to  a l lo w  
th e ir  p r a c t ic e s  to  b e c o m e  e n tr e n c h e d  to  th e  s a m e  e x te n t .  A s  s u c h ,  
th e y  are  l ik e ly  to  b e  m o r e  o p e n  to  se e in g  th e ir  p r a c t ic e s  a n d  in s t i tu ­
t io n a l  a r r a n g e m e n ts  as p r o v is io n a l  a n d  s u b je c t  to  re v is io n  in  r e ­
s p o n s e  to  n e g a t iv e  fe e d b a c k .
H y p o th e s is  se v en  e la b o r a te s  a n d  f u r th e r  d e v e lo p s  th e  id e as  o n  
in s t i tu t io n a l  r e f o r m  a n d  th e  p r o c e s s  o f  le a r n in g  in  c r is is  p r o n e  t r a n ­
s i t io n a l  s o c ie t ie s  d iscu sse d  in  th e  v o lu m e  o n  L a tv ia n  c r is is  m a n a g e ­
m e n t  (S te rn  a n d  H a n s e n ,  2 0 0 0 :  1 8 - 1 9 ) .  R e f le x iv e  le a r n in g  c a n  be  
g e n e ra te d  b y  o v e r  o p t im is m  f o r  c h a n g e  a n d  le a r n in g  in  t r a n s i t io n a l  
s ta te s ;  h o w e v e r ,  n o t  a ll  c h a n g e  is g o o d  i f  i t  is n o t  th o r o u g h ly  
th o u g h t  o u t  a n d  e v a lu a te d .  H o w e v e r ,  th e  f a c t  t h a t  in s t i tu t io n s  a n d  
d e c is io n - m a k e r s  a re  less se t  in  th e ir  w a y s  a n d  a re  n o t  to  th e  s a m e  
e x t e n t  e n tr e n c h e d  in  th e  v a lu e s  a n d  n o r m s  o f  th e  n e w  re g im e ,  th is
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c re a te s  m o r e  r o o m  f o r  p o s it iv e  le a r n in g  in  t r a n s i t io n a l  s ta te s .  O n e  
o f  th e  b ig  issu es  in  th e  l i t e r a tu r e  o n  o r g a n iz a t io n a l  le a r n in g  h a s  b e e n  
h o w  a n d  w h e n  o r g a n iz a t io n s  m a n a g e  to  e n g a g e  in  ‘d o u b le  l o o p ’ 
le a r n in g  (A rg y ris  a n d  S c h o n ,  1 9 9 6 )  o r  ‘th ird  o r d e r ’ le a r n in g  (v a n  
D u in ,  1 9 9 5 ) .  T h is  f o r m  o f  le a r n in g  fo c u s e s  o n  th e  le a r n in g  p ro c e s s  
i t s e l f  a n d  it  o c c u r s  w h e n  a n  o r g a n iz a t io n  re f le c ts  u p o n  th e  va lu es  
w h ic h  u n d e r l in e  th e  o r g a n iz a t io n ’s c o r e  a c t iv it ie s .  T h is  r e f le c t io n  
p r o c e s s  e n a b le s  c h a n g e s  in  th e  o r g a n iz a t io n ’s v a lu e  s y s te m . In  e s t a b ­
lish ed  d e m o c r a c ie s  th e s e  c o r e  v a lu e  sy s te m s  a re  d e e p ly  e m b e d d e d  in  
th e  o r g a n iz a t io n  a n d  m a y  n o t  b e  c o n s id e r e d  f o r  d is c u s s io n  o r  re v i­
s io n ,  w h e r e a s  in  t r a n s i t io n a l  s ta te s  th is  m a y  b e  p o s s ib le  b e c a u s e  
m a n y  o th e r  a s p e c ts  a re  a ls o  b e in g  r e e v a lu a te d  a n d  r e fo r m u la te d .
Overview
T h is  v o lu m e  is d iv id ed  in to  th re e  p a r ts .  T h e  f ir s t  p a r t  “ C r is is  M a n ­
a g e m e n t  in  R u s s ia :  A  B r ie f  L o o k  a t  th e  In s t i tu t io n a l  C o n t e x t ” f o c u s ­
es o n  th e  c o n t e x t  o f  th e  c r is is  ca s e s  p re s e n te d  in  p a r t  tw o .  In  C h a p ­
te r  2  M i k h a i l  F a le e v  ( th e  D e p u t y  M in is t e r  o f  E M E R C O M ) ,  D r. 
V a le ry  A k im o v  ( f r o m  th e  E M E R C O M  S tr a te g ic  R e s e a r c h  C e n te r ) ,  
a n d  P r o f .  B o r i s  P o r f ir ie v  o u t l in e  th e  d e v e lo p m e n t  a n d  e v o lu t io n  o f  
R u s s i a ’s c r is is  m a n a g e m e n t  f r a m e w o r k  d a t in g  f r o m  th e  d is s o lu t io n  
o f  th e  S o v ie t  U n io n  to  th e  p re s e n t .  M o r e  sp e c if ica l ly ,  i t  re v e a ls  th e  
b a s ic  t re n d s  o f  c h a n g e  a n d  k e y  d ire c t io n s  o f  d e v e lo p m e n t  in  n a t i o n ­
al e m e r g e n c y  a n d  d is a s te r  le g is la t io n .  In te g r a te d  a n d  sp e c if ic  ty p es  
o f  le g is la t io n ,  w h ic h  re g u la te  cr is is  p o l ic y  p la n n in g  a n d  im p le m e n t a ­
t io n ,  a re  a lso  d e s c r ib e d .  In  a d d i t io n ,  th e  c h a p t e r  h ig h lig h ts  th e  o r g a ­
n iz a t io n a l  s t r u c tu r e ,  k e y  fu n c t io n s  a n d  fe a tu re s  o f  th e  n a t io n a l  
e m e r g e n c y  m a n a g e m e n t  s y s te m  (U S E P E ) ,  a n d  e x p lo r e s  its d e v e lo p ­
m e n t  s t r a te g y  f o r  re d u c in g  th e  r is k  o f  a m a jo r  cr is is  o r  d isaster.
C h a p t e r  3 “ T y p e s  o f  C r ise s  a n d  C r is is  M a n a g e m e n t  M e c h a ­
n ism s  in  th e  R u s s ia n  M e d i a ” is a s tu d y  e x a m in in g  h o w  c r ise s  a re  
p o r t r a y e d  in  th e  R u s s ia n  p ress .  T h e  s tu d y  is c o n d u c te d  b y  D r. A lla  
M o z g o v a ia  a n d  a t e a m  o f  P h .D .  c a n d id a te s  f r o m  th e  In s t i tu te  o f  S o ­
c io lo g y  o f  th e  R u s s ia n  A c a d e m y  o f  S c ie n c e s .  T h e y  p r o v id e  a t y p o lo ­
gy  o f  th e  R u s s ia n  p ress  a n d  id e n t i fy  th e  p o l i t i c a l  o r ie n t a t io n  o f  e a c h  
p u b l ic a t io n .  T h e  m e d ia  s tu d y  a ls o  p ro v id e s  a n  o v e r v ie w  o f  te n  R u s s ­
ia n  cr is is  c a s e s  a n d  e x a m in e s  h o w  e a c h  c a s e  h a s  b e e n  p o r t r a y e d  to  
th e  p u b l ic  in  th e  R u s s ia n  p ress .
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T h e  s e c o n d  p a r t  o f  th e  b o o k ,  “ C ris is  D e v e lo p m e n t  a n d  R e ­
s p o n s e :  F o u r  C a s e  S tu d ie s ,” c o n s is ts  o f  c a s e  s tu d ies  in  R u s s ia n  cr is is  
m a n a g e m e n t .  C h a p t e r  4  “ M a n a g in g  th e  A l le v ia t io n  o f  th e  1 9 9 5  
N e f t e g o r s k  E a r t h q u a k e  D i s a s t e r ” b y  P r o f .  B o r i s  P o r f ir ie v  te lls  th e  
s to r y  o f  th e  1 9 9 5  e a r th q u a k e s .  T h e  c h a p t e r  d e s c r ib e s  th e  d e v a s ta ­
t io n  o f  th e  e a r th q u a k e  t h a t  h i t  th e  r e m o te  is la n d  o f  S a k h a l in  o n  a 
c o ld  s p r in g  n ig h t  in  1 9 9 5 ,  k i l l in g  s e v e n ty - tw o  p e r c e n t  o f  th e  p o p u la ­
t io n  in  th e  t o w n  o f  N e f te g o r s k .  P o r f ir ie v  fo c u s e s  o n  th e  d if f ic u lt  r e s ­
c u e  o p e r a t io n  t h a t  w a s  se v ere ly  a f fe c te d  b y  th e  f a c t  t h a t  a m a jo r i t y  
o f  th e  lo c a l  re s p o n s e  t e a m  w a s  in ju re d  o r  lo s t  in  th e  e a r th q u a k e ,  
le a v in g  v ery  fe w  p e o p le  a b le  to  d e a l  w ith  th e  d is a s te r  a n d  w h o  k n e w  
h o w  to  a le r t  th e  r e g io n a l  a n d  fe d e ra l  c r is is  m a n a g e m e n t  u n its .  T h e  
a u th o r i t ie s  w e re  p o o r ly  p r e p a r e d  a n d  p o o r ly  e q u ip p e d  to  h a n d le  th e  
d isaster ,  a n d  th e  e a r t h q u a k e  r e s p o n s e  w a s  f u r th e r  d e la y e d  b y  a la c k  
o f  t r u s t  re g a rd in g  th e  a la r m  se n t  f r o m  th e  lo c a l  re s id e n ts  to  th e  r e ­
g io n a l  cen ter .  T h e  d is a s te r  q u ic k ly  e s c a la te d  up th r o u g h  th e  a d m in ­
is tra t iv e  s t ru c tu re  a n d  o n c e  th e  P re s id e n t  w a s  in fo r m e d  th e  s u b s e ­
q u e n t  m a n a g e m e n t  o f  th e  c r is is  r e m a in e d  in  th e  h a n d s  o f  th e  c e n tr a l  
g o v e r n m e n t .  T h e  N e f t e g o r s k  c a s e  a ls o  h ig h lig h ts  h o w  th e  c e n tr a l  
g o v e r n m e n t  q u ic k ly  lo s t  in te r e s t  in  th e  c a s e  w h ic h  le a d  to  se r io u s  
p o l ic y  im p le m e n ta t io n  p r o b le m s  in  th e  p o s t - a c u t e  p h a se .
C h a p t e r  5 ,  “ T h e  C h e r n o b y l  L iq u id a t o r s :  T h e  Issu e  o f  S o c ia l  
W e lf a r e  a n d  B e n e f i ts  f o r  th e  N o n - P r o f e s s i o n a l  R e s c u e  W o r k e r s ” 
w r i t te n  b y  E le n a  S h l ik o v a ,  fo c u s e s  o n  th e  c r is is  m a n a g e m e n t  in  th e  
a f t e r m a t h  o f  o n e  o f  th e  m o s t  w e l l - k n o w n  d is a s te rs  o f  th e  tw e n t ie th  
ce n tu ry . T h e  c a s e  e x p lo r e s  th e  p r a c t i c a l  a n d  m o r a l  o b l ig a t io n s  in  
c o n n e c t io n  to  h e lp in g  th o s e  w h o  s a c r i f ic e d  th e ir  o w n  h e a l t h  a n d  
t h a t  o f  th e ir  c h i ld r e n  b y  a s s is t in g  in  th e  re s c u e  o p e r a t io n  a f te r  th e  
m e l td o w n  a t  th e  C h e r n o b y l  n u c le a r  p o w e r  p la n t  in  1 9 8 6 .  S h l ik o v a  
in v e s t ig a te s  th e  s o -c a l le d  ‘ l iq u id a t o r s ’ ( th e  re s c u e  w o r k e r s )  a n d  th e ir  
s tru g g le  to  re c e iv e  a p p r o p r ia te  m e d ic a l  a id ,  f in a n c ia l  c o m p e n s a t io n  
f o r  th e ir  w o r k ,  a n d  o f f i c ia l  r e c o g n i t io n  o f  th e  s a c r i f ic e s  th e y  m a d e  
f o r  th e  n a t io n .  T h e  re s c u e  w o r k e r s  w e re  b r o u g h t  to  th e  site  (m a n y  
a g a in s t  th e ir  o w n  w ill  as  c o n s c r ip ts  a n d  re serv e  o f f ic e rs  in  th e  S o v ie t  
A r m e d  F o r c e s )  n o t  k n o w in g  th e  d a n g e rs  th e y  w o u ld  b e  e x p o s e d  to  
a n d  w i th o u t  a d e q u a te  p r o t e c t io n .  T h e  C h e r n o b y l  l iq u id a t o r  c a s e  a l ­
so  i l lu s tra te s  h o w  th e  v ic t im s  f o r m e d  a n  N G O  in  o r d e r  to  in f lu e n c e  
th e  fe d e ra l  g o v e r n m e n t ’s cr is is  m a n a g e m e n t  p o l ic y  a n d  to  im p ro v e  
h o w  s u c h  m a t te r s  a re  d e a l t  w ith  in  R u s s ia .
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C h a p t e r  6 ,  “ C r is is  M a n a g e m e n t  o f  th e  E c o lo g ic a l  D is a s te r  in  
th e  T o w n  o f  K a r a b a s h ” b y  D r. A lla  M o z g o v a ia ,  e x p lo r e s  th e  m a n ­
a g e m e n t  o f  th e  e c o lo g ic a l  d is a s te r  c a u s e d  b y  th e  m in in g  a n d  p r o d u c ­
t io n  o f  c o p p e r  o re  in  th e  t o w n  o f  K a r a b a s h .  T h e  c a s e  o f  K a r a b a s h  
serv es  as a n  e x a m p le  o f  th is  w id e s p r e a d  p r o b le m  in  R u s s ia  a n d  o t h ­
er f o r m e r  S o v ie t  r e p u b l ic s .  M o n o - p r o d u c t i o n  c it ie s  l ik e  K a r a b a s h  
w e r e  e s ta b l is h e d  d u r in g  th e  S o v ie t  e ra ,  a n d  th e s e  h a z a r d o u s  a n d  
e c o lo g ic a l ly  d e tr im e n ta l  in d u s tr ie s  w e re  th e  s o le  s o u r c e  o f  e m p lo y ­
m e n t  a n d  in c o m e  f o r  th e s e  c it ie s .  M o z g o v a i a ’s s tu d y  s h o w s  h o w  
n e w  a c to r s  o n  th e  p o l i t i c a l  s c e n e  ( like  N G O s )  c a n  in f lu e n c e  th e  p o ­
l i t ic a l  a g e n d a  a n d  d ire c t  th e  a t t e n t io n  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  d e c is io n - m a k ­
ers to  s p e c if ic  c r ise s  w h ic h  w e re  m o r e  o r  less n e g le c te d  in  th e  p a s t .  
T h e  c a s e  a ls o  re v e a ls  h o w  s t r u c tu r a l ly -c r e a te d  d e p e n d e n c y  c a n  g e n ­
e ra te  a c r is is ,  a m p lify  h u m a n  s u ffe r in g ,  a n d  c o n t r ib u te  t o  th e  p e r p e t ­
u a t io n  o f  a cr is is .  T h e  K a r a b a s h  c a s e  a ls o  i l lu s tra te s  th e  n e w  ro le  
N G O s  h a v e  in  c o n t e m p o r a r y  R u s s ia  b y  p la y in g  a n  a c t iv e  ro le  in  c r i ­
sis m a n a g e m e n t  w h e n  g o v e r n m e n t  a g e n c ie s  c a n  n o t  a d e q u a te ly  d ea l 
w ith  a c r is is  b e c a u s e  o f  in s t i tu t io n a l  l im ita t io n s  a n d  r e s o u r c e  c o n ­
s tra in ts .
C h a p t e r  7  “ T h e  K u r s k  S u b m a r in e  A c c id e n t :  C o p in g  w ith  V a lu e  
C o m p le x i t y  a n d  a C r e d ib i l i ty  C r i s i s ” is c o - a u t h o r e d  b y  D a n ie l  
N o h r s t e d t  a n d  D r. L u d m ila  M in a e v a .  I t  t a k e s  a lo o k  a t  o n e  o f  th e  
m o s t  r e c e n t  c r ise s  in v o lv in g  th e  p r o b le m a t ic  c r is is  c o m p o n e n t s  o f  
n a t io n a l  secu rity , m il i ta r y  p e r s o n n e l  a n d  m il i ta r y  e q u ip m e n t .  T h e  
re s c u e  o p e r a t i o n  w a s  v ery  d if f ic u lt  a n d  th e  R u s s ia n  N a v y  w a s  u n ­
a b le  to  sav e  th e  m e n  tr a p p e d  in s id e  th e  s u n k e n  s u b m a r in e  a t  th e  
b o t t o m  o f  th e  B a r e n t s  S e a .  D e s p ite  e a r ly  o f fe r s  b y  a n u m b e r  o f  f o r ­
e ig n  g o v e r n m e n ts  to  a ss is t  th e  R u s s ia n  N a v y  in  th e  re s c u e  o p e r a ­
t io n ,  th e  P re s id e n t  d id  n o t  a u th o r iz e  th e  N a v y  to  a c c e p t  s u c h  he lp  
u n t i l  f ive  d ay s  in to  th e  c r is is .  S e v e ra l  d e lay s  in  c o m m u n ic a t io n  b e ­
tw e e n  th e  m i l i ta r y  o f f ic e rs ,  th e  P r e s id e n t ’s o f f ic e  a n d  o u ts id e  a c to r s  
p r o v e d  to  b e  fa ta l .  A  n u m b e r  o f  u n c o m f o r t a b le  issu es  w e r e  b r o u g h t  
u p  in  c o n n e c t io n  w ith  th e  K u r s k  in c id e n t .  T h e  ro le  o f  th e  d o m e s t ic  
R u s s ia n  m e d ia  as w e ll  as th e  in te r n a t io n a l  m e d ia  g re a t ly  in c r e a s e d  
th e  s ta k e s  f o r  th e  R u s s ia n  m i l i ta r y  a n d  p o l i t i c a l  le a d e rs h ip .  R e p o r t ­
in g  o n  th e  c a s e  a m p li f ie d  th e  p e rc e iv e d  t im e  p re s s u re  a n d  ra is e d  
c re d ib i l i ty  issu es  f o r  th e  n a t io n a l  le a d e rs h ip .  T h e  c a s e  a ls o  se rv ed  as 
a p a in fu l  r e m in d e r  to  th e  fa m il ie s  o f  th e  v ic t im s  a n d  th e  R u s s ia n  
p u b l ic  t h a t  m i l i ta r y  a c c id e n ts  a re  o f te n  s w e p t  u n d e r  th e  ru g  in  s e c r e ­
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c y  w ith  m a n y  q u e s t io n s  le f t  u n a n s w e r e d .  I t  w a s  a ls o  a r e m in d e r  f o r  
th e  in te r n a t io n a l  c o m m u n i t y  t h a t  n a t io n a l  s e c u r i ty  in te re s ts  still  h i n ­
d er  c o o p e r a t i o n  b e tw e e n  c o u n tr ie s  d u r in g  a c r is is .
T h e  th ird  a n d  f in a l  p a r t  o f  th e  b o o k  is c a l le d  “ A  C o m p a r a t iv e  
A n a ly s is  a n d  C o n c l u s i o n s ” a n d  c o n t a in s  o n e  ch a p te r .  T h e  c o -e d i to r s  
o f  th e  v o lu m e  w r o te  C h a p t e r  8 ,  “ T r a n s i t io n a l  C r is is  M a n a g e m e n t . ” 
I t  c o n s is ts  o f  a c o m p a r a t iv e  a n a ly s is  o f  a ll o f  th e  ca s e s  in c lu d e d  in  
th is  v o lu m e . T h e  c h a p t e r  c e n te rs  a r o u n d  th e  p r o p o s i t io n s  a n d  h y ­
p o th e s e s  e x p lo r e d  in  th e  I n t r o d u c t io n .  I t  a ssesses  th e  re la t iv e  
s t re n g th s  o f  th e se  id e a s  in  l ig h t  o f  th e  e m p ir ic a l  m a te r ia l  p re s e n te d  
in  th e  b o o k .  T h e  c h a p t e r  c o n c lu d e s  w ith  s o m e  re f le c t io n s  o n  th e  
p a r t ic u la r i t ie s  o f  m a n a g in g  c r ise s  in  a t r a n s i t io n a l  s ta te  a n d  th e  s p e ­
c i f ic  e x p e r ie n c e s  o f  R u s s ia .
T h e  c o - e d i to r s  o f  th is  b o o k  a c c e p t  th e  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  f o r  th e  
q u a l i ty  o f  th e  c a s e  s tu d ies  p re s e n te d .  H o w e v e r ,  th e  a c c u r a te n e s s  o f  
th e  d a ta  a n d  th e  in te r p r e ta t io n  o f  i t  a re  th e  s o le  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  o f  
e a c h  in d iv id u a l  a u th o r .
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Introduction
A s in  th e  re s t  o f  th e  w o r ld ,  p r o te c t in g  th e  lo c a l  re s id e n ts  a n d  c o m ­
m u n it ie s  a g a in s t  m u lt ip le  th r e a t s  w a s  a p r e r o g a t iv e  o f  th e  f o r m e r  
S o v ie t  U n i o n ’s c iv il  d e fe n se  f o r  d e c a d e s .  T h i s  w a s  a n  o r g a n ic  c o m ­
p o n e n t  o f  th e  n a t io n a l  d e fe n se  s y s te m . F u r t h e r m o r e ,  th e  n a t io n a l  
d e fen se  s y s te m  w a s  r e s p o n s ib le  fo r  p r o t e c t in g  th e  p e o p le  a g a in s t  
m i l i ta r y  th r e a t s ,  p r im a r i ly  h o s t i le  n u c le a r  a t ta c k s .  D u r in g  th e  te n se  
y e a rs  o f  th e  C o ld  W a r  in  th e  1 9 5 0 s  a n d  1 9 6 0 s ,  th is  h a d  o b v io u s  p o ­
l i t ic a l  im p lic a t io n s .
H o w e v e r  in  th e  1 9 7 0 s  a n d  1 9 8 0 s ,  p e a c e t im e  th r e a ts  (su c h  as s o ­
c ia l  c o n f l ic t s ,  t e r r o r is t  a t t a c k s ,  n a t u r a l  a n d  t e c h n o lo g ic a l  d isas te rs )  
b e c a m e  k e y  issu es  f o r  n a t io n a l  s e c u r ity  a n d  p u b l ic  sa fe ty , a n d  th u s  
r e q u ir e d  a p p r o p r ia te  c h a n g e s  in  p o l ic y  p r io r i t ie s .  T h e  s c a le  a n d  
se v er ity  o f  s u c h  cr ise s  w e re  in c r e a s in g  as th e  p ro c e s s e s  o f  p o o r ly  
m a n a g e d  in d u s tr ia l iz a t io n  a n d  u r b a n iz a t io n  (re su lt in g  f r o m  th e  S o ­
v iet U n i o n ’s o n e -s id e d  e c o n o m ic  p o l ic y )  w e re  a c c e le r a t in g .  H a z ­
a r d o u s  in d u s tr ie s  f o u n d e d  u p o n  p o o r  t e c h n o lo g ic a l  a n d  s a fe ty  m a n ­
a g e m e n t  p o l ic ie s  n e g a t iv e ly  a f fe c te d  h u m a n  a n d  e n v ir o n m e n ta l  
h e a l th .  C o n s e q u e n t ly ,  t e c h n o lo g ic a l  a c c id e n ts  a n d  d is a s te rs  a c c o u n t ­
ed  f o r  th e  b u lk  o f  cr is is  c a s u a l t ie s  in  th e  f o r m e r  S o v ie t  U n io n  d u r in g  
th e  7 0 s  a n d  8 0 s .
In  th e  1 9 8 0 s  a lo n e ,  o v e r  a m i l l io n  p e o p le  w e re  s e r io u s ly  a f f e c t ­
ed . O n  a v e ra g e ,  m o r e  t h a n  1 5 0 , 0 0 0  p e o p le  w e re  in ju re d  e a c h  y e a r  
o f  w h ic h  a t  le a s t  6 5 , 0 0 0  w e re  im m e d ia te ly  k i l le d  in  in d u s tr ia l  a c c i-
19 This paper expands upon an earlier version by Boris Porfiriev (2001) “Emergency and Disaster 
Management Policy in Russia: Institutional and Legislative Issues,” Journal of Hazardous Materials. 
Copyright © Elsevier Science Publishers.
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d e n ts  o r  d ied  p re m a tu re ly .  T h e  e c o n o m ic  d a m a g e  w a s  a ls o  c o n s id e r ­
a b le  w ith  o u r  a s s e s s m e n ts  in d ic a t in g  th e  t o t a l  d ire c t  a n d  in d ire c t  
e c o n o m ic  lo sse s  s o a r in g  to  1 2 - 1 5 %  o f  th e  c o u n t r y ’s G D P  (P o rfir iev , 
1 9 9 8 ) .
T h e  m id  8 0 s  w e re  m a r k e d  b y  g r e a t  p o l i t i c a l  a n d  e c o n o m ic  
c h a n g e s  in  th e  f o r m e r  S o v ie t  U n io n  (n a m e ly  p e re s t ro ik a )  a n d  b y  th e  
w o r ld ’s w o r s t  r a d ia t io n  d is a s te r  in  C h e r n o b y l .  T h e s e  ev en ts  m a r k e d  
th e  b e g in n in g  o f  th e  s h if t  a w a y  f r o m  th e  o ld  ‘m i l i ta r y '  p a r a d ig m  o f  
th e  n a t io n a l  s e c u r ity  p o licy . T h is  w a s  g r a d u a l ly  re p la c e d  b y  a m o r e  
c o m p r e h e n s iv e  o n e ,  w h ic h  s e r io u s ly  c o n s id e r e d  th e  o th e r  side o f  th e  
n a t io n a l  s e cu r ity :  p e a c e t im e  c o n f l ic t s  a n d  n o n - c o n f l i c t  c r is e s .  T h e s e  
issues h a v e  b e c o m e  a n  in c r e a s in g ly  o r g a n ic  a n d  im p o r t a n t  c o m p o ­
n e n t  o f  n a t io n a l  d e v e lo p m e n t  a n d  n a t io n a l  s e c u r ity  in  R u s s ia ,  b o t h  
o f  w h ic h  n o w  c o n s t i tu t e  a s p e c if ic  a re a  in  cr is is  m a n a g e m e n t  p o licy .
T h is  c h a p t e r  fo c u s e s  o n  th e  tw o  m a in  issu es  o f  cr is is  m a n a g e ­
m e n t  p o licy . F ir s t  c o n s id e r e d  is th e  in s t i tu t io n a l  o r g a n iz a t io n ,  w h ic h  
w a s  s h a p e d  in to  th e  U n if ie d  S ta te  S y s te m  f o r  E m e r g e n c y  P r e v e n t io n  
a n d  E l i m in a t io n  o f  th e  R u s s ia n  F e d e r a t io n  o r  U S E P E .  In  c o n n e c t io n  
to  th is ,  th e  e m e r g e n c y  le g is la t io n  (w h ic h  m a k e s  up th e  le g a l  f o u n d a ­
t io n  o f  th is  o r g a n iz a t io n a l  sy s te m ) is a lso  re v ie w e d . S e c o n d ly ,  th e  
th e o r e t ic a l  b a s is ,  u p o n  w h ic h  k e y  m e a s u re s  o f  th e  s t a t e ’s s tra te g ic  
p r o g r a m  f o r  re d u c in g  r isk s  f o r  n a t u r a l  a n d  t e c h n o lo g ic a l  d is a s te rs ,  
is a lso  e x a m in e d .
The Onset o f  the National Emergency and Disaster 
Management Policy
T h e  r a d ic a l  p o l i t i c a l  c h a n g e s  in  th e  f o r m e r  S o v ie t  U n io n  in  th e  s e c ­
o n d  h a l f  o f  th e  1 9 8 0 s  c o in c id e d  w ith  a se t  o f  m a jo r  e m e rg e n c ie s ,  
d isa s te rs  a n d  c a ta s t r o p h e s  ( th e  1 9 8 6  C h e r n o b y l  a c c id e n t  a n d  1 9 8 8  
A r m e n ia n  e a r th q u a k e  b e in g  th e  m o s t  d e v a s ta t in g ) .  T h is  c o m b i n a ­
t io n  o f  c i r c u m s ta n c e s  fa c i l i ta te d  a n d  a c c e le r a te d  d ra s t ic  c h a n g e s  
w ith in  th e  e x is t in g  n a t io n a l  c iv il  d e fe n se  s y s te m .
In  1 9 8 9 ,  th e  S ta te  E m e r g e n c y  C o m m it t e e  o f  th e  S o v ie t  U n io n  
w a s  e s ta b l is h e d .  S o m e  y e a rs  la ter , a n  a n a lo g o u s  c o m m it te e  w ith  th e  
s a m e  n a m e  w a s  o rg a n iz e d  as a p a r t  o f  th e  C o u n c i l  o f  M in is te r s  in  
th e  R u s s ia n  F e d e r a t io n .  T h is  c o m m it te e  w a s  la te r  m o v e d  to  th e  A d ­
m in is t r a t io n  o f  th e  P re s id e n t  o f  R u s s ia  a n d  c h a n g e d  its  n a m e  to  th e  
S ta te  C o m m it t e e  o f  th e  R u s s ia n  F e d e r a t io n  f o r  C iv il  D e fe n s e ,  E m e r ­
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g e n c ie s  a n d  N a t u r a l  D is a s te r  R e s p o n s e  ( E M E R C O M ) .  T h is  m o v e  
serv ed  as o f f i c ia l  r e c o g n i t io n  th a t  issues  c o n c e r n in g  c o m m u n i t y  a n d  
r e g io n a l  p r o t e c t i o n  in  p e a c e t im e  ju s t i fy  a re  a ls o  im p o r t a n t ,  a n d  ju s ­
t i fy  in c r e a s in g  re s o u r c e s  f o r  s u c h  m a t te r s .
W i t h  th e  d is s o lu t io n  o f  th e  S o v ie t  U n io n  in  D e c e m b e r  1 9 9 1 ,  sev ­
e ra l  in d e p e n d e n t  s ta te s  w e re  c r e a te d .  T h e  R u s s ia n  F e d e r a t io n  is th e  
la rg e s t  o f  th e m  in  te rm s  o f  t e r r i to r y  a n d  p o p u la t io n ,  a n d  is c o n s id e re d  
to  b e  th e  m o s t  d e v e lo p e d  o f  th e m . T h e  1 9 9 3  C o n s t i t u t io n  c o n s is ts  o f  
tw o  ty p es  o f  e n ti t ie s  (s o u b y e k t i  F e d e r a t s ii ): n a t io n a l  a n d  a d m in is t r a ­
tive . T h e  n a t io n a l  e n t i t ie s  in c lu d e  2 1  a u t o n o m o u s  r e p u b l ic s ,  1 0  a u ­
t o n o m o u s  d is tr ic ts  (o k r u g a ) a n d  1 a u t o n o m o u s  r e g io n  (o b la st). T h e  
a d m in is t r a t iv e  e n ti t ie s  c o n s is t  o f  6  te r r i to r ie s  (k r a ia ), 4 9  re g io n s  a n d  2  
fe d e ra l  c it ies  ( M o s c o w  a n d  St. P e te rs b u rg ) .
A t  th e  r e g io n a l  le v e l,  p e o p le  e le c t  a n  a s s e m b ly  a n d  a G o v e r n o r  
o r  a H e a d  o f  A d m in is t r a t io n .  A t  th e  fe d e ra l  lev e l,  th e  P re s id e n t  is 
e le c te d  b y  th e  e n t ire  g e n e ra l  p o p u la t io n  a n d  h a s  s ig n if ic a n t  p o w e r  as 
th e  H e a d  o f  th e  S ta te .  S/he h a s  th e  f in a l  s a y  w h e n  th e r e  is a d isp u te  
b e tw e e n  th e  fe d e ra l  le g is la t iv e  b o d y  (F e d e r a ln o y e  S o b r a n iy e ) a n d  
th e  G o v e r n m e n t .  In  a d d i t io n ,  th e  P re s id e n t  e s ta b l is h e s  g u id e lin e s  f o r  
d o m e s t ic  a n d  f o r e ig n  p o l ic ie s ,  in c lu d in g  s e c u r i ty  a n d  m i l i ta r y  p o l i ­
c ies  g iv e n  th e  f a c t  t h a t  s/he h o ld s  th e  p o s t  o f  S u p re m e  C o m m a n d e r  
o f  th e  A r m e d  F o r c e s .  T h e  P re s id e n t  a p p o in ts  th e  G o v e r n m e n t  a n d  
th e  P r im e  M in is t e r  w h o  th e n  m u s t  b e  a p p r o v e d  b y  th e  D u m a  ( th e  
lo w e r  c h a m b e r  o f  th e  fe d e ra l  le g is la t iv e  b o d y ) .
In  th e  a re a  o f  e m e r g e n c y  a n d  d is a s te r  m a n a g e m e n t ,  th e  le g a c y  o f  
th e  S o v ie t  U n io n  did n o t  h a v e  m u c h  to  c o n t r ib u t e  to  th e  p o l i t i c a l  
a n d  a d m in is t r a t iv e  t r a n s f o r m a t io n  o f  E M E R C O M .  In  1 9 9 2  th e  
G o v e r n m e n t a l  R e g u la t io n  § 2 6 1  s t re n g th e n e d  th e  ro le  o f  E M E R ­
C O M  b y  g iv in g  it  th e  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  o f  d e v e lo p in g  a n d  e n f o r c in g  th e  
ta s k  o f  p re v e n t in g  a n d  r e s p o n d in g  to  n a t u r a l  a n d  te c h n o lo g ic a l  
e m e rg e n c ie s  a n d  d isa s te rs  ( in c lu d in g  th o s e  in v o lv in g  h a z a r d o u s  m a ­
te r ia ls ) .  T h e  o th e r  fe d e ra l  a g e n c ie s  r e ta in e d  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  f o r  h a n ­
d lin g  o th e r  k in d s  o f  c r ise s  in c lu d in g  c o n f l ic t s .  T h e  b a s ic  issues  o f  
c o m m u n i t y  a n d  r e g io n a l  s a fe ty  a n d  o f  e m e r g e n c y  a n d  d is a s te r  m a n ­
a g e m e n t  in  te rm s  o f  n a t io n a l  s e c u r ity  h a v e  b e e n  a n d  a c tu a l ly  a re  e s ­
ta b l is h e d  b y  th e  P re s id e n t  a n d  th e  S e c u r i ty  C o u n c i l  ( th e  P r e s id e n t ’s 
c o n s u l ta t iv e  o r g a n ) .
In  1 9 9 4 ,  th e  fe d e ra l  le g is la t iv e  b o d y  p a sse d  “ T h e  F e d e r a l  A c t  f o r  
C o m m u n i t y  a n d  R e g io n a l  P r o t e c t io n  A g a in s t  N a t u r a l  a n d  T e c h n o ­
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lo g ic a l  D is a s te rs / E m e rg e n c ie s .” I t  is a lso  c o m m o n ly  re fe r re d  to  as 
th e  1 9 9 4  F e d e r a l  E m e r g e n c y  A c t .  T h is  a c t  s t r e n g th e n e d  E M E R ­
C O M  a n d  h e lp e d  la y  th e  f o u n d a t io n  f o r  U S E P E .
T h e  le g is la t iv e  a n d  o r g a n iz a t io n a l  c h a n g e s  o f  th e  m id  1 9 9 0 s  in ­
c r e a s e d  th e  n u m b e r  o f  o r g a n iz a t io n s  a n d  in s t i tu t io n s  in v o lv e d  in  d e ­
v e lo p in g  a n d  im p le m e n t in g  th e  e m e r g e n c y  a n d  d is a s te r  m a n a g e m e n t  
p o l ic y ,  a n d  re s p e c t iv e ly  w id e n e d  its o p e r a t io n a l  c o v e r a g e .  A c c o r d ­
ingly, th e  fe d e ra l  b u d g e t  e x p e n d itu r e s  f o r  U S E P E  in c r e a s e d .  In  th e  
1 9 9 7  f is c a l  year, e x p e n d i tu r e s  e x c e e d e d  8 , 0 0 0  m i l l io n  ru b le s  o r  
2 . 1 %  o f  th e  to t a l  e x p e n d i tu r e  b u d g e t  f o r  th e  G o v e r n m e n t ’s s p e c ia l  
e m e r g e n c y  fu n d .
In  a m o r e  g e n e r ic  se n se ,  th e  a b o v e m e n t io n e d  c h a n g e s  m a r k e d  
th e  o n s e t  o f  th e  n o t io n  t h a t  th e  R u s s ia n  s ta te  e m e r g e n c y  a n d  d is a s ­
te r  p o l ic y  w a s  s ig n if ic a n t  in  re g a rd s  to  n a t io n a l  d e v e lo p m e n t  a n d  
n a t io n a l  secu rity . T h is  w a s  c le a r ly  n o te d  b y  P re s id e n t  B o r is  Y e l t s in ’s 
1 9 9 6  a n n u a l  a d d re ss  to  th e  R u s s ia n  F e d e r a l  A s s e m b ly  w h ic h  w a s  
la rg e ly  d e d ic a te d  to  n a t io n a l  d e fe n se  issu es . Y e lt s in  e m p h a s iz e d  in  
p a r t i c u la r  th e  n e e d  to  p r o t e c t  in d iv id u a l  a n d  s o c ie ta l  in te re s ts  in  
e m e rg e n c ie s  c a u s e d  b y  n a t u r a l ,  t e c h n o lo g ic a l  a n d  o th e r  s u c h  h a z ­
a rd s .  H e  re g a rd e d  th is  to  b e  o n e  o f  th e  k e y  a r e a s  f o r  n a t io n a l  s e c u r i ­
ty. T h is  w ill  b e  e la b o r a te d  u p o n  in  th is  c h a p te r ,  as  w ell  as  th e  le g ­
is la t iv e  a n d  in s t i tu t io n a l  f r a m e w o r k  o f  U S E P E .
The Development o f  National Emergency 
Legislation
T h e  r a d ic a l  p o l i t i c a l  a n d  s o c io - e c o n o m ic  c h a n g e s  t h a t  f o l lo w e d  th e  
d is s o lu t io n  o f  th e  f o r m e r  S o v ie t  U n io n  h a d  s ig n if ic a n t  im p l ic a t io n s  
f o r  R u s s ia n  le g is la t io n .  A m e n d m e n ts  w e re  m a d e  to  th e  f irs t  f e d e ra l  
la w s  o n  c iv il  d e fe n s e ,  e n v ir o n m e n ta l  p r o t e c t io n ,  a n d  e m e r g e n c y  a n d  
d is a s te r  m a n a g e m e n t .  T h e s e  a m e n d m e n ts  in  tu r n  c o n s t i tu t e  th e  le g a l  
f o u n d a t io n  f o r  th e  in s t i tu t io n a l  f r a m e w o r k  fo r  n a t io n a l  e m e r g e n c y  
a n d  d is a s te r  m a n a g e m e n t .
T H E  A R E A S  O F  F O C U S  F O R  T H E  C H A N G IN G  L E G IS L A T IO N  
A N D  T H E  B A SIC  T R E N D S
T h e  c h a n g in g  le g is la t io n  fo c u s e d  o n  m a in ly  tw o  d if fe re n t  a r e a s :  1. 
T h e  n a t io n a l  le g is la t iv e  s y s te m  as a w h o le ,  a n d  2 .  E m e r g e n c y  a n d
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d is a s te r  m a n a g e m e n t  in  p a r t ic u la r .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  se v e ra l  d is t in c t  
t re n d s  a p p e a r e d  in  th e  c h a n g in g  le g is la t io n .
O n e  s u c h  t re n d  w a s  th e  d iv e rs ific a tio n  o f  le g is la t io n .  T h e  le g a l  
s y s te m  h a s  b e e n  in c re a s in g ly  e n r ic h e d  w ith  n e w  k in d s  o f  la w s  a n d  
r e g u la t io n s ;  f irs t  a n d  f o r e m o s t ,  th o s e  c o n c e r n in g  e m e r g e n c y  a n d  d is ­
a s te r  m a n a g e m e n t .  In  g e n e ra l ,  e m e r g e n c y  a n d  d is a s te r  m a n a g e m e n t  
le g is la t io n  h a d  b e e n  la rg e ly  n e g le c te d  d u r in g  th e  S o v ie t  y e a rs .  N e a r ­
ly  4 0  fe d e ra l  la w s ,  1 0 0  fe d e r a l  r e g u la t io n s ,  a n d  m o r e  t h a n  1 , 0 0 0  r e ­
g io n a l  a c ts  h a v e  b e e n  a d d e d  to  th e  t o t a l  n u m b e r  o f  e m e r g e n c y  a n d  
d is a s te r  la w s  in  R u s s ia .  H u n d r e d s  o f  o rd e rs  a n d  r e g u la t io n s  w e re  a l ­
so  issu ed  b y  a g a m u t  o f  f e d e ra l  b o d ie s  in c o r p o r a t e d  in  th e  U S E P E  
( G o s u d a r s tv e n n i i ,  2 0 0 0 ;  F e d u lo v , 1 9 9 8 ;  F e d u lo v , 2 0 0 0 ) .
A n o th e r  v is ib le  t re n d  in  th e  c h a n g in g  le g is la t io n  w a s  th e  in te g ra ­
tio n  o f  e m e r g e n c y  a n d  d is a s te r  a c ts  in to  o n e  sp e c if ic  b r a n c h ;  th u s ,  
in c r e a s in g ly  ta k in g  o n  th e  c h a r a c te r is t ic s  o f  fe d e ra l  le g is la t io n .  S u c h  
in te g r a t io n  im p lie s ,  o n  th e  o n e  h a n d ,  t h a t  th e  fe d e ra l  a n d  r e g io n a l  
l a w m a k e r s  a re  s e e k in g  a c le a r -c u t  s y s te m a t iz a t io n  a n d  i n c o r p o r a t io n  
o f  e x is t in g  a c ts .  O n  th e  o th e r  h a n d ,  it  in v o lv e s  th e  h a r m o n iz a t io n  
a n d  u n i f i c a t io n  o f  s u c h  a c ts  w ith  th e  p r in c ip le s  a n d  ru les  o f  in te r n a ­
t io n a l  la w  ( fo r  e x a m p le ,  th o s e  u se d  b y  o r g a n iz a t io n s  l ik e  I A E A , 
U N D R O ,  U N E P ,  W H O ,  a n d  W M O ) .  A l th o u g h  th e  f o r m e r  S o v ie t  
U n io n ,  a n d  la te r  R u s s ia ,  m o r e  o r  less c o n f o r m e d  to  th e  m a jo r i t y  o f  
in t e r n a t io n a l  a n d  r e g io n a l  s ta n d a rd s  in  th is  f ie ld ,  th e r e  w e r e  se r io u s  
g a p s  a n d  d e lay s  in  im p le m e n t in g  n a t io n a l  e m e r g e n c y  a n d  d is a s te r  
la w s .
A  th ird  t re n d  in  th e  c h a n g in g  le g is la t io n  w a s  th e  fe d era liz a tio n  
o r  cen tra liz a tio n  o f  R u s s ia n  e m e r g e n c y  le g is la t io n .  U n l ik e  m o s t  o f  
th e  W e s te r n  n a t io n s  w h e r e  r e g io n a l  (s ta te ,  p r o v in c ia l ,  e tc .)  le g is la ­
t io n  h a s  b e e n  th e  c o r n e r s to n e  f o r  d e v e lo p in g  a d is t in c t  e m e rg e n c y  
a n d  d is a s te r  m a n a g e m e n t  p o l icy , th e  b u lk  o f  th e  R u s s ia n  F e d e r a t io n  
e n ti t ie s  h a v e  s im p ly  c o p ie d  th e  e x is t in g  fe d e ra l  e m e r g e n c y  a n d  d is a s ­
te r  a c ts .  T h e  R F  e n ti t ie s  a re  still  s e a r c h in g  f o r  th e ir  o w n  u n iq u e  p o l i ­
c ies  w h ic h  a d a p t  to  th e ir  in d iv id u a l  n e e d s  a n d  r e s o u r c e s .  T h is  h a s  
h a p p e n e d  d e sp ite  th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  R u s s ia n  C o n s t i t u t io n  s t ip u la te s  
s h a re d  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  f o r  e m e r g e n c y  a n d  d is a s te r  m a n a g e m e n t  b y  
b o t h  th e  fe d e ra l  a n d  r e g io n a l  a u th o r i t ie s .  Y e t  i r o n ic a l ly  w h e n  lo c a l  
a n d  r e g io n a l  le g is la t io n  is t a i lo r  m a d e ,  i t  o f te n  c o n t r a d ic t s  th e  fe d e r ­
a l  le g is la t io n  ( fo r  e x a m p le ,  in  th e  a re a  o f  p r o p e r ty  o w n e r s h ip ,  p r i ­
v a te  e n te rp r ise s ,  a n d  t a x a t i o n ) .  S o m e  e x p e r ts  h a v e  e s t im a te d  t h a t
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1 0 - 1 2 %  o f  th e  r e g io n a l  e c o n o m ic  le g is la t io n  c o n t r a d ic t s  f e d e ra l  
la w s .  T h is  c a u s e s  g r e a t  c o n f u s io n .  A s  a re s u lt  th e  P re s id e n t  P u t in  
w a s  fo r c e d  in to  ta k in g  t o u g h  m e a s u re s  in  2 0 0 0 - 2 0 0 1  a g a in s t  s e le c t ­
ed r e g io n a l  a u th o r i t ie s  in  o r d e r  to  e n s u re  s o m e  d e g re e  o f  le g is la t io n  
c o m p l ia n c e .  T h is  in  f a c t  s im p ly  c o n t r ib u te d  to  in c r e a s e d  c e n t r a l iz a ­
t io n  in  th e  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  th e  e n t i re  le g is la t iv e  p ro c e s s .
In  g e n e ra l  o n e  c a n  sa y  t h a t  c e n t r a l iz a t io n  h a s  b e e n  a c o n s t a n t  
t re n d  t h r o u g h o u t  R u s s ia n  h is to r y ;  n a m e ly ,  in  e c o n o m ic  a n d  s o c ia l  
p o l ic ie s  a n d  le g is la t io n .  C o n s e q u e n t ly ,  th e  r e g io n a l  a u th o r i t ie s  h a v e  
b e e n  s u b s ta n t ia l ly  la g g in g  b e h in d  th e  fe d e ra l  g o v e r n m e n t  in  d e v e l­
o p in g  a n d  e n f o r c in g  its o w n  se t  o f  e m e r g e n c y  a n d  d is a s te r  la w s ,  
w h ic h  c o m p le m e n t  ( r a th e r  th a n  c o n t r a d ic t )  th e  fe d e ra l  la w s .
T h e  f o u r t h  t re n d  in  th e  c h a n g in g  le g is la t io n  h a s  b e e n  th e  in ­
c r e a s e d  e m p h a s is  o n  p r e v e n t io n  a n d  m itig a tio n . T h e r e  is a g ra d u a l  
s h if t  o c c u r r in g  f r o m  a p r e d o m in a n t ly  re a c t iv e  ty p e  o f  c r is is  m a n a g e ­
m e n t  ( fo c u s e d  o n  p r e p a r e d n e s s  a n d  re s p o n s e )  to  a m o r e  p r o a c t iv e  
( a n t ic ip a to r y )  a n d  f le x ib le  o n e  (see a ls o  A p p e n d ix  2 ,  s e c t io n  Q 3 ) .  
S u c h  a s h if t  d e m o n s tr a te s  th e  la w m a k e r s ’ d es ire  to  c h a n g e  th e  e x i s t ­
in g  p r o c e d u r e s  re g a rd in g  th e  d is t r ib u t io n  o f  fe d e ra l  b u d g e t  fu n d s  
w h ic h  is in  f a v o r  o f  a m o r e  re a c t iv e  ( r a th e r  th a n  a p r o a c t iv e )  a p ­
p r o a c h  to  c r is is  m a n a g e m e n t .  In  th e  1 9 9 6 - 1 9 9 9  f is c a l  y e a rs ,  fu n d s  
e a r m a r k e d  f o r  m i t ig a t io n  ( in c lu d in g  s p e c ia l  g o v e r n m e n t a l  fu n d s  fo r  
e m e r g e n c y  re s p o n s e )  a n d  f o r  d is a s te r  r e c o v e r y  a n d  r e h a b i l i t a t io n  
w e re  re la t iv e ly  s im ilar . T h e  fe d e ra l  g o v e r n m e n t  in te n d s  to  c a r r y  o u t  
a c o m p r e h e n s iv e  m i t ig a t io n  p r o g r a m  b e tw e e n  1 9 9 9  a n d  2 0 0 5  in  o r ­
d er  to  re d u c e  th e  r is k  o f  n a t u r a l  a n d  te c h n o lo g ic a l  d isa s te rs  (F e d e r-  
a ln a ia ,  1 9 9 9 ) .
H o w e v e r ,  it  is im p o r t a n t  to  n o te  th a t  d e sp ite  th e  p re v io u s ly  
m e n t io n e d  t re n d s  in  R u s s ia  a t  th e  tu r n  o f  th e  ce n tu ry ,  e m e r g e n c y  
a n d  d is a s te r  le g is la t io n  (p r im a r i ly  a t  th e  fe d e ra l  level)  is s till  o r ie n t ­
ed to  p r e p a re d n e s s  a n d  r e s p o n s e  r a th e r  th a n  p r e v e n t io n  a n d  m it ig a ­
t io n .  T h e  la t t e r  s till  h a s  a lo w e r  p r io r i ty  in  le g is la t io n  a n d ,  c o n s e ­
q u en tly ,  h a s  e x p e r ie n c e d  a s h o r t a g e  in  fu n d in g . O n e  r e a s o n  f o r  th is  
is th a t  l i t t le  t im e  h a s  p a sse d  s in c e  th e  n e w  a im s  w e re  p re s e n te d  an d  
m o r e  t im e  is n e e d e d  to  so l id ify  fu n d in g  a n d  th e  n e w  p r io r i t ie s .
A n o th e r  r e a s o n  f o r  th e  la c k  o f  a c t io n  c a n  b e  th e  p re s s in g  n eed s  
p u t  u p o n  d e c is io n - m a k e r s  w h o  m u s t  c o m p e te  f o r  s c a r c e  r e s o u rc e s .  
F u n d s  f o r  c o p in g  w ith  th e  d e v a s ta t in g  e f fe c ts  o f  d is a s te rs  a re  s o l i c i t ­
ed m o r e  e a g e r ly  a n d  m o r e  s u c c e ss fu l ly  th a n  fu n d in g  f o r  p r e v e n t io n
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a n d  m it ig a t io n .  F i f ty  p e r c e n t  m o r e  m o n e y  is a l lo c a te d  f r o m  th e  
R u s s ia n  fe d e r a l  b u d g e t  f o r  e x is t in g  e x p e n d itu r e s  t h a n  f o r  p r e v e n ­
t io n ,  m i t ig a t io n ,  r e c o v e r y  a n d  r e h a b i l i t a t io n .  P a r t ia l ly  th is  c a n  be  
e x p la in e d  b y  th e  f in a n c ia l  m a n a g e r s ’ d es ire  to  re d u c e  e x p e n d itu re s  
b y  f o c u s in g  m a in ly  o n  a c tu a l ,  c o n c r e te  c o s ts .  In  th e ir  v iew , fu n d s  f o r  
p r e v e n t io n ,  m i t ig a t io n ,  r e c o v e r y  a n d  r e h a b i l i t a t io n  c o u ld  v ery  w e ll  
tu r n  o u t  to  b e  ‘u se le s s ’ i f  n o  e m e r g e n c y  o c c u r s  o r  i f  r e h a b i l i t a t io n  is 
u n s u c c e ss fu l .  Y e t  a t  th e  s a m e  t im e  s u c h  issues h a v e  b e e n  p u s h e d  f o r ­
w a r d  b y  th e  a f fe c te d  c o m m u n it ie s .  T h e  p u b l ic  d e m a n d s  m o r e  s p e n d ­
in g ,  w i t h o u t  q u e s t io n  o r  delay , w h e n  a n  e m e r g e n c y  o r  a d is a s te r  
s tr ik e s .
T R E N D S  IN  E M E R G E N C Y  A N D  D IS A S T E R  L E G IS L A T IO N
S u b s ta n t ia l  c h a n g e s  in  th e  R u s s ia n  e m e r g e n c y  a n d  d is a s te r  le g is la ­
t io n  a re  c u r r e n t ly  in  p r o g re s s  a n d  fo c u s  o n  tw o  m a in  a re a s :  1 . N e w  
la w s  a n d  a c ts  c o n c e r n in g  t o x i c  m a te r ia ls ,  a n d  2 .  H a r m o n iz a t io n  a n d  
s p e c i f i c a t io n  o f  th e  e x is t in g  la w s .  T h e  f ir s t  t re n d ,  th e  d e v e lo p m e n t  
o f  n e w  la w s  a n d  a c ts ,  c e n te rs  o n  re d u c in g  th e  r isk s  a s s o c ia te d  w ith  
n e w  t o x i c  m a te r ia ls .  N e w  m e a n s  a n d  m e th o d s  f o r  le g is la t iv e  r e g u la ­
t io n s  a re  b e in g  e n fo r c e d  r e t r o a c t iv e ly  in  o r d e r  to  c o p e  w ith  e x is t in g  
e m e rg e n c ie s  a n d  d isa s te rs .  T h e  s e c o n d  tre n d  is th e  h a r m o n iz a t io n  
a n d  s p e c i f i c a t io n  o f  e x is t in g  la w s .  A m e n d m e n ts  h a v e  b e e n  a d o p te d  
a n d  a d d i t io n a l  c la u se s  h a v e  b e e n  a d d e d  to  e x is t in g  la w s ,  re g u la t io n s  
a n d  in s t r u c t io n s ,  w h ic h  p ro v id e  f o r  a b e t te r  d is t in c t io n  o f  r e s p o n s i ­
b i l i ty  a n d  c o o r d i n a t io n  b e t w e e n  th e  k e y  b o d ie s  a n d  serv ices  e n g a g e d  
in  e m e r g e n c y  a n d  d is a s te r  m a n a g e m e n t .
In  p r a c t ic e  b o t h  tre n d s  in  e m e r g e n c y  a n d  d is a s te r  m a n a g e m e n t  
p o l ic y  a re  c lo s e ly  in te r tw in e d .  T h is  c re a te s  a m o r e  o r  less h o l is t ic  
le g is la t iv e  f r a m e w o r k  f o r  p re v e n t in g ,  p r e p a r in g  for, r e s p o n d in g  to  
a n d  re c o v e r in g  f r o m  e m e rg e n c ie s  a n d  d isa s te rs .  In  R u s s ia  th is  d e ­
m a n d s  a l a w m a k e r ’s a p p r o a c h ,  s in c e  th e  f o r m a l  r e la t io n s  b e tw e e n  
c o m m u n i t y  m e m b e r s  d u r in g  a n  e m e r g e n c y  a re  d i f fe re n t  th a n  th o s e  
e x is t in g  d u r in g  a n o n - e m e r g e n c y  s i tu a t io n .  T h u s ,  th is  lo g ic a l ly  r e ­
q u ire s  th e  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  a c o m p r e h e n s iv e  n o r m a t iv e  a c t ,  w h ic h  
c a n  serve  as a n  u m b re l la  f o r  a ll  o f  th e  e x is t in g  r e g u la t io n s  in  th e  
f ie ld  o f  e m e r g e n c y  a n d  d is a s te r  m a n a g e m e n t .  T h is  w a s  e s se n t ia l ly  
a c h ie v e d  w h e n  th e  1 9 9 4  F e d e r a l  E m e r g e n c y  A c t  w a s  e n a c te d .  T h e  
1 9 9 4  F e d e r a l  E m e r g e n c y  A c t  a d d re sses  th e  f o l lo w in g  issues:
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• P r in c ip le s ,  t a s k s ,  fu n c t io n s  a n d  k e y  o r g a n iz a t io n a l  fe a tu re s  
o f  th e  U S E P E .
• R e s p o n s ib i l i t i e s  o f  th e  fe d e ra l ,  r e g io n a l  a n d  lo c a l  a u th o r i t ie s ;  
s p e c ia l  f e d e r a l  a n d  r e g io n a l  e m e r g e n c y  se rv ic e s ;  a n d  v o lu n ­
te e rs  in  th e  a re a  o f  c iv il  p r o t e c t io n .
• G u id e l in e s  f o r  p u b l ic  p re p a re d n e s s  f o r  e m e rg e n c ie s  a n d  d is ­
a s te rs .
• P r o c e d u r e s  f o r  d e le g a t in g  f in a n c ia l  a n d  m a te r ia l  s u p p o r t  fo r  
c o m m u n i t y  a n d  r e g io n a l  p r o t e c t i o n  in  th e  e v e n t  o f  a n  e m e r ­
g e n c y  o r  d isaster .
• T a s k s ,  f u n c t io n s  a n d  l ia b i l i t ie s  o f  th e  s t a t e ’s e x p e r t is e ,  s u p e r ­
v is io n  a n d  c o n t r o l  in  th e  a re a  o f  c iv il  p r o t e c t io n .
G iv e n  s u c h  c o v e r a g e  m a n y  e x p e r ts  c o n s id e r  th e  1 9 9 4  F e d e r a l  E m e r ­
g e n c y  A c t  to  be  a n  u m b r e l la  f o r  th e  e x is t in g  la w s  a n d  r e g u la t io n s  
c o n c e r n in g  v a r io u s  ty p es  o f  e m e rg e n c ie s .  H o w e v e r ,  e v en  th o u g h  th e  
1 9 9 4  F e d e r a l  E m e r g e n c y  A c t  is c o n s id e r e d  to  be  e x te n s iv e ,  it  is n o t  
c o m p r e h e n s iv e  a n d  e v e n  less e x h a u s t iv e .  I t  re g u la te s  p r o te c t iv e  
m e a s u re s  f o r  n a t u r a l  a n d  te c h n o lo g ic a l  h a z a rd s  ( in c lu d in g  th o s e  in ­
v o lv in g  t o x i c  m a te r ia ls ) ,  b u t  d o e s  n o t  t a k e  in to  c o n s id e r a t io n  th e  is ­
sue  o f  c o n f l i c t - o r ie n te d  c r ise s  (m a ss  d is tu r b a n c e s ,  r io t s ,  r e g io n a l  
w a r s ,  e tc . ) .  S u c h  cr ise s  a re ,  o r  s h o u ld  b e , c o v e re d  b y  o th e r  a c ts .  
E v e n  th e  b e s t  p o s s ib le  ‘u m b r e l la  l a w ’ in  R u s s ia  is still  in s u f f ic ie n t  
f o r  b u ild in g  a n  in te g r a te d  s y s te m  o f  la w s ,  w h ic h  c a n  re g u la te  th e  le ­
g a l  m a t te r s  o f  e m e r g e n c y  a n d  d is a s te r  m a n a g e m e n t .  A  c o l le c t io n  o f  
in te r r e la te d  a c ts ,  w h ic h  c a n  m a n a g e  sp e c if ic  fu n c t io n s  a n d  ty p es  o f  
e m e rg e n c ie s  a n d  d is a s te rs ,  is n e e d e d  in  o r d e r  to  c r e a te  s u c h  a sy s ­
te m .
Typology o f  Emergency and Disaster Legislation
A n y  set o f  la w s  s h o u ld  c o n s t i tu t e  a s p e c if ic  a re a  o f  le g is la t io n  o r  a t  
le a s t  s y n c h r o n iz e  th e  e x is t in g  le g is la t io n .  H o w e v e r ,  th is  h a s  n o t  b e e n  
th e  c a s e  in  R u s s ia ,  d e sp ite  a ll  o f  th e  e f fo r ts  p u t  in to  th e  1 9 9 4  E m e r ­
g e n c y  F e d e r a l  A c t .  T h e  t r a d i t io n  o f  a p ie c e m e a l  a n d  f r a g m e n te d  le g ­
i s la t io n  sy s te m  p re v a ils  in  R u s s ia  a n d  l i t t le  p ro g re s s  h a s  b e e n  m a d e  
in  d e v e lo p in g  a n  in te g r a te d  n a t io n a l  s y s te m  f o r  e m e r g e n c y  a n d  d is ­
a s te r  le g is la t io n .  Y e t  th e r e  a re  s igns t h a t  th e  n a t io n  is w e ll  o n  its w a y  
to  b r id g in g  th e  g a p  a n d ,  p e r h a p s ,  in  th e  fo r e s e e a b le  fu tu r e  w il l  be
5 0
Chapter 2 Crisis Management Policy in Russia: The Institutional Framework
a b le  to  m e rg e  th e  tw o  g e n e ra l  a re a s  o f  e m e r g e n c y  a n d  d is a s te r  le g is ­
la t io n ,  w h ic h  c o u ld  b e  c o n d i t io n a l ly  la b e le d  as sy s te m s  ( in te g ra te d  
a c ts )  a n d  s p e c if ic  in d iv id u a l  a c ts .  W h i le  th e  f o r m e r  c o v e rs  th e  w h o le  
g a m u t  o f  c o m m u n i t y  a n d  r e g io n a l  p r o t e c t i o n ,  th e  la t t e r  re g u la te s  e i ­
th e r  a p a r t i c u la r  c r is is  o r  a w h o le  se t  o f  e m e r g e n c y  a n d  d is a s te r  
m a n a g e m e n t  ta s k s  f o r  a sp e c if ic  ty p e  o f  c r ise s .
B e f o r e  p r o c e e d in g ,  it  is w o r t h  r e i te r a t in g  t h a t  th is  a r t i f ic ia l  d iv i­
s io n  o f  a c ts  h a s  b e e n  u se fu l  f o r  r e s e a r c h  a n d  f o r  a c q u ir in g  a b e t te r  u n ­
d e r s ta n d in g  o f  th e  s p e c t r u m  o f  e x is t in g  e m e r g e n c y  a n d  d is a s te r  le g is ­
la t io n  in  R u s s ia .  Y e t  s u c h  a d e m a r c a t io n  is to  a g r e a t  e x t e n t  c o n ­
d it io n a l .
I n t e g ra t e d  A c ts  p ro v id e  th e  b a s ic  c o n c e p t u a l  f r a m e w o r k ,  p r in c i ­
p le s ,  g o a ls  a n d  ta s k s  o f  th e  n a t io n a l  e m e r g e n c y  a n d  d is a s te r  m a n ­
a g e m e n t  p o l ic y  in  R u s s ia .  T h e s e  in c lu d e  a b o u t  4 0  fe d e ra l  la w s  f r o m  
w h ic h  ju s t  a f e w  o f  th e  m o s t  im p o r t a n t  a re  m e n t io n e d  h e re .  F ir s t  o f  
a l l ,  th e  C o n s t i t u t io n  o f  th e  R u s s ia n  F e d e r a t io n  w a s  a d o p te d  in  
1 9 9 3 .  S p e c if ic  p a r a g r a p h s  c le a r ly  u p h o ld  a c i t iz e n ’s r ig h t  to  life ,  
h e a l t h  a n d  p r o p e r t y  w ith  th e  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  th e se  b e in g  th e  k e y  o b ­
je c t iv e  o f  th e  s ta te  e m e r g e n c y  a n d  d is a s te r  p o licy . N o t w i t h s t a n d in g ,  
th e  C o n s t i t u t io n  s t ip u la te s  c e r ta in  r e s t r ic t io n s  o n  th e s e  r ig h ts  a n d  
f r e e d o m s  in  o r d e r  to  e n s u re  th e  s a fe ty  o f  a ll  d u r in g  a c r is is :  f o r  e x ­
a m p le ,  w h e n  th e  P re s id e n t  o f  R u s s ia  h a s  d e c la re d  a s ta te  o f  e m e r ­
gency.
In  a d d i t io n  to  t h a t ,  th e  1 9 9 2  S e c u r i ty  A c t  f o r m u la te s  th e  b a s ic  
c o n c e p ts  a s s o c ia te d  w ith  th e  m is s io n  a n d  g o a ls  o f  e m e r g e n c y  a n d  
d is a s te r  m a n a g e m e n t  in c lu d in g  “ s e c u r i ty ,” “ s a fe ty ,” a n d  “ se c u r ity  
a n d  s a fe ty  s y s t e m .” I t  a lso  s ta te s  th e  p r in c ip le s ,  m a in  c o m p o n e n t s  
a n d  f u n c t io n s  o f  a “ s e c u r i ty  a n d  s a fe ty  s y s te m ” in  th e  e v e n t  o f  a n  
e m e rg e n cy . P a r a g r a p h  1 0  o f  th is  a c t  c le a r ly  d is t in g u is h e s  th e  p o w e r s  
o f  th e  fe d e ra l  le g is la t iv e ,  e x e c u t iv e  a n d  ju d ic ia l  b o d ie s  w ith in  th e  n a ­
t io n a l  s e c u r i ty  s y s te m . W h i l e  s im ila r  d is t in c t io n s  a re  a lso  m a d e  b e ­
tw e e n  th e  fe d e ra l  a n d  r e g io n a l  a u th o r i t ie s  in  th is  a c t ,  s u c h  d is t in c ­
t io n s  a re  m o r e  c le a r ly  f o r m u la te d  in  th e  C o n s t i t u t io n  o f  th e  R u s s ia n  
F e d e r a t io n .  A n  in v e n to r y  o f  th e  b a s ic  m e a n s  u sed  to  e n s u re  s ta te  se ­
c u r i ty  a n d  s a fe ty  p o l ic y  im p le m e n ta t io n  is s p e c if ie d  in  P a r a g r a p h  1 2  
o f  th e  S e c u r i ty  A c t .  P a r a g r a p h  1 2  h a s  s in c e  b e e n  s u p p le m e n te d  b y  
s u b s e q u e n t  d e c re e s  a n d  r e g u la t io n s  b y  th e  P re s id e n t  a n d  b y  th e  
R u s s ia n  g o v e r n m e n t .
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A s m e n t io n e d  earlier , th e  1 9 9 4  F e d e r a l  E m e r g e n c y  A c t  serv es  to  
in c o r p o r a t e  a ll  o f  th e  e x is t in g  a c ts  c o n c e r n in g  n o n - c o n f l i c t  c r ise s  in  
p e a c e t im e .  I t  w a s  a d o p te d  in  1 9 9 4  a n d  w a s  s u p p le m e n te d  in  
1 9 9 5 - 1 9 9 8  b y  a series  o f  g o v e r n m e n ta l  r e g u la t io n s  c la s s i fy in g  n a t u ­
ra l  d isa s te rs  a n d  te c h n o lo g ic a l  a c c id e n ts ,  c o m m u n i t y  p re p a re d n e s s ,  
th e  e x c h a n g e  o f  in f o r m a t io n  d u r in g  a c r is is ,  a n d  m a t te r s  c o n c e r n in g  
th e  U S E P E  (o r g a n iz a t io n a l  s t r u c tu r e ,  f u n c t io n s ,  t a s k s ,  a n d  m e a n s ) .  
C o n f l i c t - o r ie n te d  c r ise s  a re  b e y o n d  th e  s c o p e  o f  th is  d is c o u rs e  a n d , 
th u s ,  a re  n o t  c o n s id e r e d  in  th is  c h a p te r .  ( T h o s e  in te re s te d  a re  r e c o m ­
m e n d e d  to  see  P o rf ir ie v ,  1 9 9 9 ) .  C o n f l i c t - o r ie n te d  cr ise s  a re  r e g u la t ­
ed b y  o th e r  fe d e ra l  la w s  a n d  a re  e n f o r c e d  b y  s ta te  s e c u r i ty  in s t i tu ­
t io n s  in c lu d in g  a m o n g  o th e r s :  th e  M in is t r y  o f  th e  In te r n a l  A f fa ir s ,  
th e  M in is t r y  o f  D e fe n s e ,  th e  F e d e r a l  S e c u r i ty  S e rv ic e ,  a n d  th e  F e d e r ­
al F r o n t ie r  S e rv ice .
T h e  in te n t io n  w a s  th a t  th e  1 9 9 4  F e d e r a l  E m e r g e n c y  A c t  w o u ld  
s u p p le m e n t  a n d  s p e c ify  th e  m o r e  g e n e ra l  1 9 9 2  S e c u r i ty  A c t  in  te rm s  
o f  n a tu r a l  a n d  t e c h n o lo g ic a l  d isa s te rs  w i t h o u t  n e e d in g  to  d ire c t ly  
a d d re ss  s u c h  issu es  in  th e  C o n s t i tu t io n .  Y e t  th is  a p p r o a c h  h a s  r e ­
s t r ic te d  a n d  d e b i l i ta te d  th e  c o m p r e h e n s iv e  a s p e c t  o f  th e  1 9 9 4  F e d e r ­
al E m e r g e n c y  A c t .  M o r e  im p o r ta n t ly ,  th e  s c o p e  a n d  c o m p r e h e n s iv e ­
n ess  o f  th e  U S E P E  a re  l im ite d  e v e n  a l th o u g h  th e  n a m e  o f  th is  in s t i ­
tu t io n a l  s y s te m  (T h e  U n if ie d  S ta te  S y s te m  f o r  E m e r g e n c y  P r e v e n t io n  
a n d  E l im in a t io n )  im p lie s  o th e r w is e .
T h e  s h o r t c o m in g s  o f  th e  R u s s ia n  e m e r g e n c y  a n d  d is a s te r  le g is la ­
t io n  o r ig in a te  f r o m  a fo c u s  o n  th e  c a u s e s  o f  a d is a s te r  r a th e r  th a n  
o n  th e  e f fe c ts  p r o d u c e d  o r  th e  n e c e s s a r y  r e s p o n s e .  T h is  v ie w  h a s  
b e e n  e x te n s iv e ly  c r i t ic iz e d ,  a n d  r ig h t ly  s o ,  o v e r  th e  p a s t  1 0 - 1 5  y e a rs  
b y  in te r n a t io n a l  s c h o la r s ,  w h o  h a v e  s tre sse d  th e  n e e d  to  a d d re ss  s o ­
c ia l  c o n c e r n s .  ( F o r  a re v ie w  o f  th is  d is c u s s io n ,  see Q u a r a n te l l i ,
1 9 9 8 ) .  E v e n  m o r e  im p o r ta n t ly  a re  th e  p r a c t i c a l  im p l ic a t io n s  o f  th is  
“ o n e  ty p e  o f  c r i s i s ” a p p r o a c h  in  e m e r g e n c y  a n d  d is a s te r  m a n a g e ­
m e n t .  F o r  in s ta n c e ,  th e  U S  a n d  C a n a d a  a ls o  h a v e  a s im ila r  “ o n e  
ty p e  o f  c r i s i s ” a p p r o a c h ,  b u t  e f fe c t iv e ly  u se  th e  m o s t  a p p l ic a b le  
to o ls  f o r  c h a n g in g  th e  e x is t in g  n a t io n a l  e m e r g e n c y  le g is la t io n  a n d  
m a n a g e m e n t  s y s te m s .
S p e c ific  In d iv id u a l A cts  c h a r a c te r iz e  th e  o th e r  ty p e  o f  R u s s ia n  
e m e r g e n c y  a n d  d is a s te r  le g is la t io n .  S u c h  a c ts  c a n  b e  su b d iv id e d  in to  
t w o  g ro u p s :  (1 )  th o s e  w h ic h  c o v e r  p a r t i c u la r  ty p es  o f  e m e rg e n c ie s  
a n d  d is a s te rs ,  a n d  (2 )  th o s e  w h ic h  d ea l w ith  p a r t i c u la r  f u n c t io n s ,
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ta s k s ,  a g e n c ie s  o r  se rv ices  (m in is tr ie s ,  f ire  serv ices ,  m e d ic a l  se rv ices ,  
re s c u e  w o r k ,  e tc . ) .
F e d e r a l  la w s  r e g u la t in g  th e  r isk s  a s s o c ia te d  w ith  t o x i c  m a te r ia ls  
a n d  a c c id e n ts  a re  in c lu d e d  in  th e  f ir s t  g ro u p .  F o r  in s ta n c e ,  in  th e  
e v e n t  o f  a h a z a r d o u s  c h e m ic a l  le a k  o r  a n  o n -s i te  o il  sp ill ,  o n e  s h o u ld  
im m e d ia te ly  re fe r  to  th e  1 9 9 7  In d u s t r ia l  S a fe ty  o f  H a z a r d o u s  P r o ­
d u c t io n  F a c i l i t ie s  A c t ,  th e  R u s s ia n  e q u iv a le n t  o f  th e  1 9 9 6  S e v e so  II 
D ir e c t iv e  in  th e  E C  c o u n tr ie s .  T h e  1 9 9 1  E n v ir o n m e n t a l  P r o te c t io n  
A c t  c o v e rs  th e  m a n a g e m e n t  o f  o i l  sp ills  a n d  th e  d is c h a rg e  o f  h a z ­
a r d o u s  c h e m ic a ls .  F e d e r a l  le g is la t io n  f o r  r a d ia t io n  h a z a rd s  is c o v ­
ere d  in  th e  s o c ia l  p r o t e c t i o n  a c ts  f o r  p e o p le  a f fe c te d  b y  r a d ia t io n  
d isa s te rs  in  th e  S o u th  U ra ls  a n d  C h e r n o b y l  (as a m e n d e d  in  1 9 9 9 ) ,  
o r  in  th e  1 9 9 5  la w s  r e g u la t in g  th e  u se  o f  a t o m ic  e n e rg y  a n d  e n s u r ­
in g  r a d ia t io n  safety .
T h e  s e c o n d  g ro u p  is c o m p r is e d  o f  a c ts  w h ic h  d e a l  w ith  s p e c if ic  
f u n c t io n s  a n d  ta s k s  and/or w h ic h  in v o lv e  sp e c if ic  cr is is  m a n a g e m e n t  
a g e n c ie s  o r  serv ices .  W o r t h  s p e c ia l  m e n t io n in g  is th e  1 9 9 4  A c t  f o r  
E m e r g e n c y  a n d  R e s c u e  S e rv ice s  In c lu d in g  R ig h t s  f o r  R e s c u e  W o r k ­
ers . T h is  c o v e rs  th e  w h o le  g a m u t  o f  a c t iv it ie s  re la te d  to  th e  ta s k s  in ­
v o lv e d  in  p re v e n t in g  a n d  d e a lin g  w ith  a n  e m e r g e n c y  ( in c lu d in g  a c c i ­
d e n ts  in v o lv in g  h a z a r d o u s  m a te r ia ls ) .  N u m e r o u s  p re s id e n t ia l  d e ­
c re e s  a n d  g o v e r n m e n t a l  r e g u la t io n s  s u p p le m e n t  th e se  fe d e ra l  a c ts .  
T h e  a c ts  w h ic h  r e g u la te  sp e c if ic  e m e r g e n c y  a n d  d is a s te r  m a n a g e ­
m e n t  f u n c t io n s  a re  d e s c r ib e d  in  m o r e  d e ta il  in  th e  n e x t  s e c t io n .
National Emergency and Disaster Management: Key 
Functions and Features
A s a n  o r g a n iz a t io n a l  s y s te m , th e  U n if ie d  S ta te  S y s te m  f o r  E m e r ­
g e n c y  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  E l i m in a t io n  o f  th e  R u s s ia n  F e d e r a t io n  
(U S E P E )  p r o t e c ts  in d iv id u a ls  a n d  th e  n a t io n  as a w h o le  b y  im p le ­
m e n t in g  m e a s u re s  f o r  p re v e n t in g ,  p r e p a r in g ,  r e s p o n d in g ,  a n d  r e c o v ­
e r in g  f r o m  e m e rg e n c ie s  a n d  d isa s te rs  p r o v o k e d  by  n a t u r a l  a n d  t e c h ­
n o lo g ic a l  d isa s te rs .  C r is e s  p r e c ip i ta te d  b y  s o c ia l  a n d  p o l i t i c a l  th r e a ts  
a re  d e a lt  w i th  b y  d if fe re n t  in s t i tu t io n a l  sy s te m s  w h ic h  o v e rs e e  p u b ­
lic  h e a l th ,  p u b l ic  o r d e r  a n d  n a t io n a l  se cu r ity :  M in is t r y  o f  H e a l t h ,  
th e  M in is t r y  o f  I n te r n a l  A ffa ir s  a n d  th e  F e d e r a l  S e c u r i ty  S e rv ic e  (see 
A p p e n d ix  2 ,  s e c t io n  Q l ) .  T h e  p o l ic ie s  o f  th e s e  sy s te m s  a re  b e y o n d  
th e  p u r p o s e  o f  th is  d is c u ss io n .
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U S E P E ’s o r g a n iz a t io n a l  c o m p o s i t io n  s t ip u la te s  v a r io u s  o p e r a t iv e  
t a s k s ,  a re a s  o f  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  a n d  a u th o r i ty ,  a n d  th e  d e c is io n - m a k in g  
levels  in  th e  e v e n t  o f  a n  e m e rg e n cy . U S E P E ’s c e n tr a l iz e d  c o o r d i n a ­
t io n  f o r  c o n t in g e n c y  a n d  o p e r a t i o n  p la n n in g  tr ie s  to  u til ize  g r a s s ­
r o o t s  m e t h o d s  f o r  im p le m e n t in g  p la n s  a n d  f o r  r e s p o n d in g  to  e m e r ­
g e n c ie s  a n d  d isa s te rs .
An Organizational Overview o f  the USEPE
In  a c c o r d a n c e  w ith  th e  a f o r e m e n t io n e d  r e q u ir e m e n ts ,  th e  U S E P E  is 
o rg a n iz e d  a lo n g  g e o g r a p h ic a l  b o u n d a r ie s  (sp a t ia l  c r i te r ia )  a n d  a c ­
c o r d in g  to  c e r ta in  o b je c t iv e s  (c r i te r ia  r e g a r d in g  p u rp o s e s  a n d  f u n c ­
t io n s ) .  T h u s ,  th e re  a re  t w o  s u b s y s te m s  u n d e r  U S E P E :  a s p a t ia l  s u b ­
s y s te m  ( te r r i to r ia l )  a n d  a f u n c t io n a l  m a n a g e m e n t  s u b s y s te m .
T h e  sp a tia l o r  te rrito ria l s u b s y s te m s  a re  o rg a n iz e d  b y  th e  e x e c u ­
tive  a u th o r i t ie s  o f  th e  R u s s ia n  F e d e r a t io n  e n ti t ie s  a n d  th e  lo c a l  a u ­
th o r i t ie s  b a s e d  a lo n g  th e  e x is t in g  a d m in is t r a t iv e  a n d  s p a t ia l  d iv i­
s io n s  o f  th e  n a t io n a l  t e r r i to r y  (as s t ip u la te d  b y  th e  C o n s t i t u t io n  o f  
th e  R u s s ia n  F e d e r a t io n ) .  T h e s e  s u b s y s te m s  in c lu d e :  m a n a g e m e n t  
b o d ie s ,  p u b l ic  a d m in is t r a t io n ,  th e  e x e c u t iv e  a u th o r i t ie s  o f  th e  R u s s ­
ia n  F e d e r a t io n  e n t i t ie s ,  a n d  th e  lo c a l  a u th o r i t ie s  a n d  o r g a n iz a t io n s  
r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  c o m m u n i t y  a n d  r e g io n a l  p r o t e c t i o n  a g a in s t  n a t u r a l  
d isa s te rs  a n d  te c h n o lo g ic a l  h a z a rd s .  T h e  U S E P E  h a s  m o r e  th a n
5 . 0 0 0  s p a t ia l  s u b s y s te m s  in  8 9  R u s s ia n  F e d e r a t io n  e n t i t ie s ,  o v e r
1 .0 0 0  s u b s y s te m s  in  th e  la rg e s t  u r b a n  a re a s  a n d  m o r e  th a n  2 , 2 0 0  
s u b s y s te m s  in  th e  r u r a l  a re a s .  In  2 0 0 1  th e r e  w e re  8 8  R u s s ia n  F e d e r ­
a t io n  e n ti t ie s  ( e x c lu d in g  th e  C h e c h e n  R e p u b l ic )  w i th  5 7 6  r e g io n a l  
e m e r g e n c y  c o m m is s io n s  a n d  c o m m it te e s .
T h e  fu n c t io n a l  s u b s y s te m s  a re  o rg a n iz e d  b y  th e  fe d e ra l  e x e c u ­
t ive  a u th o r i t ie s  a n d  c o n s is t  o f  th e  fe d e ra l  g o v e r n m e n t ,  th e  fe d e ra l  
m in is tr ie s  a n d  d e p a r tm e n ts  re s p o n s ib le  f o r  e m e r g e n c y  p r e v e n t io n  
a n d  re s p o n s e  in  th e  a re a s ,  a n d  v a r io u s  in d u s tr ie s .  T h e  f u n c t io n a l  
s u b s y s te m s  c o n s is t  o f  m a in ly  th re e  ta s k s :  m o n i t o r in g  ( o b s e r v a t io n s  
a n d  in s p e c t io n s ) ,  o p e r a t io n a l  m a n a g e m e n t  (e m e rg e n c y  p r e p a r e d ­
n e ss ,  r e s p o n s e  a n d  r e c o v e r y ) ,  a n d  lo g is t ic  s u p p o r t  (m a te r ia l ,  t e c h n i ­
c a l ,  f in a n c ia l ,  e tc . ) .
T h e  c o m p o s i t io n  a n d  p r im a r y  f u n c t io n s  o f  th e  U S E P E  c o in c id e  
w ith  th e  t r a d i t io n  v iew  o f  e m e r g e n c y  a n d  d is a s te r  m a n a g e m e n t ,  
w h ic h  h a s  p r im a r i ly  f o c u s e d  o n  r e s p o n s e  a n d  r e c o v e r y  m e a s u re s .
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T h e  f o r m e r  S o v ie t  U n io n  w a s  la c k in g  u r g e n t  fe d e r a l  a n d  r e g io n a l  r e ­
s p o n s e  se rv ices  a n d  h a d  f o r  d e c a d e s  s im p ly  d e p lo y e d  th e  a rm y , th e  
lo c a l  p o l ic e  a n d  v a r io u s  f i re - f ig h t in g  u n its  d u r in g  a d isaster . T h e  S o ­
v ie t p o l ic y  f o r  cr is is  m a n a g e m e n t  fo c u s e d  o n  r e a c t in g  to  c r ise s  
r a th e r  t h a n  o n  p la n n in g  a n d  try in g  to  p re v e n t  th e m  f r o m  o c c u r r in g .
H o w e v e r ,  in  r e c e n t  y e a rs  th e  s i tu a t io n  h a s  c h a n g e d  a n d  n o w  
th e r e  is m o r e  e m p h a s is  o n  p la n n in g  a n d  p r e v e n t io n  w ith in  th e  
U S E P E .  F o r  e x a m p le ,  “ T h e  F e d e r a l  T a r g e te d  P r o g r a m  f o r  R i s k  R e ­
d u c t io n  a n d  M i t i g a t i o n  o f  N a t u r a l  a n d  T e c h n o lo g ic a l  D is a s te r s  in  
th e  R u s s ia n  F e d e r a t io n  b y  2 0 0 5 ” w a s  e n a c te d  in  1 9 9 9  ( F e d e r a ln a ia ,
1 9 9 9 ) .  T h is  is c o n s id e r e d  in  m o r e  d e ta i l  la te r  in  th is  c h a p ter .
T H E  U SE P E  M A N A G E M E N T  L E V E L S : C O M P O S I T I O N  A N D  
F U N C T IO N S
T h e  U S E P E  in v o lv e s  five b a s ic  levels  f o r  m a k in g  a n d  im p le m e n t in g  
d e c is io n s  w ith  s p e c ia l  c o n s id e r a t io n  g iv e n  to  th e  se v er i ty  o f  th e  
e m e r g e n c y  o r  d isaster . T h e s e  in c lu d e :
• O r g a n iz a t i o n a l  lev e l -  a n  e n te rp r is e ,  in s t i tu t io n ,  e tc .
• L o c a l  leve l -  a t o w n ,  a c i ty  d is tr ic t ,  o r  a s m a l l  to  m e d iu m  
sized  city.
• R e g io n a l  lev e l -  a R u s s ia n  F e d e r a t io n  entity .
• M a c r o - r e g i o n a l  lev e l -  a n  a re a  ro u g h ly  th e  size o f  tw o  R F  
e n ti t ie s .
• F e d e r a l  leve l -  tw o  o r  m o r e  R F  e n ti t ie s  o r  th e  e n t ire  n a t io n  
as a w h o le .
I f  a n  e m e r g e n c y  o r  d is a s te r  s tr ik e s  a n  a re a  o r  fa c i l i ty  o w n e d  b y  th e  
fe d e ra l  g o v e r n m e n t  ( fo r  e x a m p le :  a n u c le a r  p o w e r  p la n t ,  a c h e m ic a l  
fa c to r y ,  o r  th e  c o a s t a l  b o u n d a r y ) ,  th e  c r is is  w o u ld  b e  h a n d le d  a t  th e  
fe d e ra l  level a n d ,  to  a le sser  e x te n t ,  th e  r e g io n a l  leve l. E a c h  o f  th e  
a b o v e m e n t io n e d  U S E P E  levels  h a s  a s im ila r  c o m p o s i t io n  re g a rd in g  
h o w  m o n i t o r in g  a n d  o p e r a t io n a l  m a t te r s  a re  c o n d u c te d .  A m o n g  
th e s e  a re  c o o r d i n a t io n  g ro u p s  a n d  p e r m a n e n t  o p e r a t io n a l  a n d  m o n ­
i to r in g  a g e n c ie s  w h ic h  a re  e s p e c ia l ly  a u th o r iz e d  to  p ro v id e  c o m m u ­
n ity  a n d  r e g io n a l  p r o t e c t i o n  d u r in g  a n  e m e r g e n c y  o r  d is a s te r ;  to  a l ­
lo c a te  f in a n c ia l ,  m a te r ia l  a n d  te c h n ic a l  r e s o u r c e s ;  a n d  to  in it ia te  
c o m m u n ic a t io n ,  w a r n in g  a n d  in f o r m a t io n  s u p p o r t  sy s te m s .
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T h e  c o o r d i n a t io n  g ro u p s  c o n d u c t  s t r a te g ic  a n d  ta c t i c a l  p la n n in g  
p r im a r i ly  a s s o c ia te d  w ith  p r e v e n t io n  a n d  re s p o n s e  p re p a re d n e s s .  
T h is  in v o lv e s  th e  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  sp e c if ic  f e d e ra l  a n d  r e g io n a l  e m e r ­
g e n c y  p r o g r a m s  a n d  p la n s .  T h e s e  b o d ie s  a ls o  p ro v id e  m a n a g e m e n t  
f o r  im p le m e n ta t io n .  T h e y  b e a r  th e  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  f o r  e n s u r in g  th e  
a v a i la b i l i ty ,  r e l ia b i l i ty  a n d  e ffe c t iv e n e s s  o f  th e  w a r n in g  a n d  r e s p o n s e  
s y s te m s , a n d  f o r  c o o r d in a t in g  th e  r e c o v e r y  a c t iv it ie s .  B e tw e e n  1 9 9 5  
a n d  2 0 0 0  s o m e  d o z e n  fe d e ra l  a n d  r e g io n a l  p r o g r a m s  w e re  d e v e l­
o p e d  a n d  im p le m e n te d  a t  v a r io u s  s tag e s  f o r  th e  p r e v e n t io n  a n d  m it i ­
g a t io n  o f  m a jo r  e m e rg e n c ie s  a n d  d isa s te rs .  T h is  in c lu d e d  th e  a f o r e ­
m e n t io n e d  “ F e d e r a l  T a r g e t  P r o g r a m  f o r  R i s k  R e d u c t io n  a n d  M i t i g a ­
t io n  o f  N a t u r a l  a n d  T e c h n o lo g ic a l  D is a s te r s  in  th e  R u s s ia n  
F e d e r a t io n  b y  2 0 0 1 ” w h ic h  serves  b o t h  as a c o r n e r s t o n e  a n d  as an  
o r g a n iz a t io n a l  u m b r e l la  f o r  o th e r  re la te d  fe d e ra l  p r o g r a m s .
F ir s t  o f  a ll ,  a t  th e  fe d e ra l  lev e l,  th e  In te r d e p a r tm e n ta l  C o m m i s ­
s io n  f o r  E m e r g e n c y  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  R e s p o n s e  is o n e  o f  th e  U S E P E ’s 
c o o r d in a t in g  b o d ie s .  I t  is c o m p o s e d  o f  th e  D e p u t y  M in is te r s  a n d  
C h a ir s  o f  th e  fe d e ra l  m in is tr ie s  a n d  s ta te  c o m m it te e s  in v o lv e d  in  
e m e r g e n c y  a n d  d is a s te r  m a n a g e m e n t  issu es , a n d  is h e a d e d  b y  th e  
P r im e  M in is te r .  A c c o r d in g  to  R u s s ia n  law , th e  P r im e  M in is t e r  is th e  
H e a d  o f  th e  R u s s ia n  C iv il  D e fe n s e ,  ye t  in  e v e ry d a y  m a t te r s  c iv il  d e ­
fe n se  is m a n a g e d  b y  th e  M in is t r y  f o r  C iv il  D e fe n s e ,  E m e r g e n c ie s  
a n d  N a t u r a l  D is a s te r  R e s p o n s e  ( E M E R C O M ) .  T h e  H e a d  o f  E M E R -  
C O M  is a F e d e r a l  M in is te r ,  th e  D e p u t y  C h ie f  o f  th e  C iv il  D e fe n s e ,  
a n d  th e  C o m m a n d e r - in - C h i e f  o f  th e  c iv il  d e fe n se  t r o o p s .
S e c o n d ly ,  E M E R C O M  a n d  th e  e m e r g e n c y  c o m m is s io n s  w ith in  
e a c h  o f  th ese  m in is tr ie s  a n d  s ta te  c o m m it te e s  a re  a ls o  fe d e ra l  c o o r ­
d in a t in g  b o d ie s .  E M E R C O M  is th e  k e y  fe d e ra l  g o v e r n m e n t a l  b o d y  
r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  c o o r d in a t in g  c iv il  e m e r g e n c y  p la n n in g ,  s e a r c h  a n d  
re s c u e  o p e r a t io n s ,  a n d  th e  e v a c u a t io n  p r o c e s s  d u r in g  m a jo r  n a t u r a l  
d isa s te rs  a n d  t e c h n o lo g ic a l  e m e rg e n c ie s .  M e a n w h i le ,  th e  o th e r  
e m e r g e n c y  a n d  d is a s te r  m a n a g e m e n t  fu n c t io n s  (fire  f ig h t in g ,  m e d ­
ic a l  c a r e ,  t r a n s p o r t a t io n ,  m a in ta in in g  p u b l ic  o r d e r  a n d  o th e r  s e rv ic ­
es c a r r ie d  o u t  d u r in g  m a jo r  o p e r a t io n s )  a re  th e  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  o f  o t h ­
er f e d e r a l  a g e n c ie s .  In  to t a l  th e re  a re  a b o u t  3 0  a g e n c ie s ,  in c lu d in g :  
th e  M in is t r y  o f  In te r io r ,  th e  M in is t r y  o f  H e a l t h ,  th e  M in is t r y  o f  
T r a n s p o r t a t io n ,  th e  M in is t r y  o f  C o m m u n ic a t i o n ,  as  w ell  as a fe w  
o th e r  m in is tr ie s ,  s ta te  c o m m it te e s ,  a n d  fe d e ra l  se rv ices .
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A t  th e  m a c r o - r e g io n a l  leve l, se v en  E M E R C O M  r e g io n a l  c e n te rs  
d e a l  w i th  th e  c o o r d in a t in g  e f fo r ts  w ith in  th e  U S E P E .  A t  th e  r e g io n ­
a l,  lo c a l  a n d  o r g a n iz a t io n a l  levels  th e s e  b o d ie s  h a v e  e m e r g e n c y  c o m ­
m is s io n s  o r  e m e r g e n c y  c o m m it te e s  c o m p o s e d  o f  e x e c u t iv e  a u t h o r i ­
ties  f r o m  th e  R F  e n t i t ie s ,  o f  lo c a l  a u th o r i t ie s  a n d  o f  v a r io u s  o r g a n i ­
z a t io n s .
T h e  U S E P E ’s p e r m a n e n t  o p e ra t io n a l a n d  m o n it o r in g  a g e n c ie s  
(w h ic h  a re  a u th o r iz e d  to  p ro v id e  c o m m u n i t y  a n d  r e g io n a l  p r o t e c ­
t io n  d u r in g  a n  e m e rg e n c y )  c a r r y  o u t  th e  f u n c t io n s  o f  o p e r a t io n a l  
p la n n in g  a n d  m a n a g e m e n t  b y  p r e p a r in g  c o n t in g e n c y  a n d  o p e r a ­
t io n a l  p la n s .  T h e y  a ls o  o v e rs e e  a n d  m o n i t o r  th e  im p le m e n ta t io n  
p la n s ,  in  p a r t i c u la r  th o s e  c o n c e r n in g  e m e r g e n c y  p r e p a re d n e s s  a n d  
r e s p o n s e .  A t  th e  fe d e ra l  a n d  m a c r o - r e g io n a l  lev e ls ,  E M E R C O M  a n d  
its  se v en  r e g io n a l  c e n te rs  a re  th e  m a in  s ta te  b o d ie s  re s p o n s ib le  f o r  
s u c h  m a t te r s .  A t  th e  r e g io n a l  a n d  lo c a l  lev e ls ,  th is  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  is 
p la c e d  u p o n  th e  s t a f f  o f  th e  C iv il  D e fe n s e  a n d  th e  E m e r g e n c y  a n d  
D is a s te r  M a n a g e m e n t  C o m m is s io n s .  A t  th e  o r g a n iz a t io n a l  leve l, th e  
C iv il  D e fe n s e  a n d  th e  E m e r g e n c y  a n d  D is a s te r  M a n a g e m e n t  D e p a r t ­
m e n t  (o r  c e r ta in  a u th o r iz e d  p e r s o n s  w ith in  th e s e  r e s p e c t iv e  in s t i tu ­
t io n s )  e x e r c is e  th e se  fu n c t io n s .
T h e  U S E P E ’s r o u t in e  o p e ra t io n a l a n d  m o n it o r in g  a g e n c ie s  p r o ­
v ide  s u p e rv is io n  a n d  in f o r m a t io n  s u p p o r t  to  th e  r e s p o n s ib le  a g e n ­
c ies  d e a lin g  w ith  e m e r g e n c y  a n d  d is a s te r  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  p ro v id e  
o p e r a t io n a l  s u p p o r t  d u r in g  a n  e m e rg e n cy . T h e s e  b o d ie s  in c lu d e  th e  
E M E R C O M ’s c e n tr a l  C r is is  M a n a g e m e n t  C e n te r  (a t  th e  fe d e ra l  le v ­
e l) ,  th e  O n - D u t y  O p e r a t i o n a l  S e rv ic e s  o f  th e  E M E R C O M  r e g io n a l  
c e n te r s ,  a n d  th e  p e r m a n e n t  r e g io n a l  E m e r g e n c y  C o m m is s io n s  f o r  
th e  in d iv id u a l  g o v e r n m e n ts  o f  th e  R F  e n t i t ie s .  T h e s e  se rv ices  a re  in ­
c r e a s in g ly  b e in g  t r a n s f o r m e d  in to  C r is is  M a n a g e m e n t  C e n te r s .  T h e  
s p e c i f ic  m in is tr ie s  o f  th e  R u s s ia n  F e d e r a t io n  e n t i t ie s  a t  th e  r e g io n a l  
leve l a ls o  u til ize  th e  O n - D u t y  a n d  D is p a t c h  S e rv ic e s .  A t  th e  lo c a l  
leve l r o u t in e  o p e r a t io n a l  ta s k s  a n d  m o n i t o r in g  a re  c o n d u c te d  b y  th e  
lo c a l  O n - D u t y  O p e r a t i o n a l  S e rv ic e s ,  w h ic h  in  th e  b ig g e r  c it ie s  a re  
b e in g  in c r e a s in g ly  t r a n s f o r m e d  in to  U n if ie d  O n - D u t y  a n d  D is p a t c h  
S e rv ic e s .  A ll  o f  th e s e  c h a n g e s  a re  sc h e d u le d  fo r  c o m p le t io n  in  2 0 0 5  
(F e d e r a ln a ia ,  1 9 9 9 ;  G o s u d a r s tv e n n i i ,  2 0 0 0 ) .
W it h in  th e  U S E P E ’s f u n c t io n a l  s u b s y s te m s ,  p e r m a n e n t  o p e r a ­
t io n a l  a n d  m o n i t o r in g  a g e n c ie s  c a r r y  th e  b u r d e n  o f  d e v e lo p in g  a n d  
im p le m e n t in g  m e a s u re s  f o r  p re v e n t in g  a n d  m it ig a t in g  d isa s te rs  a n d
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e m e rg e n c ie s .  T h e  m a in  ro le  o f  E M E R C O M  is to  b e  th e  k e y  c o o r d i ­
n a t o r  in  m a jo r  e m e rg e n c ie s  a n d  d isa s te rs .
A s  f o r  m in o r  a c c id e n ts  (w h ic h  c o n s t i tu t e  th e  b u lk  o f  o f f i c ia l ly  
re g is te re d  e m e rg e n c ie s ) ,  th e se  a re  th e  re s p o n s ib i l i ty  o f  th e  lo c a l  a n d  
r e g io n a l  p o l ic e ,  e m e r g e n c y  serv ices ,  m e d ic a l  se rv ices  a n d  te c h n ic a l  
s u p p o r t  serv ices .  C o n s id e r in g  th e  s u b s ta n t ia l  r e s o u rc e s  c o n c e n t r a te d  
a t  th e  fe d e r a l  leve l, th e  E M E R C O M  h e a d q u a r te r s  s h o u ld  n o t  o n ly  
b e  c o n s id e r e d  a k e y  e m e r g e n c y  p la n n in g  a n d  c o o r d in a t in g  a g e n c y  
b u t  a ls o  as a n  im p o r t a n t  r e s p o n s e  a c to r .  T h e  b u lk  o f  th e  s e a r c h  a n d  
re s c u e  u n its  in  th e  v a r io u s  re g io n s  a re  o p e r a te d  b y  th e  E M E R C O M  
r e g io n a l  c e n te rs  a n d  b y  th e  r e g io n a l  a n d  lo c a l  a u th o r i t ie s .  H o w e v e r ,  
th e s e  u n its  a re  n o t  s t r o n g  e n o u g h  to  p ro v id e  a n  e ffe c t iv e  r e s p o n s e  
in d e p e n d e n t ly  (i.e . w i t h o u t  h e lp  f r o m  th e  fe d e ra l  level)  s in c e  th e re  
a re  ju s t  a f e w  u n its  a n d  th e y  a re  w id e ly  s c a t te re d  a c r o s s  th e  c o u n try .  
T h e  p r o b le m  is f u r th e r  c o m p l ic a te d  b y  th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  U S E P E ’s 
f u n c t io n  s u b s y s te m s  u n d e r w e n t  d r a m a t ic  c h a n g e s  in  2 0 0 0  a n d  
2 0 0 1 .  T h u s ,  th e re  is a s h o r t a g e  o f  t ra in e d  e m e r g e n c y  p e r s o n n e l  a n d  
l im ite d  re s o u r c e s  a t  th e  r e g io n a l  a n d  lo c a l  leve ls  w ith in  th e  U S E P E  
s p a t ia l  s u b s y s te m s .
T H E  O P E R A T IO N A L  ST A G ES O F  U SE P E  A N D  IT S  F O R C E S
A ll  e m e r g e n c y  o p e r a t i o n a l  a n d  m o n i t o r in g  o r g a n s  a c t  as c o n t r o l  
ce n te rs  f o r  e a c h  o f  th e  U S E P E  d e c is io n - m a k in g  levels  a n d  m a n a g e  
th e ir  re s p e c t iv e  f o r c e s ,  w h ic h  e x e c u te  th e ir  o rd e rs  a n d  d ire c t iv e s .  In  
o r d e r  to  s a t is fy  th e  f u n c t io n s  o f  U S E P E ,  th e s e  fo r c e s  m u s t  b e  s u b d i­
v id ed  in to  tw o  p a r ts :  th o s e  d e a l in g  w ith  r o u t in e  m o n i t o r in g  a n d  o p ­
e r a t io n a l  a c t iv it ie s ,  a n d  th o s e  in v o lv e d  in  e m e r g e n c y  re s p o n s e  a c ­
t io n s .
A t  th e  fe d e ra l  leve l th e  f o r c e s  d e a lin g  w ith  r o u t in e  m a t te r s  p r i ­
m a r i ly  c o n s is t  o f  se rv ices  a n d  in s t i tu t io n s  f r o m  th e  fe d e r a l  m in is tr ie s  
a n d  s ta te  c o m m it te e s ,  w h ic h  a re  r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  m o n i t o r in g  th e  e n ­
v i r o n m e n t  a n d  m e d ic a l  e x a m in a t i o n s ,  a n d  f o r  s c re e n in g  h a z a r d o u s  
f a c i l i t ie s  a n d  th e  a d ja c e n t  a re a s .  In  a d d i t io n  t o  th e se  f u n c t io n s ,  
U S E P E  p e r f o r m s  r is k  a s s e s s m e n ts  o n  h u m a n  h e a l t h  a n d  a r e a s  e x ­
p o s e d  to  h a z a r d o u s  m a te r ia ls .  T h e  U S E P E ’s f o r c e s  f o r  m o n i t o r in g  
a n d  o p e r a t i o n a l  a c t iv it ie s  in c lu d e  in te r d e p a r tm e n ta l  o r g a n iz a t io n s  
a n d  se rv ic e s ,  w h ic h  a re  n o t  o f f i c ia l ly  a s s o c ia te d  w ith  th e  fe d e ra l  
g o v e r n m e n t .  O n e  s u c h  o r g a n iz a t io n  is th e  N a t i o n a l  S y s te m  f o r  S u r ­
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v e il la n c e  a n d  L a b o r a t o r y  C o n t r o l  o f  H a z a r d o u s  S u b s ta n c e s ,  u n d e r  
w h ic h  th e re  a re  v a r io u s  r e s e a r c h  c e n te rs  in c lu d in g  th e  R u s s ia n  
A c a d e m y  o f  S c ie n c e .  In  r e c e n t  y e a rs  th e re  h a s  b e e n  a g r o w in g  tre n d  
to w a r d s  c o n s o l id a t in g  th e s e  f o r c e s  u n d e r  th e  a u sp ic e s  o f  E M E R ­
C O M  in  th e  s a m e  g ro u p  w ith  h a z a r d o u s  s u b s ta n c e  su rv e i l la n c e .
T h e  U S E P E  g ro u p  d e a lin g  w ith  m a jo r  e m e r g e n c y  re s p o n s e  issues 
is c o m p r is e d  o f  f ire  se rv ic e s ,  s e a r c h  a n d  re s c u e  se rv ic e s ,  e m e rg e n c y  
se rv ic e s ,  e m e r g e n c y  te c h n ic a l  s u p p o r t  a n d  e m e r g e n c y  r e c o v e r y  u n its .  
In  th e  a re a  o f  t e c h n o lo g ic a l  e m e r g e n c ie s ,  th e re  a re  e m e r g e n c y  t e c h ­
n ic a l  c e n te rs  a t  th e  M in is t r y  f o r  N u c le a r  E n e r g y  a n d  s e a r c h  a n d  
e m e r g e n c y  re s c u e  u n its  a t  th e  M in is t r y  o f  T r a n s p o r t a t io n .  A b o v e  
a n d  b e y o n d  th o s e  p re v io u s ly  m e n t io n e d  th e re  a re  a lso  e m e rg e n c y  
m e d ic a l  c a r e ,  m il i t ia  (p o l ic e ) ,  r e g io n a l  a n d  lo c a l  c iv il  d e fe n s e  u n its ,  
a n d  c o n s t r u c t io n  a n d  t r a n s p o r t a t io n  c o m p a n ie s .  W i t h in  th e  p e r m a ­
n e n t  fo r c e s  a t  th e  fe d e ra l  lev e l,  th e  k e y  a c to r s  in  e m e r g e n c y  a n d  d is ­
a s te r  m a n a g e m e n t  in c lu d e  th e  C r is is  O p e r a t i o n a l  C e n te r s  a n d  th e  
o p e r a t io n a l  u n its  w ith in  th e  1 3  fe d e ra l  m in is tr ie s  (w ith  th e  u n its  a t  
th e  M in is t r y  o f  In te r n a l  A f f a ir s ,  M in is t r y  o f  H e a l t h ,  a n d  E M E R ­
C O M  c o m p r is in g  th e  b u lk  o f  th e  to t a l  r e s p o n s e  s t re n g th ) .
D e p e n d in g  o n  th e  s i tu a t io n ,  U S E P E  p e r f o r m s  a n y  o f  th e  th re e  
b a s i c  o p e ra t io n a l s ta g e s : r o u t in e  (o r d in a r y ) ,  a le r t  ( in c re a s e d  r e a d i ­
ness)  o r  e m e r g e n c y  ( e x t r a o r d in a r y ) .  T h e  r o u t in e  s ta g e  im p lie s  e s t a b ­
lish in g  a d a y - to - d a y  w a y  o f  liv in g  f o r  th e  c o m m u n it ie s  in  t im e s  o f  
p e a c e  a n d  in c lu d e s  m in o r  in c id e n ts  a n d  d is tu r b a n c e s ,  w h ic h  d o  n o t  
s ig n if ic a n t ly  d is ru p t  c o m m u n ic a t io n s  o r  th e  f a b r ic  o f  a c o m m u n ity .  
E n v ir o n m e n ta l  m o n i t o r in g  a n d  m o n i t o r in g  o f  h a z a r d o u s  fa c i l i t ie s ,  
c o n t in g e n c y  p la n n in g ,  s e tt in g  u p  a n d  s u p p le m e n t in g  e m e r g e n c y  r e ­
serv e  fu n d s ,  e m e r g e n c y  p e r s o n n e l  t r a in in g ,  a n d  p u b l ic  in f o r m a t io n  
s u p p o r t  a re  th e  k e y  ta s k s  in  th e  r o u t in e  o p e r a t io n a l  s ta g e .  D u r in g  
th e  a le r t  s ta g e  ( in c re a s e d  re a d in e s s ) ,  th e  U S E P E  s u b s y s te m s  m u s t  b e  
a b le  to  f u n c t io n  a n d  d e a l  w ith  a p e rc e iv e d  cr is is  o r  a n  a c tu a l  w o r s ­
e n in g  o f  r a d ia t io n ,  c h e m ic a l  e x p o s u r e  a n d  s o m e  o th e r  e n v ir o n m e n ­
ta l  th r e a t .  T h is  s ta g e  serves  as f o r e w a r n in g  f o r  a p o t e n t ia l  e m e r ­
g e n c y  and/or d isaster . In  th e  e m e r g e n c y  s ta g e  ( e x t r a o r d in a r y ) ,  th e  
U S E P E  c o m p o n e n t s  m u s t  b e  a b le  to  o p e r a te  in  a c tu a l  e m e rg e n c y  
c o n d i t io n s ,  a n d  m u s t  im m e d ia te ly  e l im in a te  o r  a l le v ia te  u n d e s ir a b le  
s o c ia l  a n d  e n v ir o n m e n ta l  e f fe c ts .
T h e  p r o c e d u r e s  d ic ta t in g  th e  in v o lv e m e n t  o f  th e  U S E P E  fo r c e s  
f o r  r e s p o n d in g  to  a n d  r e c o v e r in g  f r o m  a n  e m e r g e n c y  o r  d is a s te r  a re
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q u ite  s im ila r  to  th o s e  in  m a n y  o th e r  d e v e lo p e d  c o u n tr ie s .  In v o lv e ­
m e n t  re q u ire s  t h a t  th e re  a re  s u f f ic ie n t  re s o u r c e s  f o r  s a v in g  lives , fo r  
s a fe g u a r d in g  m a te r ia l  g o o d s  a n d  p ro p e r ty ,  a n d  f o r  p r o t e c t in g  th e  
e n v ir o n m e n t .  T h e  U S E P E  is in c r e a s in g  in v o lv e d  as a s i tu a t io n  w o r s ­
ens a n d  t r a n s f o r m s  i t s e l f  in to  a m a jo r  c a ta s t r o p h e .
T h e  o r g a n iz a t io n  o f  r e c o v e r y  a n d  r e c o n s t r u c t io n  w o r k  h a s  b e e n  
t r a d i t io n a l ly  th e  p r e r o g a t iv e  o f  th e  lo c a l  a u th o r i t ie s  a n d  o r g a n iz a ­
t io n s .  T h e  lo c a l  o r g a n iz a t io n s  m a k e  u se  o f  th e  a v a i la b le  w o r k f o r c e  
lo c a te d  in  th e  a f fe c te d  o r  a d ja c e n t  a re a s  (p r im a r i ly  f ire f ig h te rs ,  th e  
p o l ic e ,  m e d ic a l  c a r e  a n d  e m e r g e n c y  s e rv ic e s ) .  I f  th e  im p a c t  o r  d a m ­
age  is b e y o n d  th e  c a p a b i l i t ie s  o f  th e  lo c a l  a u th o r i t ie s ,  th e y  a p p ly  fo r  
e x te r n a l  h e lp .  Y e t  m o r e  o f te n  s u c h  a p p e a ls  a re  g iv e n  d ire c t ly  to  th e  
fe d e ra l  g o v e r n m e n t  r a th e r  th a n  to  th e  n e ig h b o r in g  r e g io n s .  T h e  r e a ­
s o n  f o r  th is  is th e  ‘c e n t r a l iz a t io n  s y n d r o m e . ’ T h e  c u r r e n t  lo c a l  a n d  
r e g io n a l  a d m in is t r a to r s  a re  p r o d u c ts  o f  th e  f o r m e r  S o v ie t  U n io n  
a n d ,  m o r e  im p o r ta n t ly ,  th e  c o n c e n t r a t io n  o f  e c o n o m ic  a n d  a d m in is ­
t ra t iv e  p o w e r  still  r e m a in s  in  th e  h a n d s  o f  th e  fe d e ra l  a u th o r i t ie s .
D u r in g  a n  a c tu a l  e m e rg e n cy , m a y o r s  a n d  g o v e r n o r s  in  th e  a f f e c t ­
ed re g io n s  o f te n  c a l l  u p o n  th e  r e g io n a l  E M E R C O M  o p e r a t io n a l  
c e n te rs  f o r  a s s is ta n c e .  I f  th e  c o n d i t io n s  o f  th e  d is a s te r  a re  t o o  c o m ­
p l ic a te d  f o r  ju s t  o n e  cen ter ,  th e  E M E R C O M  C e n tr a l  R e s c u e  U n it  in  
G r e a t e r  M o s c o w  a n d  th e  c iv il  d e fe n se  a n d  re s c u e  u n its  in  th e  n e ig h ­
b o r in g  re g io n s  a re  im m e d ia te ly  c a l le d  u p o n .  In  th e  c a s e  o f  a m a c r o -  
r e g io n a l  o r  n a t io n a l  e m e rg e n cy , th e  E M E R C O M  M in is t e r  see in g  th e  
n e e d  to  im p o s e  a s ta te  o f  e m e r g e n c y  m a y  a s k  th e  P re s id e n t  o f  th e  
R u s s ia n  F e d e r a t io n  to  m a k e  th e  d e c is io n  to  d e p lo y  a r m y  u n its .  In  
a d d i t io n ,  o th e r  m i l i ta r y  u n its  a n d  t r o o p s  c a n  b e  c a l le d  in  to  a ss is t  
w i th  th e  e m e rg e n cy .
Disaster Risk Reduction as USEPE’s Development 
Strategy
A s m e n t io n e d  a b o v e ,  th e  c u r r e n t  d e c a d e  m a r k s  th e  s ta r t  o f  th e  
U S E P E ’s d r a m a t ic  s h if t  to w a r d s  a m o r e  a n t ic ip a t o r y  a n d  f le x ib le  o r ­
g a n iz a t io n  a n d  to w a r d s  u s in g  d is a s te r  r is k  r e d u c t io n  as th e  c o n c e p ­
tu a l  b a s is  (see a ls o  A p p e n d ix  2 ,  s e c t io n  Q 3 ) .  T h e  U S E P E ’s n e w  d e ­
v e lo p m e n t  p r o g r a m  is “ T h e  F e d e r a l  T a r g e te d  P r o g r a m  f o r  R i s k  R e ­
d u c t io n  a n d  M i t i g a t i o n  o f  N a t u r a l  a n d  T e c h n o lo g ic a l  D is a s te r s  in
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th e  R u s s ia n  F e d e r a t io n  b y  2 0 0 5 ” (h e r e a f te r  in  th is  s e c t io n  re fe rre d  
as th e  R i s k  R e d u c t io n  a n d  M i t i g a t i o n  P r o g r a m  [ R R M P ] ) .
T h e  R R M P  w a s  d e v e lo p e d  jo in t ly  b y  E M E R C O M  a n d  th e  R u s s ­
ia n  A c a d e m y  o f  S c ie n c e s 5 a n d  w a s  f o r m a l ly  a p p r o v e d  b y  th e  G o v ­
e r n m e n t  o f  th e  R u s s ia n  F e d e r a t io n  in  D e c r e e  N o  1 0 9 8  o n  S e p te m ­
b e r  2 9 ,  1 9 9 9 .  T h e  R R M P  s u p p o r ts  th e  s u b s ta n t ia l  r e d u c t io n  o f  n a t ­
u ra l  d isa s te rs  a n d  t e c h n o lo g ic a l  r isk s  in  o r d e r  to  in c r e a s e  in d iv id u a l ,  
s o c ie ta l  a n d  e n v ir o n m e n ta l  s a fe ty  a n d  to  c r e a te  c o n d i t io n s  f o r  su s­
t a in a b le  n a t io n a l  d e v e lo p m e n t  (F e d e r a ln a ia ,  1 9 9 9 ) .
The Conceptual Fundamentals and Contents o f  the 
Risk Reduction and Mitigation Program
C o n s id e r in g  t h a t  th e  n o t io n s  o f  r is k  a n d  r is k  r e d u c t io n  a re  th e  k e y  
c o n c e p ts  in  th e  n e w  e m e r g e n c y  a n d  d is a s te r  m a n a g e m e n t  p o l icy ,  it 
w o u ld  b e  m o r e  a c c u r a te  to  u se  th e  c o n c e p t  o f  a c c e p ta b le  r is k  h e re .  
A c c o r d in g  to  th is  c o n c e p t ,  th e  r is k  o f  a c r is is  ( in c lu d in g  th o s e  a s s o ­
c ia te d  w i th  n a t u r a l  o r  te c h n o lo g ic a l  d isa s te rs )  is c a lc u la te d  b y  th e  
n u m b e r  o f  p o t e n t ia l  h u m a n  v ic t im s  a n d  th e  p o t e n t ia l  m a te r ia l  d a m ­
ag e  in c u r r e d  b y  a n  a d v e rs e  a g e n t  o r  e v e n t .  T h e  p o s s ib i l i ty  o r  f r e ­
q u e n c y  o f  s u c h  e v e n ts  s ig n if ic a n t ly  v a r ie s  w ith in  a c e r ta in  p e r io d  o f  
t im e  (see T a b le  1).
T a b le  1 : C rises  F r e q u e n c y  in R u ssia
Type of Crisis One-year-frequency
Technological Accidents 9 0 0 -1 ,2 0 0
Fires and explosions 3 5 0 -4 5 0
Pipeline accidents 6 0 -8 0
Air crashes 2 0 -4 0
Road traffic accidents (four and m ore people killed) 1 2 0 -1 5 0
Rail accidents (with four and m ore people killed) 1 5 -2 0
Dam failures____________________________________________4 -8 ________________________
Natural Disasters 2 0 0 -5 0 0
Forest fires (affected area larger than 1 0 0  ha) 1 0 0 -2 0 0
Hurricanes, tornadoes, storms_________________________ 8 0 -1 2 0 ____________________
Epidemics and Epizooties_____________________________ 1 0 0 -1 5 0 __________________
In  a d d i t io n ,  th e  c o n c e p t  o f  a c c e p ta b le  r is k  im p lie s  t h a t  th e  r is k  o f  a 
cr is is  is a c c e p ta b le  a t  c e r ta in  levels  o r  d e g re e s ,  w h ic h  a c o m m u n i t y  
o r  a n a t io n  b e l ie v es  c a n  b e  ju s t i f ie d .  C o m m u n i t y  m e m b e r s  o r  c i t i ­
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ze n s , w h o s e  s a fe ty  f o r  s o m e  r e a s o n  h a s  n o t  b e e n  g u a r a n te e d  to  an  
a c c e p ta b le  leve l, s h o u ld  re c e iv e  s o m e  s o c ia l  a n d  e c o n o m ic  p r iv ileg es  
a n d  b e n e f i t s  f r o m  so c ie ty . G iv e n  th e  v a r io u s  d e c is io n - m a k in g  levels  
in v o lv e d ,  th e  n o t io n  o f  a c c e p ta b le  r is k  c o u ld  b e ,  a n d  is , in te rp re te d  
a n d  a p p l ie d  in  m a n y  d if fe re n t  w a y s .
A t  th e  r e g io n a l ,  n a t io n a l  a n d  g lo b a l  levels  th e  n o t io n  o f  s u s ta in ­
a b le  d e v e lo p m e n t  (w h ic h  in v o lv e s  p r im a r i ly  th e  c o n c e r n  f o r  fu tu re  
g e n e r a t io n s )  is fo r m u la te d  b y  in t e r n a t io n a l  o r g a n iz a t io n s  a n d  b y  a 
n u m b e r  o f  in d iv id u a l  c o u n tr ie s .  A t  th e  i n t r a - n a t io n a l  o r  c o m m u n i t y  
lev e l,  th e  c o n c e p t  o f  a c c e p ta b le  r is k  is , o r  s h o u ld  b e ,  f o r m u la te d  b y  
th e  n a t io n a l  g o v e r n m e n t .  A t  th e  in d iv id u a l  lev e l,  th is  c o n c e p t  o f  a 
ju s t i f ie d  r is k  fo c u s e s  o n  th e  in d iv id u a l ’s life  a n d  k e y  v a lu es  w h ic h  
c o u ld  b e  th r e a te n e d  (See  T a b le  2 ) .
T a b le  2 :  R isk  M a n a g e m e n t  G o a ls  a t th e  V a rio u s  D e c is io n - M a k in g  
L e v e ls
Decision-Making Levels Risk Management Goals
Global and regional Sustainable development
Intra-national and community Acceptable risk
(including family)
Individual Justified risk
T h e  in te r p r e ta t io n  o f  a n  a c c e p ta b le  r is k  in  a c r is is ,  b a s e d  o n  a s ta t i s ­
t ic a l  a n a ly s is  o f  c r is e s ’ re la t iv e  f r e q u e n c ie s ,  w a s  used  in  d e v e lo p in g  
a n d  im p le m e n t in g  th e  R i s k  R e d u c t io n  a n d  M i t i g a t i o n  P r o g r a m . 
T h is  w a s  s l ig h tly  a m e n d e d  to  in c lu d e  th e  e c o n o m ic  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  
a cr is is ,  a s o r t  o f  ‘c o s t - b e n e f i t ’ r is k  a n a ly s is .  W i t h in  th is  f r a m e w o r k ,  
r is k  serves  as a m e a s u r e  o f  e x p e c te d  lo sses  d u r in g  a cr is is  so  th a t  
l im ite d  re s o u r c e s  a re  d is tr ib u te d  in  s u c h  to  m a x im iz e  th e ir  utility.
T h e  tw o  o th e r  b a s ic  c o n c e p ts  o f  a n  a c c e p ta b le  r is k  in  a c r is is ,  
n a m e ly  p s y c h o lo g ic a l  a n d  s o c io lo g ic a l  in te r p r e ta t io n s ,  w e r e  b a s i c a l ­
ly  b e y o n d  th e  s c o p e  o f  th e  R i s k  R e d u c t io n  a n d  M i t i g a t i o n  P r o g r a m . 
T h e  p s y c h o lo g ic a l  a p p r o a c h  fo c u s e s  o n  s tu d y in g  in d iv id u a l  b e h a v io r  
a n d  r is k / o p p o rtu n ity  p r e fe r e n c e s ,  w h i le  th e  s o c io lo g ic a l  a p p r o a c h  
a n a ly z e s  h o w  cr ise s  im p a c t  th e  b r o a d e r  c o n t e x t  o f  g ro u p  n o r m s ,  
v a lu e s ,  in te re s ts  a n d  c u l tu r a l  t r a d i t io n s .
T h e  c o n c e p tu a l  f r a m e w o r k  f o r  th e  R i s k  R e d u c t io n  a n d  M i t i g a ­
t io n  P r o g r a m  p ro v id e d  th e  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  s ix  s u b p r o g r a m s ,  w h ic h  
h ig h lig h t  th e  k e y  a im s  o f  th e  U S E P E  s tra te g y  in  th e  f irs t  d e c a d e  o f  
th e  n e w  ce n tu ry . T h e s e  s u b p r o g r a m s  a re  as f o l lo w e d :
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1. D e v e lo p m e n t  o f  a m e t h o d o lo g ic a l  a n d  le g a l  f o u n d a t io n  f o r  
p ro v id in g  m e a s u re s  to  re d u c e  r is k  a n d  m it ig a te  e m e rg e n c ie s  
a n d  d isa s te rs .
2 .  D e v e lo p m e n t  a n d  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  m e a s u re s  w h ic h  id e n t i fy  
h a z a r d s  a n d  c o m p r e h e n s iv e ly  a n a ly z e  r isk s .
3 .  D e v e lo p m e n t  a n d  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  m e a s u re s  f o r  m o n i t o r ­
in g  a n d  f o r e c a s t in g  n a t u r a l  d isa s te rs  a n d  e m e rg e n c ie s .
4 .  D e v e lo p m e n t  o f  a n  in f o r m a t io n  s y s te m  f o r  e m e r g e n c y  a n d  
d is a s te r  r i s k  m a n a g e m e n t ,  in c lu d in g  c o m m u n ic a t io n  a n d  
w a r n in g  sy s te m s .
5 .  D e v e lo p m e n t  a n d  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  m e a s u re s  f o r  r is k  r e d u c ­
t io n ,  d is a s te r  m i t ig a t io n  a n d  e m e r g e n c y  se rv ices  a t  th e  lo c a l  
a n d  r e g io n a l  levels .
6 . D e v e lo p m e n t  a n d  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  e m e r g e n c y  t r a in in g  f o r  
th e  g e n e r a l  p u b l ic  a n d  f o r  U S E P E  p r o fe s s io n a ls .
T h e  m e a s u re s  m e n t io n e d  in  e a c h  o f  th e  s ix  s u b p r o g r a m s  a re  s p e c i ­
f ied  fu r th e r  in  A p p e n d ix  1 . T h e s e  s u b p r o g r a m s  a re  to  b e  im p le m e n t ­
ed b y  1 5  fe d e ra l  e x e c u t iv e  b o d ie s  a n d  3 4  re g io n s  (in  o th e r  w o r d s ,  
2 7 . 6 %  o f  th e  R u s s ia n  F e d e r a t io n  e n ti t ie s  w h ic h  s ig n ed  a n  a g r e e ­
m e n t  w ith  E M E R C O M  a b o u t  d e v e lo p in g  r e g io n a l  p r o g r a m s .
F e d e r a l  fu n d s  a re  to  b e  u sed  f o r  f in a n c in g :
• R & D  w o r k s  r e le v a n t  f o r  th e  R R M P  as  a w h o le .
• D e v e lo p m e n t  o f  le g is la t io n  a n d  o th e r  o f f i c ia l  d o c u m e n ts  fo r  
th e  a d v a n c e m e n t  o f  th e  U S E P E .
• D e v e lo p m e n t  a n d  im p r o v e m e n t  o f  te c h n ic a l  r e s o u r c e s  fo r  
th e  U S E P E .
• D e v e lo p m e n t  a n d  im p r o v e m e n t  o f  s o f tw a r e ,  in f o r m a t io n  
a n d  te c h n ic a l  s u p p o r t  f o r  U S E P E  m a n a g e m e n t .
• T r a in in g  U S E P E  sp e c ia l is ts  a t  th e  fe d e ra l  level.
• P r o v is io n s  f o r  m a n a g in g ,  m o n i t o r in g  a n d  s c re e n in g  l a b o r a ­
to r ie s ,  a n d  U S E P E  u n its  a n d  a g e n c ie s  a t  th e  fe d e ra l  level.
F u n d s  to  th e  R F  e n t i t ie s  h a v e  to  b e  u sed  f o r  f in a n c in g  th e  fo l lo w in g  
s p e c i f ic  ta s k s :
• D e v e lo p m e n t  a n d  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  m e a s u r e s  f o r  re d u c in g  
c e r ta in  r is k s  a n d  d isa s te rs  m o s t  ty p ic a l  f o r  s p e c if ic  re g io n s  in  
R u s s ia .
6 3
Crisis Management in Russia: Overcoming Institutional Rigidity and Resource Constraints
• E m e r g e n c y  t r a in in g  a n d  m a te r ia l  s u p p o r t  f o r  in d iv id u a ls  a n d  
th e  c o m m u n it ie s  in  th e  v a r io u s  re g io n s  in  R u s s ia .
• T e c h n ic a l  s u p p o r t  f o r  e m e r g e n c y  re s p o n s e  u n its  in  th e  R F  
e n ti t ie s .
• A c c u m u la t i o n  a n d  r e p le n is h m e n t  o f  m a te r ia l  a n d  f in a n c ia l  
r e s o u r c e s  f o r  e m e r g e n c y  r e s p o n s e  a t  th e  r e g io n a l  level.
T h e  s u b p r o g r a m s  a n d  th e  sp e c if ic  ta s k s  o f  th e  R R M P  a re  d iv id ed  up 
in to  tw o  im p le m e n ta t io n  s ta g e s .  T h e  f ir s t  o n e  e n ta i le d  th e  d e v e lo p ­
m e n t  o f  s c ie n t i f ic ,  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  e c o n o m ic  p r in c ip le s  f o r  e m e r ­
g e n c y  a n d  d is a s te r  r is k  a n a ly s e s  a n d  f o r  r is k  m a n a g e m e n t  b e tw e e n  
1 9 9 9  a n d  2 0 0 1 .  T h e  r e m a in in g  ta s k s  s h o u ld  b e  c a r r ie d  o u t  f r o m  
2 0 0 2  to  2 0 0 5 .
T h e r e  a re  m o r e  th a n  6 0  ta s k s .  W o r t h  s p e c ia l  m e n t io n in g  are  
th o s e  p r o v id in g  f u r th e r  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  th e  m e th o d s  f o r  m o n i t o r in g  
r isk s  a n d  f o r  f o r e c a s t in g  c r is is  o c c u r r e n c e s ,  e s p e c ia l ly  th o s e  p r o ­
v o k e d  b y  n a t u r a l  d isa s te rs .  T o  id e n t i fy  a n d  o p e r a t iv e ly  p re d ic t  th e  
in c id e n c e  o f  th e s e  in  th e  e a r ly  s ta g e ,  o n e  n e e d s  a w e l l  e q u ip p e d  an d  
a w e l l -a t tu n e d  n a t io n a l  m o n i t o r in g  sy s te m .
T h e  F e d e r a l  E m e r g e n c y  M o n i t o r i n g  a n d  F o r e c a s t  S y s te m  (w h ic h  
in v o lv e s  E M E R C O M  a n d  a fe w  o th e r  fe d e r a l  a g e n c ie s )  is b e in g  p e r ­
m a n e n t ly  im p r o v e d  a n d  u p d a te d .  A ls o  w o r t h  p a r t i c u la r  m e n t io n in g  
is th e  s u b s y s te m  f o r  o p e r a t io n a l  fo r e c a s t in g  o f  a n  e a r t h q u a k e ’s a f ­
te r m a t h  u s in g  G IS  ( g e o g r a p h ic a l  in f o r m a t io n  sy ste m ) te c h n o lo g ie s .  
T h is  s u b s y s te m  is s u c c e ss fu l ly  f u n c t io n in g  n o w . T h e  G IS  c o n t a in s  
d a ta  a b o u t  th e  p o p u la t io n ,  in fr a s t r u c tu r e  a n d  th e  in d u s tr ia l  fa c i l i t ie s  
in  e v ery  s e t t le m e n t  in  th e  R u s s ia n  F e d e r a t io n .  U ti l iz in g  d a ta  f r o m  
th e  In te r n e t  re g a rd in g  a n  e a r t h q u a k e ’s e p ic e n te r  c o o r d in a te s  an d  
m a g n itu d e ,  th e  s y s te m  issues a f o r e c a s t  o f  th e  e a r t h q u a k e ’s e f fe c ts ,  
e x p e c te d  a f te r m a th ,  a n d  th e  n u m b e r  o f  u n its  th a t  s h o u ld  b e  a c t iv a t ­
ed f o r  th e  e m e r g e n c y  re s p o n s e .
A s  f o r  te c h n o lo g ic a l  c r is e s ,  th e  R R M P  s t ip u la te s  th e  ty p e  o f  d e ­
v e lo p m e n t  a n d  in s ta l lm e n t  o f  fe d e ra l  a n d  r e g io n a l  sy s te m s  f o r  m o n i ­
to r in g  a n d  fo r e c a s t in g  p o s s ib le  a c c id e n ts  ( th a t  is , a c c e p ta b le  r is k  
s ta n d a rd s  a n d  n o r m s  w h ic h  a re  c o m p a t ib le  w ith  th o s e  e n f o r c e d  in  
m o s t  d e v e lo p e d  c o u n tr ie s ) .  T h e  R R M P  a ls o  in c lu d e s  e c o n o m ic  s u p ­
p o r t  ( in c lu d in g  in s u r a n c e  m e c h a n is m s )  a n d  t r a in in g  ( fo r  e m e r g e n c y  
u n its  a n d  c o m m u n i t y  m e m b e r s )  as a m e a n s  o f  re d u c in g  t e c h n o lo g i ­
c a l  r isk s  to  a m o r e  a c c e p ta b le  level.
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Implementation o f  the RRMP in 1999-2000 and 
Expectations for the Year 2005
T h e  f ir s t  im p le m e n ta t io n  e f fo r ts  in v e s te d  in to  th e  R R M P  fo r  R & D  
a c t iv it ie s  re su lte d  in  a n u m b e r  o f  v a lu a b le  g o a ls .  T h e s e  in c lu d e :
• A  d r a f t  o f  th e  N a t i o n a l  S ta te  P o l ic y  fo r  D is a s te r  R i s k  R e d u c ­
t io n .
• C o n c e p ts  o f  s u s ta in a b le  d e v e lo p m e n t ,  a n d  a c c e p ta b le  a n d  
ju s t i f ie d  r is k  f o r  e m e r g e n c y  a n d  d is a s te r  m a n a g e m e n t .
• S o c ia l  c r i te r ia  f o r  c o m m u n i t y  s a fe ty  a n d  n a t io n a l  se c u r ity  
d u r in g  n a t u r a l  a n d  t e c h n o lo g ic a l  d isa s te rs .
• Im p r o v e d  c la s s i f i c a t io n  o f  n a t u r a l  a n d  t e c h n o lo g ic a l  d is a s ­
ters .
• Im p r o v e d  m e t h o d s  a n d  p r o c e d u r e s  f o r  r is k  e v a lu a t io n s .
• N e w  a n d  im p r o v e d  m e t h o d s  f o r  f o r e c a s t in g  te c h n o lo g ic a l  
a n d  n a t u r a l  d isa s te rs .
• In c r e a s e d  a c c u r a c y  o f  n a t u r a l  d is a s te r  fo r e c a s t in g .
• T h e  u se  o f  a d v a n c e d  in f o r m a t io n  te c h n o lo g ie s  f o r  r is k  m o n i ­
t o r in g  a n d  f o r  f o r e c a s t in g  e m e rg e n c ie s  a n d  d isa s te rs .
T h e  e c o n o m ic  cr is is  in  th e  1 9 9 0 s  a n d  b u d g e t  c o n s t r a in t s  ( s te m m in g  
f r o m  th e  R u s s ia n  d e b t  to  th e  W e s t)  s e r io u s ly  h in d e re d  th e  fu ll  im p le ­
m e n t a t io n  o f  th e  g o a ls  m a d e  in  th e  f irs t  s ta g e  o f  th e  R R M P .  S o m e  
e s t im a te s  su g g e st  t h a t  in  1 9 9 9 - 2 0 0 0  th e  re a l  a l lo c a t io n s  w e re  6 0 %  
less th a n  th e  a p p r o p r ia t io n s  e n d o rs e d  in  th e  fe d e ra l  b u d g e t  b y  th e  
S ta te  D u m a .
N e v e r th e le s s ,  th is  s h o u ld  n o t  b lu r  th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  n a t io n a l  
e m e r g e n c y  a n d  d is a s te r  m a n a g e m e n t  p o l ic y  w a s  in c r e a s in g ly  s h if te d  
f r o m  a r e s p o n s e -o r ie n te d  s tra te g y  to  a m i t ig a t io n  s t ra te g y  a n d  s o m e  
s ig n if i c a n t  c h a n g e s  a re  v is ib le .  In  p a r t i c u la r ly  th e  N a t i o n a l  S y s te m  
f o r  S u rv e i l la n c e  a n d  L a b o r a t o r y  C o n t r o l  o f  H a z a r d o u s  S u b s ta n c e s  
w a s  re o r g a n iz e d  in  1 9 9 9 .  T h is  sy s te m  m e rg e s  a n d  s tre n g th e n s  b o t h  
th e  s p a t ia l  a n d  th e  f u n c t io n a l  s u b s y s te m s ’ c a p a c i ty  f o r  f o r e c a s t in g  
a n d  m o n i t o r in g  h a z a r d o u s  c h e m ic a ls  a n d  ra d io a c t iv i ty ,  a m o n g  o th e r  
th in g s .  N e a r ly  6 0 %  o f  th e  s y s te m  i ( a lm o s t  7 , 0 0 0  o r g a n iz a t io n s )  is 
a f f i l ia te d  w ith  th e  M in is t r y  o f  H e a l t h  a n d  th e  M in is t r y  o f  A g r ic u l ­
tu r e ;  th e  o th e r  4 0 %  p r im a r i ly  c o m e s  f r o m  th e  H y d r o lo g ic a l  a n d  
M e t e o r o l o g i c a l  S e rv ic e  a n d  th e  E n v ir o n m e n t a l  P r o t e c t io n  O f f i c e  o f  
th e  N a t u r a l  R e s o u r c e s  M in is t r y  ( G o d u d a r s te n n i i ,  2 0 0 0 ) .
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T h e  s e c o n d  s ta g e  fo c u s e s  o n  im p le m e n t in g  th e  g o a ls  e s ta b l is h e d  
in  th e  f ir s t  s ta g e  (in  2 0 0 1 ) .  T h is  m e a n s  t h a t  th e  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  
s p e c if ic  in v e s tm e n t  p r o je c t s  a n d  s p e c if ic  b u s in e s s  p la n s  a re  c u r r e n t ly  
b e in g  d e v e lo p e d . T h e  k e y  a re a s  c o v e r e d  b y  th e s e  p r o je c t s  w il l  e n ta i l :
• F u r th e r  a d v a n c e m e n t  o f  th e  d is a s te r  m o n i t o r in g  a n d  f o r e ­
c a s t in g  s y s te m s .
• I m p r o v e m e n t  o f  a ir  a n d  sa te l l i te  sy s te m s  u sed  f o r  m o n i t o r in g  
h ig h ly  h a z a r d o u s  a re a s .
• D e v e lo p m e n t  a n d  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  a n  in f o r m a t io n  s u p p o r t  
s y s te m  f o r  e m e r g e n c y  a n d  d is a s te r  m a n a g e m e n t .
• M o d e r n iz a t io n  o f  th e  c e n tra l iz e d  a u to m a te d  w a r n in g  sy s te m  
a t  th e  lo c a l  level.
• A c c u m u la t io n  o f  m a te r ia l  r e s o u r c e s  f o r  d is a s te r  m it ig a t io n  
a n d  p r o v is io n s  (b a s ic  n eed s)  f o r  p e o p le  a f fe c te d  b y  a d isaster .
• M e d ic in e  a n d  o th e r  p r o v is io n s  f o r  c o m m u n it ie s  liv in g  in  
h ig h -r is k  z o n e s .
• I m p le m e n ta t io n  o f  r o b o t i c  a n d  a v ia t io n  sy s te m s  f o r  e m e r ­
g e n c y  re s p o n s e .
• O r g a n iz a t io n a l  a n d  t e c h n o lo g ic a l  in te g r a t io n  o f  th e  o n -d u ty  
d is p a tc h  se rv ices  in  th e  u r b a n  a re a s .
• I m p le m e n ta t io n  o f  m o b i le  sy s te m s  f o r  a sse ss in g  th e  s e ism ic  
re s i l ie n c e  o f  b u ild in g s .
• E q u ip p in g  th e  F e d e r a l  S y s te m  f o r  S e is m o lo g ic a l  S u rv e i l la n c e  
E a r t h q u a k e  C o n t r o l  (a p a r t  o f  U S E P E )  w i th  m o d e r n  d ig ita l  
s ta t io n s .
• D e v e lo p in g  a s y s te m  f o r  t r a in in g  s p e c ia l is ts  in  th e  a re a  o f  
d is a s te r  a n d  e m e r g e n c y  m o n i t o r in g ,  fo r e c a s t in g  a n d  in s p e c t ­
ing .
I f  s u c c e ss fu l ly  im p le m e n te d ,  i t  is e x p e c te d  t h a t  b y  2 0 0 5  d is a s te r  r is k  
r e d u c t io n  a n d  e m e r g e n c y  m i t ig a t io n  m e a s u re s  w il l  h e lp  to  re d u c e  
p o t e n t ia l  e c o n o m ic  lo sse s  b y  4 0 - 5 0 %  in  th e  m o s t  v u ln e r a b le  a re a s  
in  R u s s ia  p r o n e  to  e n v ir o n m e n ta l  c o n t a m in a t io n .  T h e s e  m e a s u re s  
s h o u ld  a lso  c u t  th e  n u m b e r  o f  p e o p le  k il le d  in  t e c h n o lo g ic a l  a c c i ­
d e n ts  b y  o n e - th ir d  s in c e  m a n y  o f  th e s e  a c c id e n ts  c a n  b e  to ta l ly  p r e ­
v e n te d  ( F e d e r a ln a ia ,  1 9 9 9 ) .
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Conclusion
T h e  te n - y e a r  e x p e r ie n c e  o f  th e  R u s s ia n  e m e r g e n c y  a n d  d is a s te r  m a n ­
a g e m e n t  p o l ic y  re v e a ls  c o n t r a d ic t o r y  t r e n d s .  In  th e  a r e a  o f  le g is la ­
t io n ,  th e  in c r e a s in g  n u m b e r  o f  r e g u la t io n s  e n a c te d  a t  a ll  leve ls  o f  
g o v e r n m e n t  h a s  b e e n  a p o s it iv e  t r e n d .  T h e s e  r e g u la t io n s  c o v e r  a 
w id e  r a n g e  o f  c r i t i c a l  issu es  in  e m e r g e n c y  p o l ic y  a n d  th e  ju r id ic a l  r e ­
la t io n s h ip  b e t w e e n  m a n a g e m e n t  a c to r s .  H o w e v e r ,  th e  s c o p e  a n d  
q u a l i ty  o f  th e  e x is t in g  le g is la t io n  s t i l l  d o  n o t  m e e t  a ll  o f  th e  b a s ic  
n e e d s  a n d  r e q u ir e m e n ts  f o r  c iv il  e m e r g e n c y  a n d  d is a s te r  m a n a g e ­
m e n t  in  R u s s ia .
T h is  ca l ls  f o r  a  m o r e  t h o r o u g h  a n d  c r i t i c a l  a n a ly s is  o f  th e  p a s t  
e f fo r ts  m a d e  a t  th e  n a t io n a l  lev e l in  th is  a re a .  In  a d d i t io n ,  a n  in te n ­
sive a n d  c o m p r e h e n s iv e  s tu d y  o f  in te r n a t io n a l  le g is la t io n  a n d  e x p e ­
r ie n c e s  in  c o p in g  w ith  m a jo r  e m e rg e n c ie s  a n d  d is a s te rs  ( in  p a r t i c u la r  
th o s e  a c c id e n ts  in v o lv in g  h a z a r d o u s  m a te r ia ls )  w o u ld  b e  in s ig h tfu l .  
T h e  h is to r ic  e x a m p le  o f  S e v e so  I  D ir e c t iv e  ( la te r  f o l lo w e d  b y  S e v e so  
II  D ir e c t iv e )  s t r o n g ly  s u p p o r ts  th e  id e a  t h a t  th o u g h t f u l  le g is la t io n  
a n d  e n f o r c e m e n t  e f fo r ts  c a n  re d u c e  th e  r is k s  o f  s u c h  a c c id e n ts  in  
ju s t  o n e  d e c a d e  b y  n e a r ly  t e n  t o  f o u r t e e n  p e rc e n t .
T h e r e  a re  s t r o n g  in d ic a t io n s  t h a t  a  n e w  s tr a te g y  is d e v e lo p in g  in  
R u s s ia  w ith in  th e  le g is la t iv e  a n d  in s t i tu t io n a l  r e a lm s  o f  e m e rg e n c y  
a n d  d is a s te r  m a n a g e m e n t  p o l ic y  a n d ,  in  a b r o a d e r  s e n se ,  th e  n a t i o n ­
a l  s e c u r ity  s y s te m . E v e n  i f  th is  n e w  s tr a te g y  c a n  n o t  y e t  b e  c o n s id ­
e re d  ‘s u s ta in a b le  d e v e lo p m e n t ’ in  in t e r n a t io n a l  t e r m s ,  it  n e v e r th e le s s  
h a s  re s u lte d  in  a m o r e  c o m p r e h e n s iv e  c o n c e p t  o f  r is k  m a n a g e m e n t .  
E v e n  th e  b e s t  a v a i la b le  a n d  m o s t  e f f ic ie n t  m e a s u r e s  w o u ld  n o t  be  
a b le  to  c o m p le te ly  e l im in a te  a ll  r is k s ,  b u t  R u s s i a ’s n e w  s tr a te g y  w ill  
h e lp  t o  re d u c e  a c tu a l  a n d  p o t e n t ia l  r is k s .
In  a d d i t io n ,  s u c h  p o l ic y  m e a s u r e s  s h o u ld  b e  o r ie n te d  t o  a c h ie v ­
a b le  a n d  s o c ia l ly  a c c e p ta b le  r i s k  m a r g in s ,  w h ic h  w il l  p e rh a p s  v ary  
w ith in  th e  v a s t  t e r r i to r y  o f  th e  R u s s ia n  F e d e r a t io n .  F r o m  a t o t a l  o f  
8 9  R u s s ia n  F e d e r a t io n  e n t i t ie s ,  2 7  e n ti t ie s  (o r  3 0 . 3 % )  h a v e  s o m e  
s o r t  o f  c h e m ic a l ,  r a d io a c t iv e  a n d  o th e r  h ig h -r is k  fa c i l i t ie s .  M o r e  
t h a n  7 0 0 , 0 0 0  p e o p le  (o r  0 . 5 %  o f  th e  t o t a l  p o p u la t io n  in  R u s s ia )  
live  in  th e se  a r e a s .  E M E R C O M  c o n s id e r s  th e s e  a re a s  t o  b e  th e  m o s t  
h a z a r d o u s  re g io n s  in  th e  c o u n tr y  a n d  th u s  a re  c la s s i f ie d  as  C la s s  I 
a re a s .  R e s p e c t iv e ly ,  3 3  e n ti t ie s  (o r  3 7 . 1 % )  a re  c la s s i f ie d  as C la s s  II  
a re a s  o r  “ h a z a r d o u s  r e g io n s .” A p p r o x i m a t e ly  3 0 0 , 0 0 0  to  7 0 0 , 0 0 0  
p e o p le  (o r  c a .  0 . 2 %  t o  0 . 5 %  o f  th e  c o u n t r y ’s t o t a l  p o p u la t io n )  live
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in  s u c h  a re a s .  In  a d d i t io n ,  2 9  re g io n s  (o r  3 2 . 6 % )  a re  c la s s i f ie d  as 
C la s s  I I I  a re a s  o r  “ less h a z a r d o u s  r e g io n s ” (A k im o v , F a le e v  an d  
S h a k h r a m a n ia n ,  1 9 9 9 ) .
T h is  m e a n s  t h a t  m o r e  th a n  h a l f  o f  th e  c o u n t r y ’s p o p u la t io n  (liv ­
in g  in  ro u g h ly  tw o - th i r d s  o f  th e  R u s s ia n  te r r i to ry )  is s u b je c te d  to  e x ­
t r e m e ly  h a z a r d o u s  c o n d i t io n s .  T h e s e  c o n d i t io n s  a re  c r e a te d  b y  n e a r ­
ly  4 5 , 0 0 0  h a z a r d o u s  fa c i l i t ie s  w h ic h  th r e a t e n  p u b l ic  h e a l th  a n d  s a fe ­
ty. T h e s e  re g io n s  a n d  c o m m u n it ie s  s h o u ld  b e  g iv e n  p r io r i ty  an d  
s h o u ld  b e  in  fo c u s  in  th e  n e w  e m e r g e n c y  a n d  d is a s te r  m a n a g e m e n t  
p o l ic y  a t  th e  r e g io n a l  leve l. A t  th e  s a m e  t im e ,  m it ig a t io n  m e a s u re s  
s h o u ld  b e  d e v e lo p e d  a n d  im p le m e n te d  a t  th e  fe d e r a l  leve l, t o o .  T h e  
R u s s ia n  p o p u la t io n ,  o n  a v e ra g e ,  h a s  tw ic e  th e  r is k  o f  s u f fe r in g  f r o m  
a n a t u r a l  d is a s te r  o r  t e c h n o lo g ic a l  a c c id e n t  in  c o m p a r i s o n  to  o th e r  
in d u s tr ia l iz e d  c o u n tr ie s .  T h e s e  c o n c e r n s  s h o u ld  b e  s e r io u s ly  c o n s id ­
e re d . I f  p r o p e r ly  im p le m e n te d  in  th e  f o r e s e e a b le  fu tu re ,  th e  n e w  
e m e r g e n c y  a n d  d is a s te r  m a n a g e m e n t  p o l ic y  w o u ld  p ro v id e  a m o r e  
c o m p r e h e n s iv e  n a t io n a l  s e c u r ity  p o l ic y  f o r  R u s s ia  a n d  f o r  m o r e  s u s ­
ta in a b le  d e v e lo p m e n t  in  th e  lo n g  te rm .
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Appendix 1
The Subprogram Measures on Risk Reduction and 
Mitigation for Natural and Technological Disasters 
Targeted for 2005
S u b p r o g r a m  1
1 . D e v e lo p m e n t  o f  a  d r a f t  o f  “ T h e  N a t i o n a l  S ta te  P o l ic y  f o r  D is a s ­
te r  R i s k  R e d u c t io n  in  th e  R u s s ia n  F e d e r a t i o n .”
2 .  D e v e lo p m e n t  a n d  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  le g is la t io n  a n d  d ire c t iv e s  
f o r  d is a s te r  r is k  m a n a g e m e n t .
3 .  R e c o g n i t i o n  a n d  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  a  s y s te m  f o r  se t t in g  d is a s te r  
r is k  s ta n d a r d s .
4 .  D e v e lo p m e n t  o f  th e  c o n c e p t  o f  c o m p o u n d  r is k  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  
le g a l  s u p p o r t  f o r  th e  R u s s ia n  re g io n s  re g a rd in g  th e  r e g u la t io n  o f  
d is a s te r  r is k  r e d u c t io n  a n d  m it ig a t io n .
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5 .  D e v e lo p m e n t  o f  le g is la t io n  f o r  re s tr ic t in g  sh ip s  w h ic h  d o  n o t  
m e e t  th e  s a fe ty  s ta n d a rd s  as a m e a n s  o f  p re v e n t in g  a c c id e n ts  a t  
th e  sea .
6 . D e v e lo p m e n t  o f  s ta te  s ta n d a rd s  f o r  e m e r g e n c y  a n d  d is a s te r  m o n ­
ito r in g ,  f o r e c a s t in g  a n d  d a m a g e  a s s e s s m e n t .
7 .  D e v e lo p m e n t  a n d  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  le g is la t io n  f o r  assess in g  th e  
h e a l th  o f  p e o p le  in  a re a s  a f fe c te d  b y  d is a s te rs ,  a n d  c a lc u la t in g  
th e  a m o u n t  o f  s o c ia l  d a m a g e  in c u rre d .
8 . Im p r o v e m e n t  o f  th e  le g is la t iv e  f o u n d a t io n  w h ic h  o v e rse e s  th e  a l ­
l o c a t i o n  o f  f in a n c ia l  c o m p e n s a t io n  to  p e o p le  a f fe c te d  b y  d is a s ­
ters .
9 .  D e v e lo p m e n t  a n d  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  le g is la t io n  f o r  assess in g  th e  
e c o n o m ic  e ffe c t iv e n e s s  o f  in v e s tm e n ts  m a d e  in  d is a s te r  p r e v e n ­
t io n ,  r is k  r e d u c t io n  a n d  cr is is  m it ig a t io n .
1 0 .  D e v e lo p m e n t  a n d  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  a le g is la t iv e  f o u n d a t io n  
a n d  d ire c t iv e s  f o r  d is a s te r  in s u r a n c e  a n d  r e in s u r a n c e .
1 1 .  D e v e lo p m e n t  o f  r e c o m m e n d a t io n s  f o r  o rg a n iz in g  th e  s t a t e ’s r e g ­
u la t io n  o f  r isk s  f o r  d isa s te rs  a n d  m a jo r  t e c h n o lo g ic a l  a c c id e n ts .
S u b p r o g r a m  2
1 2 .  D e v e lo p m e n t  a n d  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  a le g is la t iv e  f o u n d a t io n  fo r  
id e n t i fy in g  h a z a r d  a n d  d is a s te r  r is k  a g e n ts .
1 3 .  P r e p a r a t io n  a n d  s y s te m a t iz a t io n  o f  h a z a r d o u s  fa c i l i t ie s  a n d  h a z ­
a rd  e v a lu a t io n s  f o r  a p o t e n t ia l  m a jo r  r a i l r o a d  a c c id e n t .
1 4 .  D e v e lo p m e n t  a n d  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  m e th o d s  f o r  a sse ss in g  th e  
r isk s  o f  a n a t u r a l  a n d  te c h n o lo g ic a l  d is a s te r  o c c u r r in g  a t  o r  n e a r  
n u c le a r/ ra d ia t io n  fa c i l i t ie s .
1 5 .  D e v e lo p m e n t  a n d  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  m e th o d s  f o r  r is k  e v a lu a ­
t io n s  c o n c e r n in g  t e c h n o lo g ic a l  a c c id e n ts  a n d  d isa s te rs .
1 6 .  D e v e lo p m e n t  a n d  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  m e th o d s  f o r  a sse ss in g  th e  
p r o b a b i l i t y  (u s in g  s ta t is t i c a l  d a ta  o n  t e c h n o lo g ic a l  in c id e n ts )  
a n d  th e  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  a n  a c c id e n t  a t  a fu e l o r  e n e rg y  p la n t .
1 7 .  D e v e lo p m e n t  a n d  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  a le g is la t iv e  f o u n d a t io n  fo r  
assess in g  th e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  a n  e m e r g e n c y  o r  a d isaster .
1 8 .  D e v e lo p m e n t  o f  m e th o d s  f o r  assess in g  th e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  a n  e p i­
d e m ic  o r  a n  e p iz o o t ic .
1 9 .  D e v e lo p m e n t  a n d  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  m e th o d s  f o r  r is k  e v a lu a ­
t io n s  a b o u t  h o w  h u m a n  h e a l t h  is a f fe c te d  b y  p h e n o l  (a b y p r o d u c t  
o f  sh a le  m in in g )  a n d  u n d e r g r o u n d  p o t a b le  w a te r  c o n t a m in a t io n
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2 0 .  D e v e lo p m e n t  a n d  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  m e th o d s  f o r  r is k  e v a lu a ­
t io n s  c o n c e r n in g  h o w  h u m a n  h e a l th  a f fe c te d  b y  a c c id e n ta l  e n v i­
r o n m e n t a l  p o l lu t io n  in  th e  R u s s ia n  F e d e r a t io n .
2 1 .  I m p r o v e m e n t  a n d  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  m e th o d s  f o r  e n v ir o n m e n ­
ta l  r is k  a s s e s s m e n ts  d u r in g  a n  e m e r g e n c y  o r  a d isaster .
2 2 .  D e v e lo p m e n t  a n d  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  s o c io lo g ic a l  m e th o d s  used  
to  c o n d u c t  a r i s k  p e r c e p t io n  su rv e y  fo r  e v a lu a t in g  th e  s o c ia l  im ­
p a c t  o f  a n  e m e r g e n c y  o r  d isaster.
2 3 .  D e v e lo p m e n t  a n d  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  a le g is la t iv e  f o u n d a t io n  fo r  
e v a lu a t in g  th e  e c o n o m ic  d a m a g e s  in c u r r e d  b y  th e  s o c ia l  a n d  
e c o lo g ic a l  im p a c ts  o f  a n  e m e r g e n c y  o r  d isaster .
2 4 .  D e v e lo p m e n t  o f  a s y s te m  w ith  in te g r a te d  in d ic a to r s  f o r  e m e r ­
g e n c y  a n d  d is a s te r  r is k  a s s e s s m e n ts .
2 5 .  D e v e lo p m e n t  a n d  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  a le g is la t iv e  a n d  m e t h o d ­
o lo g ic a l  f o u n d a t io n  fo r  e v a lu a t in g  a n d  c o m p r e h e n s iv e ly  a n a ly z ­
in g  e m e r g e n c y  a n d  d is a s te r  r isk s .
2 6 .  D e v e lo p m e n t  o f  a se t  o f  m e a s u re s  f o r  h a z a r d  id e n t i f ic a t io n ,  r is k  
e v a lu a t io n  a n d  r is k  r e d u c t io n  a t  in d u s tr ie s  d e a lin g  w ith  h a z ­
a r d o u s  m a te r ia ls .
2 7 .  D e v e lo p m e n t  a n d  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  a le g is la t iv e  f o u n d a t io n  fo r  
r i s k  e v a lu a t io n  a t  fu e l a n d  e n e rg y  p la n t  s ites .
2 8 .  D e v e lo p m e n t  a n d  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  a le g is la t iv e  f o u n d a t io n  fo r  
r i s k  e v a lu a t io n s  a n d  r e c o m m e n d a t io n s  f o r  r is k  r e d u c t io n  a t  f a ­
c il it ies  m a n a g e d  b y  th e  R u s s ia n  M in is t r y  o f  D e fe n s e .
2 9 .  D e v e lo p m e n t  a n d  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  a le g is la t iv e  f o u n d a t io n  fo r  
a sse ss in g  th e  r is k s  a n d  c o n s e q u e n c e s  f o r  h u m a n  a n d  e n v ir o n ­
m e n ta l  h e a l th  o f  a n  e m e r g e n c y  o r  d is a s te r  a t  a n u c le a r/ ra d ia t io n  
faci l ity .
S u b p r o g r a m  3
3 0 .  D e v e lo p m e n t  a n d  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  f o r e c a s t in g  m e th o d s  fo r  
n a t u r a l  d isa s te rs  a n d  te c h n o lo g ic a l  a c c id e n ts .
3 1 .  D e v e lo p m e n t  o f  f o r e c a s t in g  m e th o d s  f o r  d e te r m in in g  th e  r is k  o f  
a n a t u r a l  d isaster.
3 2 .  I m p r o v e m e n t  o f  th e  u n if ie d  s ta te  a u to m a te d  s y s te m  fo r  e m e r ­
g e n c y  a n d  d is a s te r  m o n i t o r in g  a n d  fo r e c a s t in g .
3 3 .  M o d e r n iz a t io n  o f  a ir  a n d  s a te l l i te  sy s te m s  f o r  m o n i t o r in g  h ig h -  
r is k  a re a s .
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3 4 .  O r g a n iz a t i o n  o f  a n e t w o r k  o f  c e n te rs  ( fo u n d e d  u p o n  th e  
E M E R C O M  r e g io n a l  c e n te rs )  f o r  r e g io n a l  e m erg en cy / d isas ter  
m o n i t o r in g  a n d  f o r e c a s t in g .
3 5 .  D e v e lo p m e n t  a n d  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  a g e o - e c o lo g ic a l  m o n i t o r ­
in g  s y s te m  f o r  a re a s  w ith  in c r e a s e d  levels  o f  k a r s t  ( l im e s to n e )  
d e v e lo p m e n t .
3 6 .  D e v e lo p m e n t  a n d  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  a g e o - e c o lo g ic a l  m o n i t o r ­
in g  s y s te m  f o r  a re a s  w ith  in c r e a s e d  levels  o f  e n v ir o n m e n ta l  p o l ­
lu t io n .
3 7 .  M o d e r n iz a t io n  a n d  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  r e g io n a l  f o r e s t  f ire  m o n i ­
to r in g  a n d  f o r e c a s t in g .
3 8 .  D e v e lo p m e n t  o f  a s y s te m  f o r  m o n i t o r in g ,  f o r e c a s t in g  a n d  m a k ­
in g  r is k  e v a lu a t io n s  o f  sea  a c c id e n ts .
S u b p r o g r a m  4
3 9 .  D e v e lo p m e n t  a n d  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  a se t  o f  in f o r m a t io n  s u p ­
p o r t  m e a s u re s  f o r  a u to m a te d  in f o r m a t io n  a n d  c o n t r o l  sy s te m s  
f o r  e m e r g e n c y  m e d ic a l  c a r e  u sed  d u r in g  e m e r g e n c y  re s p o n s e .
4 0 .  D e v e lo p m e n t  a n d  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  a se t  o f  in f o r m a t io n  s u p ­
p o r t  m e a s u re s  f o r  U S E P E .
4 1 .  D e v e lo p m e n t  a n d  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  s o f tw a r e  a n d  te c h n ic a l  s u p ­
p o r t  f o r  m o n i t o r in g  h a z a r d o u s  n u c le a r  a n d  r a d ia t io n  s ites .
4 2 .  D e v e lo p m e n t  a n d  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  in f o r m a t io n  te c h n o lo g ie s  
p ro v id in g  th e  p u b l ic  w ith  c h e m ic a l  s a fe ty  d u r in g  a n  a c c id e n t  a t  
a n  in d u s tr ia l  faci l ity .
4 3 . M o d e r n iz a t io n  o f  th e  a u to m a te d  c e n tr a l iz e d  w a r n in g  s y s te m  fo r  
th e  R u s s ia n  p o p u la t io n .
4 4 .  M o d e r n iz a t io n  a n d  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  a c o m m u n ic a t io n  s y s te m  
f o r  c o n f id e n t ia l  c o m m u n ic a t io n  b e tw e e n  th e  fe d e ra l  a n d  th e  r e ­
g io n a l  e x e c u t iv e  a u th o r i t ie s  re s p o n s ib le  f o r  e m e r g e n c y  r e s p o n s e  
a n d  re co v e ry .
4 5 .  D e v e lo p m e n t  a n d  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  a U S E P E  w a r n in g  s y s te m .
4 6 .  D e v e lo p m e n t  o f  r is k  m a p s  in d ic a t in g  th e  a re a s  w ith  th e  m o s t  
d a n g e r o u s  h u m a n ,  a n im a l  a n d  p la n t  d iseases .
S u b p r o g r a m  5
4 7 .  D e v e lo p m e n t  a n d  p r o d u c t io n  o f  p r o te c t iv e  e q u ip m e n t  a n d  m e d i­
c in e  f o r  e m e r g e n c y  m e d ic a l  p e r s o n n e l  a n d  f o r  p e o p le  w o r k in g  a t  
h a z a r d o u s  fa c i l i t ie s .
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4 8 .Development and implementation of methods and means for the 
prevention and reduction of the risk associated with missile 
components falling from space.
4 9 .Development of technologies and equipment for eliminating ac­
cidental oil and oil product spills.
50. Development of a set of measures providing public safety in ar­
eas located near nuclear, radiation and hazardous chemical 
sites.
51. Development of measures providing urgent support for the pub­
lic’s basic needs during an emergency or disaster.
52. Development of urgent measures providing individual protec­
tion, medicine and other safety items to the general public and 
to the USEPE units.
5 3 .Development and modernization of radiation control devices for 
safety management in radioactively contaminated areas located 
in the Russian Federation.
54. Development of a safety control and alarm system for railroad 
transportation units.
55. Development of a mobile robotic and aviation system for emer­
gency response.
56. Improvement of emergency search and rescue forces conducting 
response operations at sea and on waterways in the Russian 
Federation.
57. Development of means and methods for locating chemical waste 
sites and eliminating the consequences of chemical accidents.
5 8 .Development of USEPE mobile command and control centers at 
the federal and regional levels.
59. Development of a set of measures providing technological inte­
gration of on-duty dispatch services in urban areas.
Subprogram 6
60. Development of a set of measures for training USEPE specialists 
for emergency prevention at the federal and regional levels.
61. Organization of a training center for USEPE surveillance and 
laboratory control units.
62. Organization of federal and local TV and radio broadcasting on 
emergency/disaster risk reduction and mitigation issues.
6 3 .Publication of manuals for training emergency specialists in risk 
management.
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A ppen dix  2 
Civil Crisis M anagem ent in Russia: Bridging the 
G ap B etw een Research and Practice20
Q l: To what extent is the systematic knowledge of civil crisis man­
agement accumulated and disseminated in your country (Russia) and 
how?
The existing information network for accumulating and sharing 
data about crises and crisis management in Russia is relatively new, 
less than one decade. Before that, the official ideology existing in the 
former Soviet Union presumed that crises were “atypical” in socialist 
countries and “nonexistent” in communist countries. Thus the accu­
mulation and dissemination of systematic knowledge on civil crises 
and crisis management was classified as ‘confidential’ or ‘restricted 
access.’ Such data was accumulated, studied and shared among a lim­
ited number of research institutions and practitioners, and was only 
published in special professional journals with a small circulation. It 
was first when the Chernobyl accident and then the Spitak earth­
quake hit that the situation changed drastically and gave rise to the es­
tablishment of a modern information network in the field of civil 
crises and crisis management.
Within this network, systematic knowledge is accumulated by 
using a flexible organizational approach and a mixture of centralized 
and decentralized methods for collecting, processing and disseminat­
ing data. Such tasks are carried out by information centers and re­
search institutions under the auspices of a few federal ministries and 
departments which are responsible for dealing with various types of 
crises.
Today, the collection and processing of data on non-conflict crises 
and crisis management is primarily the prerogative of EMERCOM, 
while conflict crises and crisis management is principally the respon­
sibility of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA). The accumulation 
and sharing of systematic knowledge on compound crises (i.e. crises 
occurring simultaneously) and crisis management (e.g. environmental 
crises, epidemics and so on) are the shared governance of EMER­
COM, MIA and a few other federal departments. In particular, these 
involve the information and research institutions of the State Envi­
ronmental Protection Committee (since 2000 it is a department with-
10 This questionnaire was filled in by Prof. Boris Porfiriev at the OCR/CRSS W orkshop on Civil Securi­
ty and Crisis M anagem ent in Stockholm (March 18-19, 1999).
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in the Ministry for Natural Resources), Ministry of Health, Ministry 
of Agriculture and a few other governmental bodies as well as several 
academic research organizations.
In order to collect field information, the aforementioned organi­
zations use complex networks. These include national environmental 
monitoring networks for warning and monitoring environmental ac­
cidents, national seismological monitoring and forecasting networks 
(used to detect and respond to crises provoked by earthquakes), spe­
cial national monitoring networks (to warn and cope with chemical 
accidents and radiation), and so on. In addition, the information net­
work of the MIA involves tens of thousands of militia stations and 
hundreds of thousands of people from the Armed Forces to collect da­
ta concerning civilian matters. This data is then processed at local an­
alytical departments and stored electronically as data banks in MIA 
regional and federal information centers.
All of the agents within the existing crisis information networks 
exchange research findings and operational data. Intrasystem ex­
changes are the most common because substantial problems arise 
with intersystem data exchanges (i.e. between various ministries and 
departments) for a variety of reasons: the complexity of the informa­
tion involved, organizational pathologies, or obsolescent (or even the 
total lack of it) communication and data processing equipment. Such 
obstacles impede the effectiveness of emergency response operations 
and increase the economic damage incurred by crises in Russia.
Q2: Are there any joint activities planned or in progress between prac­
titioners and the academic community? Is there a potential for en­
hancing inter-community cooperation between practitioners and 
scholars in this field?
Joint activities between the research community and practitioners 
are an organic component of civil crisis studies and crisis management 
in Russia. Cooperation is strongest between research institutions and 
operational services within any given ministry or department active in 
the area of public security. This is quite natural given the hierarchic 
nature of the organizational and financial relationships existing with­
in the ministries. Here research institutions are often subordinate to 
the ministries and serve primarily as the operational components of 
the ministries. However, because of the economic slowdown in the 
early 1990s, the ‘crisis’ ministries (as many others) experienced a
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shortage of funds and thus their research institutions become the first 
victims of financial cuts. This only weakened the intellectual potential 
of such institutions and the joint efforts made with practitioners in the 
area of crisis mitigation.
The situation becomes even more complicated and ambiguous 
when considering the cooperation efforts between academic research 
institutions and operational organizations. On the one hand, such co­
operation exists in the form of bilateral agreements between specific 
representatives of the two communities and by using the existing fed­
eral programs as an organizational umbrella. Two examples of such 
programs are the federal R&D program on “Safety Support to Indus­
tries for Natural and Technological Risks” (active since 1991) and the 
“Federal Target Program for Risk Reduction and Mitigation of Nat­
ural and Technological Disasters in the Russian Federation for 2 0 0 5 .” 
These programs have already brought together dozens of institutions 
from various academic and industrial research institutions, and from 
operational organizations from those ministries responsible for civil 
crisis management.
Yet on the other hand, these “crisis” ministries rely on their own 
research organizations much more than on the academic community 
for advice for several reasons. Thus, the academic community has be­
come increasingly dependent upon scarce funding from the Ministry 
of Science and Technology. This ministry allocates resources to aca­
demic institutions for primarily fundamental research rather than ap­
plied research. As a result, the amount of potential cooperation be­
tween the academic community and practitioners is shrinking at the 
same time that the scope and effectiveness of their research activities 
are also decreasing.
Economic and financial crisis conditions are exacerbating the ex­
isting cleavage in cooperation between the two communities. In fact 
in 1997 and 1998 the federal safety program received less than a 
quarter of the funds earmarked by the central state budget. Nonethe­
less, the potential for enhancing cooperation between practitioners 
and scholars in the field of civil crisis management exists. Without go­
ing into too many details, two principal opportunities can be out­
lined.
One of these demands a much more intensive use of competitive 
selection mechanisms guided by a wider and a more heterogeneous 
team of authoritative experts. These experts should be knowledgeable
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in and open to both academic activities and the work of practitioners, 
and understand that the best operational programs are those based 
upon concepts deriving from extensive academic research. The sec­
ond opportunity requires increasing the involvement of international 
cooperation in civil crisis research and crisis management practice. In 
this specific area, the Multilateral Crisis Management Cooperation 
Initiative proposed by the CBSS should be fully implemented (see sec­
tion Q4 in Appendix 2).
Q3: What types of crisis scenarios are prioritized for planning pur­
poses (floods, terrorism, etc.)?
A comparative study between the civil crisis management existing 
in the former Soviet Union and in contemporary Russia reveals the 
gradual, although still insignificant, drift from the deterministic type 
of emergency planning (posteriori) to a more comprehensive one in­
volving scenario development and proactive measures for dealing 
with crises. Federal programs for natural disasters and technological 
risks should prioritize risk and mitigation concepts as a basis for de­
veloping scenarios for non-conflict crisis planning. Meanwhile, the 
bulk of the federal programs for civil crisis issues are still oriented to­
wards response-type scenarios rather than prevention and mitigation; 
whereas regional programs look a bit more balanced in this respect.
Certain crises are heavily dependent upon the origin and severi­
ty of the hazards involved. For example, in the northwestern part of 
Russia near the Baltic Sea region there are oblasts (administrative re­
gions) with less than 700,000 people (or less than 0.5%  of the coun­
try’s total population) living in areas prone to natural disasters and 
technological hazards. In accordance to the existing EMERCOM ty­
pology, these are classified as Class II and Class III regions. The St. Pe­
tersburg oblast is classified as a Class I region, since it has a high risk 
for natural and technological disasters. A disaster in this area would 
automatically affect more people since it is more densely populated. 
The Kaliningrad and Pskov oblasts have the highest crime rates in the 
region and therefore are at a higher risk for conflict crises. So just 
within northwest Russia, there is a wide range of risks; some areas are 
more prone to non-conflict crises (i.e. natural and technological dis­
asters) and other areas are more prone to conflict crises (crime, etc.). 
Thus, the strategies for civil crisis management in these areas greatly 
differ in terms of risks, responsibilities, resources and coping meas­
ures.
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Q4: How can academics and policy makers in your country [i.e. Rus­
sia] contribute to strengthening the proposed Multilateral Crisis 
Management Cooperation Initiative?
Both policy makers and academic researchers in Russia can con­
tribute to strengthening the Multilateral Crisis Management Cooper­
ation Initiative by participating in the development and implementa­
tion of joint projects which directly involve security issues concerning 
the Baltic Sea region. In addition, there are some specify areas where 
Russian scholars can concretely and significantly contribute.
Academic studies in civil crisis management issues concerning 
national and international security (in particular, in northwest Russia 
and the Baltic Sea region) should be prioritized at the national level. 
The emphasis of such research should be increasingly focused on (a) 
compound crises (multiple crises occurring simultaneously) and (b) 
future crises (those types of crises which have never occurred before 
and therefore include unknown and unpredictable risk agents). Such 
crises place more demands upon the systems and multidisciplinary re­
search. Increased demands upon research means that the research or­
ganizations must strengthen their institutional and financial status 
and their cooperative efforts with practitioners. This challenge is 
more or less directed to the Russian Academy of Sciences, since it is, 
and has been, the cornerstone for research in Russia for decades.
At the international level, Russian scholars need to intensify their 
collaboration with their colleagues and partners from the Baltic Sea 
states. Such cooperation should be both multilateral and multifac­
eted. Russian academics should be increasingly involved in interna­
tional research teams including those established under the auspices 
of the CBSS and/or the EU commissions. Furthermore, Russian schol­
ars should also serve as more active consultants to various interna­
tional agencies and other operational organizations in developing and 
implementing projects and programs in the field of industrial and en­
vironmental safety, community protection, business continuity and 
other areas of civil crisis management.
As a part of these research teams, Russian experts can bring their 
experience and unique knowledge about centralized and transitional 
societies (which differ substantially from those in Western Europe) to 
the field of crisis management. Put into a comparative framework, 
such systematic knowledge would enable practitioners to draw valu­
able lessons for the European community as a whole and for the Baltic 
Sea states in particular.
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M a n a g e m e n t M ech an ism s in the  
R ussian  M ed ia
A l l a  M o z g o v a t a , M a y a  D a r h o v s k a y a , M a r t n a  E l t m o v a , K t r t l l  
G a v r t l o v , A l l a  G o r o d n t t c h e v a , A l e x a n d e r  T o l m a t c h , a n d  E l e n a  
Sh l t k o v a
Introduction
The existing situation in Russia is increasingly interpreted by many 
analysts, lawmakers, administrators and politicians as a systemic 
and deepening crisis. Research findings reveal that Russia has ex­
ceeded or has closely approached the thresholds for a major nation­
al crisis according to a number of crucial social, economic, demo­
graphic and ecological indicators (Katastrofi, 2000: 14-15 ; Rossiya, 
1997).
As never before, the Russian society needs in-depth methodolog­
ical and empirical studies on crises and crisis management issues. 
However, the Russian research community has limited access to pri­
mary documentation and data on crises, accidents, and emergencies. 
This stems from Russia’s persistent management practice which 
considers the non-formalized production and reproduction of 
norms, traditions and stereotypes to be more important than those 
documented. Likewise, many ministries and departments feel that 
they need to withhold information from outsiders.
For this reason, the mass media often serves as an important 
source of crisis information for the public. It provides data about 
failures in the economic, political and societal systems, although the 
presentation of this data is not always adequate. If these topical 
publications would be put together into a single file, they would 
serve as a crisis database providing for more focused policy analy­
ses. Given this, we felt it would be fruitful to examine the available 
data published in Russian newspapers and professional journals in
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order to categorize and classify the Russian press coverage of partic­
ular crises and crisis management issues.
The authors of this chapter determined two basic tasks and thus 
the study was divided up into two successive stages. In the first 
stage, as many newspapers and professional journals as possible 
were collected. Then an inventory of the publications was compiled 
of the events and issues which complied to the crisis concept used 
by the current authors. In turn, the inventory was used to create an 
empirical typology of ten specific crises. These cases were then ana­
lyzed in the second stage with a particular focus on crisis manage­
ment issues.
It should be pointed out that the selected publications were not 
scrutinized within the sociology of mass media framework (which 
considers the media to be a social phenomenon) but rather as textu­
al documents. This approach is actually a documentary study and 
builds upon the method of collecting sociological data (Giddens, 
1993: 626).
Admittedly, sociology of mass media is most advanced in the 
United States, where quantitative measurements of press readership 
and radio, cinema and TV audiences were introduced as early as the 
1920s. Laswell coined an aphoristic formula of the most generic 
type of mass media sociological research: “Who says what over 
what channel to whom and with what effect” (cf. Spravochnoye, 
1986: 203). This classic formula has served as an outline for sociol­
ogy of mass media research, and guides the analysis of the mass me­
dia, the audience and communication.
In this study we deliberately look at the Russian press not as a 
social phenomenon but rather as a specific set of publications simi­
lar to those documents published by government agencies. It is also 
worth mentioning here that Russian empirical sociology, both in the 
past and in particular now, has been underfunded and has repeated­
ly experienced a shortage of funds for data collection. Therefore, 
Russian sociologists have been more inclined to use newspaper arti­
cles, which often provide important documentation for analysis. 
Utilizing these materials as textual documents is quite effective con­
sidering the fact that in-depth empirical investigations are expen­
sive.
8o
Chapter 3 Types of Crises and Crisis Management Mechanisms in the Russian Media
M eth odology
The researchers engaged in experimental and empirical studies be­
lieve that a wide range of data produces more reliable conclusions. 
Unfortunately, real life is much more complicated, and researchers 
are confined to making sample surveys. It is clear that data should 
be grouped or categorized in some way in order to enable an analy­
sis of a specific research theme or period of time. This methodology 
was used to compile an empirical typology of the data presented by 
the Russian press on various crises.
First, a list of all of the daily and weekly publications (with at 
least 25,000 copies in circulation) and the monthly editions in Rus­
sia were compiled. Then using the ‘orientation’ criterion (i.e. the ed­
itorial policy of each publication -  political orientation, party affili­
ation, etc.), all of the publications were classified into five groups: 
independent, trade unionist, pro-government, oligarchic, and com­
munist/patriotic. From each of these groups, specific editions were 
selected based on certain criteria for in-depth analysis. The criteria 
included the following considerations:
• circulation (newspapers with high circulation),
• geographic coverage (federal newspapers distributed in both 
densely populated and more remote areas in Russia),
• popularity among various groups and communities, and
• a minimum number of publications from each of the five 
group so that the sample would be representative and com­
prehensive.
All of the daily, weekly and monthly newspapers/newsletters select­
ed to be in the final sample are listed in Table 1. The time perimeter 
for this study was limited from September 1, 1999 to February 29, 
2000. The daily newspapers were selected using the following 
method: the first and third weeks of the even numbered months, 
and the second and fourth week of the odd numbered months. The 
method was reversed the following month. Weekly and monthly 
newspapers as well as professional journals were studied in full and 
included all issues.
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Table 1: List of Newspapers and Journals Included in the Sample
Name Circulation Orientation
Daily
Moskovskiy Komsomolets* 219,457 “Independent”
Trud* 612,850 “Trade unionist”
Rossiiskaya Gazeta 436,892 “Progovernment”




Argumenti i Facti* 2,830,000 “Independent”
Zavtra 100,000 “Communist/patriotic'
Novaya Gazeta 73,500 “Independent”
Monthly
Sovershenno Secretno 582,700 “Independent”
* These newspapers existed before 1985 (i.e. before perestroika). The other news­
papers (without a *) emerged after 1985.
K ey Features o f  a Crisis
The research team used a unique understanding of a crisis for the 
empirical investigation. The existing interpretations and the main 
features of a crisis were considered (see Anatomiya, 2000; An- 
tikrizisnoe, 1998; Chesnokov, 1991; Giddens, 1989; Rossiya, 1997; 
Shrivastava, 1993; Stem, 1999; Svedin, 2001; Tsennosti, 1991; 
Zondov, 1999). Various concepts of a crisis exist in different fields 
of research, teaching disciplines and practical applications such as: 
medicine, economy, engineering, political science, sociology and so 
forth. Each field centers on its core theme (natural or social science, 
organic or inorganic, abstract or concrete, etc.) and defines its own 
unique crisis stages and crisis development. Math provides the most 
abstract definition of a crisis: a moment of change in the develop­
ment of programs for (or within) a system. The mass media focuses 
mainly on crises which affect the social system in the broad sense, 
and often provides empirical information on different types of 
crises.
Using these basic principles, a conceptual framework was devel­
oped and used to select and analyze events or occasions which were 
perceived as crises. According to our definition, an event is per­
ceived a crisis when there is a breach in the social and/or organiza­
82
Chapter 3 Types of Crises and Crisis Management Mechanisms in the Russian Media
tional order, which threatens the existing social norms and values. A 
crisis can occur at the international, national or local level and can 
affect any number of groups (ex. community, social, demographic 
or professional).
Using this crisis definition and the aforementioned selected sam­
ple of the Russian press, an inventory was taken of the crisis events 
covered in these publications. This inventory evolved into a 120- 
page manuscript which was used in the first stage of analysis for 
building an empirical typology of crises (as depicted by the media). 
Three basic crisis types were investigated:
• Crises processes which develop in the main areas of society’s 
routine activities.
• Crises consequences caused by a major destabilizing or non­
routine event like the war in Chechnya.
• Crisis events or emergencies, which call for immediate re­
sponse or action.
The events of a crisis process constitute a crisis by definition, but 
they have not exploded into a full-blown crisis. The events have de­
veloped into a crisis scenario but have not yet reached the “boiling 
point” and may never do so. Some examples of crisis processes are: 
banking crises, business crises, production crises, energy crises, the 
contraband of national resources, and the flow of ethnic Russian 
refugees from the former Soviet republics.
A further analysis of crises as portrayed by the press resulted in 
a further subdivision of the types of crisis events:
• Political and social crises including terrorist acts (like the 
bombing of the residential buildings in Buinaksk, Moscow 
and Volgodonsk in 1999 and the ethnic conflicts in 
Karachai-Circassia in 1999).
• Social and economic crises including property conflicts and 
the problems associated with mono-industrial settlements. In 
particular, these include crises associated with the painful re­
distribution of property, for example: at the Vyborg pulp 
and paper mill, the Lomonosov porcelain plant in Leningrad 
region, the Kuznetsk metallurgical complex in Siberia, the 
Cheryomushki ceramic plant, the pharmaceutical complex in 
Moscow, Domodedovo airport, and the mono-industrial set­
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tlements in Ivanovo and Karabash (see Chapter 6 in this vol­
ume) .
• Industrial, environmental and food crises like the poisoning 
incident at Verkhniaya Saida, the ecological disaster pro­
voked by cyanide discharged into Dunai, or the uranium cri­
sis in Uzbekistan.
Selection o f  Crises and Crisis M anagem ent Issues
At the second stage of the analysis, ten specific crisis events were se­
lected from the collected data. Some events were discussed exten­
sively in several newspapers while others were only mentioned spo­
radically. The selected cases were examined and the findings are pre­
sented in the second part of this chapter. These ten crisis events were 
compiled into an original typology by the current authors in accor­
dance with the aforementioned criteria.
A specific procedure was used to analyze the data in each case 
study with particular attention given to crisis management issues. A 
brief description of the crisis event, the key crisis actors, the crisis 
sources, the crisis managers, the crisis agents and the crisis victims is 
presented. Likewise, the sequence of the decision-making steps for 
managing the crisis (including chronological data where possible) 
and the institutions involved in decision making are discussed. 
These included, for example, the Russian President and his adminis­
tration, the federal assembly, various courts, the church, the Armed 
Forces, and the mass media. Lastly, the effectiveness of the crisis 
management is also considered.
It should be strongly underlined that the crisis management is­
sues in the selected crises were not always so clear-cut and some­
times a bit ambiguous. These issues were reconstructed and re­
designed using the descriptive, and often quite emotional, stories 
found in the Russian press. Given this, the current authors tried to 
find a more comprehensive source of information for each of the se­
lected crisis events in professional journals and newsletters. This 
task proved to be quite difficult since many of these publications 
have very expensive subscription fees, which only a few libraries can 
afford. In fact, many of the universities and academic institutions do 
not have subscriptions due to limited funding. Therefore the analy-
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sis was restricted to those sources (published in 1999-2000) which 
were accessible.
One valuable source was the journal Problemi Bezopasnosti pri 
Cbrezvicbanikb Situatsiyakh [Security and Safety Issues in Emer­
gencies] which is issued six times a year. It highlights the general 
and specific safety and security problems in disaster management; 
the legal and organizational issues in civil protection and emergen­
cies; quantitative risk assessments; technical and information sup­
port for rescue workers; statistical analysis of natural and human- 
made emergencies; and emergency and disaster forecasting. The 
journal’s main focus is on industrial safety, in particular that of haz­
ardous facilities.
Another helpful journal was Vorosi Analiza Riska [Issues of 
Risk Analysis] which has a circulation of about 1,000 and was first 
published in 1999. It discusses the theoretical, methodological and 
practical problems of risk analysis and of risk assessment. The jour­
nal analyzes the fatal risks of various kinds of economic activities; 
environmental safety in terms of radiation caused by industrial acci­
dents; and the methodological and legal issues of risk. However, the 
main focus is on financial risks and various methods of quantitative 
assessment. Crisis and risk management issues are not explicitly ad­
dressed in this journal.
The journal Upravleniye Riskom [Risk management] was also 
utilized. It has a circulation of about 1,000. This journal contains 
both a scientific and popular approach to various kinds of risks and 
risk impacts (political, ecological, economic, human-made, health, 
stress, etc.). The publication analyzes the management of financial 
and insurance risks, and to a lesser extent considers political risks. 
The authors of the journal identify national crises, but they fail to 
critically analyze of the management of them. Instead they blame 
these upon the loopholes and shortcomings in the state policy.
To sum up, the analysis of the available professional journals re­
vealed that crisis management issues (in particular, practical crisis 
decisions) are of little or no interest for the publishers. If considered 
at all, these issues are discussed in very broad terms and focus on 
the political and economic risks at the national or regional levels. 
Very little attention is given to how specific decision-makers deal 
with concrete crisis management issues.
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Political and Social Crises
1. B O M B IN G  OF RESIDENTIAL BUILDINGS IN  M O S C O W
Description of the crisis -  On September 8 and 13, 1999, two resi­
dential buildings in Moscow were bombed. The first explosion con­
taining 350 kg of TNT killed 92 people (of which 12 were chil­
dren), and 72 people were injured. The second explosion containing 
250 kg of TNT killed 116 people (of which 8 were children), and 
injured 9 people.
This was a crisis since the values of personal safety, national 
safety, human life, human health and material wealth were put at 
stake. The crisis was aggravated since the respective authorities 
were not inadequately prepared, nor was the emergency response. 
Likewise, mechanisms for anticipating and preventing the second 
explosion had failed. In addition the respective authorities acted 
quite distant and removed after the bombings; sometimes they were 
even unprofessional. Their actions were more symbolic (awarding 
heroes) or auxiliary (cleaning the city of arms and drugs). They ap­
parently did not have a sincere interest in coping with the tragedy or 
the will to implement better response activities. This occurred for 
one of the following reasons: the respective authorities lacked the 
competence and experience for dealing with such situations, or the 
respective authorities were trying to escape responsibility for the cri-
Crisis actors -  The crisis was allegedly organized and executed 
by a terrorist group (the so-called Chechen Path Version) or by the 
Russian special services as some newspapers claimed. The crisis vic­
tims were those directly affected by the bombings -  the residents of 
the blasted buildings and those who happened to be in the area 
when the explosions occurred. The crisis managers were the city 
and federal authorities.
Management of the crisis -  The alleviation measures taken by 
the authorities after the first and the second bombings were those 
aimed at solving the most acute problems for the displaced residents 
and the investigation. The crisis management measures after the 
first bombing (September 9, 1999) focused on helping the victims 
and the investigation. The police searched for witnesses, and the res­
cue workers assisted the victims. Experts from the Federal Security 
Service were able to identify the location and type of bomb. Several
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hot lines were opened for providing information to the public about 
the casualties. However there was no central information center 
even after the second bombing.
On September 10, 1999, President Yeltsin announced a day of 
mourning for those killed in the explosion. None of the officials or 
journalists mentioned the threat of a second bombing.
After the second bombing, urgent response measures were tak­
en. Prime Minister Putin ended his visit in New Zealand and imme­
diately returned to Moscow. He made a public statement. First of 
all, Putin expressed his condolences to the victims and their families, 
and promised that no one would lack support or attention. Second­
ly, he said that if a connection existed between the terrorist attacks 
in Dagestan and Moscow, the Government would regard the terror­
ist bombings as an act of aggression and would use all available 
means to extinguish it. This justified the Government’s right to use 
whatever means necessary for self defense.
The Mayor of Moscow (Y. Luzhkov) imposed special security 
regulations in the city including: tightened passport control, check­
ing of cars and trucks on all main roads; registration of all incomers 
into Moscow, total control over all abandoned goods at surface 
transport, and police reinforcement in the subway. Likewise, all of 
the city hospitals were placed under a state of emergency (physi­
cians could be called at any moment irrespective of their schedules), 
and a hot line was installed at the city’s Head Office for Combating 
Organized Crime for receiving calls about suspicious behavior.
On October 21, 1999, the President of Russia signed a decree 
awarding the title of “Hero of Russia” to EMERCOM Minister 
Shoigu and medals were given to the EMERCOM rescue team.
In the beginning of October, the Moscow city police started the 
operation called “Whirlwind Anti-Terror” which included the fol­
lowing:
• The district police officers held meetings with the local resi­
dents in order to give them instructions on how to act if ex­
plosive material was found. There were 80,000 such meet­
ings.
• More than 4,500 Muscovites were charged with illegally 
renting their apartments.
• The status of about 86,000 people was checked, and half of 
them had come to Moscow illegally.
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• More than 2,000 people were suspected of committing vari­
ous crimes (including the illegal possession of firearms, ex­
plosive materials, and drugs) and 126 people are taken into 
custody.
• Alleviation of the long-term consequences of the bombings 
(specifically those for the displaced residents).
Many other problems surfaced after the bombings. Many of the 
Moscow residents lacked the financial means to repair their apart­
ments which were damaged by the bombings. Furthermore the fire 
destroyed many necessary documents. The residents were promised 
an allowance of 2 ,000 rubles and a compensation up to 75 rubles 
after the evaluation commission finished its job (1 US$ = 27  rubles). 
Despite the fact that many of the residents had insured their apart­
ments, the court turned down their claims and this decision could 
not realistically be challenged. It was not clear whether this decision 
affected only those who owned their apartments, or also those who 
lived there but had not registered ownership. The officials suggested 
that these individuals “should take their claims to the terrorists.” 
Prior to the bombings, the apartment buildings of 76 families in 
Pechatniki (the site of the first bombing) had been privatized free of 
charge according to a new federal law, but this law enabled only 
one free transfer of ownership. This meant that if the person who 
signed the contract died or if the appropriate documents could not 
be produced, the victim’s family could lose ownership and automat­
ically become renters since the new law had not taken these issues 
into consideration. One Moscow Duma Deputy suggested an 
amendment to this federal law which would permit one transfer of 
ownership free of charge if the existing apartment was lost due to 
unforeseeable or unavoidable circumstances (such as a natural dis­
aster or a terrorist attack). However, the federal authorities still 
have not passed this amendment yet and nobody knows when it 
might happen. There is no foreseeable solution to this problem as of 
yet. This issue will most likely be suspended and pushed aside since 
“nobody is lacking support or attention.”
The aftermath of the bombings focused on the problems of the 
investigation. The culprits of the explosions have not yet been ap­
prehended. Speculations on this topic in the more radical newspa­
pers (such as Moscouskiy Komsomolets, Segodnya, Argumenti i fac-
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ti and Kommersant) have suggested that the federal authorities are 
not interested in the investigation since the special services were in­
volved in the terrorist attacks. These newspapers have cited anony­
mous representatives from the military and from the industry world, 
who argued that the amount of explosives (13 tons) used for the 
bombings could have only been obtained with the help of high- 
ranking people. The origins of the explosives were confirmed by the 
Head of the central office for Combating Organized Crime within 
the Russian Ministry of Interior. In addition, the claim that Chechen 
rebels were involved has also been questioned since some analysts 
believe that such an attack would have required at least 4 -5  months 
of planning (i.e. sometime in the spring of 1999 before the 
Chechens had even entered Dagestan).
Lastly, the newspapers also cited the President of Georgia, E. 
Shevarnadze, who apparently made a TV statement on November 
15, 1999 saying, “I informed Yeltsin at our Kishinev meeting that 
his special services were in contact with Chechen terrorists. But it 
seems that Russia doesn’t want to listen to its friends.”
Four months after the bombings, the press criticized the respon­
sible agencies for not finding the criminals yet. According to the 
Deputy Director of the Anti-Terrorist Department (of the Federal 
Security Services), the law enforcement bodies were unsatisfied with 
the results of their work since they “didn’t manage to prevent the 
bombings in Moscow, Volgodonsk and Buinaksk. The head organiz­
ers and perpetrators are still free.”
Effectiveness of the crisis management -  The crisis management 
decisions taken could be characterized as auxiliary (i.e. not of pri­
mary importance), reflexive, and a posteriori, since the crisis man­
agers were incapable of foreseeing and preventing the second bomb­
ing. The authorities have not kept their promises they made imme­
diately after the tragedy. The publications in our sample claimed 
that the culprits and the victims of the tragedy were soon forgotten 
in the pile of new crises.
2. E T H N IC  C O N F L IC T  IN  KARAHAI-CIRCASSIA
Description of the crisis -  On September 4, 1999, a conflict started 
between the followers of Stanislav Derev (the mayor of the town of 
Circassk who had lost the presidential election for the Karachai-
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Circassian Republic) and the supporters of General Vladimir Se­
menov (the winner of the election). The two main ethnic groups, the 
Karachais and the Circassians, found themselves at opposite ends: 
the Karachais and Russians supported Semenov, and the Circassians 
voted for Derev. The defeat of Derev inspired his advocates to de­
mand that the region of Circassia withdraw from its existing entity 
and establish its own autonomous republic. The situation was com­
plicated by the fact that Valentin Vlasov (the acting head of 
Karachai-Circassia before the elections) had not been formally dis­
missed from his position according to the President’s Decree. This 
just put more fuel on the fire for the Derev supporters.
This situation could be perceived as a crisis in two regards. On 
the one hand, it was a long drawn out regional conflict with strong 
ethnic tensions instigated by the federal authorities’ sluggish re­
sponse and incompetence. In other words, this was a crisis stem­
ming from misused time and opportunities. On the other hand, the 
situation threatened the basic values of the region and its residents 
(i.e. the democratic system, security, and life).
Crisis actors -  The mayor of Circassk and his followers can be 
considered the source of the crisis. One could even suggest that the 
fiasco during the elections led to a personal crisis for the mayor, 
which significantly increased the severity of the crisis (namely, the 
inter-ethnic relations).
The crisis victims were, first of all, the citizens of Circassk, and 
then the crisis spread throughout the entire region of Karachai-Cir­
cassia. Semenov’s part in the crisis is not so clear. If one shares the 
view of the Russian parliamentarians, who considered the elections 
to be corrupt, then General Semenov should be regarded as the indi­
rect source of the crisis. However, he suffered personally as well. 
The federal authorities most likely were both a source and a victim 
in this crisis.
Chronology -  On September 3, 1999, a gang of youngsters at­
tacked a group of older Karachai men praying in the center of Cir­
cassk with batons and rods. Reportedly 14 people were injured of 
which 11 had to be hospitalized. The police immediately started on 
a search for the young men.
On September 4, 1999, tension in Circassk increased between 
the Derev supporters and the guards at the electoral headquarters in 
Semenov. One of Derev’s brothers broke off the negotiations with
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the opponents saying, “You [Semenov supporters] don’t deserve to 
be treated the same.” Semenov’s followers replied with “If even a 
single hair falls from the head of someone in our electorate, then a 
lot of Circassians are going to lose their heads.”
Derev’s brother led a crowd of 200 people, including two police 
officers armed with Kalashnikov machine guns, into an open con­
frontation with the Semenov supporters. The police officers started 
firing and eight people were injured, some of those very seriously.
On the night of September 6, a cafe owned by a Karachai was 
set on fire. Several unidentified people shot at a watchman who 
tried to extinguish the fire.
Despite the fact that Semenov had won the elections, he could 
not terminate the Acting Republic President’s duties since the gov­
ernment building was being blocked by the demonstrators. The 
demonstrators were demanding the establishment of a separate Cir­
cassian Republic and their own government. Almost 60 Derev sup­
porters in the Karachai-Circassian government declared their with­
drawal from the existing executive body. A delegation of Balkars 
came to Circassk and endorsed the resolution to the Prime Minister 
and the President of Russia. The delegation declared that the 
Balkars were ready to leave their native Kabardino-Balkaria and 
join the newly established republic of Karachais.
On September 10, 1999, the Slavic community organized a 
meeting in Circassk in order to support Semenov as the legitimate 
head of the Karachai-Circassian Republic.
Management of the crisis -  It took the federal authorities a long 
time before they intervened; they were waiting to see what would 
happen next. The Kremlin had advised Semenov to agree to a meet­
ing with Derev as a sign of goodwill, since the Prime Minister had 
come to the republic with no real alternative.
The General Prosecutor of Russia suggested to wait until the 
Supreme Court of Russia made a decision on the new appeal put 
forth by Derev advocates, but Semenov disagreed. Semenov believed 
that any attempt to postpone the decision to the unknown future 
would only escalate the situation in the republic.
Negotiations between the Derev and Semenov supporters even­
tually took place in Moscow, and the participants called a stop to 
the conflict.
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On September 22, 1999, the Chief of the Presidential Adminis­
tration (A. Voloshin) met in Moscow with representatives from the 
Russian and Nogai communities in Karachai-Circassia. A decision 
was then made to organize a federal commission to resolve the con­
flict.
On September 23, 1999, General Semenov’s assistant was assas­
sinated by an unidentified man. On the same day Derev’s advocates 
organized a new meeting and demanded the dissolution of Semen­
ov’s post since Vlasov could not leave his post as Acting President of 
the republic without a verdict from the Supreme Court or a Presi­
dent’s Decree; both of which were still missing. At this meeting the 
people expressed their resentment towards the federal authorities 
who refused to send a commission to consider the problems of the 
republic in spite of an earlier verbal agreement reached between 
Putin and Voloshin.
Meanwhile, Semenov’s advocates wanted the Karachai-Circass- 
ian police (who were subordinate to the federal government) to 
break up the demonstrators. However, the Interior Minister of 
Karachai-Circassia, Alexander Volkodav, said that he would not use 
force against the demonstrators.
The federal authorities were inconsistent. On the one hand, the 
head of the President’s administration promised Derev that Semenov 
would only continue to work for 45 days in the Ministry of Agricul­
ture building not in the President’s residential building. On the other 
hand the Prime Minister confessed to Semenov his discontent with 
the Circassians, who promised him that they would actively partici­
pate in the organization of the republican government but instead 
organized demonstrations and protests.
On September 24, 1999, the Russian President signed a decree 
dismissing Vlasov from his post as the Acting President of Karachai- 
Circassia. This decision cushioned the emotional tension in the re­
public. The Republic’s Minister for the Interior at last succeeded in 
getting the Circassians and the Abazins to a spontaneous meeting 
outside the central square of Circassk.
On October 18, 1999, on the eve of the Supreme Court session, 
Semenov prohibited all meetings and demonstrations in the repub­
lic. This provoked fury in the democratic press.
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On October 21, 1999, the Supreme Court of Russia approved 
Semenov as the legal and legitimate head of Karachai-Circassian Re­
public.
On October 23, 1999, Semenov, Derev and Putin agreed that Se­
menov would remain the head of the republic for one year. Then at 
that time, October 2000, a referendum would be held to confirm his 
authority. In total, it took seven months for the federal authorities 
to reach this fragile compromise in Karachai-Circassia.
In October 1999, a delegation of the State Duma came to Cir­
cassk. This indirectly implied that they felt the elections in the re­
public were fraudulent. Semenov would have won anyway since the 
Karachais outnumbered the Circassains. The level of hostility be­
tween the two communities reached a critical point. According to 
the newspapers, the crisis had deep historical roots and had not 
been caused by differences in living standards or by Semenov per­
sonally.
The Russian-speaking community lacked any real influence in 
the conflict since the community did not have a strong leader. In 
fact the Russian-speaking community was actually torn between the 
two other ethnic communities during the conflict.
During the Karachai-Circassia conflict, each side wanted 
Moscow as its ally. Concerns were raised that similar conflicts 
would cross into the other regions and spark similar ethnic con­
flicts. It was feared that the Kabardins would join the Circussians 
and the Balkars would gang up with the Karachais, which result in 
another ethnic conflict.
Effectiveness of crisis management -  The situation in Karachai- 
Circassia could be characterized as a temporary solution which 
cushioned, but did not resolve, the crisis.
3. ULTIM ATUM  FO R  T H E  RESIDENTS O F G R O Z N Y
Description of the crisis -  In December 1999 an anti-terrorist opera­
tion in Chechnya was declared. Russian federal troops were given 
the task of forcing the bandits out of Grozny, the capital of the 
Chechen Republic. All of the Grozny residents were to receive an ul­
timatum to leave the city by December 11, 1999. The terms of the 
ultimatum were explained in a leaflet. The ultimatum leaflets were 
to be distributed by an airplane to all of the residents, but the wind
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blew them to the uninhabited district of Grozny (Zavodskoi) leav­
ing most of the city’s residents unaware of the ultimatum.
Under such circumstances, any type of bombing would result in 
the massacre of innocent civilians. Therefore, serious concerns were 
expressed by the Russian and international public, the mass media, 
and various organizations. The emerging crisis demanded an urgent 
resolution.
Crisis actors -  The crisis victims were the Grozny residents. The 
ultimatum threatened their fundamental values of personal safety, 
housing and property. The crisis source is difficult to identify since 
the body or agency responsible for issuing the ultimatum remains 
unknown; it was either issued by the federal authorities or the feder­
al military. Nevertheless, the federal level could be regarded as a cri­
sis source and a crisis victim since the ultimatum was severely criti­
cized by the world community, which threatened to issue economic 
sanctions against Russia.
Chronology -  On December 6, 1999, federal troops dropped the 
ultimatum leaflets over Grozny in an attempt to encourage the resi­
dents to leave the city by December 11. Promises were made to those 
who left the city willingly; they would receive food, shelter, and med­
ical services, and would not be killed. In the leaflets there was a warn­
ing to the rebels, “You are encircled and all the roads to Grozny are 
blocked. You have no chance! It is useless to keep fighting!”
The 30,000 residents were instructed to leave the city through 
specially designed corridors and would then be resettled in camps 
near the village of Znamenskoe. Everyone who followed these in­
structions was guaranteed constitutional rights and the possibility of 
returning home immediately after the operation. Those who refused 
to leave Grozny after the deadline would be subjected to air fire.
The official statement claiming that the federal troops’ mission 
was to protect the residents is questionable. It was hypocritical for the 
federal authorities to claim that the troops would not assault Grozny 
and that they just wanted to “squeeze” the rebels out of the city.
The authorities largely neglected the concerns and interests of 
the Grozny residents. First and foremost, the bulk of the civilian res­
idents failed to receive the information in the leaflets. In addition, 
many of the Grozny residents were older and could hardly walk 15 
km to the designated corridors. Moreover, those who wanted to 
leave the city were stopped by the rebels. The rebels tried to prevent
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the residents (especially the elderly) from leaving the city so they 
could use them as living shields. Many people were also reluctant to 
leave their houses because they were afraid of looting. Others feared 
that they would have no home to return to after the bombing and 
artillery attacks.
On December 7, 1999, a group of Grozny residents reached the 
regional center of Achkhoi-Martan and requested an extension of 
the ultimatum knowing that not everyone had read the leaflets. 
However, the military generals assured them that all of the Grozny 
residents were aware of the ultimatum. The world community 
sharply criticized the ultimatum. The US President (Bill Clinton) 
warned Russia that it would lose its position in the international 
arena if the ultimatum was implemented. The President of France 
(Jacque Chiraque) called the ultimatum “unacceptable.” The British 
Foreign Affairs Minister summoned the Russian Ambassador in 
London to an urgent meeting to discuss the actions of the Russian 
troops in Chechnya.
At the same time, the first minor economic sanctions were im­
posed against Russia. The International Monetary Fund Board of 
Directors refused to specify a date for considering the issue of pro­
viding a loan to Moscow before the ultimatum was dismissed.
Management of the crisis -  One can hardly speculate now what 
exactly caused the federal authorities to call off their plans. It could 
have been the world community’s reactions to the issue or the fear 
of provoking negative public opinion among the Russians voters be­
fore the Duma elections. However, one thing is sure -  Grozny was 
definitely a trump card for some of the political movements during 
the parliamentary election campaigns.
As a result of the termination of the ultimatum, the combat mis­
sion in Chechnya was changed. The federal troops were sent instead 
to reinforce positions in the territory seized in the eastern suburbs of 
Grozny to fight the rebels there.
The effectiveness of the crisis management -  It is hard to proper­
ly assess the effectiveness of the measures taken to cope with this 
crisis given the fact that the crisis source and crisis victim ended up 
being one and the same (i.e. the federal government). It is true that 
the federal bodies reconciled the dispute but this was to a great ex­
tent done because of strong international pressure and criticism 
from the democratic movements in Russia.
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Social and Econom ic Crises
4. PR O PE R T Y  RED ISTR IB U TIO N  AT T H E  V Y BO R G  PULP 
A N D  PAPER MILL
Description of the crisis -  The Vyborg pulp and paper mill (PPM) is 
the cornerstone for social and economic life in town of the Soviet- 
skoe in the Leningrad region. Over the past two years, the plant 
owners have made two attempts to sell it to foreign companies. 
However, both times the PPM workers protested heavily upon hear­
ing that the new owners were planning to cut and partially replace 
the PPM workers. In October 1999 a clash occurred between the 
mill workers and the urgent response police units (the so-called 
spetsnaz) who the owners had contracted to keep the workers under 
control.
This conflict conforms to our criteria of a crisis. First of all, 
there was a clear threat to the mill workers’ basic values (more 
specifically, gainful employment, and livelihood). Secondly, both the 
PPM owners and the regional authorities poorly managed this dis­
pute, which eventually evolved into a violent conflict with armed 
weapons.
Crisis actors -  The new owners of the mill (first Cypriot then an 
English company called ALCEM), the PPM workers and the so- 
called “People’s Director” (a representative elected by the workers) 
were the primary crisis actors. The new owners were the crisis vic­
tims and the People’s Director was the crisis source since he instigat­
ed the workers to oppose the owners despite the fact that the work­
ers had wavered their right to make decisions when they sold their 
shares to the plant owners.
One actor who should have been involved in the crisis, but did 
not, was the regional administration of the Leningrad region. The 
regional authorities distanced themselves from the PPM problems 
and ignore them for two years. This policy of non-interference actu­
ally aggravated the crisis and to a great extent provoked the vio­
lence. Thus, the regional administration could be considered as the 
indirect or secondary crisis source. The Sovetskoe residents who 
were employed as strikebreakers by the new owners were also a cri­
sis source.
Secondly, another potential crisis actor, who also failed to step 
in, was the federal government. The federal government has a policy
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of distancing itself from any serious conflict regarding property 
(re)distribution. For instance, the federal government kept quiet 
when the Governor of Krasnoyarski region (Alexander Lebed) tried 
to use force to resolve a conflict at the Achinsk aluminum plant in 
Siberia shortly before the events in Vyborg. Such conflicts provide 
the advocates of a state-planned economy and the leftist politicians 
an opportunity to call for the nationalization of some industries. 
Such politicians, as well, could be regarded as potential actors in the 
Vyborg crisis.
Chronology -  In the beginning of 1998 the former English own­
ers (Cypriots) of the plant announced a forthcoming cut in the 
workforce because of a serious slowdown in production. This gave 
rise to a conflict. The plant workers organized a strike committee 
and elected a “People’s Director,” who declared that the workers 
should be able to keep their right to make decisions despite the fact 
that the workers had sold their shares to the existing owners (Cypri­
ots). The workers went so far as to deny the Cypriot shareholders 
access to the plant premises. By the end of 1998 the People’s Direc­
tor managed to increase production at the plant (or more accurately 
put it back into production) and increased the workers’ salaries. 
However, the funds used to cover the payroll actually came from a 
commercial bank credit issued on very unclear terms and shaky con­
ditions.
In spring 1999 the Cypriots owners sold the plant to ALCEM. 
The new owners reregistered the pulp and paper mill, and changed 
its name and status. The old stock company was transformed into a 
public stock company called “Vyborg Cellulose.” In the summer, 
the bailiff of the Leningrad region ordered the closure of the plant, 
but the workers denied the authorities access to the plant’s premises.
On the night of October 10, 1999, the Regional Deputy Prose­
cutor and the PPM co-owner entered the plant with the assistance 
of 30 members of the “Taifun” spetsnaz unit from the Law Enforce­
ment Department. They made their way to the administrative office. 
This action was secretly planned by the Law Enforcement Depart­
ment and the Chief Officer of the Interior in the Leningrad region. 
The plant workers on duty (up to 100 workers) refused to let them 
in the administrative building. Shots were fired. Two workers were 
slightly injured and the plant co-owner was taken hostage.
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By morning all of the plant workers were on-site. The police en­
circled the plant. The regional administration started negotiations 
with the strike committee while the Governor of the Leningrad re­
gion appealed to the federal government to activate the responsible 
agencies. The federal government did not do or say much more than 
“do not relinquish privatization.”
Almost a month later in November 1999, the then Minister of 
Labor and Social Development (Serguei Kalashnikhov) came to the 
plant. He was in favor of searching for a compromise: a legal basis 
for providing the workers the right to contest the issue of property 
ownership/governance but only in the court of law. A hearing in the 
arbitrage court was scheduled for January 20,2000. In the Minis­
ter’s opinion, if the owner’s rights were confirmed, the situation 
would explode and would get totally out of control. Therefore he 
proposed to sign an agreement with the British company on trans­
ferring the trust management to the administration of the Leningrad 
region, which could consider the owners’ interests.
In late November, labor union representatives from all over Rus­
sia gathered at PPM in Vyborg to support the protests against the 
privatization process which they regarded as illegal. The labor 
union representatives had a meeting and exchanged their experi­
ences on non-subordination.
On December 10, 1999, the arbitrage court held a session and 
delivered a sentence in favor of the owners. The PPM workers 
signed a letter of mistrust to the former People’s Director and ap­
plied for jobs in the new public stock company Vyborg Cellulose. 
After they were paid an advancement of 1,000 rubles. The new 
owners committed themselves to keeping as many jobs as possible. 
Thus, the PPM crisis was resolved.
The effectiveness of crisis management -  The crisis started due 
to the regional (Leningrad region) and federal authorities’ negli­
gence and indifference to the problems of private property and own­
ership rights. Similar conflicts have popped up before and thus 
should not be considered unique. However, none of the responsible 
agencies had executed effective crisis planning or utilized crisis man­
agement in good time. As for the urgent crisis response measures, 
the federal government did not have any real specific tools or means 
prepared for solving the problem. The proposal from the Minister 
of Labor could hardly be regarded as acceptable either.
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An effective approach would have included early crisis planning 
(conflict mediation and reconciliation) with the regional authorities, 
the trade unions, experts in labor relations and property issues, and 
the plant owners. Crisis events like the one at PPM are becoming 
more commonplace in Russia. This disturbing trend highlights the 
need for better crisis prevention and crisis management in Russia.
5. CRISIS AT D O M O D E D O V O  A IR PO R T
Description of the crisis- Domodedovo Airlines is one of the Rus­
sia’s main airlines. It transports the largest share of national air car­
go and serves almost 70%  of all commercial flights to the Far East 
(with some regions having no other service). Canceling just a few 
flights could provoke a serious crisis.
On January 19, 2000, the Ministry for Taxation and Fees 
blocked all of the company’s accounts and suspended all of its pay­
ments for fuel, airport fees and navigation services. As a result, sev­
eral flights were cancelled and many people were stranded at the 
airports; they could not reach their final destination nor could they 
get a refund for their tickets. The Ministry for Taxation and Fees 
imposed sanctions against the company, which had acquired a debt 
of 16 million rubles to the federal budget. However, the federal 
budget was indebted to the company (for VIP passenger transporta­
tion) 200 million rubles with some sources claiming even up to 230  
million rubles.
This situation could be regarded as a crisis since at least several 
hundred people were affected and they lost a considerable amount 
of time and money. Though life values were not threatened, social 
and legal norms were disturbed when the passengers failed to reach 
their destinations. Domodedovo Airlines did not provide them with 
lodging and none of the hotels would provide credit to the stranded 
passengers. The passengers could not refund their tickets, so they 
had to just wait and press the airline staff hoping that the crisis 
would soon be resolved.
The crisis actors -  The newspapers provided little data on the 
crisis actors. The source of this crisis was the federal government: in 
particular, the Ministry for Taxation and Fees, which blocked the 
airline’s accounts. Likewise, the federal agencies played a part in 
causing the crisis since they had not paid back their debt to Do­
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modedovo Airlines in time. In turn, the company could hardly be 
considered just a crisis victim since it failed to pay its taxes in time. 
Thus Domodedovo Airlines could be regarded as both a crisis 
source and a crisis victim. Every passenger scheduled to fly with Do­
modedovo Airlines at that point in time was definitely a crisis vic­
tim.
One more specific crisis actor could be the administration of 
Domodedovo Airlines. On February 28, 1999, the company should 
have started a privatization process, but apparently somebody did 
not like these plans and decided to pick on the company by freezing 
its accounts and forcing it into bankruptcy. These are mere specula­
tions and there is no reliable information to prove these claims.
Chronology -  Despite the lack of a solution from any of the 
government agencies, Domodedovo Airlines resumed flights to the 
Far East on January 20, 2000, by lending fuel from other companies 
with their “word of honor” for future payment. On January 25, 
2000, the airline administration started negotiations with the tax 
authorities but failed to find a mutual understanding.
The Ministry of Defense also owed Domodedovo Airlines 230  
million rubles, but did not pay it back since it would set an unpleas­
ant precedent for the federal government.
In fact, these were the only actions taken to resolve the crisis as 
of February 2000 (the time limitation designated for this study). 
One can only guess how the situation will develop. The airline will 
most likely be able to settle the dispute with the tax authorities by 
postponing the deadline for payment. Meanwhile, Domodedovo 
Airlines could at least try to get part of its money from the Ministry 
of Defense. The Director of the Federal Aviation Service was in fa­
vor of this option and promised to “analyze the problem of pay­
ment with the servicemen.” The airline could possibly apply for 
bank credit in order to be able to pay its taxes and compensation to 
the affected passengers. Thus, its accounts would be reopened and 
the final resolution of the crisis could be postponed.
However, the crisis should have in fact been better managed 
since the airline is needed to service the more remote areas and to 
transport VIPs. If the company is not able to settle this problem 
with the tax authorities by itself, then the company must take this 
issue to court. This would mean introducing a new actor in the cri­
sis management (i.e. the court). This could mean a long court ses­
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sion and thus the company could be forced to suspend its activity 
for a longer period of time. That in turn would give Domodedovo 
Airlines’ competitors a lead in the market and could eventually 
drive Domodedovo Airlines into bankruptcy.
According to the latest updates, the airline and the tax authori­
ties have successfully met for negotiations. Domodedovo Airlines 
has been back to full service since early March 2000; however, the 
company still has to pay back 16 million rubles to all of its credi­
tors.
Effectiveness of the crisis management -  Once the tax authori­
ties decide to reopen the airline’s accounts, the crisis will be essen­
tially over for those who use the company’s services. Nevertheless, 
there could still be undesirable consequences for Domodedovo Air­
lines in the future.
6 . CRISIS AT T H E  K A C H K A N A R  M IN IN G  PLA N T
Description of the crisis -  This conflict-induced crisis (similar to the 
one in Vyborg) occurred at the Kachkanar mining plant, one of 
Russia’s largest mining facilities. The plant provides high quality 
iron ores containing vanadium, titanium, platinum, gold and iron 
concentrates to the metallurgic smelting giants in the Urals and 
Siberia.
The General Director of the plant, Janol Khaidarov, organized it 
so that the three middleman dealers bought the plant’s production 
for 218 rubles per ton. They then turned around and sold it to the 
metallurgical companies for 4 2 0 -5 0 0  rubles per ton. The annual 
profit of this deal was estimated at US$ 48 million, a profit which 
the Kachkanar mining plant should have made from the very begin­
ning. The plant workers and the miners were already furious upon 
hearing this because their wages had been reduced when Khaidarov 
became director.
The way the plant’s top management carried out production and 
other activities violated the legal and social order at the plant and at 
the regional level. The low wages and poor standard of living for 
the miners meant that there was a high risk of a strike. If there was 
a strike, then the plant’s production would be suspended and the en­
tire town (which was completely dependent upon the plant in many 
ways) would simply be paralyzed. In turn this would affect the ore
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supply to the metallurgic companies and would decrease the taxes 
paid into the local and regional budgets.
The Chairman of the plant’s trade union claimed that the Gener­
al Director refused to even discuss the problem with the workers. 
Unsurprisingly, the miners threatened to strike. The administration 
of the Sverdlovsk region was also discontent with the Director’s be­
havior.
The General Director’s policy affected the safety standards at the 
plant. Funds for buying new equipment had been reduced and the 
depreciation rate of the existing plant equipment was as high as 
70%  to 100% . Over the past few years, repair and maintenance re­
ceived only 30%  of the necessary funding which meant such tasks 
were behind schedule and this created conditions for an increased 
accident rate and a higher probability of a major accident.
On Tuesday night, November 2, 1999, the dam of the sludge 
storage facility broke and flooded the plant’s premises. Economic 
damage to the plant alone was estimated at 207 million rubles. The 
economy and environment of Kachkanar as well as the Via River 
were badly affected. The measures taken by the plant administra­
tion to cope with the accident were insufficient. Industrial waste 
was washed out by the spring floods into the river and thus spread 
the sludge out into the region. The people in the neighboring towns 
of Nizhniaya, Tura and Lesnoi were also affected by the accident 
and this ecological disaster threatened the entire region of Sverd­
lovsk. Therefore, the situation at the Kachkanar mining plant can 
be perceived as a crisis.
Crisis actors -  The top plant management should be considered 
the crisis source since it was the General Director’s selfish policy 
that led to the shrinking of company funds for municipal social 
services and industrial safety, which increased the threat of a major 
environmental crisis in the Sverdlovsk region. His policy also in­
creased the risk of a strike, which affected not only the plant but al­
so the town of Kachkanar and the neighboring communities. The 
plant miners with their low wages and the residents affected by the 
sludge from the broken dam should be considered the crisis victims. 
The metallurgical plants had no other alternative than to buy the 
exceptionally high-priced ores from Kachkanar’s middleman deal-
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Chronology -  On December 31, 1999, the administration of the 
Sverdlovsk region declared a local state of emergency because of the 
dam accident at the mining plant. In conjunction with this, it was 
mentioned that the plant administration had overlooked plant safe­
ty. Furthermore, the General Director was specifically charged with 
personal negligence.
Given this, the Kachkanar local authorities supported the 
Sverdlovsk regional authorities’ (who owned the bulk of the plant’s 
shares) decision to replace the General Director (Khaidarov) and the 
Board Chairman (Gareev), and thus the plant’s Board of Directors 
did this. The regional authorities’ legitimate right to interfere in the 
plant’s activities was authorized by the existing rules and regula­
tions (mainly, the Federal Privatization Act). The Regional Gover­
nor’s Decree (dated February 11, 1999) prohibits shareholders from 
dismissing the General Director of a state-controlled enterprise 
without the consent of the regional administration and the head of 
the municipal assembly. The Sverdklovsk regional administration 
then became the key shareholder of the plant and took over running 
the enterprise in every respect.
At 11:00 p.m. on January 29, 2000, Khaidarov and Gareev 
were dismissed, and the new General Director and Board Chairman 
were appointed. The new General Director assumed his duties im­
mediately after his appointment. However, the members of the 
plant’s administration, who had earlier supported Khaidarov, op­
posed all of these changes so fiercely that the new General Director 
had to have his office and the entire administration building guard­
ed by the town police and security guards.
At 8:20 a.m. on January 30, 2000, the former plant administra­
tion and its supporters tried to attack the administration building. 
The attempt failed, but two security guards were injured. Less than 
three hours later, the assailants arranged a meeting near the Mayor’s 
office. Most of these people were activists in the “May Movement” 
led by Alexander Bourkov who was the main opponent to the act­
ing Governor of Sverdlovsk region (Eduard Rossel). The May 
Movement had long been known for making trouble. The assailants 
tried to seize the Mayor’s office. The police fired a warning shot in 
the air and warned the assailants that they could use their weapons 
to defend the government building. The assailants retreated.
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On January 31, 2000, the federal TV stations reported “ the 
shooting of angry workers” and the workers’ attempts to regain the 
“wicked redistribution of ownership” with footage of the attack on 
the Mayor’s office by the May Movement activists. Likewise on 
February 2, 2000, the State Duma’s Chairman, Gennady Seleznev, 
hastily accused the new plant’s administration of having criminal 
links and urged the then Interior Minister, Vladimir Rushailo, to im­
mediately interfere in the crisis at the Kachkanar mining plant.
In addition, Mr. Ashenbrenner from the German company 
(Davis International L.L.C.), which held almost twenty percent of 
the plant’s shares, handed over a written protest to Governor Rossel 
for the “unacceptable violation of German investors’ rights.” The 
Metallurgy Minister, Molchanov, made reference to the replacement 
of the former General Director by saying that the former plant ad­
ministration had failed to perform its duties and that the new direc­
tor, Kozitsin, was a skillful professional and experienced leader.
The former General Director, Khaidarov, protested his dismissal 
in the Kachkanar town court, at the municipal and regional prose­
cutor’s offices, and to the town and regional authorities. However, 
all of them confirmed the legitimacy of the new plant administra­
tion and dismissed his appeals.
The plant’s trade union made a number of demands to the new 
General Director for higher wages and declared they would not in­
terfere in the ongoing dispute. “Let the owners solve the problems 
themselves. We don’t want to get involved. Our work and salaries 
come before everything else.” In response, the new director (Koz­
itsin) ordered a stepwise 10% increase in monthly wages over a pe­
riod of three months (i.e. a total of a thirty percent increase). In ad­
dition, the new plant management decided to terminate their busi­
ness relations with the middleman dealers, and signed a direct 
contract with the customers.
Effectiveness of the crisis management -  The analysis of the cri­
sis management reveals three groups of crisis agents in this case: the 
active supporters of the regional administration, the opponents, and 
the observers. The plant’s newly appointed General Director as­
sumed his position but had to be protected by the local law enforce­
ment agents when he was simply implementing the decision made 
by the Sverdlovsk regional administration. Some of the other actors 
(the administration, the court and the prosecutor’s office) upheld
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this decision and thus they validated the legitimacy of the plant 
changes.
The people who had been dismissed from the plant’s administra­
tion and who made several attempts to reverse the decision were the 
main instigators of the crisis. In addition, the May Movement 
brought about mayhem at the plant and the Mayor’s office when 
they tried to prevent the implementation of the changes. Among 
those opposing the decision were the German investors who felt 
that their interests were not being considered.
The crisis observers were the mass media, the State Duma repre­
sented by its Chairman, and the plant’s trade union. The newspa­
pers (analyzed in this study) did not mention any police activities in 
response to the State Duma’s appeal to the Interior Minister’s in­
volvement. The newspapers did however mention that interfering in 
the affairs of a private enterprise violates the Russian Civil Code.
Worth special mentioning is the decision of the plant’s trade 
union not to support any side in the conflict, but rather to simply 
make a list of demands to the new director. In fact, the union ended 
up being a crisis agent, since it initiated some measures which actu­
ally calmed down the crisis (namely, demands for a wage increase 
and a direct contract with the customers). These measures immedi­
ately had a positive and significant impact on resolving the crisis 
and were important in the long-term for preventing new crises. In 
addition to these measures, diverse strategies were used for coping 
with the crisis at the Kachkanar mining plant: negotiations, direct 
law enforcement, court appeals, and the exchange of official letters.
As a result of these efforts, the plant managed to solve some of 
its economic troubles. The new revenues obtained were put towards 
increased wages, tax revenues for the town and regional budgets, 
and modernization of the plant. The Kachkanar residents (including 
the miners and their families) noticed concrete improvements in 
their social living standards. Likewise, the work began on repairing 
the ruptured dam. Thus in terms of crisis resolution, one could ad­
mit that the strategies and measures taken by the key crisis man­
agers delayed the crisis but eventually put an end to it.
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7. T H E  CRISIS IN  IV A N O V O
Description of the crisis -  The crisis developed in the city of Ivano­
vo, the former Soviet center of the textile and clothing industry. 
When the factories were first built there, there was a severe shortage 
of female workers so future weavers were encouraged to come to 
Ivanovo from all over the country. As a result, a mono-industrial 
city emerged with its economic and social life almost exclusively de­
pendent upon the textile and clothing factories. For that reason 
Ivanovo was often called “the national textile capital” and “the city 
of brides.” The quality of the Ivanovo textiles could not, however, 
compete with the foreign production and the local warehouses were 
soon overstocked.
After privatization occurred in Ivanovo, some of the new own­
ers of the big enterprises began to sell the social infrastructure facili­
ties (such as two recreation centers, two hostels and a summer camp 
for children). Even the weaver’s looms were sold to Turkey and 
thousands of workers lost their jobs. However, the local authorities 
ignored the complaints and declared that the new owners were now 
responsible for making decisions regarding the production and sale 
of the textile facilities.
Enflamed by the local authorities’ negligence, the Ivanovo resi­
dents organized a big meeting to discuss how to protect their inter­
ests. Picket lines, demonstrations and hunger strikes became every­
day scenes in Ivanovo, and from time to time “women’s riots” oc­
curred. For example, when there was a delay in paying the workers’ 
salaries at the Noviye Gorky textile factory, the desperate weavers 
took the Director hostage. Impoverishment and unemployment have 
flourished in the former “city of brides” since most of the textile 
and clothing factories have closed in recent years.
There is a severe lack of job opportunities outside the textile and 
clothing industry. As a result, thousands of weavers and their fami­
lies have had to turn to retail trade (mostly at flea markets) bringing 
goods from Moscow or from abroad. Without salaries or a govern­
ment child allowance, several women have been forced to leave the 
city or forced into prostitution. In addition to unemployment, other 
problems have mushroomed in Ivanovo. The construction and re­
pair of buildings have stopped. Many day care centers and schools 
have closed and those that remain open are unable to feed the chil­
dren. In winter, many buildings do not have proper heating so the
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students do not take off their coats during class. Given the fact that 
the city budget is short of funds and is having a hard time paying 
for the city’s electricity bills, the electric power stations have cut or 
completely terminated service to the industrial and transport enter­
prises. Consequently, the lights in residential buildings have to be 
switched off periodically a few hours at a time.
The morbidity rate (including that of serious illnesses) has in­
creased in Ivanovo, and the occurrence of tuberculosis tripled be­
tween 1991 and 1999. The criminal rate is grim. Robbery, burglary, 
and murders increased dramatically in Ivanovo in the 1990s. All of 
these factors put together are more than sufficient for calling the sit­
uation in Ivanovo a crisis.
Crisis actors -  The local and federal authorities and the new 
owners were the crisis sources. The federal authorities were respon­
sible for turning Ivanovo into a mono-industrial city during the So­
viet years and for neglecting the problems associated with privatiza­
tion in the late 1980s and the 1990s; they simply passed on the 
problems to the new owners of the textile and clothing factories. 
The new owners are not concerned about re-establishing the Russ­
ian textile production and have given preference to other sources of 
fast income. The local authorities have failed to protect the social 
rights of the local residents and have been unable to help them cope 
with the crisis.
The main crisis victims were obviously the residents of Ivanovo, 
primarily the employees who lost their jobs. Everyone living in the 
troubled city, even those who were not working in the textile and 
clothing industry, has suffered economically and socially.
Chronology -  None of the newspapers in our study provided 
concrete information on the crisis events or the decisions made dur­
ing the crisis. They did however stress that the Ivanovo authorities 
ignored the existing crisis and failed to take any action to deal with 
it even after several demonstrations.
Moreover, some of the decisions made actually gave rise to the 
escalation of the crisis. For instance, the municipal Duma and the 
Mayor of Ivanovo (Valeriy Troeglazov) closed the biggest and best 
hotel in the city so the building could be used for the local police. As 
a result, some hundred employees lost their jobs. That only added 
to the severity of the crisis and just increased the number of crisis 
actors. Before the decision was made to close the hotel, the Ivanovo
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Mayor was a crisis actor and only a minor source of the economic 
and social problems associated with the reduced production in the 
textile and clothing industry. However, he immediately turned into a 
major crisis source, who aggravated the existing unrest in the city.
Effectiveness of the crisis management -  Opportunities for 
preventing this major crisis were lost because the federal authorities 
were not interested and did not want to get involved and the local 
authorities were passive. The development of the situation was cri­
sis-prone and the crisis prevention policy was ineffective. In addi­
tion to that, the authorities, the former plant owners, and the new 
owners failed to cope with the acute phase of the crisis when it 
emerged and simply let it evolve into a much bigger problem. The 
measures for urgent response and primary recovery were basically 
nonexistent. Moreover, it would hardly be an exaggeration to say 
that the actual crisis management policy did not even exist at the lo­
cal, regional and federal levels at the time of the socio-economic un­
rest in Ivanovo.
Industrial and E nvironm ental Crises
8 . P O IS O N IN G  CRISIS AT T H E  VERKHNIAYA SALDA
SMELTER
Description of the crisis -  On the night of December 12, 1999, an 
accident occurred at the Verkhniaya Saida smelter (one of the 
world’s largest titanium producers). Dozens of workers were affect­
ed. Some were very seriously injured with respiratory burns as a re­
sult of the emission of nitric acid vapors. A special inter-organiza­
tional commission was organized to investigate the accident and is­
sued a preliminary report. This preliminary report cited an electrical 
short circuit, which had in turn unplugged the plant’s equipment, as 
the direct cause of the accident.
This was a crisis for a number of reasons. First, the event direct­
ly threatened human health and human life considering the fact that 
over 40 people were seriously injured and had to be hospitalized. 
The doctors have speculated that at least some of the injured (main­
ly those who had inhaled the nitric acid vapors) will eventually be­
come paralyzed.
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Secondly, the accident was also in part caused by obsolete tech­
nological equipment which was unable to adapt to an electricity 
failure. In turn, failure to replace the outdated equipment was a re­
sult of loopholes in safety management and the shortage of funds, 
and the responsibility of these failures rest on the plant and regional 
administrations. Even though it is hard to do anything when funds 
are short, the modest repairs and timely maintenance service would 
have dramatically decreased the risk of such an accident. These sys­
tematic errors in safety management and the risks to human health 
justify using the term crisis to describe this incident.
Crisis actors -  The plant management and the Sverdlovsk re­
gional administration can be considered the crisis sources. In spite 
of a number of warnings about continuous electricity failures, obso­
lete equipment, and previous accidents at the plant and in the re­
gion, the crisis actors did very little to prevent another accident. The 
other crisis actors (who were more crisis catalysts than crisis 
sources) were the plant security guards who delayed the crisis re­
sponse by forcing the affected workers to submit time cards before 
allowing them to leave the plant premises instead of letting them go 
immediately to the hospital.
The crisis victims were the 109 people working at the plant 
when the accident occurred. Over 40 of them were seriously injured 
and had to be taken to the local hospital and the regional toxicolog- 
ical center. The worst injured were the women (most in their 50s) 
working near the hot bath with nitric acid. The main crisis agents 
were the doctors, who provided first aid and medical assistance to 
those affected at the local hospital and the toxicological center in 
Ekaterinburg, and the mass media (in particular, the newspaper 
“Kommersant”), which reported the accident.
Management of the crisis -  One can identify two main types of 
crisis action for coping with this accident. The first involved the use 
of primary (urgent) response: evacuating the affected workers, pro­
viding medical aid to the injured, investigating the causes of the ac­
cident, and fixing the equipment. The other set of measures were 
more long-term in nature and focused on improving the safety man­
agement system (including preventive measures and an automatic 
warning system), replacing outdated equipment, etc.
The primary response measures were taken immediately after 
the electric transformer was cut (sometime around 5:00 a.m.). It
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took the electricians about 45 minutes to find out the cause of the 
short circuit and then more than an hour (from 5:45 to 7:00) to 
check and activate the reserve transformer. By 7:00 a.m. the electric­
ity supply to the plant had been restored and all units were back 
and running.
The evacuation of the workers who had been injured was not 
properly organized. The security guards delayed the response by re­
quiring the workers to follow all of the bureaucratic procedures be­
fore leaving the plant, and a special safety team was not on the 
plant premises at the time of the accident. The good news was that 
everyone received adequate medical aid.
Effectiveness of the crisis management -  The response measures 
implemented for coping with the accident were really helpful for 
getting the plant back into running order and for giving the neces­
sary medical aid to those injured. However, this did not mean the 
end of the crisis for the victims; some will eventually become para­
lyzed. As for the long-term crisis actions, it is difficult to accurately 
assess their effectiveness and know whether they will ever be prop­
erly implemented.
This accident was in no way unique for the Sverdlovsk region 
considering the earlier environmental crisis at the Kachkanar mill 
and the accident at the Sredny Ural copper smelter. Unfortunately, 
these two previous crises did not serve as a timely warning for the 
regional administration or the management of the Verkhniaya Saida 
plant. Thus in general we can conclude that few lessons have been 
learned about preventative crisis management in Russia concerning 
crisis development and safety policies.
9. T H E  U R A N IU M  CRISIS IN  UZBEKISTAN
Description of the crisis -  Devices containing cesium and uranium 
used to detect and measure radiation levels were shipped to the 
Navoi Electromechanical Plant in 1991. However for a number of 
reasons, this plant was never in service. The plant lacked proper se­
curity and safety measures, thus making it easily to smuggle the ra­
dioactive devices. A retired police officer, named Akhmedov, smug­
gled three of these containers (containing 55 kg of uranium).
Akhmedov hid these containers in his chicken coop until they 
could be picked up a seller who was going to pay as much as US$
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1,500,000. Apparently Akhmedov was unaware of how dangerous 
the containers really were. Almost every member of his family was 
subjected to high levels of radiation.
Time passed. The chickens in the coop went blind, and Akhme­
dov’s wife started complaining of various ailments. By chance the 
smugglers were caught when one of them tried to sell a container to 
an uncover policeman.
This situation should be considered as a crisis given the fact that 
the radioactive material was not properly stored and that it eventu­
ally came into contact with a large number of people who had ab­
solutely no protective gear. Fortunately, the impact of the radiation 
was confined to one area and the radioactive devices had not been 
transported further. If playing children or some other unsuspecting 
person had accidentally opened the containers, radiation of 1,5 
mR/h would have spread and would have killed everybody in the 
area. Likewise many other people could have been unknowingly ex­
posed if Akhmedov had succeeded in selling the containers which 
most likely would have been transported to another area.
Crisis actors -  The initial criminal act evolved into a crisis for 
those who came in direct contact with the radioactive material (i.e. 
the crisis victims), including the workers at the Navoi Electro­
mechanical Plant since the plant never met the minimum safety 
standards. The administration of this facility, however, was a crisis 
source as well as a crisis agent.
Akhmedov, his accomplices and one of the plant managers (who 
had helped arranged the smuggling operation) should be regarded 
as the main crisis sources. The crisis was intensified when the ra­
dioactive containers were moved from the holding facilities to 
Akhmedov’s private property. The crisis reached its peak when a po­
tential customer of the containers turned out to be a policeman, and 
the smugglers were arrested.
The crisis victims included Akhmedov’s family, who were ex­
posed to large doses of radiation (especially his wife who took care 
of the hens), the neighbors and the Navoi plant workers who most 
likely carelessly handled the highly radioactive devices. The crisis 
actors were the potential customers who came to Akhmedov’s house 
to bargain a deal for the containers, and the police officers investi­
gating the case as well as the media reporters covering the case.
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Management of the crisis -  Given the fact that nobody paid at­
tention to the missing containers at the plant, no measures were im­
plemented to minimize the danger. It was not until a police officer 
had exposed the deal that the radioactive material was properly 
handled. The case was then turned over to the Antiterrorist and 
Corruption Control Department of the Ministry of Interior. This de­
partment was the major crisis agent providing management of the 
case later on as well as the prosecutor’s office. The smugglers were 
caught red-handed, Akhmedov was arrested and an investigation 
began. Then the chicken coop was dismantled and the debris was 
buried in a special containment.
Effectiveness of crisis management -  The specific measures tak­
en to localize and alleviate the uranium crisis could be considered 
effective. However, the case should hardly be considered closed 
since the key culprits responsible for the smuggling of the radioac­
tive materials still have not been prosecuted and sentenced.
Putting this crisis into a broader perspective, the uranium crisis 
could be considered as a part or stage of a larger creeping crisis. 
There was in general a lack of control over radioactive materials 
and harmful chemicals in the former Soviet republics (including 
Russia) throughout the 1990s. Many of the workers at the radioac­
tive plants in these countries have smuggled and sold hazardous ma­
terials in order to make a living.
10. T H E  D ISC H A R G E OF CYANIDE IN T O  T H E  DANUBE 
RIVER
Description of the crisis -  A break in the silt tanks at Aurul (a Ro­
manian gold mining company) occurred in January 2000 and result­
ed in the discharge of some 100,000 m3 of wastewater containing 
cyanide and heavy metals into the Danube River. Nearly eighty to 
ninety percent of the fauna and flora in the region was destroyed 
and the ecosystem was seriously disturbed. Heavy metals have set­
tled at the bottom of the river and will therefore increase the risk of 
chronic intoxication for the local environment.
This environmental crisis had serious economic, social and polit­
ical consequences for the countries along the Danube River. Some 
estimates predict that the magnitude of order for the economic dam­
age in the affected regions amounts to percentages of their respec­
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tive national GDP. The above consequences negatively impacted the 
internal politics in each of these countries and exposed the serious 
shortcomings of the regional (interstate) legislation.
The immediate cause of the accident was an obsolete silt tank, 
which had failed to be repaired. This happened despite the fact that 
Esmeralda Exploration Co. (an Australian firm owning fifty percent 
of the Aurul shares) agreed to do this when it purchased half of the 
Romanian company.
Crisis actors -  The crisis involved many actors. The crisis source 
was the top management of Aurul Co., who had failed to take ade­
quate safety measures in order to prevent or reduce the chances of 
an accident. Also the top management of Esmeralda Exploration 
Co. had disregarded the agreement they had made in the purchasing 
contract regarding the repairing and maintenance of the tanks. The 
Romanian government bears part of the responsibility for turning 
the accident into a crisis. The Romanian government actually tried 
to cover up the accident for more than a week and allowed the con­
taminated water to spill over the Romanian borders into the neigh­
boring countries. This significantly increased the magnitude and the 
complexity of the crisis.
The crisis victims primarily were the communities along the 
Danube River in Romania and Hungary. The bulk of these commu­
nities’ revenues came from fishing in the Danube but fishing in the 
Danube was immediately suspended after the accident. The river 
water is poisoned and will not be safe for many years to come. Even 
those who do not directly depend upon the river were also affected 
since the contaminated river water has infiltrated and polluted the 
ground water.
In addition, the farmers were affected, and in some regions 
farming has completely been terminated. For instance, this hap­
pened in the province of Vojvodina in northern Serbia which had 
been regarded as the breadbasket of former Yugoslavia. These peo­
ple are still trying to recover from the recent war and this disaster 
just increased their suffering.
Local tourism (including the huge network of hotels, restau­
rants, shops, etc.) was hit hard by the accident so the local residents 
were certainly crisis victims. The beautiful landscape along the Tisa 
River and the Danube River in Hungary, which had been a popular
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tourist site in the past and had generated a sizeable income for the 
local residents, was greatly damaged by the accident.
The Romanian government, earlier pinpointed as a crisis source, 
was at the same time a crisis victim. Negotiations on Romania’s in­
tegration into the European Union began in Brussels on February 
15, 2000. This environmental crisis substantially complicated these 
negotiations.
Numerous environmental organizations (several which have in­
tensively studied the environmental consequences of the accident) 
and the mass media were among the crisis agents. In the first few 
days, some newspapers and TV stations exaggerated the severity of 
the crisis citing unverified data. This added to the fact that the crisis 
politically spilled over into the neighboring countries (for example 
Ukraine). Later these reporters had to admit that they had drama­
tized the crisis.
Last but not the least, the European Union should be also con­
sidered a crisis agent since it offered active assistance to Romania in 
handling the crisis. Yet the European Union had unwillingly and in­
directly encouraged the Romanian government to cover up the acci­
dent since it had occurred shortly before the EU negotiations in 
Brussels were scheduled to begin.
Chronology -  When Esmeralda Exploration Co. purchased 50%  
of the Romanian gold mining factory shares, it made a commitment 
to reconstruct the silt tanks at the wastewater treatment facilities. 
However, the greedy policy of quick profits outweighed the compa­
ny’s commitment and obligation to maintaining minimum safety 
standards. This to a great extent precipitated the crisis along with 
the poor supervision of the respective Romanian agencies and the 
national operator (the gold mining company).
On the night of January 30, 2000, toxic wastewater was dis­
charged into the Danube River. For a few days, only the Romanian 
government and the culprits of the accident (Aurul Co. and Esmer­
alda Exploration Co.) knew what had happened and they tried to 
hide this from the public. Another discharge occurred on February
6, 2000. Three days later the Romanian government confessed to its 
neighbor, Hungary, about the first discharge. The other endangered 
countries were still unaware of the discharges. Later the Romanian 
government tried to justify this by saying that there had been a mal­
function in the computerized communication system.
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The toxic wastewater moved at a speed of 4 km/h and reached 
the Hungarian border on February 12, 2000. It was only then that 
the rest of the world learned about this tragic environmental crisis. 
However, the Hungarian government did not take any concrete 
measures to prevent the accident from escalating into a major envi­
ronmental disaster. On February 13, 2000, the deputies of the Hun­
garian Parliament organized a symbolic funeral for the Tisa River 
and placed black flags and candles along the riverbank.
At the same time, two commissions were organized to evaluate 
the environmental damage and to find the culprits responsible for 
the accident so compensation could be issued to the affected com­
munities. Both commissions only had Hungarian and Romanian 
representatives since none of the other countries were involved in 
the crisis at that time. For a few days, experts from Hungary and 
Romania discussed the matter among themselves without consulting 
any international law organizations.
The Romanian government tried to blame the Australian com­
pany. In turn the company sent a special team to the site to investi­
gate the causes of the dam rupture and to find evidence to prove 
that Esmeralda Exploration’s top management was innocent. The 
company lawyers tried to blame the accident on other factors, in 
particular the fast melting snow. The Romanian government 
stressed that since the Romanian gold mining company (Aurul) was 
a privately owned enterprise, its owners (Australians) should as­
sume the damages. And with that said, the Romanian government 
refused to pay for any damages associated with the accident.
Since Romania refused to pay, the Hungarian government 
threatened to take Romania to the international court. Thus, the in­
ternational court system was partially involved in the management 
of the crisis. In addition to compensation, Hungary also called for 
changes in international legislation. This involved the right to veto 
the construction of hazardous facilities in close proximity to inter­
national rivers, and amendments stipulating obligatory compensa­
tion for accidental damages to neighboring countries.
On February 14, 2000, the contaminated waters reached Vojvo- 
dina in Yugoslavia and spoiled the farmland thus throwing the 
country into a crisis. Yugoslavia immediately declared its intention 
to appeal to the international court. The crisis captured the atten­
tion of several other European countries. The Chairman of the Eu­
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ropean Commission declared that the EU would consider the op­
tions for helping to alleviate the consequences of the accident.
By that time, other countries (Ukraine in particular) activated 
their crisis response units. The Emergency Ministry of Ukraine test­
ed the water several times per day, special response teams were put 
on alert, potable water was stocked, and fishing and swimming was 
forbidden. Fortunately, the wastewater did not reach Ukraine since 
the hydroelectric power station dam “Iron Gate” stopped the toxic 
spill from spreading.
Effectiveness of the crisis management -  The bulk of the crisis 
response activities were taken by the crisis agents. The newspapers 
did not assess the measures which were implemented. Yet, these 
sources clearly pointed out that the accident developed into a major 
environmental crisis which had many adverse political and econom­
ic ramifications for the affected countries.
Conclusion
Considering the multiple limitations of this study, it should be con­
sidered as merely an attempt to provide an overall view of the vari­
ous types of crises and crisis management practices in Russia as re­
ported and perceived by the Russian press. At the same time, this 
overview provides observations and conclusions we believe are of 
particular interest.
First, it supports the concept of a crisis according to most of the 
criteria used by the CRiSMART scholars as well as a few of the au­
thors’ own criteria. In particular it showed that the crisis events, ex­
amined in this study, threatened basic values and rights such as hu­
man life and health, national feelings (national self-consciousness, 
national pride), housing, employment, a clean environment, and 
self-realization. The crisis processes and/or their outcomes broke the 
social and organizational order in various ways (including failures 
in community services, civil disturbances, mass layoffs, unemploy­
ment, deterioration of the social infrastructure, environment degra­
dation, etc.).
Secondly, the analysis revealed the remarkable diversity of crises 
existing in modern Russia. No less important are the many political, 
social, cultural, economic and ecological factors, which have pro­
voked a number of transformations or mutations in the actual defi­
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nition and perception of a crisis. Thus, these new crisis ‘species’ re­
quire new tools for managing them.
As for crisis sources, these involved terrorists, national move­
ments, the military, new owners, company administrations, and var­
ious government authorities. The crisis victims included often town 
residents, employees, owners of various enterprises, and many oth­
ers. Crisis agents, in particular those taking active part in conflict 
resolution, were represented by the President of Russia, EMER­
COM, national security units, and the other federal and regional 
governmental bodies. Added to these should be the courts, the pros­
ecutor’s office, the plants and companies, local and regional admin­
istrations, the mass media, strikers’ committees, and trade unions. 
Sometimes the world community was also involved.
There were often missed opportunities for taking control of the 
situation during the management of these crises. Good crisis manage­
ment tools were lacking. Sometimes the tools existed, but failed to be 
used. The crisis (re)solutions were almost always achieved with nego­
tiations, court trials or special aid programs for the victims.
Other possible ways to continue this research on the perception 
of crises and crisis management issues in the press would include ex­
panding the sample and deepening the analysis. Primary informa­
tion sources (from government agencies and departments) would 
further enrich any future research in this area. But this primary in­
formation needs to be made more accessible to the general public 
and definitely to academic researchers.
Nevertheless, despite such limitations, the findings and hypothe­
ses in this study should be of interest to all (academics and practi­
tioners alike) in the field of crisis research and crisis management. 
The Russian perspective of crisis management is scrutinized through 
the lens of the national press. This study may also serve as a basis 
for future crisis development in research programs focusing on com­
parative studies in this area.
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September 14, 1999
Topol, S. Ponedelnick, 13 (M onday, 13)
Topol, S. Boynia N  3 (Slaughter N o  3)
1 2 0
References
Escho 38 m eshkov vzryvchatky (Thirty Eight M ore  Bags of Explosives: D e­
pa r tm en t of Crime)
September 18, 1999
Escho 7 dom ov  (Seven M ore  H ouses. D ep artm en t of Crime)
“Segodnya”
September 11, 1999
Dibsky, K. O sobennosti natsyonalnoiy  trau ra  (The Peculiarities of N a tional 
M ourning)
Skakunov, I. Versiya zam edlennogo deistviya (Ways of Restra in ing Ac- 
tion).p .7 .
September 14, 1999
Dvinsky, I. Dalshe to lko  pan ika  (N ext -  Only Panic)
Koritsky, A. Terakty v stolitze oplacheny (Terrorist A ttacks in the Capital 
Were O rdered)
September 16, 1999
Skakunov, I. Terroristy nakhodily  pom ochn ikov  po  obiyavleniyu (Terrorists 
Found  Assistants in a Notice)
Skakunov, I. M oskovskiye dom a vzryvali diyavolskoiy smesiu (M oscow  
H ouses Were Exploded by a Devilish Mix)
September 18, 1999
Skakunov, I. Ruki v gexogene (H ands in H exogen)
September 21, 1999
Ukolov, R. Glavniy spasatel Rossii stal eio Geroyem  (The M ain  Rescue O p ­
e ra tion  in Russia Was Heroic)
October 4, 1999
Domin, S. My predstavlyaem zhilploschad v sootvetstvii s zakonom 
(We Build Houses in Accordance to the Building Codes)
“Pravda”
September 14-15 , 1999
E ratova, M . D en  trau ra  po d  g ro k h o t vzryva (Day o f M o u rn in g  A ccom pa­
nied by a T h u n d er  of Explosion)
“Zavtra”
September, 15
Brezhnev, A. Pogrebenie (Burial)
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“Kommersant”
September 4 ,1999
Barakhova, A. G lavu K arachaevo-Cherkessii ne p rizna io t chast naseleniia 
(Some of the Local Residents of Karachai-C ircassia  D o N o t  A cknow l­
edge the H e ad  of the Republic)
September 7 ,1 9 9 9
Barakhova, A. Semenov gotov obsuzhda t Cherkesskuyu nezavisimost (Se­
m enov Is Ready to  Discuss C ircassian Independence)
September 1 6 ,1 9 9 9
Barakhova, A. V  K arachaievo-Cherkessii nachalas voina (War Begins in 
K arachaevo-Circussia)
September 2 3 ,1 9 9 9
Barakhova, A. B. Lyauf. N a  Volcodava rasschityvat ne p rikhoditsia  (Volko- 
dav Is N o t  the M a n  to  Rely Upon)
September 2 8 ,1 9 9 9
Barakhova, A. Dvoevlastie zakonchilos (The E nd  of Two Powers)
“Segodnya”
September 9 ,1 9 9 9
Koretsky, A. Sobytiya v Cherkesske (Events in Circassk)
September 1 1 ,1 9 9 9
Koretsky, A. K arachaevo-Cherkessiya: ch to  budet zavtra? (Karachai-C ir­
cassia: W h a t  Will H a p p en  Tom orrow ?)
September 1 6 ,1 9 9 9
Koretsky, A. V  Cherkesske liotsa krov (Circassk Is Bleeding)
September 1 8 ,1 9 9 9
Koretsky, A. General Semenov prosit poschi u Volkodava (General 
Semenov Asks Volkodav for Help)
September 2 8 ,1 9 9 9
Koretsky, A. General Semenov popytalsia ostanovit “schiotchik 
Putina” (General Semenov Tries to Stop “Putin’s Opponent”) 
October 20, 1999
Koretsky, A. Rossiiskaia konstitu tsiya o tm enena (Russian C onsti tu tion  Is 
Cancelled)
October 25, 1999
Ofitova, S. V ladim iru  Semenovu dali god  (They Gave V ladim ir Semenov 
O ne Year)
“Trud”
September 2 ,1 9 9 9




Smirnov, V. Stenka na stenku (Dead End)
September 11, 1999
Smirnov, V. M y za edinuiu i ne delimuiu (We Stand  U nited  and  Undivided) 
October 13, 1999




ITAR-TASS. Karachaevo-Cherkessia  khochet nats ionalnoy  avtonom ii 
(Karachai-Circassia W ants N a tio n a l  A utonom y)
September 18, 1999
Beldugina, L. Obschego yazyka ne nashli (Failure to  Find a C om m on  L an ­
guage)
“ Pravda ”
September 10 -13 , 1999
ITAR-TASS. G rem iat vzryvy: v M oskve, v Cherkesske (Explosions T hunder  
in M o sco w  and  in Circassk)
September 2 4 -2 7 , 1999
ITAR-TASS. Karachaevo-Cherkessia  (Karachai-Circassia)
October 1 -4 , 1999
ITAR-TASS. Karachaevo-Cherkessia (Karachai-Circassia)
October 12 -13 , 1999
ITAR-TASS. Karachaevo-Cherkessia  (Karachai-Circassia)
CASE 3
“Novay a gazeta” (weekly)
December 2 -5 , 1999, No 45
Politkovskaya, A. M ilosti prosim  v ad. (Welcome to  Hell), pp. 1 -2  
M ilash ina , E. Terror nasiliem my razrushim . D o osnovaniya (Terror Raised 
by Violence. On the G round), p. 2 
December 16 -19 , 1999, No 47
Politkovskaya, A. Svyaschennaia voina i pozorniy  m ir (Sacred W ar an d  
Shameful Peace), pp. 1 -2  
December 2 0 -2 6 , 1999, No 48
Prokhaskova , P. V  G roznom  idut tiazholye boi (Tough Fighting in Grozny), 
p. 12.
“Argumenti i facti”
December, 1999, No 50.
C hto  budet s Chechnioy? (W hat Will H appen  to  Chechnya?), p. 2.
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“Trud”
December 8, 1999
Yanchenkov, V. Zhivoi schit (A Living Shield)
“Rossiiskaya gazeta”
December 12, 1999
ITAR-TASS. Uslovie odno  -  clozhit oruzhie (The Unique Phrase -  To Lay 
D ow n Arms)
“Kommersant”
December 8, 1999
Syrtsov, I. Milosti prosim , canktsii pro tiv  Rossii uzhe nachalis (Welcome, 
There  Are Already Sanctions A gainst Russia)
Stepenin, M . Chechentsy p rosia t p rod lit  s rok u ltim atum a (Chechens Call 
for an Extension of the  U ltim atum )
“Segodnya”
December 1.1999, No 272.
Viktorov, A. So vet Muftiev prizyvaet k mirnomu resheniiu 
Chechenskoi problemy (The Council of Mufti Calls for 
Peaceful Decisions on the Chechen Issue)
December 8.1999, No 278.
Skakunov, I. Vy bom bite , my vas p o dozhd iom  (Do Your Bombing, W e’ll 
W ait for You)
“Pravda”
November 4, 1999
Lorsanukaev, S. V  poskakh  vykhoda iz Chechenskogo tup ika  (In Search of 
a Resolution to  the  Chechen Crisis)
November 25, 1999
Kozhanov, N . Chechnia: kogda zam kniotsia  koltso (Chechnya: W hen Will 
the  Ring Close)
February 8 -9 , 2000, No 14.










Bezrukova, L. Z ak h v a t  (Seizure)
November 16, 1999
Velednitsky, A. Daiosh natsionalizatsiiu  (Let N ationaliza tion  Go) 
Velednitsky, A. Bulyzhnik p ro le ta ria ta  (Paved by Proletariats)
“Argumenti i Facti”
December, 1999, No 49.
K urganova, V. Posledniy boi. Bessmyslenniy i besposchadniy  (The Last B at­
tle: Senseless and  Merciless), p. 10 
December, 1999, No 50
M ikhailova, T. Z avody  snova rvut na  chasti (The Plants Are Again Torn in­
to  Parts), p. 8
“Segodnya”
October 15, 1999
Gavrilina, S and  Gosteva, E. V ooruzhen i ochen zakonoposlushen  (Armed 
and  C om plian t to  the  Law)
October 20, 1999
Gavrilina, S., Gosteva, E. and  O setinskaya, L. Vyborgskiy CBK m ogut pere- 
da t  n a ro d u  (Vyborg PPM  Can Be R etu rned  to  the  People)
November 20, 1999
Boreiko, A. and  Nesvizhsky, V. V odochno-neftenoy k om bina t (A V odka and  
oil In tegrated  Plant)
November 27, 1999
Boreiko, A. Vyborg Rossii (Vyborg o f Russia)
“Kommersant”
October 15, 1999
Tsiganov, A. an d  Smirnov, A. Profsoiuz pobedil spetsnazevtsev (Trade 
Union W on over the  Special Troops)
November 18, 1999
Arseniev, A. N e t  smysla vkladyvat dengi v tak u iu  s tranu  (No Sense in In ­
vesting M oney  in Such a Country)
January 2, 2000
Klepikov, A. an d  Smirnov, A. Vyborgskiy stsenariy na  LFZ (The Vyborg Sce­
nario  at Lom onosov  Porcelain Plant)
“Pravda”
October 15-18 , 1999
ITAR-TASS. I snova Vyborg (And Again Vyborg)
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October 19-20 , 1999
Volinsky, N . Z h an d a rm y  n ap ad a iu t  po nocham  (G endarm es A ttack  at 
N ight)
November 16-17 , 1999
Levchenko, M . Rossiai, uslysh Vyborg (Russia, Listen to  Vyborg) 
December 1, 1999
Volinsky, N . Vyborgskiy CBK v blokade (Vyborg PPM  Is in a Blockade) 
January 18-19 , 2000  
ITAR-TASS. Vyborg.
February 1 -2 , 2000
V la d im iro v ,  I. V y b o rg sk iy  C B K . B o rb a  n e  o k o n c h e n a  (V y b o rg  P P M : 
T h e  F ig h t  I s n ’t  O v e r)
“Zavtra”
November, 1999, No 44.




Zavarsky  L. G um anita rnaia  katastrofa  v D om odedovo  (H um anita rian  C a t­
astrophe  in D om odedovo)
January, 26
Zavarsky  L. “D om odedovsk ie  avialinii” letaiut na chestnom  slove (D o­
m odedovo  Airlines Fly with W ord  of H onor)
February, 4




D avydova, V. O bogatite lnaya rokirovochka. (Enrichm ent Castling).
“Rossiskaya gazeta”
February 8, 2000
Demidov, P. Bitva za vanady. (Struggle for Vanady).
“Sovershenno Sekretno”
February, 2000, No 2
Latynina, J. Trety peredel. (The T h ird  R edistribution), pp. 5 - 7




Djapakov, A. C herny peredel. (Black Redistribution)
February 10, 2000
Zayavlenie profkoma GOK. (Statement from the Plant’s Trade 
Union)
February 15, 2000
L opatin , V. Pust tochku  postavit zakon. (Let the  Law  Decide)
February 22, 2000
K ovalenko, V. “Vooruzhennye m o lodch ik i” okazalis .. .  m olodkam i. 




Knyazev, V. G o ro d  golodnykh nevest (The City of Flungry Brides)
CASE 8
“Kommersant”
Decem ber 1 5 ,1 9 9 9
Smirnov, V. R abochie  otravilis azotnoi kislotoi. O p asn a ia  avariia na 
V erkhnesaldinskom  m etallurgicheskom  obiedinenii. (Workers Are Poi­









G am ova, S. and  Skakunov, I. C hiornye flagi nad  Tisoi. (Black Flags over Ti- 
sa)
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February 17, 2000
Gamova, S. Miortviy sezon na Dunae. (Season of Death on the 
Danube)
February 29, 2000
G am ova S. Zhizn na Tise ne obnaruzhena  (No Life Was F o und  in Tisa)
“Rossiyskaya gazeta”
February 15, 2000




M iklashevskaya, A. R edkaia  ryba doplyviot do serediny D unaia  (A Rare 
Fish M ad e  Its W ay to  the  M iddle  of the  D anube)
“Trud”
February 15, 2000
Chigrin, I. C hornye flagi nad  Tisoi. (Black Flags over Tisa)
February 17, 2000
Chigrin, I. R um ynia  ne khochet p la tit za otravlenie rek. (Rom ania  D oesn’t 
W ant to  Pay for Poisoning the Rivers)
February 19, 2000
O travlennaia  voda idiot v U krainu . (Poisoned W ater Flows to  Ukraine)
“Argumenti i Facti”
January, No 8
Proshak , L. and  Shkarovskaia, V. Cianistiy D unai (Cyanided D anube), 
p. 21.
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Chapter 4 Managing the Alleviation of the 1995 Neftegorsk Earthquake
M an a g in g  the  A lleviation  o f  the  
1995  N efteg o rsk  E a r th q u ak e
B o r t s  P o r f t r t e v
Case O verview
In 1995, two major earthquakes occurred simultaneously in the 
Kobe prefecture in Japan and in Sakhalin in Russia (See Appendix 
6.1 for specific details). While the Great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake 
in Kobe turned out to be the one of the world’s most costly disasters 
with damages estimating about US$ 100 billion (Sasayama, 1996), 
the Neftegorsk earthquake in Sakhalin can be considered one of the 
most fatal in world history.
The Neftegorsk earthquake killed immediately 1,995 people, in­
jured some 400 others and over 400 people were reported missing. 
The total number of people directly affected by the earthquake in 
Sakhalin (ca. 2,500) was in absolute terms much less than the total 
in Kobe (ca. 6,000). Devastating earthquakes hit China in 1976, the 
Turkmen Republic in 1948, and Tokyo in 1923 (each killing more 
than 100,000 people). More recently over 12,000 people were killed 
in Gujarat, India in 2001 and some 50,000 people in Turkey in 
1999. However in relative terms, the town of Neftegorsk lost al­
most 72%  of its population.
In relative terms, a similar disaster occurred when a major tidal 
wave hit the Far East in 1952. Circa 80% of the Severo-Kurilsk resi­
dents were killed. Earthquakes and other natural disasters are com­
monplace in world history. Ancient Pompeii in Italy was virtually 
decimated by the Vezuvius volcano in 79 A.D. Each of these earth­
quakes has also had tremendous economic consequences. More im­
portantly, many people have become seriously handicapped or 
homeless, and the victims and their families have suffered enormous 
psychological stress. In fact in Neftegorsk, several families were 
completely wiped out by the earthquake. Damages were estimated 
at about 100 million US dollars; quite a substantial amount for a
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town of just 3,500 residents (see Kallioma, 2000; Vikulin, 1996; 
Appendix 1 of this chapter).
The earthquake in Neftegorsk was a real tragedy. The entire 
community was completely devastated; those who survived the dis­
aster abandoned the town and the town simply disappeared from 
the map. The memorial built soon after the tragedy serves as the on­
ly reminder that there was once a lively town here. Since May 
28,1995, a memorial service has been held annually in Sakhalin and 
is a day of grieving (Shlikova, 2000).
This paper discusses the earthquake disaster and its subsequent 
management with particular focus on the affected communities’ vul­
nerability, the decision-making occasions and the various measures 
implemented by the crisis management actors (institutions, func­
tions and social groups). All of the basic policy levels (including the 
local, regional and federal authorities) are considered and a few in­
ternational aid organizations are also mentioned. Such an approach 
provides a comprehensive analysis of some of the causes behind the 
Neftegorsk crisis (i.e. the loopholes in emergency planning and dis­
aster preparedness).
In turn, this case study could be of particular interest for disaster 
and crisis theorists in terms of comparing the organizational and 
policy model used in Russia, a country in transition. Similar models 
still exist in the Baltic countries as a result of the Soviet legacy. In 
addition, this case study can help crisis management practitioners 
learn more about vulnerable crisis management in order to help pre­
vent future disasters (see Kouzmin and Korac-Kakabadze, 1999).
D efining a Crisis and a D isaster
Social science scholars and practical managers use a number of con­
cepts to define a major unexpected event which involves a threat or 
some sort of undesirable impact on a community and which breaks 
the social norms. When such events and processes (i.e. social con­
flicts, technological accidents, natural disasters and compound haz­
ards) occur within the social and ecological systems, often debilitat­
ing and/or deteriorating consequences are produced that provoke 
uncertainty, incur economic damage and increase social, psychologi­
cal and political tensions.
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Such situations demand a special management policy with meas­
ures and mechanisms different from those used for everyday rou­
tines and often require an immediate, decisive and comprehensive 
response. In the West practical notions and research about crises, 
emergencies and disasters are more extensively used. It is important 
that these terms are considered in terms of methodology (which pre­
determines a conceptual structure) and the practical perspective 
(which provides a description of the subject area and the mission of 
the management process). The problems of crisis, emergency and 
disaster management in uncertain and dangerous conditions have 
been studied for more than half a century and research in this area 
has evolved substantially over time.
The more traditional concept of a crisis emphasizes time pres­
sure, the element of surprise and a threat to core values -  often in 
the form of military action by some adversary. Dutch and Swedish 
scholars have contributed to a more balanced interpretation which 
stresses uncertainty rather than the element of surprise and consid­
ers a wide gamut of values -  not just those restricted to national se­
curity. In their definition of a crisis, central decision-makers per­
ceive: there is a threat to core values, societal norms and/or the ba­
sic infrastructure of the social system; time is limited; and a high 
degree of uncertainty is present (Rosenthal, 1986; Rosenthal, Hart 
and Charles, 1989: 10; Shrivastava, 1992: 5; Svedin, 1999; Sun­
delius, Stern and Bynander, 1997: 13).
In my opinion, the notion of a crisis is also applicable for de­
scribing situations which disturb communities and the local envi­
ronment. However, the direct threat to human health and life as a 
core value is not necessarily a compulsory aspect of this notion. The 
impact of a crisis upon a community and/or the local environment 
can vary in severity.
When looking at an extensive and ongoing crisis, social science 
scholars (especially those in the US) most widely use the concept of 
a disaster. My analysis reveals that in Russia practitioners (adminis­
trators, managers, police, fire fighter, etc.) and researchers still pre­
fer the terms “emergency” and “accident” (see Britton, 1987; Por­
firiev, 1998: 35). In my opinion these terms are more suitable for 
acute crisis occasions which disturb or have a debilitating impact on 
the communities and the environment.
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Crises involving many casualties, huge economic losses and irre­
versible environmental deterioration (like the one in Sakhalin in 
1995) should be regarded as catastrophic disasters or catastrophes 
(see Appendix 2 of this chapter). Various approaches and the sys­
tematic analysis of similar crises are presented in order to provide a 
more comprehensive understanding of the concept.
M eth od
An institutional and functional analysis and a historical and com­
parative approach are the primary research methods used in this 
case study. These are employed in order to explore and to analyze 
the management decisions made and the coping measures imple­
mented during the Neftegorsk crisis within a broader framework.
The Neftegorsk disaster is placed within the context of other 
major earthquakes in the world, especially those which occurred 
shortly before or after the one in Sakhalin (i.e. in Northridge, USA 
in 1994 and in Kobe, Japan in January 1995). The decision-making 
occasions and the measures implemented by certain organizations in 
response to the Neftegorsk disaster are analyzed and compared to 
previous major crises.
This case study considers the model introduced and developed 
by Dynes and Quarantelli, but it is not presented in whole here 
since it has been extensively discussed elsewhere in disaster litera­
ture (see original sources -  Dynes, 1974/1998; Dynes and Quaran­
telli, 1968; Quarantelli, 1966/1970; Quarantelli and Dynes, 1977). 
The characteristics of the key actors involved and the decisions they 
made and implemented during the crisis can be categorized using 
Dynes and Quarantelli’s model. To a certain extent, this serves to 
support the model, which has been around for three decades with­
out any serious challenges (Scanlon, 1999).
Sources and L im itations
The foundation of this study is comprised of a variety of secondary 
sources and to a lesser extent data derived from primary sources. 
The latter includes informal interviews conducted by the author 
with a few of the rescue workers, fire fighters and police officers in­
volved in the response operations in Sakhalin in 1995. Their com­
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ments provided valuable insight for understanding the behavioral 
aspects of crisis management at various phases. Furthermore, some 
of these officers videotaped the disaster while in the field. Likewise 
information and video footage was obtained from the local and re­
gional TV  stations. Both the amateur and professional videos were 
quite useful and informative. News reports on federal TV  also 
served as an important secondary data source. In addition, the au­
thor collected a dossier with various regional and federal newspaper 
clippings. Some factual information about the earthquake was col­
lected from geological surveys. If not explicitly cited, the data used 
in this case study was obtained from the video footage.
Two factors largely limited the amount and type of data collect­
ed. First of all, there was the problem of collecting primary data giv­
en the shortage of funding and the remoteness of the disaster area in 
question (which was eight time zones from Moscow). Secondly the 
study focused primarily on tactical decision-making and the meas­
ures implemented by the regional and federal response units, not the 
local involvement in the rescue operations.
Crisis management is perceived as a cyclic process and thus this 
case study has been dissected into functional and institutional ele­
ments rather than by its cognitive institutional elements (see Stern, 
1999). The former provides a better understanding and means for 
assessing the operational mode and the effectiveness of specific deci­
sions in comparison to the existing mandates and stipulated func­
tions with consideration given to the changes influenced by specific 
contingencies. Meanwhile, a functional and institutional analysis 
(see Kouzmin and Korac-Kakabadze, 1999) does not provide an ad­
equate explanation or description of the actual process of decision 
making (i.e. why certain decisions are made and others not, the in­
terests and conflicts steering decision-making processes, etc.). On 
the contrary, a cognitive institutional approach reveals the nature 
and logic of the decision-making process, the actors’ roles and con­
flicting interests, and the implications of each decision.
This case study is restricted to the time frame from mid May to 
mid June 1995 when the response operations were terminated. 
However, some reference is made to the immediate recovery stage 
two months later and provides some insight on the disaster after­
math, including a few lessons learned.
i 35
Crisis Management in Russia: Overcoming Institutional Rigidity and Resource Constraints
The last but perhaps the most important delimitation was the 
incompleteness of the secondary sources which made up the bulk of 
the empirical information used for this study. The secondary sources 
(available to the author) did not provide systematic hourly updates 
about the disaster. This explains the gaps in the documentation 
(mainly, the facts and figures) cited in the case overview and man­
agement sections (Porfiriev, 1998). The lack of data hindered the at­
tempts to construct a chronology of the crisis events and the specific 
activities of certain actors. Thus only general characteristics of the 
most important crisis events, key decision-making occasions and im­
plemented measures were derived from the existing fragmented da­
ta. Moreover, substantial changes were made in the crisis account, 
with reference to the specific decision-making occasions, a year after 
the disaster (see Porfiriev, 1996). Nevertheless, the reconstruction 
and the analysis of the Neftegorsk disaster provide valuable insight 
and opportunities for learning.
Disaster a n d  Disaster M a n a g e m e n t
The strategic management regarding the political and institutional 
context of the Neftegorsk earthquake is discussed in Chapter 2 of 
this volume (see Faleev, Akimov and Porfiriev) summarizing the 
EM ERCOM  framework. Therefore, the analysis of this case will be­
gin directly with the disaster’s tactical management.
TACTICAL MANAGEMENT: LOCAL AND REGIONAL
VULNERABILITY
The earthquake in Neftegorsk was quickly perceived as a national 
disaster and thus the regional and federal urgent response units 
were quickly activated. However a number of specific features (both 
of geographical and social nature) quickly escalated the event into a 
catastrophic disaster.
The earthquake struck the northern part of Sakhalin which is an 
island located in the Far East in Russia between the Sea of Okhotsk 
and the Sea of Japan The island’s climate is harsh. In January the 
average temperature is between minus 2 0 -2 5 °C  and in July varies 
from + 5°C to 10°C. Annual precipitation is low (an average of 
2 5 0 -5 0 0  mm per year) and the island is often hit by strong winds.
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The infamous Russian novelist Anton Chekhov worked a few 
months in Sakhalin as a medical doctor and wrote the book “The 
Island of Sakhalin.” Chekhov described in great detail the harsh cli­
mate and the tough living conditions there.
The island as a whole and the affected area (an area of about
15,000 km2) in particular are famous for its rich oil and gas fields 
which are owned by the federal corporation Sakhalinmorneftegaz. 
This company drills oil and gas from the Okha rayon (a regional 
district) and pumps it through undersea pipelines to the mainland. 
This district has several towns and settlements including Okha (the 
district center), Neftegorsk, Sabo and a few others which are prima­
rily inhabited by oil and gas miners and their families. The total 
population of northern Sakhalin is almost 60,000 with a low popu­
lation density of some 4 -5  people/km2.
Both in terms of physical and economic geography the island is 
especially vulnerable to a disaster in at least three significant ways. 
Firstly, the climatic conditions are harsh, particularly in spring (in 
late April/early May) when the temperature fluctuates between 
+2°C and -2 °C . This means that shelter and warmth are necessary. 
This was an issue after the earthquake hit since people were trapped 
under rubble and ran the risk of freezing to death. This risk was 
considerably higher for small children since their bodies can not 
withstand the cold as well as adults.
Secondly, Sakhalin is one of the most remote areas in the coun­
try; it takes no less than 10 hours to reach the regional center of 
Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk by plane from the European part of Russia, 
where the bulk of the rescue and relief forces are located. This 
means that rescue and medical care teams require a great deal of 
time and planning if they are to assist the island of Sakhalin. Also 
one should consider the time required to process warning and noti­
fication signals, to verify the data, and to mobilize the necessary 
forces on the island itself. It takes quite a bit of time to get from 
Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, which is in the south, to Okha in the north. 
This further increases the amount of time needed to allocate and 
distribute resources. However, the low population density in the 
area means that a relatively small number of people are affected by 
such crises in comparison to those living in larger cities like Kobe in 
Japan or San Francisco in the USA.
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Thirdly, the dense network of oil and gas mining facilities and 
pipelines constructing the industrial landscape in northern Sakhalin 
puts the local residents at high risk. World experience shows, and 
this study confirms the fact, that numerous pipelines and infrastruc­
tural facilities (electric grids, roads and so on) are susceptible to nat­
ural disasters, which often result in substantial economic losses. In 
addition to economic losses, damaged pipelines and ruptures can 
lead to oil spills and gas leaks, and thus can cause a serious environ­
mental crisis.
Such risks are substantially increased in the event of a severe 
earthquake (like the one that hit in 1995). Moreover, many seismol­
ogists believe that the exploitation of oil and gas deposits con­
tributes to the initiation of an earthquake. The world known seis­
mologist A. Nikolayev has asserted:
“ Obviously, according to all criteria enumerated earlier the 
Sakhalin earthquake conforms the hypothesis regarding the 
potential impact of oil extraction upon earthquake condi­
tions. Essentially, there is not doubt that the development of 
oil fields has affected both the process of creating an earth­
quake’s center and its outbreak” (Nikolayev, 1995).
These geographic conditions apparently contributed to the commu­
nities’ vulnerability to an earthquake. N o matter how substantial 
the physical impact is, the core of the devastation is usually primari­
ly rooted in the social domain of the community hit by the disaster.
The key features of this social domain (which in a broad sense 
includes the historical, cultural, political and socio-economic condi­
tions of Russia as a whole and of northern Sakhalin in particular) 
negatively influenced the local and regional communities’ resilience 
to the 1995 earthquake. From this perspective, one should empha­
size the erroneous economic policy of the former Soviet Union, 
which adversely tampered with the remote regions of the country 
including the Far East. Excessive military funding and the central­
ization of the Soviet economy deterred resources from developing 
civilian industries. In particular, this involved cost-saving measures 
for the construction of civilian installations including residential 
buildings. Cheap municipal apartments and temporary infrastruc­
tural units mushroomed at the expense of safety and comfort so 
that resources could be pumped into developing gigantic military
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and industrial facilities. The deep economic crisis that escorted the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union and the chaotic economic reforms of 
the early 1990s made the situation even worse. In addition, finan­
cial and material resources, which had previously been allocated for 
mitigation and preparedness programs (including those for earth­
quake prone areas), were significantly reduced after the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union.
Consequently, all of this has had adverse implications for the 
northern Sakhalin communities, namely its resilience and prepared­
ness for crises. One major concern is the quality of building con­
struction in Sakhalin. Such issues were also raised after the Spitak 
earthquake in Armenia in 1988 (see Wyllie and Filson, 1989; Por­
firiev, 1993). Cheap construction materials and poor technology 
were widely used in Sakhalin in 1969-1970  for building panel hous­
es and the social infrastructure. These building projects were often 
in accordance to the existing building codes, but these building 
codes greatly underestimated the seismological activity in the area.
In addition to the poor building materials, the buildings were 
actually poorly constructed for a number of reasons (low expecta­
tions, low working morale and a lack of supervision). As a result, 
this considerably increased the risk for accidents. In developing 
countries the quality of buildings is generally poor because people 
simply can not afford to comply with all of the building codes and 
standards, yet this is not the only reason for poorly constructed 
buildings in Russia. Nevertheless, the consequences are the same 
and this means increased vulnerability for certain communities.
Another significant factor for poor crisis management in Russia 
is the low level of preparedness (i.e. crisis forecasting and warning), 
which to a considerable extent influences the success or failure of 
response operations. O f the 22 seismological stations located in the 
Far East as late as 1994 (including the one in Okha close to Nefte­
gorsk), 19 or 86 %  are inoperative because of a lack of funding. 
Likewise, the only fire station in Neftegorsk was closed just three 
months before the Neftegorsk earthquake hit (Riabchikov, 1995; 
Tsarev and Zolotov, 1995a).
In addition, there were institutional loopholes in the seismologi­
cal zoning system in the former Soviet Union. Seismological map­
ping was conducted in the late 1960s and served as a basis for the 
building codes which existed when the bulk of the 17 five-story resi­
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dential buildings were constructed in Neftegorsk (Ulomov, 1995). 
The risk assessments and building standards at that time substan­
tially underestimated the seismological activity in the area. As a re­
sult of these oversights, cheap buildings were constructed without 
any consideration for a potential earthquake.
On the subject of forecasting, worth particular mentioning is the 
contingency plan which was made prior to the Neftegorsk earth­
quake. The EM ERCOM  headquarters and its Far East and Siberian 
regional centers had collected data which indicated there would be a 
major earthquake on the Kamchatka peninsula. The seismological 
data suggested that the earthquake would most likely strike in the 
fall of 1995. High federal government officials reviewed the findings 
and praised the contingency plan (Shoigu and Vorobyov, 1995). 
However the earthquake actually occurred somewhere else, and 
therefore the aforementioned contingency plan had to be substan­
tially changed.
As for the warning system, the town of Neftegorsk was some­
how excluded from the Sakhalin network. This warning system was 
organized in 1980 and incorporated 242 electric sirens, 38 broad­
casting stations, 34 circular warning consoles, and a number of ra­
dio and TV networks. This central warning system could notify 
75 %  of the population in Sakhalin within two minutes and 85%  
within five minutes. The system could reach in total 9 5 %  of the re­
gion’s residents (Kaznacheev, 1995; Komandirov, 1995). Yet, Nefte­
gorsk was part of this 5 %  which was not in the central warning sys­
tem. Thus the residents of Neftegorsk had to be notified by tele­
phone. Yet this method was unreliable since Neftegorsk only had 
one telephone cable system with no back-up system in the event of a 
malfunction. When and if a major disaster hits (like a big earth­
quake), there is a high risk that the cables will break and the auto­
matic telephone stations will be knocked out. This is exactly what 
happened in Neftegorsk.
OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT: THE IMMEDIATE IMPACT
OF THE EARTHQUAKE
The political, institutional, geographical and socio-economic situa­
tion in northern Sakhalin to a large degree determined the severity 
and the nature of the 1995 disaster. Meanwhile, the contingent con­
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ditions and agents of this event (both physical and social) signifi­
cantly influenced the response, the decision-making and the meas­
ures implemented.
The earthquake struck late at night at 1:04 a.m. local time on 
May 28, 1995 (5:04 p.m. M T  or 1:04 p.m. G M T on May 27, 1995, 
respectively) with a magnitude as high as 9.0 on the Richter scale at 
the epicenter in the Sea of Okhotsk. On the mainland, it varied 
from 7.1 in northern Sakhalin (in general) to 7.6 in the most affect­
ed areas (i.e. Neftegorsk). These figures were almost as high as 
those recorded in Spitak in 1988, Northridge in 1994 and Kobe in 
1995.
Because of the area’s low population density, the earthquake in 
Sakhalin affected fewer people and resulted in less economic dam­
age in absolute figures compared to similar earthquakes. The direct 
economic losses amounted to only US$ 500 million compared to 
US$ 13 ,000 -20 ,000  million in Northridge, US$ 15 ,000 -20 ,000  mil­
lion in Armenia and more than $ 100,000 million in Kobe (Aizen­
berg et al., 1995; Arnold, 1995; Comfort, 1994). In other words, 
the economic damage ratio was 1:33:35:200 (Sakhalin, Northridge, 
Armenia, and Kobe respectively), and the casualty/homeless ratio 
was 1:16:43:170 (respectively).
However, the combination of social time and space in regards to 
the Neftegorsk earthquake was unfavorable. The earthquake struck 
at night, which meant nearly all of the residents were inside asleep. 
Some of the younger Neftegorsk residents were at the local dance 
club which was completely destroyed by the quake. If the earth­
quake had struck during the day, there would have most likely been 
fewer people indoors. In addition, the earthquake occurred on the 
weekend when many workers from the neighboring oil fields were 
home from their weekly shifts. Likewise, the earthquake struck just 
as summer vacation was beginning and many children were visiting 
their friends and relatives in Neftegorsk. Apparently several of the 
children had arrived just before the quake. The earthquake hit in 
late spring, which meant the low night temperatures considerably 
worsened the situation for the people trapped in the ruins. And last­
ly, Neftegorsk was hit with aftershocks the next night. This aggra­
vated the situation further for the hundreds of people already 
trapped under the rubble.
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All of the 17 residential buildings (with 80 apartment units in 
each) were demolished by the earthquake. Similarly, the local hospi­
tal, school, boiler, bakery, police office and dance club were com­
pletely destroyed. The buildings constructed between 1979-1983 in 
accordance with the revised building codes seemed to be more ro­
bust and just a few of those buildings were partially damaged. Inter­
esting enough the situation was quite similar in Kobe, where 66%  
of the older and only 3 %  of the newer buildings were wiped out 
(Great, 1995; Koff, 1995; Sasayama, 1996). The construction of the 
older buildings in Kobe was substantially different because when 
they collapsed they produced a dense pile of rubble with very few 
air pockets. This greatly reduced the chances of finding survivors. 
This issue reappeared five years later when an earthquake hit Izmit, 
Turkey. In contrast, the flat-slab design and more accurate construc­
tion of residential buildings in Mexico proved their worth in 1985 
when an earthquake hit and completely leveled the buildings, but 
still provided many air pockets which increase the chances for sur­
vivors.
The Neftegorsk earthquake knocked out all of the bridges con­
necting Neftegorsk to Okha. There were significant breaks in the 
communication lines, the electrical grid, and the oil and gas pipe­
lines. In Neftegorsk alone, the direct economic losses accrued from 
damages to residential buildings and the infrastructure exceeded 
US$ 100 million (Aizenberg et al., 1995; Goncharov and Melnikov, 
1995; Koff, 1995; No author, 1995b; Shoigu and Vorobyev, 1995; 
Zaitsev, 1995).
T h e  Decision-Making Occasions a n d  Implemented 
Measures: A  Functional a n d  Institutional Analysis
The unique factors of the affected area substantially influenced the 
occasions for decision-making and implemented measures. Similarly, 
these factors determined the framework and the effectiveness of the 
organizational response.
EARLY NOTIFICATION AND WARNING SYSTEMS
The organizational framework and the existing practices in Russia 
emphasize early notification and warning systems. They are consid­
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ered to be the cornerstone of crisis preparedness and early response. 
Yet when the Neftegorsk earthquake occurred, the local community 
and local authorities had not been forewarned. Vital information 
concerning a potential earthquake in the area had not been spread.
EM ER CO M ’s federal and regional centers had received a notifi­
cation of the earthquake at 5:46 p.m. M T  on May 27, 1995, or 42  
minutes after it hit (according to the Ministry of Defense seismic 
stations). However, no immediate data was available on its severity. 
The lack of critical information drastically limited the possibilities 
for preparing an appropriate and timely search and rescue opera­
tion.
The delayed notification was, in part, provoked by the disas­
trous nature of the earthquake. It had disrupted communication 
lines and had completely destroyed important strategic facilities (in­
cluding command and communication posts, the police office, the 
emergency medical center and so on). Similarly, many of the people 
trained to respond to such disasters had been killed or seriously in­
jured by the quake. For instance, nearly two thirds of the police 
force and medical staff in Neftegorsk had been killed, and countless 
others had been injured. The fact that the staff operating the region­
al warning network was also hit had a big impact on the response 
stage especially considering the limited sources the small town had 
(see Porfiriev, 1998: 136-139). In addition, the regional authorities 
failed to activate the regional warning system ’’since the earthquake 
was unexpected” (Komandirov, 1995).
The first information with specifics about the earthquake came 
from two police officers a few hours later. One of them, Sergeant 
Glebov, had managed to escape after his apartment building crum­
bled to the ground. Despite serious injures, he managed to find his 
way out of the ruins all by himself. He later found three of his col­
leagues who had been on duty when the earthquake hit. They had 
been able to escape major injuries when the police building col­
lapsed. They found an undamaged car and the sergeant used it to 
drive to the closest settlement, Sabo, 20 km away. The road to Sabo 
was heavily damaged and it took the sergeant several hours to make 
the 20 km to Sabo. Once in Sabo, he was able to find a telephone in 
working condition and he called the district authorities in Okha to 
inform them of the tragedy.
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The impact of the earthquake had been less severe in Sabo. The 
police commander of Neftegorsk (and Glebov’s superior), Major 
Novoselov, lived in Sabo. He and his family had survived the quake. 
Major Novoselov immediately got in his car and drove to Nefte­
gorsk (at the same time that Sergeant Glebov was on his way to 
Sabo) in order to find out what had happened there. As Major 
Novoselov approached Neftegorsk, he saw a glow of fire off in the 
distance, some 20 km away, and he immediately assumed that the 
oil mining facility had caught on fire. Right away he sent a radio 
message to his superior in Okha and then headed for the oil fields 
which were located on the outskirts of Neftegorsk. When he 
reached the oil fields, he found no fire. The facility had been slightly 
damaged and had been abandoned by its three operators. He head­
ed back for Neftegorsk and realized that the fire was coming from 
two buildings in town. He was overwhelmed by the sight of com­
plete destruction. Many people had been immediately killed by the 
earthquake and he could cries from the ruins. There were several 
shocked survivors trying to find their relatives and neighbors in the 
ruins with their bare hands. Major Novoselov sent a new radio mes­
sage to his superior in Okha correcting his previous alarm about the 
burning oil facility. Since the connection was so bad, Major 
Novoselov said he would call him back in Sabo with more details. 
When at last he reached Sabo, Major Novoselov met Sergeant Gle­
bov who had already called the authorities in Okha.
At that time, the Okha municipal authorities were trying to get 
the situation in their own city under control. Okha had experienced 
quakes up to 4.0 and 5.0 degrees on the Richter scale. Fortunately, 
only some of the buildings had cracked and none of the 37,000  
Okha residents had been injured. From Sabo, Major Novoselov 
called both the Okha emergency staff and the Deputy Chief of the 
municipal road construction company, which could repair the roads 
in order to help facilitate the rescue operation. However, neither of 
the two officials believed the initial alarm set by Sergeant Glebov; 
nor did they trust Mayor Novoselov when he called a couple of 
minutes later. It took some 40 minutes for the Okha officials to 
make a decision to send a helicopter to the disaster site in order to 
verify the messages. After receiving a confirmation, the Deputy 
Chief of the municipal road construction company then sent equip­
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ment to Neftegorsk to be used for repairing the damaged roads and 
infrastructure.
Once the Okha municipal authorities received a field report 
from the scouting teams, they forwarded a message on to the re­
gional authorities in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk who also felt the need to 
double-check these claims before contacting the EM ERCOM  head­
quarters in Moscow. The headquarters received the notification at 
1:50 a.m. M T  (9:50 local time) on May 28, 1995. The only govern­
ment agencies truly capable of providing adequate help (i.e. the re­
gional and federal authorities), did not know the severity of the 
earthquake for almost eight to nine hours after the fact. This does 
not mean, however, that they did not know anything about the 
earthquake as such. As mentioned before, the EM ERCOM  Regional 
Center in Khabarovsk and the Federal Emergency Operation Center 
in Moscow were aware of the earthquake as early as at 5:46 p.m. 
on the previous day. Yet even that notice was delayed by more than
40 minutes (Dibskiy and Trofimov, 1995).
The lack of a timely warning and an early notice to the local/re­
gional communities and the urgent response agencies resulted in a 
substantial delay. First of all, this made it difficult to correctly assess 
the situation and thus decide what kind of response action should 
be taken Secondly, the remoteness of the affected area caused a de­
lay in the search and rescue operations by as much as 17 hours. For 
the sake of being fair, a total delay was unavoidable considering the 
cut in the communication system and the remoteness of the affected 
area.
For example, there was also a significant delay in Japan when 
the Great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake occurred in January 1995. In 
took four hours before the Governor of the Hyogo prefecture asked 
for help from the Japanese Defense Forces, which needed another 
five hours to mobilize. Moreover, the Japanese Defense Forces ar­
rived in Kobe nearly two days after the earthquake. The Japanese 
Prime Minister, Murayama, confessed that the lack of preparedness 
and bureaucratic bungling significantly delayed the response efforts 
(Arnold, 1995; Sasayama, 1996). The same happened with the 
Neftegorsk disaster when the considerable delay adversely affected 
the effectiveness of the search and rescue work and the emergency 
medical care.
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SEARCH AND RESCUE OPERATIONS: THE ROLE OF 
EMERGENT AND BROAD-BASED ORGANIZATIONS
According to Dynes and Quarantelli’s model on organizational re­
sponse, when a disaster hits there are four types of organizations 
which get involved:
• Type I -  already established or institutionalized organiza­
tions, which carry out routine tasks (police, emergency medical 
care and professional search and rescue units);
• Type II -  broad-based organizations with routine tasks (like 
the Red Cross);
• Type III -  external or peripheral organizations with non-rou­
tine tasks (construction and transportation companies which 
help clear debris and assist in evacuation); and
• Type IV -  emergent groups which are composed of profes­
sionals involved in non-routine tasks.
According to the model, “ a sudden onset disaster [like that in Nefte­
gorsk]21 would involve Type I and II organizations in rapid mobi­
lization, quickly followed by Type III organizations and the rapid 
emergence of Type IV” (Dynes, 1998: 119; Stallings, 1978: 91).
Despite the lack of a timely warning and primary data on what 
had happened, the situation in Neftegorsk was substantially chang­
ed by the presence of emergent or quasi-emergent groups which 
played a leading role in the first few hours. Small groups of people 
(some containing up to 120 people) began the first rescue efforts. 
They tried with just their bare hands to find their relatives and 
neighbors buried beneath the ruins. A  few hours later some people 
from the town of Sabo, who had heard about the tragedy in Nefte­
gorsk from Major Novoselov and Sergeant Glebov, rushed to help 
their relatives living there and joined the emergent groups. However, 
the rescue efforts were chaotic and unprofessional. It was dark and 
the only lighting they had was from a few car headlights. Among 
the worried relatives rushing to Neftegorsk from Sabo, there were a 
few looters who obviously had no interest in helping the rescue ef­
forts. Given the unfavorable circumstances, the rescue efforts were 
not very effective and just a few people were saved.
21 Author’s own example.
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In addition to the emergent groups involved in the rescue opera­
tions, there was a group of four policemen. Three of them had been 
slightly injured when they had made their way out of the cracked 
police building where they had been on duty. The fourth policeman 
was the aforementioned Sergeant Glebov, who had been more seri­
ously injured after his apartment building had completely collapsed. 
All of the other Neftegorsk policemen were killed by the earth­
quake.
Given these circumstances, one could define this small collective 
as an emergent group and as an established/institutionalized unit. 
Thus it could be referred to as a quasi-emergent group. Such a 
group complies with Quarantelli’s description of the emergency phe­
nomena as “new, novel, non-traditional and non-routine” which is 
partly rooted in and arises from pre-existing structures, functions 
and roles (1991: 74). This was certainly the case for this quasi- 
emergent group since all four people had worked together as police­
men. This explains why they were more professional and effective in 
their rescue efforts than the purely emergent groups.
These four policemen conducted a primarily investigation of the 
disaster site. Sergeant Glebov then reported the findings from Sabo 
via telephone. The policemen came across two burning hoses caused 
by a gas leak from a broken pipeline. So the sergeant made a special 
stop on his way to Sabo from Neftegorsk and closed the gas valve. 
His three colleagues managed to find the head of the Neftegorsk 
municipal government, who had also succeeded in escaping serious 
injury. She tried to introduce some order by trying to organize the 
chaotic rescue efforts. The four policemen assisted her in these ac­
tivities and tried to maintain public order (i.e. measures against 
looting).
A  few hours later, on the morning of May 28, one more group 
of crisis management actors joined the rescue efforts. This group 
consisted of workers from the Sakhalinmorneftegaz oil and gas fa­
cilities and from the local road construction company in Okha (a 
Type III or external/peripheral organization). Miners, operators and 
others left their work places and hurried back home to their families 
immediately after the impact. When they saw their homes complete­
ly destroyed and realized that their family members were buried un­
der the ruins, they quickly returned to work and came back with 
mining equipment (i.e. bulldozers and cranes). The bulldozers and
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cranes along with trucks from the road maintenance and construc­
tion company in Okha provided significantly more lighting which 
greatly helped the search and rescue work. The workers from the lo­
cal road maintenance and construction company contributed over 
120 pieces of equipment including welding units and chisels.
The workers from Sakkalinmorneftegaz and the local road con­
struction company did not form their own independent rescue team. 
Rather they joined the existing emergent groups thus creating some 
sort of mixed “ emergent-external/peripheral” group (Type II and 
Type III). Unfortunately, the chaotic and unprofessional efforts of 
the emergent groups could not replace specially trained rescue 
workers despite the fact that the new group members from the local 
road construction company had some general rescue training and 
useful equipment. Although these efforts helped to save a few peo­
ple from the ruins, the situation for the others still trapped deep un­
der the rubble was actually worsened (and some were even killed). 
The bulldozers and the small cranes were not powerful enough to 
lift the big concrete slabs so they just pushed the debris. This result­
ed in fewer air pockets in the rubble.
For the most part, the employees of the local road maintenance 
and construction company from Okha had more relevant work ex­
perience and thus were able to act more professionally. This group 
could be categorized as a Type III group (an external/peripheral 
group). They joined the rescue operation a few hours later because 
the company’s director did not trust the early calls from the police­
men. It also took them some time to reach Neftegorsk from the 
towns of Okha and Nogliki after the company’s top management fi­
nally issued an order to act.
By 10:00 am local time (M T 2:00 a.m.) on May 28, more than 
390 workers with special equipment and trucks came to Neftegorsk 
and started repairing the damaged roads in order to help facilitate 
the transportation of professional rescue teams and the other emer­
gency forces. Later that day, they successfully restored some of the 
basic community services, repaired the phone system and set up 
temporary camps and kitchens in order to provide hot meals for the 
victims and the professional rescue workers who arrived later 
(Yurin, 1995).
In short, the early response operations were activated within 
about 12 -14  hours after the earthquake. The official crisis manage­
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ment team from the regional center (in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk) arrived 
in Neftegorsk around 6:00 p.m. local time (10:00 a.m. MT) on May 
28. Another team left Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk for Okha at 2:00 p.m. lo­
cal time (6:00 a.m. M T) on May 28, and was composed of more 
than a dozen regional officials from the regional administration and 
the Duma (the legislative body) headed by Governor Farkhutdinov. 
With them came five rescue workers from the Sakhalin regional 
search and rescue services and eight physicians. The team assessed 
the situation and organized a commission to be responsible for 
making decisions and to oversee the implementation of various 
measures.
As the Regional Duma Chairman Maksutov said:
It’s a catastrophic earthquake, much worse than that on the 
Kuril Islands in 1994. We set up a commission to immediate­
ly provide urgent response measures. These measures includ­
ed clearing the ruins, and assisting the trapped people and 
providing them with medical care and temporary housing. 
Contrary to the situation in the Kurils, now we have the nec­
essary equipment to save people.
This high official’s assessment of the crisis alleviation on Sakhalin 
Island was erroneous. There was not enough equipment or re­
sources for the rescue work. Support should have been strengthened 
from the regional level and supplemented soon thereafter by the fed­
eral level (primarily EM ERCOM ).
RESCUE WORK, FIRE FIGHTING AND MAINTAINING 
PUBLIC ORDER: THE CONTRIBUTION OF ESTABLISHED/ 
INSTITUTIONALIZED ORGANIZATIONS
The established/institutionalized organizations and the broad-based 
organizations did not get involved in Neftegorsk until after the 
emergent, quasi-emergent and external/peripheral groups had start­
ed the search and rescue operations. The first established/institu­
tionalized organizations to get involved were the urgent response 
police and fire units from the Okha district and the Sakhalin region, 
and the rescue units from Khabarovsk (representing the local and 
regional authorities as well as EM ER CO M ’s regional center).
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Around 11:00 a.m. local time (3:00 a.m. M T), a joint police and 
military unit (similar to the National Guard) of 364 servicemen ar­
rived in Neftegorsk from Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk (the regional center) 
and Okha (the district center). This unit assisted the four local po­
licemen in the rescue operations in maintaining public order, in es­
tablishing road check points and patrolling the area. In the next few 
days the local policemen were actively involved in identifying the 
corps since some families had been entirely wiped out and many 
bodies had been so severely mutilated that only the local policemen 
could identify them. Such is only possible in a small town where 
everybody knows everybody. The police collected and kept an in­
ventory of the documents and personal belongings found in the ru­
ins. These items were kept safe until they could be returned to the 
original owners or their relatives.
Despite the fact that the local police office had been completely 
destroyed and nearly 70 %  of the local police force had been killed, 
social order was effectively maintained in Neftegorsk throughout 
the disaster. On the first day, the police patrols were able to stop 
seven looting attempts and arrested the criminals. The total number 
of criminal acts amounted to 11 in Neftegorsk (Chinarov, 1995; Os­
trovskaia et al., 1995; Appendix 6.1). This is worth special men­
tioning since the social domain of crisis management in Russia is 
unique compared to that in the West. In general, US disaster sociol­
ogists believe looting is uncommon during natural calamities (see 
Dynes and Quarantelli, 1968; Quarantelli, 1992a/1992b). No loot­
ing was mentioned in connection with the earthquakes in Mexico, 
Northridge or Kobe. Thus the Neftegorsk case reveals quite a differ­
ent experience on this issue and requires further investigation.
In addition to the police and the National Guard-like units, ac­
tive components from the established/institutionalized organizations 
engaged in the disaster response also assisted in the fire fighting. 
Three fire squads from the Okha district entered the rescue opera­
tion late in the game and started extinguishing the fires as late at 
5:00 am on May 28. The next day, a special team with 13 firefight­
ers from the regional fire services who were equipped with rescue 
equipment reinforced these units which intensified the fire fighting 
operation in the affected area. From May 28 to June 9, the state fire 
service units (i.e. from the regional level) successfully extinguished 
13 fires, rescued residents from one of the destroyed buildings, and
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helped remove debris. In total, 92 people (of which 17 were alive) 
were salvaged from the rubble (Gerasimova, 1995; Mikeev, 1996; 
see also Appendix 1).
Around 9:00 a.m. local time (1:00 a.m. M T) on May 28 the first 
rescue unit from EM ER CO M ’s regional center in Yuzhno-Sakhalin­
sk came and was soon followed by one more unit. These units were 
poorly equipped and often used no more than their belts and bare 
hands to remove the heavy blocks (Chinarov and Dzyuba, 2000).
A  rescue team from Khabarovsk arrived at 12:30 p.m. local time 
(4:30 a.m. M T) and proved to be quite important. The helicopter, 
which left Khabarovsk for Neftegorsk at 8:15 a.m. MT, delivered 
eight rescue workers with special equipment (including an electric 
generator). For many hours this was the only reliable powerful 
source of light at the disaster site during the long and dark nights; a 
fact particularly stressed by both the local residents and the media.
The team from Khabarovsk was reinforced by 41 people from 
Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk and 10 more from Kamchatka. These included 
five rescue workers from the regional Sakhalin search and rescue 
services which also had eight physicians along. They and the gover­
nor’s team arrived sometime around 6:00 p.m. local time on May 
28. The rescue unit from Kamchatka alone freed 42 people from the 
rubble within the first few days (Osokin, 1995). Early in the morn­
ing on May 29, all of these teams were joined by the EM ERCOM  
units from Moscow. One EM ERCOM  unit (which had left Moscow  
for Okha at 6:50 a.m. MT) consisted of eight rescue workers, six 
surgeons, and thirteen servicemen from EM ER CO M ’s Central Air­
mobile Unit (CENTROSPAS). The EM ERCOM  Operation Task 
Force, headed by the EM ERCOM  Minister himself and consisting 
of 23 rescue workers from CENTROSPAS, left at 8:45 a.m. M T  on 
May 28. The EM ERCOM  crisis management center in Moscow and 
its Far East regional center in Khabarovsk worked non-stop from 
12:40 M T  (8:40 p.m. local time) on May 28 until the end of the res­
cue operation (see Dibskiy and Trofimov, 1995; Koff, 1995; Shoigu 
and Vorobyov, 1995).
To sum up, the strength of the rescue, medical and police units 
from the regional and federal levels sharply increased on the evening 
(local time) of May 28. Within just 24 hours (i.e. from May 28 -29 ), 
the number of rescue personnel and equipment quadrupled and 
doubled, respectively. After May 30, the combined units amounted
1 5 1
Crisis Management in Russia: Overcoming Institutional Rigidity and Resource Constraints
to roughly 1,600 individuals (including more than 600 professional 
rescue workers), 190 pieces of machinery, 20 aircrafts, and 15 heli­
copters (Shoigu and Vorobyov, 1995).
The concentration of emergency personnel and equipment in 
Neftegorsk was extraordinary. Calculations reveal that the relative 
number of workers involved in the search and rescue operation per
1,000 of the population reached 500 in comparison with only 19 in 
Kobe. Thus the ratio between these figures is as large as 26:1. Like­
wise, the ratio for doctors and nurses soared to 56:1 and the relative 
number of policemen was also higher than in Kobe (see Appendix 1).
MEDICAL CARE AND HELP TO THE DISPLACED 
RESIDENTS: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE ESTABLISHED/ 
INSTITUTIONALIZED AND BROAD-BASED 
ORGANIZATIONS
The emergent, quasi-emergent and external/peripheral groups domi­
nated during the first hours of search and rescue operations but the 
broad-based organizations played a key role in fire fighting. At the 
same time, the established/institutionalized and broad-based organi­
zations were the primary crisis management actors in the terms of 
medical and health care, transporting the injured and providing help 
to all of the displaced residents during the entire crisis. The medical 
teams from the neighboring communities played a major role within 
the established/institutionalized organizations since the earthquake 
had killed most of the medical personnel and had severely damaged 
the medical facilities in Neftegorsk. The units of the All-Russian 
Emergency Medical Care Center were the leaders among the broad- 
based organizations (Goncharov and Melnikov, 1995).
Sometime around 11:00 a.m. local time (3:00 a.m. MT) on May
28 the first medical team of circa 10 people came to the disaster site 
from Okha. Twelve additional people including seven doctors and 
five assistants from the neighboring town of Nogliki came an hour 
later. These two teams worked together for about three to four 
hours and provided emergency medical care to between 80 and 100 
people before the medical team from the Far East Emergency Med­
ical Regional Center in Khabarovsk arrived at 1:40 p.m. local time 
(5:40 a.m. M T). By that time, the number of physicians working in 
the disaster area had reached 40 including those from Yuzhno- 
Sakhalinsk. The number of people who had received medical care
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increased to more than 120 (including 107 who had been seriously 
injured and were later moved to Okha).
On May 29, the medical brigade from the All-Russian Emer­
gency Medical Care Center Zaschita provided high-level profession­
al assistance. They were well-equipped with specialists experienced 
in working under such harsh conditions. In addition, about 28 tons 
of medical supplies arrived from Surgut, Ufa, Perm, Khabarovsk, 
Vladivostok and other Russian cities. More than 342 tons of this 
had been provided by foreign countries and various international 
organizations. Two mobile medical posts with six rotating medical 
teams worked directly on-site in Neftegorsk, and another mobile fa­
cility with 40 physicians and 28 nurses provided medical assistance 
in Okha (Gvozdikov, Litovkin and Ostrovskaia, 1995). In total, 510  
people (of which 180 were children) received medical assistance. 
The field hospital established by Zaschita was located only 20 m 
from the ruins (Goncharov and Melnikov, 1995; Shoigu and 
Vorobyov, 1995).
Additionally, the Sakhalin, Khabarovsk and Primorsk regional 
administrations substantially contributed to organizing the trans­
portation and hospitalization of 203 patients in clinics throughout 
Okha, 98 in Khabarovsk, 43 in Vladivostok, 40 in Yuzhno- 
Sakhalinsk and 1 in Nogliki. One very seriously injured person was 
transported and hospitalized in Moscow. The regional authorities 
also took active measures to provide assistance to those who had 
been displaced; 72 people were relocated to Okha and 51 to Yuzh­
no-Sakhalinsk (Shoigu and Vorobyov, 1995).
The epidemiological situation in the disaster area was compli­
cated by the multiple interruptions in the area’s lifelines (primarily 
water and sewage systems) and many human and animal corpses 
were scattered among the ruins. On May 29, a special team of 14 
people from the Sakhalin State Sanitation and Epidemiological In­
spectorate began helping the locals deal with such issues. The team 
thoroughly tested the water and food, and prepared burial places so 
that the epidemiological situation in the disaster area was kept un­
der control (Goncharov and Melnikov, 1995).
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FEDERAL AND INTERNATIONAL RELIEF
After receiving the first message about the earthquake from EMER­
C O M  at 8:06 a.m. M T  on May 28, the President of Russia was 
continuously updated on the progress of the rescue operation. On 
May 30, the President appeared on national television to express his 
condolences to the families of the victims and to declare the follow­
ing day a national day of mourning.
The federal government was the key crisis manager in terms of 
organizing and providing federal disaster relief. Having received the 
news early in the morning on May 28, the Council of Ministers of 
the Russian Federation immediately issued an executive order, 
which established the Inter-Organizational Government Commis­
sion for Emergency Prevention and Liquidation headed by the 
EM ERCOM  (Minister, S. Shoigu). This commission was responsible 
for serving as the principal coordinator for the international, feder­
al, regional and local executive bodies involved in estimating the 
amount of relief needed, and for organizing the necessary measures 
for alleviating the aftermath of the earthquake in the Okha district. 
Aid was of particular concern for the commission. By July 13, 1995, 
about 441 tons of humanitarian aid was collected from the other 
Russian regions and from abroad. The bulk of this (77% ) was pro­
vided by more than 100 foreign countries and international organi­
zations, totaling: 118 tons of equipment and material, 114 tons of 
medical supplies, 76 tons of food items, and 35 tons of clothes 
(Shoigu and Vorobyov, 1995).
The executive governmental order also entrusted the Ministry of 
Finance to allocate an additional 30 billion rubles (about US$ 7.5 
million) to EM ERCOM  in order to support the search and rescue 
operations and the medical services. The State Committee for Mate­
rial and Technical Reserves (Goskomreserv) and the Ministry of 
Transport and Railways were responsible for providing supplies and 
for transporting equipment and rescue workers. From the federal re­
lief fund, a lump sum of 1.0 million rubles (approximately US$ 250) 
was provided to each affected person; the first 93 men and women 
received this as early as June 1, 1995 (Pravitelstvo. Rasporiazheniye, 
1995a; Neftegorsk, 1995a). Federal compensations are quite com­
mon in Russia because regional funds are scarce, especially in the 
less developed regions (such as the Far East). Another reason why
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the federal government issues compensation is because the private 
insurance industry in Russia is grossly underdeveloped.
Just after the aforementioned order was signed, the Federal 
Governmental Commission (the top officials from the ministries and 
the state committees for health, transport, railways and construc­
tion) arrived soon after the EM ERCOM  Operation Task Force. The 
findings from the on-site assessments were used to prepare five gov­
ernmental directives (regulations and executive orders) in order to 
provide adequate guidance for federal relief in Neftegorsk (Aga­
fonov, 1996).
The government of Russia issued two regulations and one exec­
utive order on June 2 and June 3,1995 (respectively), which chan­
neled the flow of financial aid totaling 107 billion rubles (about 
US$ 27 million) to the Sakhalin region (Pravitelstvo. Postanov- 
leniye, 1995a; Pravitelstvo. Postanovleniye, 1995b; Pravitelstvo. 
Rasporiazheniye, 1995b). In addition to the individual compensa­
tion of 1.0 million rubles (US$ 250), these documents governed the 
allocation of a lump sum of 5.0 million rubles (about US$ 1,200) to 
each family for burial expenses. An additional 50 million rubles 
(about US$ 12,000) was allocated for lost property and for the 
death of a family member. Although these allowances and compen­
sations were insufficient in terms of amount (less than 2.5 million 
rubles to each), 889 people had received some sort of financial sup­
port by June 6, 1995 (Gvozdikov, 1995a).
Two documents (both signed on June 5, 1995) specified the 
adoption and implementation of governmental regulations regard­
ing the issue of liquidation after the earthquake. In addition, an ex­
ecutive order was passed on financing the search and rescue opera­
tion and repairing the oil and gas facilities in the affected area. The 
documents called upon the respective federal and regional executive 
bodies to assess the damages and the costs for rebuilding and relo­
cating the Neftegorsk residents. The reconstruction of the infra­
structure and the industrial facilities at Sakkalinmorneftegaz, and 
the development and implementation of the federal mitigation pro­
gram were mentioned. Moreover, the issues of reopening the seis­
mological stations and improving the accuracy and precision of seis­
mological zoning in Sakhalin were also discussed (Pravitelstvo. 
Postanovleniye, 1995c).
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In addition, the Russian government provided some tax breaks 
and some other privileges totaling 465 billion rubles (over US$ 100 
million) to Sakbalinmorneftegaz in order to help compensate its 
losses. These expenses exceeded hundreds of billion rubles in 1995 
alone and was anticipated to reach nearly 1,000 billion (about $210  
million) the following two years, 1995-1996  (Baskaev, 1996).
Given the complete destruction of Neftegorsk per se, the Russ­
ian government decided that the town would not be rebuilt and that 
the surviving residents would be relocated within the Sakhalin re­
gion, namely to the cities of Okha, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk and Nogliki 
(Tsarev, 1995b). The survivors and the people in the neighboring 
communities consented to the idea of relocating, even though that 
was quite painful and stressful in itself. The Sakhalin regional and 
Okha municipal administrations along with Sakbalinmorneftegaz 
provided funds for building 71 and 12 apartment units, respectively, 
which, were undoubtedly insufficient for the 500 affected families. 
Financial support was also earmarked for the relocation of 183 
families who wished to move to the mainland.
However, the implementation of these plans was considerably 
limited by bureaucratic red tape, corruption, and the lack of funds. 
Not surprising, only half of the victims had received full compensa­
tions as late as two months after the earthquake (Gvozdikov, 
1995b; Drouzhinin, 1995).
The situation considerably worsened in January 1996 when an­
other earthquake (6.1 on the Richter scale) struck northern Sakhalin 
and severely destroyed 14 buildings leaving 800 families homeless 
(Ostrovskaia, 1996). Given the fact that the 1996 Federal Budget 
Act lacked funding for the Neftegorsk disaster, the new disaster only 
made matters worse. As a result, the federal budget was pushed fur­
ther into debt by over 135 billion rubles (US$ 30 million). The over­
all demand for funding for the aftermath of the Neftegorsk disaster 
alone (without considering the earthquake that occurred in January 
1996) has soared to 458 billion rubles (about US$ 90 million) 
(Baskaev, 1996).
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Conclusion
THE EFFECTIVENESS AND DISTINCTIVENESS OF CRISIS 
MANAGEMENT IN NEFTEGORSK
Undoubtedly the rescue of more than 400 people should be con­
sidered the main achievement of the crisis management efforts after 
the earthquake hit in Neftegorsk. Contrary to the situation in 1988 
in Spitak (Armenia), where the Soviet crisis management system was 
incapable of managing a large-scale search and rescue operation in a 
remote area, the Neftegorsk disaster in 1995 revealed that the orga­
nizational response in contemporary Russia was much more effec­
tive.
The newly established USEPE system was put to the test for the 
first time. It proved that it was better coordinated and more opera­
tive than the one in the former Soviet Union. EM ERCOM  rescue 
workers (especially those from the regional centers and the doctors 
from the All-Russian Emergency Medical Care Center Zaschita) 
served as a nucleus for the search and rescue operation and the 
emergency medical care in the disaster area. Together with munici­
pal medical teams and fire fighting units from the Sakhalin regional 
department of the Russian Ministry of Interior, they represented 
4 2 %  of the total response personnel. Thus the established/institu­
tionalized organizations (and to a lesser degree the broad-based or­
ganizations) were the key crisis management actors in Neftegorsk. 
The emergent and quasi-emergent groups accounted for 3 1 %  of the 
total emergency response. The external/peripheral groups (mainly 
composed of the Sakhalinmorneftegaz workers and the servicemen 
from the Far East district of the Russian Ministry of Defense) made 
up the remaining 2 7 % . Over 400 volunteers from the local commu­
nities whole-heartedly contributed to the rescue efforts and deserve 
special recognition (Osokin, 1995).
The local and regional organizations provided over 7 0 %  of the 
people directly involved in crisis alleviation in Neftegorsk. This im­
plies that the bulk of the actual disaster response was locally admin­
istered; whereas the management of the crisis was largely adminis­
tered by the federal government representatives (mainly EMER­
CO M ). Thus it can be argued that the Neftegorsk disaster response 
was fairly balanced in terms of decentralized and centralized forces. 
In contrast, after the 1988 Spitak earthquake in Armenia the fire
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fighting activities were locally managed in the field (Wyllie and Fil- 
son, 1989). In Neftegorsk, all of the fire fighting activities after May 
30 were commanded by regional and federal coordinating officers. 
In particular, the regional fire service in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk and the 
federal fire service in Moscow oversaw the operations.
Within the newly established USEPE system, this balanced ap­
proach provided intensive and effective search and rescue activities 
under extremely difficult conditions. During the first day (May 28, 
1995) 150 people were pulled from the rubble. The next day this 
figure increased by 3 0 % . After two more days it doubled and more 
than 300 people were found in the ruins (more than half of them 
alive). Unfortunately, time ran out for the rescue workers and after 
June 4 no more survivors were pulled from the rubble. On June 10, 
the rescue operations were terminated. The total number of people 
salvaged from the rubble had soared to 2,364 (of which 406 were 
survivors).
LESSONS LEARNED
The progress achieved in the crisis management of the Neftegorsk 
earthquake should be considered as a partial success. Every disaster 
response provides important lessons, of both a practical and theo­
retical nature, for the future.
From the public policy perspective, the Neftegorsk disaster had 
a relatively low profile in terms of media coverage and had few po­
litical implications. The local and regional media (TV, radio and 
newspapers) provided regular although mainly emotional reports 
from the disaster site in the first few days of the disaster. Even 
months after the rescue work had been terminated, specific issues 
for the victims and specific shortcomings in crisis planning, pre­
paredness and response were raised. The national press extensively 
wrote on the case the first ten days but then the news coverage be­
came less regular and less descriptive especially in the later response 
phase and the early recovery stage. The TV coverage of the crisis 
lasted for less than a week. The Neftegorsk earthquake went almost 
unnoticed in the international media with just a handful of TV and 
newspaper reports (just a few lines in the first two or three days af­
ter the earthquake hit).
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The policy implications primarily focused on the poor construc­
tion of buildings and the lessons for seismological mapping. The les­
sons centered on issues concerning loopholes in design, cutting cor­
ners, corruption and the low working morale. Comparisons were 
made with the earthquake disasters in Armenia in 1988, Taiwan in 
1999 and Turkey in 1999. However, considering the fact that the 
buildings in Neftegorsk were constructed in the late 1960s during 
the Soviet Era, it is difficult to find and prosecute the responsible 
parties. According to older seismological research, Sakhalin had 
been incorrectly declared as a low risk area; another error which 
could not be blamed on any specific party. Consequently serious re­
visions were made to the existing seismological mapping of the Far 
East.
Despite the magnitude of the disaster, no one was officially 
blamed for the inadequate preparedness or for the delayed ineffec­
tive response. Some TV and newspaper interviews with those affect­
ed by the disaster and unsurprisingly revealed a loss of public confi­
dence in the regional authorities. Yet those interviewed perceived 
the response efforts taken by the district and local authorities as ad­
equate, and the respondents still have quite a bit of confidence in 
their abilities. However, the public has more or less simply internal­
ized their negative feelings which has just added frustration and un­
certainty to their everyday lives. These have been perceived by the 
local people as a result of the ongoing social and economic crisis 
both in the region and in Russia as a whole. In addition, many peo­
ple are accustomed to the reality that many of the authorities and 
political VIPs simply escape responsibility and are not held account­
able for their actions. So despite the criticism mentioned in the me­
dia interviews, the Neftegorsk earthquake disaster did not trans­
form into a serious political crisis. The local and regional adminis­
trations in Sakhalin remained untouched.
From a practical crisis management perspective, the low level of 
preparedness and poor training at all levels was evident. During the 
response stage, the crisis management was delayed and often chaot­
ic. In fact, the authorities initially questioned the earthquake warn­
ing from the local policemen. This is in no way unique or specific to 
just Russian but rather is a problem which exists in the crisis man­
agement culture.
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As Lagadec correctly puts it, in order to cope with these issues, 
work must begin on more open-ended political concepts which in 
turn will pose a cultural challenge to decision-makers. The current 
mentality is “If it can’t be proved (or hasn’t been proven), then I 
don’t need to do anything about it.” Other acceptable strategies are 
used to limit information to the public such as, “If I talk about un­
certainty, then everybody will just panic.” Deep down they believe 
that the experts will come up with a solution. Unless properly 
trained, managers are programmed to fail in crisis situations (La­
gadec, 1997).
This refers not only to the local and regional decision-makers 
but also to the federal executive bodies, in particular the EMER­
C O M  federal and regional centers. Inconsistency and disruptions in 
the rescue operation became increasingly common among the feder­
al authorities during the early and middle recovery stages.
Failures were evident in the area of financial aid and compensa­
tion to the victims and their families. Many factors contributed to 
this: the shortage of funding, loopholes in the redistribution of the 
budget, bureaucratism, the international economic crisis in the mid 
1990s, the Soviet legacy, and the historical development of Russia. 
In March 1996 (two years after the Neftegorsk earthquake) as 
many as 280 families of the 740 displaced (or 37 .8% ) still did not 
have permanent housing. Moreover, as late as May 1999 (four years 
after the earthquake) the federal government still owed the commu­
nities in the Okha district almost 10.5 million rubles (some US$ 
400,000) for property losses and over 70 million rubles (almost US$ 
2.7  million) for home repairs (Dazhuntz, 1996; No author, 1999). 
This suggests that the housing problem for those displaced as a re­
sult of the 1995 Neftegorsk disaster and the 1996 Okha earthquake 
will linger well into the year 2002 before it is resolved (Kim, 1999).
Above and beyond those already mentioned, one could claim 
that the local and regional administrators are still suffering from the 
Soviet centralization syndrome. In general they are more inclined to 
appeal to the federal government rather than to the authorities in 
their neighboring regions. The fact is that the concentration of eco­
nomic and administrative power is still in the hands of the federal 
authorities; a policy inherited from the Soviet power structure. This 
reveals poor coordination between the various levels of authority 
during all stages of the crisis (i.e. prevention, preparedness, response
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and recovery). However, the widespread uncertainty and the lack of 
meaningful coordination between the various organizations and 
agencies are common in the early hours of a disaster (Rosenthal et 
al., 1994). Poor crisis training can only partly explains the short­
comings in the response to the Neftegorsk disaster.
One more practical management and policy lesson from this cri­
sis concerns the technological backwardness of disaster prepared­
ness and response in Russia. Obsolete and unreliable communica­
tion lines, the lack of seismological stations and early warning sys­
tems, and loopholes in the exchange of information adversely 
affected the response especially in the initial stage. Based on the 
available data for Russia as a whole, the amount of time needed to 
activate the USEPE response units in the mid 1990s varied from one 
and a half hours to ten days; this is far below the standards for a 
modern response organization.
In addition to communication and technological problems, there 
was a shortage of powerful cranes which symbolized the problems 
associated with the location and distribution of rescue equipment. 
The USEPE’s forces and equipment are concentrated in the big cities 
(primarily at the EM ERCOM  regional centers); thus the capability 
of the rescue units in the more remote and difficult-to-reach areas of 
Russia are significantly limited. Luckily in the Neftegorsk case the 
oil and gas and the road construction companies in the region could 
provide trucks and busses for the rescue operation.
From a theoretical perspective, the main lessons learned from 
the Neftegorsk crisis largely deal with the organizational response 
model. This model has some similarities and yet some significant 
differences in comparison to the Dynes and Quarantelli model. The 
study of the alleviation policy in Neftegorsk revealed that most of 
the key elements in this model are applicable in this case as well. 
However, no less important are the deviations from that model. For 
instance, the issue of looting appeared in Neftegorsk, but is not be­
lieved to be typical for natural disasters.
One more specific feature of the Neftegorsk crisis management 
model was the sequence in which the main organizational types of 
crisis agents entered the response stage. Contrary to the Dynes and 
Quarantelli model, the organizational model used in Sakhalin re­
veals that emergent and quasi-emergent groups were the first crisis 
management actors to respond and played a very important role in
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the crisis response. Various factors led to this (loopholes in pre­
paredness, the lack of a warning system, and the delay in communi­
cation and decision-making). However, two other issues should also 
be emphasized.
First, the severity of the disaster disrupted the existing emer­
gency plans and virtually wiped out the entire local rescue organiza­
tion, which had a huge impact on the resilience of the local commu­
nity. The crisis managers themselves became victims. This highlights 
the challenges of designing robust and sustainable disaster manage­
ment systems. Potential emergent groups (that is, every adult com­
munity member) should be trained for improvising in the field in the 
event that a disaster strikes. Implementation of such a policy is not 
simple since it requires additional considerations and further explo­
ration. It could be argued, though, that many of the existing train­
ing programs in several countries (including Russia) are much more 
factual and instructional in nature rather than oriented towards 
problem solving and improvisation. (For instance, see the special is­
sue of Contingencies and Crisis Management22 on crisis preparation 
and training).
Second, the uniqueness of rural/peripheral crises and crisis man­
agement should be investigated further. Neftegorsk is a typical case 
of these challenges:
• geographical remoteness,
• the lack of consideration in emergency planning and pre­
paredness efforts,
• concentration of resources in the urban areas, and
• the fact that rural and more remote areas are undervalued 
and underfunded.
Crisis management in such areas needs to be explored, and is an im­
portant and relevant issue for crisis research. Likewise, more sys­
tematic and comprehensive case studies would contribute to a better 
understanding of crisis development and could be fruitful for recon­
sidering organizational response models.
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Ap p e n d i x  1 




Population density 9,2 (persons/ km2)
SEISMOLOGICAL INFORMATION
Occurrence time 1:04 a.m. (local time) 28 May 1995
1:04 p.m. (GMT) 27 May 1995
Magnitude 7.1 -  7.6 (Richter scale)
Epicenter 52,8'N 143'E
Focal depth 33 km
IMPACT AND DAMAGE
Sakhalin
Territory affected > 15,000 km2 
Population affected_______> 55,000 persons________
Neftegorsk
Casualties___________________________Damaged facilities
Instantly killed 1,989 Buildings"' 26
Missing 350 Totally destroyed 17
Injured 375 Severely destroyed 0
Partially destroyed 9
Buildings 9
* Municipal buildings alone. More than 1,500 private houses are not included
IMPACT AND DAMAGE TO LIFE-LINE UTILITIES
Suspension of water supply All houses in Neftegorsk for 24 hours
Impact on electrical grid lines 200 km
Impact on communications (telephone) 300 km
Impact on oil pipelines 45 km
Impact on gas pipelines 1 km
Suspension of oil and gas terminals 3
Direct economic losses US$ 100,000,000
Indirect economic losses_________________________ US$ 300,000,000________
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MEANS AND FORCES INVOLVED IN SEARCH AND RESCUE 
OPERATIONS IN NEFTEGORSK 
(MAY 28- JUNE 10, 1995)
Increase within 24 hours (May 28-29, 1995)
Rescue personnel (persons) > 4 times
Equipment (pieces) > 2 times
SAR capacity since May 30, 1995
Rescue personnel 1,600




PROFESSIONALS INVOLVED IN RESPONSE ACTIVITIES
(personnel per 10,000 population affected"')
Sakhalin Hyogo and Osaka Prefectures
(Russia) (Japan)
SAR personnel 291 31
Doctors and nurses 19 9
Policemen 13 28
• Population affected in Sakhalin exceeded 55,000 and those in the Hyogo and 
Osaka prefectures 9,390,000.




(local & regional) (Federal)
01 Industrial & Municipal □  Military District of the MOD
(local & regional) (regional)
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RESPONSE ACTIVITIES
SAR operations
Number of bodies salvaged 2,634
Number of victims saved 406
Medical and health care support
Number of treated persons (including children) 510
Of which were children 180
Evacuation and hospitalization
Number evacuated and hospitalized 203
Fire fighting activities
Number of fires extinguished 13
Counter-looting operations
Number of cases stopped 7
I / O
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Ap p e n d i x  2 
Types of Crises
Crisis type Examples Characteristics of the continuity 





Occasions, which involve a temporary 
break of normal social routines, 
substantial economic costs (or losses) 
and casualties within a community. 
Normal routines can be restored to a 
considerable extent within a relatively 
short period of time.
Chronic and 
exhaustive crises
Disaster Occasions, which involve a long-term 
break or substantial rupture in social 
communications and the social structures 
of a community:
• can imply deaths and/or severe health 
and/or environmental deterioration, and
• huge material damages which could 
be restored (rehabilitated, compens­
ated) to a certain degree only within 
the medium or long-term perspective.
Devastating crises Catastrophic 
disaster or a 
catastrophe
Occasions, which involve a long-term 
break or rupture in social communications 
and the social structures of a given com­
munity:
• can imply numerous deaths, massive 
health and/or environmental deteriora­
tion.
• a huge amount of stress to the affected 
people and the neighboring communi­
ties.
• can involve enormous and practically 
irreversible (uncompensated) social, 
environmental and material damages 
which may only be resolved or restored 
in the distant future.
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Ap p e n d i x  3 
Organizational Structure of the U S E P E
RUSPRE Management Levels






(Committees) of the Regional 
Authorities (RF Entities)
Commands and information flows







Chapter 5 Social Welfare and Benefits for the Chernobyl Liquidators
Chernobyl Liquidators
E l e n a  Sh l t k o v a
CM E u r o p e 23 P r o g r a m  Me th odo lo gy  a n d  Design
The C M  Europe Program is compiled of case studies based on a 
“ structured and focused comparison” methodology (George, 1979). 
This approach enables the integration of findings from several stud­
ies by focusing on specific elements or aspects in each individual 
case. The concept of crisis decision making is one significant ele­
ment within the framework of the CM  Europe Program and this 
concept is considered in this case study.
The subject of this study concerns the management of the recov­
ery process for those affected by the Chernobyl nuclear disaster 
from its onset to the present. The evolution of the state’s policy con­
cerning the rehabilitation of the Chernobyl rescue workers (liquida­
tors24) and the institutional context of providing social aid to these 
individuals are contemplated in this study. Particular attention is 
paid to analyzing the various management tools and procedures em­
ployed by the government agencies for providing the liquidators 
with social security (economic security and social welfare) and so­
cial benefits (preferential treatment and privileges in return for their 
service to the nation). Additionally, the effectiveness of these man­
agement tools and procedures in increasing the quality of life for the 
Chernobyl rescue workers is examined. The state’s social security 
policy for the people affected by the Chernobyl accident is com­
pared to the policies and methods promoted by the Chernobyl res­
cue workers’ own organization. This task is done to a large extent
23 The C M  Europe Program was originally established in 1997 as the C M  Baltic Program. The C M  
Baltic Program focused its research on the Baltic Sea region. In July 2000, the research program ex­
panded to include Europe as a whole and thus evolved into the C M  Europe Program.
24 Liquidator is the term used to describe the use of professional and amateur rescue workers (includ­
ing medical personnel, police officers, etc.).
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by scrutinizing the changes in the Russian Federation Law on Social 
Security Measures for Those Affected by Chernobyl (hereafter Cher­
nobyl Social Security Act) and in other relevant legislation, and by 
exploring the Chernobyl rescue workers’ attitudes to these changes.
Crisis Definition
Many scientifically grounded definitions of a crisis exist. For exam­
ple, the US sociologist R. Park (the forefather of social ecology) as­
serted that when societal crises become recurring phenomena, they 
test a system’s critical breaking point in terms of the system’s own 
development and the system’s relations with its environment (cf. 
Barazgova, 1977: 70).
Within the framework of the social order conflict theory (which 
implies that a conflict is a specific organizational form of breaking 
social order), a crisis is regarded as an agent or factor contributing 
to a conflict’s acceleration. One key characteristic of a crisis, accord­
ing to this perspective, is an individual’s inadequate comprehension 
of his/her place in the social structure. This creates a gap between 
the individual’s desired and real position in any given situation 
(Roy, 1994: 36).
CRiSMART scholars regard a crisis as a situation which entails 
a serious threat to basic values and norms with a great deal of un­
certainty and considerable time constraints. A  crisis often involves 
an increasing number of unfavorable events which call for immedi­
ate action and wise decisions (Svedin, 1999: 1). While this study 
considers the definitions and methods used by the CRiSMART re­
search group in Sweden, the discussion of the Chernobyl crisis will 
primarily be guided by the crisis definition developed by the team 
from the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences. 
This understanding of a crisis focuses on the concept of a crisis as a 
breach in the social order which threatens the norms and values of 
the social being and social cohesion. This disorder usually stems 
from a lack of tools or means for effective crisis management and 
for maintaining social control. Such crises may occur at the interna­
tional, national and/or local (community, social, demographic, pro­
fessional, etc.) levels.
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T h e  Subject of the Study a n d  the M e t h o d s  Used
This case study focuses on the management of the social security 
policy for Chernobyl liquidators starting from the time of the acci­
dent up to the present. The research methods used in this study are 
similar to those extensively used within crisis management research. 
In particular, the development and implementation of normative 
state laws and acts (which regulate the social security policy for the 
Chernobyl liquidators and its institutional context) are considered. 
The various management tools used to provide social security to the 
liquidators and the liquidators’ attitudes to these policies are also 
analyzed.
Sources
The sources used in this study include normative documents, the 
government’s investigation of the accident, the recovery program, 
expert information, newspaper articles, professional journals, work­
shop and conference presentations, and the findings from the liq­
uidator survey.
Ba c k g r o u n d
THE CRISIS EVENT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
The Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant (ChNPP) is situated in the east­
ern part of a vast region called the Belorussian and Ukrainian Po- 
lessye. The nuclear power plant is located on the bank of the Pripy- 
at River which drains into the Dnieper River 18 km from the re­
gional center of Chernobyl.
The accident at ChNPP occurred at 1:23 a.m. (Moscow time) on 
April 26, 1986, when the fourth power unit of the plant exploded 
during a test. The power unit capability was being tested while the 
electricity supply was switched off, yet the generator’s turbine was 
still rotating inertially. During this test, the electricity supply to the 
safety system was also turned off in order to ensure an accurate test­
ing. However, this meant that the reactor was uncontrollable thus 
creating conditions for a major crisis. The explosion tore the reac­
tor’s vessel and severely damaged the reactor building. The explo­
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sion was followed by a fire and radioactive material was discharged 
into the air.
The Chernobyl disaster was the worst of its kind in the entire 
history of nuclear power industry in terms of its impact on human 
life, the economy and the environment. From an environmental per­
spective, Chernobyl was considered a global disaster. Russian ex­
perts estimated in 1990 that economic damages would soar up to as 
much as US$ 180 ,000-250 ,000  million by the year 2000 (Arskiy, 
1991).
Nearly 30 regions in the former Soviet Union, with more 
than 4 million people, were directly affected by the radioactive fall­
out. The fallout was also registered as far as 2000 km away from 
the accident site; it spread to at least 20 other countries. Thousands 
of people died or became seriously ill, and many others have had 
their health considerably compromised. The health effects include 
among other things: radiation sickness, cancer in children, chromo­
some abnormalities, malignant neoplasm and heart attacks. The 
population living within the 30 km radius of ChNPP experienced 
severe trauma with numbers reaching 116,000 in April and May 
1986 (Porfiriev, 1996). In addition, considerable damage was inflict­
ed upon the natural environment with thousands of hectares of for­
est and arable land spoiled by radiation. This considerably dis­
turbed the reproductive functions, blood composition and bone 
marrow of the mammals living in the area. Furthermore, the acci­
dent significantly altered the fauna and soil composition, as well as 
fish and mussel reproduction.
T h e  Liquidators: T h e  Acute Crisis Response T e a m s
Given the severity of the accident, attempts to alleviate the conse­
quences took several years and involved a number of stages. In gen­
eral the crisis response was focused on two principal stages: 1. the 
explosion of the reactor and the fire thereafter, and 2. the radioac­
tive fallout and the long term consequences. The rescue workers’ 
main tasks after the explosion were to prevent the fires from spread­
ing to the neighboring ChNPP power units, to provide urgent med­
ical care to those exposed, and to evacuate the residents in the sur­
rounding communities. After the radioactive fallout, a few of the 
main crisis management aims were to locate and deactivate the radi­
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ation in the affected area, to provide medical aid to the displaced 
residents, and to maintain public order in the disaster area and the 
neighboring communities.
The rescue workers took an active part in all kinds of activi­
ties during both of the disaster alleviation stages. The response was 
officially described as the “ liquidation of the accident’s conse­
quences.” For this reason the rescue workers, medical staff, police, 
military personnel, various other professionals, and volunteers in­
volved in the urgent response field were called “ liquidatori” in 
Russian (“ liquidators” in English).
The firefighters and the ChNPP personnel were the first to be 
exposed to the radiation, and thus were exposed to the highest lev­
els of radioactivity. In the initial stage of emergency response, ordi­
nary military units (composed mainly of enlisted soldiers between 
the ages of 18 and 20) were involved in the rescue work. They were 
then subsequently replaced by the older servicemen (over 30 years 
old) from the army reserve units.
The burden of the first urgent response measures fell upon 
the chemical units who measured the radiation levels and who in­
spected and deactivated the chemicals in the contaminated area. In 
addition, the military aviation units ‘bombed’ the damaged reactor 
with anti-heat materials from above with helicopters. Soldiers and 
volunteers conducted the dangerous and difficult task of cleaning 
off the radioactive debris from the roof and the machine hall of the 
damaged reactor building. The military engineering corps and the 
construction corps also assisted. They put concrete under the reac­
tor’s foundation in order to reinforce it and to prevent radiation 
from leaking into the groundwater.
In addition to the military units, the liquidators included 
civilian professions: miners, construction workers, and electricians. 
The miners assisted with the work underground. The miners’ most 
labor intensive and dangerous task was cutting out a corridor under 
the destroyed facility so that a refrigerating ‘pillow’ could be con­
structed in order to cool the area under the damaged reactor. To 
prevent the radioactivity from penetrating the groundwater and sur­
face water, the construction workers erected protective dams and 
barriers. A steel and concrete container was built over the damaged 
reactor. In difficult and hazardous conditions, the electricians set up 
lighting in order to facilitate the rescue and alleviation work in the
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least accessible places and to enable work throughout the night. The 
outstanding contribution of the physicians (military and civilian), 
the police, scientists (physicists, chemists, biologists), drivers, cooks 
and many others can not be overestimated. Some of these liquida­
tors worked several shifts in Chernobyl. In brief, the Chernobyl res­
cue and alleviation operations were conducted under harsh and high 
risk conditions. More than 600,000 liquidators from almost every 
Soviet republic assisted in the operations.
The Russian State Medical and Dose Register is an inventory 
of information on the 174,916 liquidators and 21,771 children (born 
after the accident). This inventory was presented on January 1, 1999 
(Federalnaia Tselevaia Programma, 1999). Most of the liquidators 
came from the North Caucasian region (more than 23,000), the Cen­
tral European region (almost 22,000), the Urals (19,000) and Volga 
River region (17,000). The social, economic and psychological prob­
lems experienced by the Chernobyl rescue workers are similar, to a 
great extent, to those experienced by war veterans and by victims of 
war, atomic bombing and natural disasters.
However, the problems of the Chernobyl rescue workers are 
in many ways unique. First of all, the liquidators were not profes­
sionally trained rescue workers. Secondly, many of them had been 
dispatched to the area with little or no knowledge about the nature 
of the mission. In addition, the Chernobyl rescue workers conduct­
ed the rescue operation within the existing framework of the totali­
tarian state government, which had declared itself democratic, but 
had not yet implemented democratic practices. The failure to solve a 
number of critical issues during the Chernobyl crisis should be at­
tributed to the transitional character of the socio-economic policy 
and institutional structure of the system which existed at that point 
in time.
T h e  Russian M a s s  M e d i a  Coverage of Chernobyl
The first public statement from the USSR Council of Ministers 
about the accident at the ChNPP was brief and published in the So­
viet newspapers on the third day after the explosion on April 28, 
1986. On May 7, 1986, Pravda (a daily Moscow newspaper) pub­
lished an account of the press conference held by the members of 
the Government Commission for the Liquidation of the Accident at
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the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant. On May 14, Mikhail Gor­
bachev (the then General Secretary of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of the USSR [CC CPSU]) appeared on Soviet TV. 
He said a few words about the accident but neither he nor the press 
gave a true picture of the magnitude and severity of the disaster.
The CC CPSU immediately organized a special task force after 
the accident. Premier Nikolai Ryzhkov chaired the task force. The 
mass media was not given access to information discussed by the 
task force until May 26, 1986. At that point, the chief editors of the 
federal newspapers were instructed ”to concentrate the public’s at­
tention on the measures being taken by the CC CPSU and the Gov­
ernment to ensure normal everyday working and social conditions 
and on the measures to liquidate the accident. And there should be 
a lot of media coverage on the work being done to implement these 
measures” (Yaroshinskaya, 1992: 245). At the special task force 
meetings, all of the newspaper articles and radio and TV broadcasts 
were reviewed. The ‘positive‘ publications were approved and given 
a specific publication date whereas the ‘negative’ ones were com­
pletely rejected.
Immediately after the accident and in the years to come, various 
departments issued instructions about concealing or completely 
withholding information from the public concerning the causes and 
severity of the accident. For example, Yaroshinskaya (1992) points 
out the instructions given by the Third Chief Department of the 
USSR Ministry of Health in “Enhancing the Regime of Secrecy Con­
cerning the Liquidation of the Accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear 
Power Plant” dated July 27, 1986. This approved classifying infor­
mation on the accident, the degree of radiation contamination, and 
the effectiveness of the medical treatment for those exposed. She al­
so cites “ Information on Issues Pertaining to the Accident at the 
Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Prohibited for Open Publication in 
the Press and Prohibited for Radio/Television Broadcasting” dated 
September 24, 1987. This stipulated classifying information on the 
radiation contamination levels which had exceeded the legal limits. 
It also prohibited making public data on the deteriorating physical 
well-being of and working conditions for those engaged in the liqui­
dation process (Yaroshinskaya, 1992: 55).
In early 1989 the USSR Minister of Power Industry and Electri­
cal Energy (Minenergo), Mr. Mayorets, issued an order which re­
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stricted information to the public concerning accidents and fires at 
the country’s industrial engineering plants and construction sites, 
equipment failures, data on material and environmental damage, 
and human casualties. This information was covered up ”to ensure 
control precluding the unauthorized disclosure of the above infor­
mation in internal documents, telegraph correspondence, and mate­
rials intended for publication in the open press” (Yaroshinskaya, 
1992: 58).
These and other instructions were implemented and the media 
was significantly limited. This restricted the general public’s access 
to trustworthy information about Chernobyl until the late 1980s. 
Some of the data regarding public health and the environmental ef­
fects of the radioactive fallout in the regions affected by the Cher­
nobyl accident were opened to the public three years after the acci­
dent when the Order of the USSR Government (May 24, 1989) was 
issued. An analysis of the federal, regional and local newspapers 
and journals published between 1989 and 1991 reveals that the ma­
jority of information concerning the severity of the disaster and the 
liquidators’ health was covered up.
During these two years (1989-1991), the press publications fo­
cused primarily on the problems of relocating the residents from the 
contaminated areas. These articles also mentioned the rate of illness 
and the organization of medical and social aid. The journalists of 
these articles were quite critical to the authorities’ efforts to alleviate 
the disaster. Likewise, discussions arose concerning the hazards as­
sociated with radiation exposure, and the alternative methods of as­
sessing and monitoring radiation. In addition, information about 
the distribution of federal and international relief aid for Chernobyl 
was compared to that allocated for similar accidents.
Some interesting information about the liquidators was pub­
lished in the professional weekly newsletter Rossiiskii Chernobyl. 
Unfortunately this newsletter has a very limited circulation of just
6,000 and is solely distributed to the regional branches of the N G O  
“ Souyz Chernobyl” [Chernobyl Union]. For this reason (and be­
cause of irregular publishing as a result of financial problems), this 
newsletter was not available for analysis in this case study.
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T h e  K e y  Crisis Actors
The bulk of crisis and disaster experts have asserted that the Soviet 
response units and services were poorly prepared to deal with the 
Chernobyl disaster. Prior to the explosion, specialists considered 
that the possibility of a major accident occurring at one of the Sovi­
et nuclear power plants was close to zero. Likewise, it was pre­
sumed that there was a very low probability of a large radioactive 
discharge occurring. However, reality proved to be much different 
than those assessments. The actual radioactive fallout from the 
damaged reactor in Chernobyl lasted for at least 10 days.
Despite the fact that many nuclear and radiology experts in the 
former Soviet Union considered the country’s safety measures at the 
various nuclear facilities to be satisfactory and the civil defense 
plans for community protection to be adequate, the Chernobyl acci­
dent revealed that there were serious flaws in the system. For in­
stance, at the time of the Chernobyl disaster, no system or service 
existed for properly training professional rescue workers for a ra­
dioactive disaster. Previous accidents in the nuclear industry (i.e. at 
the Mayak facility in the Chelyabinsk region and at the Semipalatin- 
sk nuclear testing grounds) were simply covered up and swept under 
the rug.
Most of the liquidators, who were employed to help during 
the Chernobyl accident, were lay people with little or no training in 
radiation safety so they lacked the necessary skills to deal with such 
matters. After the accident, these people were removed from their 
everyday social environment (work, family, friends, etc.) and relo­
cated to a totally different domain (often against their will and 
against the wishes of their families) with strict rules and discipline 
under extremely dangerous conditions. These people sacrificed their 
health and the health of their future children in an attempt to mini­
mize the consequences of the radioactive accident.
According to the Ministry of Health sources, the number of 
healthy liquidators dropped between 1986 and 1990 from 78 %  to 
5 6 %  (Porfiriev, 1996: 16). Today more than 50,000 liquidators (av­
erage age 3 8 -4 0  years) are invalids and almost 15,000 have died 
(Grishin, 1999). Likewise, medical and psychological tests have re­
vealed substantial changes in the psychological well-being of many 
liquidators after their experiences at Chernobyl (see Bobneva, 1992; 
Kirilenko, 1992).
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The Chernobyl accident and its aftermath was a complex and 
multi-stage crisis. First and foremost, the liquidators’ basic values 
(including life itself) were directly threatened. They were taken 
away from their everyday life and put into a high risk situation 
which the non-professional rescue workers were not properly 
trained to deal with. Experts call this the “ Chernobyl victim com­
plex” or “the lost sense of life” which manifested itself among the 
liquidators and the victims who suffered psychologically. They were 
“ looking for someone to blame for their inferior social status” (Ar- 
skiy, 1991: 10). These factors comply with the notion of crisis as an 
event which breaks social norms and standards.
Despite the efforts undertaken by the federal government to 
cope with the major crisis, the situation was further exacerbated by 
poor legislation and an inadequate social security policy. When the 
accident occurred, legislation was lacking which mandated the 
state’s responsibility to the country’s citizens. Social security mecha­
nisms for victims of radiation were also lacking. There were missed 
opportunities for implementing measures to restore organizational 
order. Considering the number of people affected by the liquidation 
attempts, this was clearly a national crisis.
In 1991 the crisis entered the second phase and had at that 
point evolved into a “creeping crisis.” Also that same year the Cher­
nobyl Social Security Act was enacted. It set up a number of privi­
leges and compensation for the liquidators. However, no mecha­
nisms for implementation accompanied the act. The liquidators con­
tinuously received written guarantees promising social protection 
from the government, although concrete privileges and compensa­
tion were not issued because there were no formal procedures for 
implementing them. The second ‘creeping’ stage of the Chernobyl 
crisis is explored further in this chapter. The key crisis source was 
the federal government and the crisis victims were the Chernobyl 
liquidators who were striving for legal, social and psychological aid 
from the government authorities.
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Chronology
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATE SOCIAL SECURITY
POLICY FOR THE LIQUIDATORS: 1986-2000
In this section the main decision-making issues concerning the alle­
viation of the Chernobyl disaster and the social security policy for 
the liquidators are presented.
The Beginning: 1986-1989
Large-scale activities for dealing with the disaster were initiated by 
the federal ministries, federal departments, and national services im­
mediately after the accident on April 26, 1986. The crisis manage­
ment centered on reducing the radiation risk, removing the radioac­
tive debris, and relocating the area residents. There were also some 
normative acts providing certain privileges and compensation to the 
liquidators. These are considered in more detail later in this chapter.
According to a number of government documents (Sbornik, 
1993: 19 -20 , 5 0 -5 2 , 59 -60 ), the Chernobyl rescue workers were 
entitled to extra payment, a daily allowance and free meals while 
working in Chernobyl. The same right was provided to the service­
men directly engaged in the rescue and recovery work in the evacu­
ated areas. In addition, the rescue workers and servicemen received 
special vouchers for free visits to various clinics and health resorts 
the first year after working in Chernobyl. In the event of occupa­
tional disease, the above mentioned acts provided the liquidators 
with the right to early retirement and/or a privileged pension. The 
emphasis was on privileges rather than compensation for the health 
problems experienced by the liquidators. Health problems caused 
by radiation do not appear right away. There is usually a delay in 
the impact it has on human health and the environment. Thus, the 
liquidators’ state of health will increasingly deteriorate in the future.
The Order of the USSR Council of Ministers from December 11, 
1986 (No 2 4 8 8p) addressed the issue of people with radiation sick­
ness as a result of the Chernobyl accident (Sbornik, 1993: 63). 
These people were given free medicine and free visits to various clin­
ics and health resorts (including reimbursement of travel costs to 
and from such facilities). The State Labor Committee and the USSR 
Ministry of Health were ordered to organize special medical and la­
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bor commissions to examine those who got ill and were diagnosed 
with occupational diseases as a result of the Chernobyl accident.
Another order was issued in 1990 (Sbornik, 1993: 78 -80) which 
gave every eligible liquidator the right to a privileged pension. This 
implied equal rights for all of the liquidators and for those working 
in the evacuation zone, since the health risks for these people was 
apparently much higher. Therefore, distinguishing the liquidators 
from the other victims, and determining their legal and social status 
became increasingly important for the crisis decision-makers.
Every law and regulation passed between 1986 and 1989 in 
one way or another contained decisions regarding financial and so­
cial aid for the Chernobyl liquidators. Yet the issue of social security 
for those affected by radiation was not taken up by the federal gov­
ernment nor the Parliament until 1989. It was considered for the 
first time in the construction of the State Program for the Liquida­
tion of the ChNPP Accident (from 1990 up to 2000) and in the ac­
companying documents.
In March 1990 the former Soviet Parliament (Sbornik, 1993: 
155-157) in a decree established the legal status of the liquidators. 
This meant that everybody engaged in rescue work within a 30 km ra­
dius of the accident was certified as a “ Chernobyl liquidator” and 
thus entitled to certain rights and privileges. The same decree also dis­
tinguished the liquidators from the other radiation victims. The res­
cue workers were subdivided into two categories: those working in 
the disaster zone between 19 86 -198 7  and those between 1988-1989. 
This time specification was used to differentiate the set of privileges 
provided to the liquidators since the radiation risk to human health 
was much higher immediately after the accident. Lastly, the decree 
promoted the development of an integrated state register for all of the 
liquidators.
The Governmental Programs
In November 1989 the USSR Supreme Soviet gave the federal gov­
ernment and the State Committee for Ecology and the Rational Use 
of Natural Resources the task of preparing an unified program for 
the alleviation of the Chernobyl disaster. The governments of the 
former Soviet Union republics in Russia, Belorussia and Ukraine de­
veloped two kinds of state programs: urgent measures for dealing
1 8 4
Chapter 5 Social Welfare and Benefits for the Chernobyl Liquidators
with the liquidation of the accident (1990-1992), and long-term 
measures (1990-1995 and thereafter).
The state program for urgent measures was approved by the 
USSR Council of Ministers on April 21, 1990. The program consist­
ed of four parts: one for the federal union and three for each of the 
affected republics (Russia, Belorussia and Ukraine). The federal 
union part focused on the scientific and technical aspects of the ur­
gent recovery measures including deterring radionuclides, protecting 
the groundwater, providing radiation safety and so forth. A  special 
section of the program considered measures for protecting the 
health of the residents living in the radioactive areas and the health 
of the liquidators. In order to coordinate the implementation of this, 
the Joint Coordination Council of the Russian, Belorussian and 
Ukrainian Academies of Sciences was organized.
A program for the long-term recovery policy was drafted. This 
draft was seriously scrutinized by the State Expert Commission 
which consisted of nearly 90 specialists and was headed by three na­
tional experts (one being Prof. Boris Porfiriev who is a co-editor of 
this volume). These specialists came from the USSR Academy of Sci­
ences, the USSR State Construction Committee, the USSR State 
Committee on Science and Technology, the USSR State Committee 
for Hydrometeorology, and the N G O  “ Chernobyl Union.”
The commission pointed out that a number of serious loop­
holes existed in the draft program, in particular the state policy con­
cerning the recovery work in Chernobyl. The state policy tended to 
down play the public’s interests and concerns regarding the acci­
dent’s long-term consequences, and tried to shift responsibility away 
from the state and the government institutions. This disregarded the 
anxiety and frustration experienced by the victims for themselves 
and the well-being of their children. These programs failed to ad­
dress social protection and social security issues, although there 
were hundreds of thousand of rescue workers suffering from high 
radiation exposure. The programs also lacked implementation and 
control mechanisms, crisis management tools, and legal support 
(Arskiy, 1991: 17 -21).
State programs on the issue of long-term recovery from the 
Chernobyl disaster were submitted for consideration to the USSR 
Supreme Soviet on April 25, 1990. During the hearings, the mem­
bers of the USSR Supreme Soviet stressed the necessity to include a
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special section on social protection and social security for the liq­
uidators. Here are a few excerpts from some of the speeches made 
by the USSR Supreme Soviet members at the joint session hearings 
on April 25, 1990.
K Salikov -  Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Com­
mittee on Ecology and the Rational Use of Natural Re­
sources:
“Economic issues are discussed too much to the extent 
that it is detriment to the human spirit and morale. One 
could argue that the role of social and psychological as­
pects has been underestimated... Liquidators, in particu­
lar, should be considered and deserve special attention. 
Together they amount to over 600,000 people. How can 
our country ever repay its debt to all of them?” (Verk- 
hovnii Soviet SSSR, 1990: 17).
S. Gurenko -  The Second Secretary of the Ukrainian 
Communist Party Central Committee:
“The existing privileges [to the liquidators] are scattered 
in various governmental and departmental documents 
and their circulation is restricted because they are consid­
ered “ confidential.” Those affected are not aware that 
such documents exist and many local officials do not ei­
ther. Due to the loopholes in the existing [legal] norms, 
fair compensation to such people for the loss of health 
and economic damages are not often awarded” (Verk- 
hovnii Soviet SSSR, 1990: 39 -40 ).
N. Feskov -  A  member of the USSR Supreme Soviet:
“The children of the liquidators deserve the same atten­
tion as those living in the contaminated areas” (Verk- 
hovnii Soviet SSSR, 1990: 48).
In spite of the aforementioned serious shortcomings the All-Union 
and Republican Program on the Liquidation of the Chernobyl NPP 
Accident (adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet on April 25, 1990) 
ignored most of the proposals which were critical. In addition, the 
Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers (No 645) issued the “Im­
plementation of the USSR Supreme Soviet Decree on the Unified 
Program for the Liquidation of the Chernobyl NPP Accident” as
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late as on June 30, 1990 (Sbornik, 1993: 158-159). This document 
described the mechanisms for implementing the program.
“The Unified State Program on the Protection of the Russian 
Federation Population Against the Impact of the Chernobyl Disaster 
for the Period up until the Year 2 0 0 0 ” and “Urgent Protective Mea­
sures Against the Impact of the Chernobyl Disaster for the Russian 
Federation Population, 1 9 9 6 -1 9 9 7 ” were adopted. Later these two 
were amended by “The Federal Targeted Program on the Protection 
of the Russian Federation Population Against the Chernobyl Disas­
ter Impact up until the Year 2 0 0 0 .” Despite all of the shortcomings 
and loopholes, it is evident that since 1990 Russia has seriously con­
sidered the issue of recovering from the Chernobyl disaster and has 
attempted to address this with various programs.
On February 20, 1991, the third session of the Russian 
Supreme Soviet held hearings on the Russian Federation program 
“ Children of Chernobyl” ; a program introduced by the Committee 
on Women, Family, and Child Protection of the Supreme Soviet of 
the USSR. The program was designed by the Institute of Pediatrics, 
the Institute of Child Surgery (under the Russian Ministry of 
Health), and the Committee on Family and Demographic Policy Af­
fairs (under the Russian Council of Ministers). The program aimed 
to provide medical and social aid to the women and children living 
in the contaminated areas, since a number of genetic defects have 
been linked to radiation exposure (including those indirectly ex­
posed via their parents). Nevertheless, the program failed to consid­
er the issues of the liquidators’ children, those born after April 26, 
1996 (Verkhovnii Soviet RSFSR, 1991). The program was endorsed 
and then set for implementation between 1991 and 1995 by the de­
cree of Russian Supreme Soviet (No 1113-1) dated April 27, 1991 
(Sbornik, 1993: 273-274).
Numerous decrees and guidelines from the different state 
bodies were issued between April 1986 and 1991 and focused on 
the specific problems related to alleviating the consequences of the 
accident, but they often lacked the concept of a social security poli­
cy. Thus these documents were often quite ambiguous, and distor­
tions and abuses were clearly evident at the local and regional lev­
els. Vast material and financial resources were ineffectively used. 
This problem was partly alleviated after the Chernobyl Social Secu­
rity Act was passed in 1991.
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The 1991 Chernobyl Social Security Act
On May 12, 1991, the USSR Supreme Soviet approved the decree 
on enforcing the USSR Chernobyl Social Security Act (Sbornik, 
1993: 242). The draft was developed by the USSR government with 
active participation from the Council of Ministers of Ukraine, Be­
lorussia and Russia along with various committees and commissions 
from the Supreme Soviets (in particular, the Committee on the Liq­
uidation of the ChNPP Accident, the Public Health Protection Com­
mittee, and the Ecology Issues Committee).
The 1991 Social Security Act focused on defending the rights 
and interests of the citizens exposed to radiation as a result of the 
accident at ChNPP. It established legal perimeters for the radiation 
victims and for the contaminated areas. Likewise, privileges and 
compensation were stipulated for every category. Medical standards 
and radiation protection for the affected communities and liquida­
tors were also established. The act specified measures for social se­
curity, medical and health care, state insurance rules, and pension 
guarantees for all liquidators.
The Supreme Soviet, the local Soviet Deputies, the trade unions 
and the various organizations for the Chernobyl victims supervised 
the implementation of the act. Sections concerning social security 
for the liquidators and their families are mentioned in: Paragraph 
13 “ Categories of citizens exposed to radiation from the Chernobyl 
catastrophe,” Paragraph 14 “ Compensation and privileges to the 
citizens with radiation sickness and other health-related problems as 
a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe,” and Paragraph 15 “ Com­
pensation and privileges to the liquidators of the Chernobyl NPP ca­
tastrophe.”
Other paragraphs worth mentioning include Paragraph 24 “ Or­
ganization of medical care and radiation protection for the people 
affected by the catastrophe at Chernobyl NPP” and Paragraph 25 
“ Social security, medical and health care for children.” Paragraph
29 “Pensions for citizens who have become invalid as a result of the 
Chernobyl catastrophe and for people who lost family members as a 
result of the Chernobyl catastrophe” and Paragraph 30 “Pensions 
for the liquidators of the Chernobyl NPP catastrophe” should also 
be mentioned as well.
One should not overlook Paragraph 39 “ Compensation for 
health problems (radiation sickness, invalidism or other disorders)
1 8 8
Chapter 5 Social Welfare and Benefits for the Chernobyl Liquidators
obtained as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe, and compensa­
tion to people who lost family members as a result of the Chernobyl 
catastrophe.” This one is supplemented by Paragraph 40 “ Compen­
sation to liquidators who have experienced health problems as a re­
sult of the Chernobyl NPP catastrophe.” Lastly, there are Paragraph
41 “ Compensation for the loss of a family wage earner involved in 
the liquidation of the Chernobyl NPP catastrophe” and Paragraph
42 “ Compensation for health problems as a result of the Chernobyl 
catastrophe and for the loss of a family wage earner.”
Significant changes and amendments have been introduced 
since the act was signed in 1991. For instance, the sections on social 
security for the liquidators were amended on June 18, 1992, in or­
der to include free medical insurance for the liquidators. The federal 
budget had to fill the gap between the expenses for implementing 
this special program and those for the basic obligatory medical in­
surance. In addition, social security and medical and health care for 
the liquidators’ children were included in Paragraph 25.
Amendments Made to the 1991 Chernobyl Social Security 
Act After 1995
The increasing number of amendments to the original 1991 Cher­
nobyl Social Security Act led to its replacement in November 1995, 
when a new act with a very similar title was introduced. Worth par­
ticular mentioning is Paragraph 15. The respective section in the 
earlier mentioned 1991 act specified the allocation of interest-free 
loans for the construction of housing (equivalent to 600 minimal 
wages), but in the 1995 Act this paragraph allocated just a lump 
sum for interest-free loans to be used to buy apartments. These 
loans could only be obtained on the unique condition that a liquida­
tor was officially recognized as “in need of housing.” However, the 
formal procedures for this are missing thus it is unclear what should 
be regarded as a basis for such compensation and for what amount. 
Thus the local administrators responsible for enforcing this and oth­
er issues of the act have been put into a difficult situation.
On December 11, 1996, the act was further amended with a 
paragraph, which encompassed people affected by other radiation 
accidents so they too could be eligible for privileges and compensa­
tion. These people included those exposed to the nuclear tests in the
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Semipalatinsk region in the 1950s and 1960s, the radiation acci­
dents at the Mayak facility in the Chelyabinsk region in 1957 and 
1961, and the servicemen of the so-called special units exposed to 
high risks.
Despite these changes, the legislation still lacks the necessary 
mechanisms for implementing such privileges and for issuing com­
pensation to the liquidators. The existing Russian legislation also ig­
nores the fact that the federal government used conscription to mo­
bilize rescue workers. The high-level authorities simply shifted their 
responsibility for the liquidators’ and their families’ social security 
to the lower decision-making levels. The existing legislation also 
lacks guidelines for addressing the potential and actual health prob­
lems experienced by the liquidators and their children born after the 
accident. Thus, clauses in the current law on Chernobyl concerning 
social protection and social security for the liquidators need to be 
improved.
Governmental Recovery Program for 2001-2005
The Order of the Russian Federation Government from April 29, 
1999 (No GL-P1 -  14233) was used as a foundation for developing 
the Federal Targeted Program on the Protection of the Russian Fed­
eration Population for Minimizing the Impact of the Chernobyl Dis­
aster between 2001 and 2005. It focused on reducing the adverse 
physical, social and psychological impact of the disaster agents on 
the communities and liquidators, and on economically rehabilitating 
the radioactively contaminated areas. The aim of the program is to 
reduce the risk of remote radiation-induced pathologies, to improve 
the quality and availability of medical and psychological aid, and to 
raise the living conditions for those people affected by the Cher­
nobyl accident (Federalnaia Tselevaia Programma, 1999).
The program was designed by EM ERCOM  (who also serves 
as the program coordinator), the Russian Federation Ministry of 
Health Care, the Russian State Committee for Environmental Pro­
tection, the Russian Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and En­
vironmental Monitoring, the Russian Federal Forest Service, and the 
regional administrations in Briansk, Kaluga, Orel and Tula. The im­
plementation of this program is the responsibility of the executive 
branches of the aforementioned federal bodies and regional authori-
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ties. This means that the same departments and often the same peo­
ple are in charge of developing, making and implementing the deci­
sions regarding the program.
The social security system for the liquidators within the insti­
tutional framework is presented in the following diagram.
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The Legend to Figure 1
-  Management functions
1.
-  Management agents 
Committee for Labor and Social Policy
2. Committee for Ecology and Natural Resources
3. Committee for Health Care
4. Committee for Women, Family and Youth Issues
5. Ministry of Health Care
6. EM ERCOM
7. Ministry for Nuclear Energy
8. Ministry of Defense
9. State Federal Committee for Property and Ownership
10. State Federal Sanitary and Epidemiological Supervision
11. Ministry for Natural Resources
12. Ministry of Finance
13. State Federal Customs Committee
14. State Insurance Company (GOSSTRAKH)
15. Ministry of Social Security
16. Ministry of Labor
17. Federal Employment Service
18. Pension Foundation
19. Social Insurance Foundation
20. Medical Insurance Foundation
21. Public Social Security Foundation
22. Red Cross Society
23. All-Russian Society for Invalids
24. Charity and Health Foundation
25. Russian Children Foundation
26. Church
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Quality of Life for the Liquidators: T h e  
Effectiveness of the Social Security Policy
The social security policy for the Chernobyl liquidators is stipulated 
within the existing framework for the public social security system, 
which involves a gamut of public ministries and departments. Since 
1994, EM ERCOM  has been acting as the federal coordinator or­
chestrating and directing the efforts of all of the state bodies in­
volved in the alleviation of radiation accidents and disasters. 
EM ERCOM  provides guidance and organizational support to the 
respective federal executive bodies, the regional and local authori­
ties, and various enterprises and organizations. Likewise, legal and 
medical support has been provided to people affected by radiation 
accidents (including the Chernobyl liquidators). EM ERCOM  also 
executes control over the implementation of such measures. In gen­
eral, EM ERCOM  works more with operational issues, yet recovery 
from the Chernobyl accident and other similar disasters requires 
more strategic long-term efforts. This calls for a special organiza­
tional system which can implement the social security policy for 
those affected by Chernobyl and other similar accidents (Grishin, 
1999).
In my opinion, the liquidators’ standard and quality of life is a 
key indicator of the effectiveness of the social security policy. As 
mentioned above, the existing law stipulates considerable privileges 
and compensation to the liquidators, but as social monitoring 
shows, implementation procedures are inadequate and this in itself 
has contributed to a creeping crisis. The values threatened by this 
crisis involve individual well-being, health care, standard of living, 
employment, social protection and guaranteed governmental sup­
port. The essence of the crisis lies in the fact that community bonds 
and normal social routines were broken. There were failures in the 
implementation of legitimate guarantees and the respective authori­
ties poorly executed their duties.
These claims are supported by the findings from a sociological 
survey of the liquidators. This survey was carried out by mail by the 
Department of Social Problems and Risks at the Institute of Sociolo­
gy of the Russian Academy of Sciences led by Alla Mozgovaia and 
was financially supported by EM ERCOM . The analysis of this sur­
vey was restricted to two questions directly related to crisis manage­
ment issues.
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Question #1: “As a liquidator you have had to submit applica­
tions to various organizations and have had contact with many dif­
ferent agencies. Where and what aid have you applied for in the last 
2 -3  years, and what has been the outcome of these efforts? How  
did you feel you were treated? Did you receive the help you need­
ed?”
This question was constructed in order to find out which state 
agencies, organizations, and social institutions were most involved 
in the execution of the federal law on social security for the Cher­
nobyl liquidators.
Question #2: “Please list what kind of social security and social 
support you expect from the state.”
This question was aimed at determining whether the liquidators 
considered themselves as a specific group in need of a special social 
security policy. It was also intended to identify the specific kinds of 
social aid which are needed, and to reveal the liquidators’ knowl­
edge about which social institutions are responsible for protecting 
their interests. Table 1 summarizes the findings from the liquidators’ 
responses regarding the social security policy.
Table 2 provides data on the specific privileges and compensa­
tion which the liquidators applied for from various agencies and or­
ganizations and the outcomes of such applications. The survey re­
vealed that most of the privileges designated for the liquidators had 
not been awarded by the responsible agencies. The bulk of the re­
spondents felt that the social security legislation had not been put 
into practice. The respondents also stressed that they felt “ deceived 
by the state.”
Table 1: The Results of the Liquidators’ Applications for Privileges 
in Three Russian Regions
Region The Outcome of Applications (%)
Successful Failed
Briansk region25 20.5 79.5
Vladimir region 21.0 79.0
Moscow region 30.8 69.2
15 The Briansk region was the Russian region worst hit by the radiation fallout. The Vladimir region 
and the Moscow region are used here as reference groups for comparison.
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This survey and a few other studies reveal that many of the liquida­
tors felt morally devastated by the lack of “sincere human concern” 
from some of the administrators and bureaucrats. Often the liquida­
tors were met with statements like: “ I don’t know anything,” “I 
can’t do anything,” or “I didn’t send you there [Chernobyl].”
The survey also revealed that the liquidators felt they did not 
have any social protection in terms of the most important elements 
for survival: employment, financial security, decent living condi­
tions, good health, medication, health care, or psychological and 
emotional support.
The main social security issues for the liquidators included their 
own personal concerns and often the concerns and problems of 
their families. However the social security policy has focused prima­
rily on the individual and does not include the concept of the family 
as an affected unit.
Table 2: The Liquidators’ Applications for Privileges and 
Compensation
Privileges The Outcome of Applications (%)
Successful Failure
Pension insurance 80.2 20.0
Vouchers to clinics 66.7 33.3
Food subsidies 66.7 33.3
Financial support 62.5 31.5
Discount for utility services and apartments 54.5 45.5
Yard and garden lots 37.5 62.5
Discounted food 36.4 63.6
Coupons, cards, certificates 25.0 75.0
Compensation for unused vouchers 25.0 75.0
Discount for buying a car or a motorcycle 23.8 76.2
Garage space 20.0 80.0
Improvement of living conditions 16.2 83.3
Subsidized loans 14.3 85.7
Telephone installation 13.8 86.2
Income tax breaks 11.1 88.9
Privileged commodity prices 5.9 94.1
Property for a private building 0.0 100.0
Employment services 0.0 100.0
Privileged conditions for starting a business 0.0 100.0
Subsidized travel costs 0.0 100.0
Convenient vacation time 0.0 100.0
Child allowance 0.0 100.0
Help in repairing a house or an apartment 0.0 100.0
Children subsidies 0.0 100.0
195
Crisis Management in Russia: Overcoming Institutional Rigidity and Resource Constraints
In addition, the results of the sociological survey revealed that a 
number of liquidators’ claims for privileges were not granted even 
though they were entitled to them. This means there is a gap between 
the formally declared privileges and the real needs of the liquidators. 
The existing legislation regarding privileges for the liquidators is 
largely ignored and overlooks many of the liquidators’ basic needs 
(Mozgovaia and Shlikova, 1994). The Chernobyl victims and people 
who lost family members have protested and gone on hunger strikes 
demanding compliance of the existing legislation concerning their 
privileges and rights (Kachaeva, 1999). The liquidators have also 
tried to defend their civil rights in court by suing the responsible state 
agencies. Court hearings are often long and drawn-out, and require 
specific knowledge, patience, and good health, most of which the liq­
uidators obviously lack (Grishin, 1999).
Thus there is a significant need to change the state social securi­
ty policy for the liquidators in order to provide better coordination 
between the responsible departments and agencies, and to ensure 
that the laws are implemented. Functioning communication systems 
should exist between and within the various government depart­
ments, and the system should include tough sanctions against those 
who choose to ignore the law. Channels for the exchange of reliable 
and operative data should also be established or improved in order 
to provide timely information to the public and to specialists. How­
ever, it took one year for critical information on the social and med­
ical services available for the liquidators at the local level to reach 
the desks of the responsible federal and regional state organizations.
Moreover, there is a high risk that the current personnel work­
ing for the departments responsible for the social security policy will 
be cut due to financial constraints. Their functions would then be 
transferred to other departments, which are not familiar with such 
activities; thus, adversely affecting the quality of the decision-mak­
ing process and the implementation of the laws (Grishin, 1999).
T h e  Union Chernobyl of Russia: Th e  Liquidators’ 
N G O
The N G O  “Union Chernobyl” is a voluntary association for the liq­
uidators of Chernobyl and the victims of other radiation disasters. 
This N G O  has been working for ten years to protect the interests of
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the liq u id a tors  an d  the v ictim s o f  ra d ia tion . U n io n  C h e rn o b y l is a c ­
tive in  every  R u ssian  re g io n  and  in clu d es , a m o n g  oth ers, the f o l l o w ­
ing  su b g rou p s : “ C h ild ren  o f  C h e r n o b y l,”  “ W o rk e rs  o f  C h e r n o b y l,”  
“ V eterans o f  C h e r n o b y l,”  and “ Invalids o f  C h e r n o b y l.”
T h e  President o f  U n ion  C h e rn o b y l, V .L . G rish in , s tron g ly  em ­
p h asized  the ro le  o f  the o rg a n iza tio n  in in flu en cin g  the so c ia l secu ri­
ty  p o licy . T h e  reg ion a l ch ap ters  o f  U n ion  C h e rn o b y l have a c lo se  
link  to  the a ffe cted  co m m u n ities  and  thus ca n  o b ta in  va lu ab le  u p - 
to -d a te  in fo rm a tio n  o n  the lo ca l m em bers. T h is  data p ro v id e s  a 
g o o d  fo u n d a t io n  fo r  a m o re  deta iled  analysis o f  the fin an cia l situa­
t io n  and  liv in g  co n d it io n s  o f  the C h e rn o b y l liq u id a tors  and  victim s. 
In a d d it io n , it helps to  q u ick ly  id en tify  th ose  p e o p le  m ost in  need  
and  thus ca n  p r o v id e  a p p ro p ria te  su p p ort. T h e  o rg a n iza tio n  a lso  fa ­
cilitates as a sort o f  lia ison , w h ich  helps m in im ize  all o f  the b u rea u ­
cra tic  red tape, and  in  this regard  p ro v id e s  tran spa ren cy  in to  fu n d  
a llo ca t io n  and  the d istr ib u tion  p rocess .
In a d d it io n  to  the tra d ition a l N G O  fu n ct io n  o f  m o n ito r in g  la w  
co m p lia n ce , the reg ion a l ch apters  o f  U n io n  C h e rn o b y l are a u th o r ­
ized  to  c o n tr o l and im p ro v e  the d istr ib u tion  o f  federa l fu n d s fo r  im ­
p lem en tin g  the targeted  federa l p ro g ra m s  fo r  re co v e ry  w o rk . 
E M E R C O M  gran ted  U n ion  C h e rn o b y l the p o w e r  to  d o  this. 
E M E R C O M  sees to  it that federa l fu n d s are used fo r  that there 
w ere  in ten d ed . N everth eless, the u n a u th orized  use o f  su ch  fu n d s in 
R u ssia , esp ecia lly  at the reg ion a l level, is p reva len t.
T h e  adm in istrative  and  spatia l structure o f  U n ion  C h e rn o b y l en ­
ables an a ccu rate  reg istra tion  o f  the va riou s  ca tegories  o f  in valids 
and  liq u id a tors  in  term s o f  their m ed ica l s itu ation  an d  so c ia l secu ri­
ty  needs. In flu en ce  o v e r  the lo ca l a d m in is tra tion ’s activities helps in 
ad d ressin g  the co n ce rn s  and  needs o f  th ose  a ffected  b y  the C h er­
n o b y l d isaster (G rish in , 1 9 9 9 ).
U n ion  C h e rn o b y l has carried  o u t  la rge-sca le  activities o v e r  the 
past ten years and  the o rg a n iza tio n  has had  a s ign ifican t ro le  in  im ­
p r o v in g  the so c ia l secu rity  p o l ic y  fo r  the liq u id a tors  and  the a ffected  
co m m u n ities . T h ere  are several exa m p les  o f  this. In 1 9 9 1  specia l 
b o d ie s  w ere  created  to  oversee  this p o lic y  d e v e lo p m e n t and  im p le ­
m en ta tion , U n io n  C h e rn o b y l p ro v id e d  its o w n  fu n d in g  and  o rg a n ­
ized  the m o b iliz a t io n  o f  resou rces  (in clu d in g  m ed ica l eq u ip m en t, 
m ed icin e  and  fo o d )  fo r  the a ffected  p e o p le . It a lso  p a id  fo r  m ed ica l 
treatm en t and  h ea lth  care  b o th  in R u ssian  and  fo re ig n  h osp ita ls  and
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clin ics. T h a t sam e year U n io n  C h e rn o b y l o rg a n ized  an in tern ation a l 
ch arity  fo r  the C h ild ren  o f  C h e rn o b y l in  o rd e r  to  c o lle c t  a d d ition a l 
fu n ds fo r  the im p lem en ta tion  o f  the a b o v e  m en tion ed  p rog ra m s.
B y 1 9 9 3  the M o s c o w  reg ion a l ch ap ter  o f  U n io n  C h e rn o b y l 
a lon e  h e lp ed  o rga n ize  a b o u t  th irty  co m m e rc ia l firm s in  co lle c tin g  
m o n e y  to  help  the C h e rn o b y l v ictim s. In 1 9 9 5  the President o f  
U n io n  C h e rn o b y l a p p eared  o n  a n a tion a l T V  talk  sh ow , w h ich  d is­
cu ssed  the C h e rn o b y l disaster. T h e  ta lk  s h o w  d rew  the a tten tion  o f  
m illion s  to  the seriou s p ro b le m s  in flictin g  the C h e rn o b y l v ictim s. 
U n io n  C h e rn o b y l has h ad  m a n y  o th er  ach ievem en ts. Perhaps m ost 
im p ortan tly , it has h e lp ed  to  create  a sort o f  cam arad erie  and a su p ­
p o r t  g ro u p  fo r  th ose  c o p in g  w ith  p ost-tra u m a tic  stress.
Social and Psychological Support for the Chernobyl 
Victims
A  n u m b er o f  sch o lars  have o rg a n ized  specia l services fo r  p ro v id in g  
s o c ia l and p s y c h o lo g ic a l a id  to  the C h e rn o b y l v ictim s. F or  instance, 
the sm all state enterprise “ V o tu m -p s i”  at the Institute o f  P sy ch o lo g y  
o f  R u ssian  A ca d e m y  o f  S ciences o rg a n ized  a co u n se lin g  center 
w h ich  w o rk s  togeth er  w ith  reg ion a l services and centers.
W ith  su p p o rt  fr o m  E M E R C O M , the C en ter o f  S ocia l and  Psy­
c h o lo g ic a l  S u p p ort w as estab lish ed  in the to w n  o f  N o v o z y b k o v  in 
the B riansk  re g ion . T h is  cen ter receives assistance fr o m  the D e p a rt­
m en t o f  M e d ica l and  B io lo g ica l C o n seq u en ces  at the S erbsky Insti­
tute o f  F oren sic  and  P sych ia tric  E xpertise . U N E S C O  p ro v id e s  m eth ­
o d o lo g ic a l  and  fin an cia l su p p o rt  to  6 4  p ro je c ts  run  b y  three so c ia l 
a id  centers. O n e  cen ter is lo ca te d  in  the t o w n  o f  U zlov a ya  in  the T u ­
la re g io n  and  an oth er  is in  the to w n  o f  B o lk h o v  in  the O re l reg ion  
(p e o p le  liv in g  in  these areas have the right to  re loca te  at the sta te ’s 
exp en se ). O n e  m o re  cen ter is in  the v illage o f  N ik o lsk a y a  S lo b o d a  in 
the B riansk  re g io n  w h ere  the eva cu ated  residents w ere  re lo ca ted . In 
1 9 9 5  the C en ter o f  S ocia l and  P sy ch o lo g ica l R e h a b ilita tio n  fo r  the 
L iq u id a tors  w as o rg a n ized  in  M o s c o w . E M E R C O M ’s D ep a rtm en t 
fo r  the A lle v ia tio n  o f  R a d ia t io n  D isasters co o rd in a te s  activities ca r ­
ried  o u t  b y  all o f  the a b o v e  m en tio n e d  centers.
T h ese  centers p ro v id e  assistance in  the area o f  s o c ia l secu rity  fo r  
the com m u n ities  a ffected  b y  C h e rn o b y l disaster. T h e  cen ters ’ e m ­
p loy ees  p ro v id e  m ed ica l care  and  p sy c h o lo g ic a l assistance, o rga n ize
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c lu bs  and  ju rid ica l con su lta tio n s , and  share in fo rm a tio n  o n  e n v iro n ­
m en ta l sa fety  and h yg ien e . T h e y  a lso  m o n ito r  the so c ia l and  p s y c h o ­
lo g ica l status o f  the a ffe cted  com m u n ities  and  d e v e lo p  r e co m m e n d a ­
tion s  fo r  s o lv in g  the ex istin g  p ro b le m s . T h e y  in fo rm  the au thorities 
an d  the resp on s ib le  org a n iza tion s  a b o u t  the m o st  seriou s and  urgent 
issues co n ce rn in g  the co m m u n itie s , and  orga n ize  lectures and  sem i­
nars.
T h e  p os itiv e  im p a ct o f  this w o r k  (m a in ly  the m itig a tion  an d  p re ­
v e n tio n  o f  stress d isord ers) has b een  h ig h ly  a cc la im ed  at m a n y  n a ­
tion a l and  in tern ation a l co n feren ces . L ik ew ise , the p u b lic ’s u n d er­
stan d in g  and  sym p a th y  fo r  the liq u id a to rs ’ p ro b le m s  has in creased . 
T h e  p os itiv e  effects  o f  this s o c ia l and  p s y c h o lo g ic a l a id  can  n o t  be 
overestim a ted .
U n io n  C h e rn o b y l p rep a red  re co m m e n d a tio n s  and  assisted in  o r ­
ga n iz in g  specia l in fo rm a tio n  and  co u n se lin g  services fo r  the liq u id a ­
tors  (as a sp ec ific  g ro u p ) in  a c co rd a n ce  w ith  E M E R C O M . L ik ew ise , 
the liq u id a to rs ’ needs (in  term s o f  s o c ia l, m ed ica l and  lega l services) 
are registered . In a d d it io n  to  the ex istin g  centers m en tio n e d  a b o v e , a 
fe w  m o re  centers have b een  o rg a n ized  in  M o s c o w  (i.e. the C en ter 
fo r  the S ocia l and  P sy ch o lo g ica l R e h a b ilita tio n  o f  the L iq u id a to rs ), 
in  the U rals, and  in  sou th ern  R ussia  (M a rc h e n k o  and  M o z g o v a ia , 
1 9 9 6 ).
Lessons Learned
T h e  o n g o in g  creep in g  crisis fo r  the liq u id a tors  and  their fam ilies is 
far fr o m  reso lv ed . P erm anen t ch an ges are u n d erw a y  in  the m a n a g e ­
m en t o f  the n a tion a l s o c ia l secu rity  p o lic y  fo r  the v ictim s o f  C h er­
n o b y l. H o w e v e r , i f  the ch an ges  in  the in stitu tion a l and  lega l fra m e ­
w o r k  are actu a lly  so m e d a y  im p lem en ted  then  there is h o p e  that the 
G o v e rn m e n t w ill deal w ith  the crisis m o re  effectively . G iven  the 
lo n g -te rm  con se q u e n ce s  o f  the C h e rn o b y l disaster, a n u m ber o f  a c ­
tion s  w o u ld  be  b en e fic ia l n o w  an d  in the fo reseea b le  fu ture. T h ese  
re co m m e n d a tio n s  are:
• O ff ic ia l  r e co g n it io n  that m a n y  liq u id a tors  w ere  m o b iliz e d  
fo r  the rescue w o r k  in  C h e rn o b y l via co n s cr ip t io n  and  c o n ­
sequently , the state is resp on s ib le  fo r  p ro v id in g  these in d iv id ­
uals and  their fam ilies w ith  the necessary  a id  and  so c ia l secu ­
rity.
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• Im p rov em en t o f  the ex istin g  leg is la tion  w ith  p articu lar at­
ten tion  g iven  to  the real needs o f  the liq u id a tors  and  their 
fam ilies.
• Sh ifting the fo cu s  o f  the so c ia l secu rity  p o lic y  fr o m  the in d i­
v idu a l liq u id a to r  to  in clu d e  his (her) fa m ily  as a w h o le .
• In creased  c o o r d in a t io n  betw een  va riou s  agencies and  o rg a n i­
za tion s  in v o lv e d  in  e n fo rc in g  the C h e rn o b y l Law . C o n s id e ra ­
t io n  sh ou ld  a lso  be g iven  to  o rg a n iz in g  a specia l state b o d y  
to  oversee  the p ro b le m s  in  the n a tion a l so c ia l secu rity  p o lic y  
fo r  the C h e rn o b y l v ictim s.
• C o m b in in g  the ‘ to ta l assistan ce ’ a p p ro a ch  w ith  in d iv id u a l 
h elp  fo r  the in d iv id u a l liq u id a tors  and  their fam ilies (i.e. r e c ­
og n iz in g  the C h e rn o b y l rescue w o rk e rs  as a sp ec ific  g ro u p ).
• B u ild in g  up  in fo rm a tio n  ch an n els  fo r  e x ch a n g in g  reliab le  in ­
fo rm a tio n  and  op era tive  details betw een  the crisis m a n a g e ­
m en t a ctors  in v o lv e d  in  the issue o f  so c ia l secu rity  fo r  the 
liq u id a tors .
• B ring ing togeth er the e fforts  o f  the state agencies and  the 
N G O s  (active  in  the n a tion a l so c ia l secu rity  p o licy )  in  ord er  
to  try  to  rep a y  the n a t io n ’s d eb t to  the C h e rn o b y l rescue 
w o rk e rs  in  exch a n g e  fo r  their serv ice to  the state.
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Crisis Management of the 
Ecological Disaster in the T o w n  of 
Karabash
A lla  M o zg o vata
Introduction
T h is  ch ap ter  con s id ers  b o th  the gen era l an d  sp ec ific  ch aracteristics  
o f  R u ssian  crisis m a n ag em en t in  d ea lin g  w ith  the c o n flic t  betw een  
en v iron m en ta l issues an d  the e co n o m y . T h ere  is a c o n flic t  betw een  
p u b lic  c o re  values (such  as the right to  health  an d  w e ll-b e in g  as stip ­
u la ted  in  the C o n stitu tio n  o f  R u ssia ) o n  the on e  h a n d , an d  p u b lic  
a n d  p rivate  business interests (e m p lo y m e n t and  p ro fits ) o n  the oth er 
h an d . Such  co n flic ts  ex ist in  R u ssia  largely  in  sm all an d  m ed iu m  
m o n o -in d u str ia l to w n s . T h e  e c o n o m y  an d  the entire surviva l o f  
these to w n s  is co m p le te ly  d ep en d en t u p o n  just on e  o r  tw o  c o m p a ­
nies (usu ally  h eavy  industries o r  m in in g  p lan ts). C lo s in g  d o w n  these 
co m p a n ie s  w o u ld  tu rn  these to w n s  in to  g h o st  to w n s .
Brief Outline of the Crisis Situation
In the early  1 9 9 0 s , the t o w n  o f  K arabash  (a sm all m o n o -in d u str ia l 
settlem ent in  the U rals re g io n  o f  R u ssia ) en d ed  up  in su ch  a d ilem ­
m a. T h e  o n g o in g  o p e ra tio n s  at the t o w n ’s h a za rd ou s  facilities have 
h a d  adverse e ffects  o n  the en v iron m en t an d  h u m an  health  (esp ecia l­
ly  that o f  the t o w n ’s ch ild ren ).
T h e re fo re  the t o w n ’s en v iron m en ta l activists have d em a n d ed  
that the lo ca l au thorities take urgen t m easures to  p ro te c t  p u b lic  
health  an d  the en v iron m en t b y  s to p p in g  the h a za rd ou s  p r o d u c t io n . 
S u p p orted  b y  a p art o f  the lo ca l co m m u n ity , the en v iron m en ta lists  
have su ccessfu lly  pressu red  the lo ca l an d  reg ion a l ad m in istra tion s  
in to  su sp en d in g  som e  o f  the w o r k  at the h a za rd ou s  insta lla tion s (in ­
c lu d in g  a large m eta llu rg ica l c o m p le x ).
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A s a resu lt, so m e  o f  the e m p loy ees  have lo s t  their jo b s  an d  they 
have n o  o th er  real jo b  o p p ortu n itie s . In turn , this has a rou sed  d is­
co n te n t and  protests  fr o m  the n e w ly  u n e m p lo y e d  and  their fam ilies. 
P eop le  interested  in  k eep in g  the m eta llu rg ica l c o m p le x  in  o p e ra t io n , 
bu t u n d er n e w  o w n e rsh ip , used  this s itu ation  fo r  their o w n  ben efit 
and  b o u g h t  up  the d ep recia ted  c o m p a n y  shares p re v io u s ly  held  b y  
the e m p loy ees . In fo l lo w in g  the 1 9 9 5  E n v iron m en ta l E xpertise  A ct  
and  the re co m m e n d a tio n s  p u t fo r th  b y  a fed era l exp ert task c o m ­
m iss ion , the K arabash  m u n ic ip a l ad m in istra tion  p rep a red  a rep ort 
fo r  o f fic ia lly  d ecla rin g  the to w n  an e c o lo g ic a l  d isaster zo n e . In c o m ­
p lia n ce  w ith  the 1 9 9 1  E n v iron m en ta l P ro te ct io n  A ct , fin a n cia l assis­
tan ce  and  oth er  m easures sh ou ld  fo l lo w  su ch  a d ecla ra tion .
Definition of a Crisis
T h e  vast b o d y  o f  crisis m an agem en t literature reveals a variety  o f  
crisis d e fin ition s . It a lso  in d icates  that the very  n o t io n  o f  a crisis is 
con sta n tly  b e in g  d iscu ssed  as n e w  k in ds o f  crises em erge . N e v e rth e ­
less, m o st  specia lists in  the fie ld  agree u p o n  a n u m b er o f  bas ic  cr ite ­
ria co n ce rn in g  the c o n c e p t  o f  a crisis. T h ese  in clu d e  uncertainty , a 
threat to  a c o r e  va lue (w h ich  is d iscu ssed  to  a large exten t in  this 
ch apter) and  lim ited  tim e.
T h e  crisis d e fin itio n  suggested  b y  the S w edish  sch o lars  fr o m  
C R iS M A R T  is la rge ly  fo cu se d  o n  m an agem en t issues an d  thus is re­
stricted  to  the p e rcep tion s  w h ich  m anagers and  d ecis ion -m a k ers  
h ave o f  a crisis s itu ation . T h is  d e fin itio n  o f  a crisis “ in clu d es  cen tra l 
d ecis ion -m a k ers  p erce iv in g  the s itu ation  as en ta ilin g  that c o re  values 
are threatened . L im ited  tim e fo r  d e c is io n -m a k in g  and  resp on se  is 
ava ilab le  and  the c ircu m stan ces  in v o lv e  a h igh  level o f  u n ce rta in ty ”  
(H art, Stern and  S undelius, 1 9 9 8 ; Stern, 1 9 9 9 : 8 ; S vedin , fo r t h c o m ­
ing).
In m y  o p in io n  a c o u p le  o f  im p o rta n t features are m issing  here 
w h ich  I fee l sh o u ld  b e  a d d ed  to  the a b o v e m e n tio n e d  d e fin ition . I d e ­
fin e  a crisis as a s itu a tion  e m b e d d e d  w ith  threats to  a c o m m u n ity ’s 
c o r e  values and  surviva l. T h ese  threats result fr o m  the la ck  o f  e ffi­
c ien t m an agem en t to o ls  and  m eans fo r  m itigatin g  o r  p reven tin g  an 
a cc id en ta l b rea ch  in  the so c ia l and  org a n iza tio n a l o rd e r  at the lo ca l, 
n a tion a l, in tern ation a l o r  o rg a n iza tio n a l level.
2 0  6
C hapter 6 C ris is  M anagem ent o f the E co logical D isaster in the Tow n of K arab ash
T h is  co n ce p tu a liza t io n  deviates fr o m  the crisis m a n a g ers ’ p e r ­
c e p tio n  o f  a crisis. In m an y  cases, h ow ever , the s itu a tion  m a y  be 
p erce iv ed  as a crisis b y  the general p u b lic  b u t n o t  b y  the d ec is io n  
m akers a n d /o r  the crisis m anager. T h is  is som eth in g  w h ich  is qu ite  
typ ica l n o w  in  R u ssia . It is im p o rta n t in  crisis m an ag em en t research  
that the q u estion  “ A  crisis fo r  w h o m ? ”  is ra ised .
A Crisis for Whom?
T h e  s itu ation  in  K arabash  sh ou ld  be  regard ed  as a crisis fo r  a n u m ­
ber o f  reason s. First, u n regu la ted  an d  u n co n tro lle d  p riv a tiza tion  o f  
the k ey  p lants, w h ich  w ere  the b a c k b o n e  o f  the t o w n ’s e c o n o m y  and 
co m m u n ity  w e ll-b e in g , c o n s id e ra b ly  aggravated  the p ro b le m s . T h is  
threatened  the very  ex isten ce  o f  the to w n  as a com m u n ity . H o w e v e r , 
this d id  n o t  (and  still d oes  n ot) w o rr y  m a n y  o f  the n e w  sh areh old ers  
o f  the p riva tized  m eta llu rg ica l c o m p le x  s ince the n e w  o w n ers  are 
n o t  residents o f  the to w n .
M e a n w h ile , the lives o f  the to w n  residents have literally  been  
p u t o n  the line ; their sheer ex isten ce  has b een  severely  je o p a rd ize d . 
In a d d it io n , the in creasin g  en v iron m en ta l d e ter io ra tion  hurts the 
spiritual a n d  m o ra l valu es  o f  the co n te m p o ra ry  an d  fu ture gen era ­
tion s  b y  a ctu a lly  d estroy in g  their n e ig h b o r h o o d s  and  fo r c in g  them  
to  m o v e  fr o m  fa m ily  p ro p e r ty  in  search  fo r  a better life  fo r  th em ­
selves an d  fo r  their ch ild ren . U n e m p lo y m e n t and  an acute  sh orta ge  
o f  fu n d in g  fo r  the to w n  in frastru ctu re  sh o u ld  be  a d d ed  to  the o v e r ­
all g rim  p ictu re .
F u rth erm ore , the m u n ic ip a l and  reg ion a l ad m in istra tion s  are 
c o n fro n te d  w ith  h ard  p ro b le m s  su ch  as civ il d isorder, m ass d istur­
b a n ces , and  p rotests . T h e  en v iron m en ta l activists are su p p orted  b y  
the m ass m edia  n o t  o n ly  at the lo ca l level bu t a lso  at the reg ion a l 
an d  federa l levels. G iven  this, the lo ca l and  reg ion a l au thorities 
c o u ld  be  co n s id e re d  crisis v ictim s desp ite  the fa ct  that they bear the 
b u lk  o f  resp on s ib ility  fo r  the esca latin g  crisis. A t  the sam e tim e, 
these ad m in istra tion s  h ave  to  deal w ith  the crisis. It is im p o rta n t to  
rem em b er that crises are d ifficu lt  to  h an d le  even  w h en  standard  
rou tin e  adm in istrative  p ro ce d u re s  ex ist; crises d em a n d  sp ec ific  crisis 
m a n ag em en t to o ls .
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Background
T h e  t o w n  o f  K arabash  is lo ca te d  in  the eastern  fo o th ills  o f  the 
S ou th ern  U rals an d  in  the w atersh ed  o f  the A tk u s an d  Sak-E lga 
R ivers  w h ich  d ra in  in to  the M ia ss  R iver. T h is  re g io n  is the o ld est 
m in in g  ore  re g io n  in  the U rals d a tin g  b a ck  to  the first h a lf o f  the 
1 8 th century. T h e  settlem ent b eg a n  to  g r o w  ra p id ly  after r ich  g o ld -  
bearin g  d ep osits  w ere  d isco v e re d  in S ak-E lga R iv er  V a lley  in  the 
1 8 2 0 s . T h e  first c o p p e r  ore  d ep osits  w ere  d isco v e re d  thereafter and  
this gave b irth  to  a sm all c o p p e r  sm elting  p lan t in  the area. B y the 
b eg in n in g  o f  the 2 0 th cen tu ry  K arabash  h ad  tu rn ed  in to  a large in ­
dustrial cen ter an d  a b ig  c o p p e r  sm elter w as  bu ilt in  1 9 1 0 . T h is  
p lan t p r o d u ce d  a lm ost a th ird  o f  the to ta l c o p p e r  sm elted  in  R u ssia  
at the tim e. S ubsequen t te ch n o lo g ica l ch an ges at the p lan t en ab led  
the p r o d u c t io n  o f  z in c con cen tra tes  fr o m  c o p p e r  an d  zin c ores.
In the early  1 9 3 0 s  three m ines w ere  op era tin g  in  K arabash  w ith  
the to ta l o re  s to ck  a m ou n tin g  to  3 ,5 0 5  th o u sa n d  ton s , o f  w h ich  
8 4 ,5 0 0  ton s  w ere  c o p p e r  ore . In 1 9 1 3  the p r o d u c t io n  o f  c o p p e r  ore  
w as  3 4 3 ,0 0 0  ton s . In a d d it io n , 1 9 ,5 0 0  ton s  o f  su lfu r pyrites and  
9 ,3 0 0  ton s  o f  iro n  o re  w ere  ex tra cted  b y  a lm ost 1 ,8 0 0  m iners. T h e  
c o p p e r  p r o d u c t io n  o u tp u t a m o u n te d  to  6 ,5 0 0  ton s  (M a la ia  S ov iet- 
skaia E n ts ik lop ed ia , 1 9 3 1 : 7 0 7 ).
F or tw o  d ecad es  K arabash  w as  a large cen ter fo r  o re  m in in g  and  
n o n -fe rro u s  m eta llu rgy  industries. A  huge c o p p e r  sm elter rep la ced  
the on e  co n stru cte d  earlier in  the cen tu ry  an d  a p lan t b eg a n  p r o d u c ­
ing  c o p p e r  con cen tra tes . T h ere  w ere  three se co n d a ry  s ch o o ls , on e  
seven -year s c h o o l, a m in in g  an d  m eta llu rg ica l v o c a t io n a l s c h o o l , a 
s c h o o l  fo r  on -site  e d u ca tio n  an d  tra in in g  at the p lan t, an d  th irteen  
libraries (B olsh a ia  S ovietska ia  E n ts ik lop ed ia , 1 9 5 1 : 9 2 ) . A fte r  m ore  
than  three d eca d es , the o u tp u t ca p a c ity  ra p id ly  in creased  at the e x ­
tractin g  and  p ro ce ss in g  facilities w h ich  p r o d u ce d  blister cop p er , 
h igh  qu a lity  c o p p e r  an d  z in c con cen tra tes .
A s a resu lt, b y  the m id  1 9 9 0 s  the t o w n  o f  K arabash  h ad  d ev e l­
o p e d  in to  a p rim a rily  m in in g  and  m eta llu rg ica l area w ith  over  
1 6 ,1 0 0  residents. T h e  re g io n  w as  filled  w ith  industria l p lants, 
p ro ce sse d  o re  r o c k  an d  slag d u m p s (ta ilings), w a stew a ter  reservoirs , 
and  tra n sp o rta tio n  an d  p o w e r  units. T h ere  w ere  d o zen s  o f  o n e -s to ry  
residentia l h ou ses an d  a fe w  fiv e -s to ry  bu ild in gs  in  the n orth w est.
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Environmental and Public Health Problems
By the late 1 9 8 0 s  the ev id en ce  o f  years o f  h a za rd ou s  m ateria l d is­
ch arge  (con ta in in g  sulfur, cop p er , z in c, silver, g o ld , ca d m iu m , ar­
sen ic an d  m ercu ry ) fr o m  the K arabash  c o p p e r  sm elter began  to  sur­
fa ce . In 1 9 8 9  the a ir -p o llu tin g  p r o d u c t io n  o f  c o p p e r  con cen tra tes  
w as  s to p p e d . H o w e v e r , this d id  n o t  help  to  im p ro v e  the e n v iro n ­
m en ta l qu a lity  g iven  the fa ct  that the p r o d u c t io n  o f  c o p p e r  m etal 
c o n tin u e d  w ith  intensive d u m p in g , w h ich  heav ily  co n ta m in a te d  the 
so il o f  the Sak-E lga R iv er  w atersh ed . T h e  tailings p o n d  o f  c o p p e r  
pyrites c o v e re d  nearly  15 hectares w ith  h eavy  m etals (su ch  as iron , 
co p p er , an d  z in c) w h ich  w a sh ed  in to  the rivers.
U p  until 1 9 8 9 , m eta llu rg ica l p lants w ere  p ro ce ss in g  m o re  than 
18 types o f  lo w  qu a lity  c o p p e r  ores , w h ich  d id  n o t  even  m eet the re ­
qu irem en ts o f  the ex istin g  sm elting  regu la tion s. H a za rd o u s  m ateri­
als w ere  d isch a rg ed  fro m  the sm elter fu rn aces in to  the air. A lth o u g h  
the p r o d u c t io n  o f  blister c o p p e r  w as  s to p p e d  in  1 9 8 9 , as early  as 
the n ex t year a reverb era tion  fu rn ace  w as  pu t in to  o p e ra t io n  and  
en v iron m en ta l p o llu t io n  co n tin u e d . D esp ite  the fa ct  that the exh aust 
ch im n ey  w as 1 2 7  m  h igh , the su rrou n d in g  area (ro u g h ly  a 5 - 6  km  
rad ius) w as  a ffected . M o r e  sp ec ific  data  o n  en v iron m en ta l d e te r io ­
ra tio n  in d icates  that the c o p p e r  c o m p le x  w as  p ro ce ss in g  th ou san d s  
o f  h a za rd ou s  substances; p r im a rily  su lfur b y -p ro d u cts  w h ich  w ere  
d isch a rg ed  in to  the air. T h e  level o f  air p o llu t io n  cau sed  by  su lfur 
d io x id e  an d  lead  (m easu red  in b o th  average annual and  d a ily  c o n ­
cen tra tion s  o v e r  the past three d ecad es) c o n fo r m  to  the R u ssian  
g o v e rn m e n t ’s criteria  fo r  d ecla rin g  an area an e c o lo g ic a l disaster.
T h ese  ch em ica ls  have con ta m in a te d  the fo rest  so il and  thus the 
natural re fo re s ta tio n  p rocess  has been  h in d ered . B eautifu l b irch  and  
p in e  forests , w h ich  fo rm e r ly  w ere  c o m m o n  in the area, have been  
d estroyed . D e g ra d a tio n  o f  the v eg e ta tion  w as  very  intensive du rin g  
the 1 9 5 0 s , 1 9 6 0 s  an d  1 9 7 0 s . M o u n ta in s  s lop es  w ere  strip p ed  and  
the m o u n ta in  veg e ta tion  has rece d e d  several k ilom eters  fr o m  the 
to w n . O n ly  a fe w  sm all islands o f  veg e ta tion  can  be fo u n d  in  the 
residentia l areas w h ere  the t o w n  d w ellers  g r o w  vegetab les  an d  fru its 
w h ich  are co n ta m in a te d  w ith  arsen ic, m ercu ry  and  lead .
T h e  level o f  c o n ta m in a tio n  in  the su rface  w ater cau sed  b y  c o p ­
per, z in c and  iro n  exceed s  the m a x im u m  p erm issib le  con ce n tra tio n s  
in  degrees o f  m a gn itu d e . F or  instance, the aggregate  co n ta m in a tio n  
in d e x  o f  co p p er , z in c , iron , and  p h e n o l (w ell k n o w n  fo r  be in g  an e x ­
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trem ely  d a n g erou s  ch em ica l) exceed s  the m a x im u m  perm issib le  lim ­
it b y  1 ,0 1 8  fo ld ! B y an y  ex isting  criteria , this co m p lie s  w ith  the n o ­
t io n  o f  an e c o lo g ic a l d isaster (Z a k lu ch e n iy e , 1 9 9 6 ).
T h e  d e p lo ra b le  state o f  the en v iron m en t has co n s id e ra b ly  im ­
p a cted  the health  o f  the lo ca l p e o p le , esp ecia lly  that o f  the ch ildren . 
T h e  pren ata l in fan t m o rta lity  rate in  K arabash  is m u ch  h igher than  
that in  the re feren ce  g rou p s  (the so -ca lle d  ‘ c lean  co m m u n it ie s ’ ); in ­
fan t m o rb id ity  is 1 .5 -2  tim es h igh er in  K arabash . D isord ers  d e b ili­
tating the n ervou s  system , u p p er  resp ira tory  tract, osseou s  m uscular, 
the d igestive  system , the im m u n ity  system , the skin , and  b lo o d  c ir ­
cu la tio n  are p reva ilin g  and  w id esp rea d . N o t  surprisingly , the state 
o f  p h ysica l d e v e lo p m e n t o f  the lo ca l p e o p le  is 5 - 8  tim es w o rse  than  
o f  th ose  in  the re feren ce  grou p s .
The Crisis from the Outside
T h e  o n ce  p ictu resq u e  lakes and  m ou n ta in s  co v e re d  w ith  b irch  
forests  su rrou n d in g  the t o w n  o f  K arabash  lo o k e d  m u ch  d ifferen t in  
the m id  to  late 1 9 9 0 s . T h e  m ou n ta in s  had  b een  stripped  m in ed , and  
the v eg eta tion  w as in  a sad state. T h e  lo ca l residents ju stifia b ly  d e ­
scr ibed  it as “ m o o n  la n d s ca p e .”
O n e -s to ry  ram sh ack le  w o o d e n  h ou ses  w ith o u t an y  m o d e rn  fa ­
cilities are typ ica l in  the so -ca lle d  private  h o u s in g  sector ; fa m ily - 
o w n e d  h om es  are lo ca te d  in the o ld  p art o f  to w n . T h ere  are a fe w  
relatively  n e w  b lo c k s  o f  tw o -s to ry , th ree -story  an d  fiv e -s to ry  b u ild ­
ings. L ik ew ise , there are tw o -s to r y  barrack s  la ck in g  ad equ a te  fa c ili­
ties, w h ich  a c c o m m o d a te  m a n y  fam ilies. T h e  streets are n o t  ligh ted . 
M u n ic ip a l buses are in  sh orta ge  and  bus tra ffic  is irregular. S hops 
are em p ty  and  the fe w  co m m o d it ie s  ava ilab le  are m u ch  m o re  e x p e n ­
sive than  th ose  in  the reg ion a l cen ter o f  C h e liab in sk  (a c ity  w ith  
m o re  than  o n e  m illio n  residents).
A m o n g  the 1 6 ,0 0 0  K arabash  d w ellers , the e ld erly  and  the very  
y o u n g  d o m in a te  in  sheer n u m bers w ith  just a sm all p ercen ta ge  o f  
m id d le -a g ed  p e o p le . P rev iou sly  the t o w n ’s p o p u la t io n  h ad  been  re­
p len ish ed  b y  p o lit ica l p rison ers  sent to  exile . M o s t  o f  the m ale p o p ­
u la tion  d oes  n o t  w o rk , and  m a n y  p e o p le  are s tron g ly  a d d icted  to  a l­
c o h o l .  C h ild ren  are sluggish , and  have pa le  faces w ith  dark  circles 
u n d er their eyes. U nsurprisingly , m a n y  o f  th em  attend  a specia l 
s ch o o l fo r  m en ta lly  retarded  ch ild ren . E very oth er  to w n  d w eller  su f­
2 1 0
C hapter 6 C ris is  M anagem ent o f the E co logical D isaster in the Tow n of K arab ash
fers fr o m  so m e  sort o f  a llergy  and m a n y  have p ro b le m s  w ith  their 
resp ira tory  organ s and  liver. M a n y  relatively  y o u n g  and  elderly  p e o ­
p le  are too th less . T h e  m orta lity  rate a m o n g  b o th  adults and  ch ild ren  
is very  h igh .
M a n y  o f  the to w n  d w ellers  (in c lu d in g  very sm all ch ild ren  and 
o ld  w o m e n ) ca n  be  seen bu sy  d igg in g  o u t  c o p p e r  fr o m  the heaps o f  
w aste  fr o m  the c o p p e r  sm elter. T h e  ex tra cted  m etal is so ld  in  an at­
tem p t to  m ak e  a fa m ily  liv in g . W h e n  the g ro u n d  b e co m e s  to ta lly  
fro z e n , these sam e p e o p le  cu t the te lep h on e  cab les  in  o rd e r  to  e x ­
tract the cop p er . F or this rea son , several o f  the lo c a l te lep h on e  lines 
are n o t  in  w o rk in g  order.
T h e  industria l enterprises have h is torica lly  been  the b a c k b o n e  o f  
the to w n  and  have p ro v id e d  the lo c a l residents w ith  e m p loy m en t. 
T h e  industria l c o o p e r  c o m p le x  has been  reorg a n ized  in to  a jo in t  
s to ck  co m p a n y . F orm ally , all o p e ra tio n s  are su sp en d ed . M e a n w h ile  
in  p ra ctice , a n e tw o rk  o f  co o p e ra tiv e s , sm all businesses, m in i-jo in t  
s to ck  co m p a n ie s  (all u n d er the c a n o p y  o f  the id le  m eta llu rg ica l c o m ­
p lex ) have co n tin u e d  p r o d u c t io n  bu t o n  a sm aller scale. T h e  p lant 
m a n ag em en t has tried  to  re-estab lish  fu ll p r o d u c t io n  bu t w ith o u t 
m u ch  lu ck .
O n e  m o re  cu r iou s  fa ct  a b o u t  the m eta llu rg ica l c o m p le x  is that 
the p lan t, w h ich  is n o  lo n g e r  in  fu n ct io n , has had  its shares in  b ig  
d em a n d  o n  the s to ck  ex ch a n g e . T h e  p lan t m an agem en t su cceed ed  in 
raising su p p o rt  fr o m  part o f  the lo c a l co m m u n ity  and  the to w n  and 
reg ion a l ad m in istra tion s  fo r  p u ttin g  the c o m p a n y ’s shares o n  the 
s to ck  m ark et, w h ile  oth ers w ere  s tron g ly  o p p o s e d  to  this. Such  ten ­
s ion  is easy to  u n d erstan d  given  the fa ct that p e o p le  felt they p er­
son a lly  h ad  co n flic t in g  interests. F or  e x a m p le , in creased  p r o d u c t io n  
w o u ld  m ean  m o re  jo b s  and  better jo b  security, yet p erh aps m o re  
p ro b le m s  fo r  the en v iron m en t and  h u m an  health ; a to ta l o r  partia l 
c lo su re  w o u ld  m ean  in creased  u n e m p lo y m e n t bu t p erh aps in creased  
h o p e  fo r  the en v iron m en t.
T h e  to w n  a d m in istra tion  has been  fa ir ly  a m b ig u o u s  to  all o f  
these issues. A  p ro g ra m  fo r  p lan t re n o v a tio n  w as d e v e lo p e d  in  1 9 8 7  
w h ich  in c lu d ed  the in tro d u c tio n  o f  safer m o d e rn  p r o d u c t io n  te ch ­
n o lo g y  an d  a m o re  e ffic ien t treatm en t system . H o w e v e r , an e c o n o m ­
ic survey later p ro v e d  that it w as im p o ss ib le  to  install n e w  e q u ip ­
m en t becau se  o f  a sh orta ge  o f  fu n ds and  tim e, and even tu a lly  the l o ­
ca l a d m in istra tion  just gave up.
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M u c h  the sam e seem s to  be  h a p p en in g  to  the n e w  em p lo y m e n t 
p ro g ra m , w h ich  has created  2 ,0 0 0  n e w  jo b s  thanks to  the n e w  p r o ­
d u ct io n  lines in tro d u ce d  at a ra d io  fa ctory . A c c o r d in g  to  the lo ca l 
a d m in istra tion , this sh o u ld  help  c o p e  w ith  the u n e m p lo y m e n t p r o b ­
lem  w ith o u t  h av in g  to  re -la u n ch  the o p era tion s  at the m eta llu rg ica l 
c o m p le x  an d  the oth er h a za rd ou s  facilities in  K arabash . A p p aren tly , 
this in creased  the ten s ion  b e tw een  part o f  the lo ca l ad m in istra tion  
(w h o  su p p o rte d  the n e w  e m p lo y m e n t p ro g ra m ) and  the p lan t m a n ­
agem en t and  their lob b y is ts . T h e  latter g ro u p  argu ed  that “ o n e  ca n ­
n o t  d o  an yth in g  w ith o u t  the p la n t” ; a m en ta lity  la rge ly  in gra in ed  in 
the m in d s o f  the lo c a l com m u n ity . Y et o n  the oth er h a n d , m ost o f  
the to w n sp e o p le  and  m an y  o f  the lo c a l au th orities  w ere  co n v in ce d  
that som eth in g  h ad  to  be  ch an ged .
The Crisis from the Inside
A  s o c io lo g ic a l  su rvey  co n d u c te d  in  1 9 9 9  p ro v id e d  data o n  b o th  the 
actua l and  the p erce iv ed  s o c io -e c o n o m ic  s itu a tion  in  K arabash  in ­
c lu d in g  health  and  w e ll-b e in g , so c ia l security , stan dard  o f  liv in g , m i­
g ra tion , w o rk in g  co n d it io n s , and fa m ily  life . T h ese  issues w ere c o n ­
sidered  w ith in  the sp ec ific  c o n te x t  o f  the re sp o n d e n ts ’ e c o lo g ic a l 
v iew s and  attitudes. T h e  su rvey  in v o lv e d  a ra n d o m  and  n o n -re cu r ­
rent p o ll  o f  the lo c a l p u b lic  o p in io n . T h e  resp on d en ts  w ere  ch o se n  
fr o m  the list o f  registered  voters  and  b y  fo l lo w in g  certa in  p rin cip les  
in  o rd e r  to  ensure a ra n d o m  se lection . T h ere  w ere  3 0 2  resp on d en ts . 
T h e  a ccu ra cy  error  d id  n o t  e x ce e d  5 %  w ith  the p ro b a b ility  level at
0 .9 5  and  d isp ers ion  at 0 .2 5 . T h u s, the analysis in c lu d ed  a rep resen ­
tative sam ple  w ith  an a ccep ta b le  level o f  reliability.
T h e  survey revea led  that the p u b lic  (in d iv id u a lly  and  as a w h o le ) 
has ex p er ien ced  sign ifican t a m o u n t o f  en v iron m en ta l stress and  a 
n u m b er o f  seriou s p ro b le m s  in  a lm ost every  sphere o f  life . T h ere  is a 
clear c o n flic t  b e tw een  en v iron m en ta l and  e c o n o m ic  interests. T h e  
lo ca l residents be lieve  that o n ce  this c o n flic t  is reso lv ed , all o f  the 
o th er  p ro b le m s  w o u ld  m o re  o r  less disappear.
T h e  m a jo r ity  o f  resp on d en ts  co n s id e re d  their health  to  be  p o o r ;  
m o re  than  a h a lf o f  them  su ffer fr o m  so m e  ch ro n ic  disease. T h ese  
c h ro n ic  diseases ca n  be d irectly  lin k ed  to  the p o o r  en v iron m en ta l 
c o n d it io n s  in  K arabash . O fte n  the organ s  are a ffected  and  m an y  
su ffer fr o m  n e u ro lo g ica l and  ca rd io v a scu la r  d isord ers. T h e  re sp o n ­
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dents w ith  y o u n g  ch ild ren  n o te d  a h igh  in c id en ce  o f  certa in  diseases, 
in c lu d in g  la ryn x  d isord ers  and  allergies. M o r e  than  7 0 %  o f  the re­
sp on d en ts  said  their state o f  health  in  the past tw o  o r  three years 
h ad  sign ifican tly  w o rse n e d  citin g  e levated  b lo o d  pressure, jo in t  
p a in s , ca rd iov a scu la r  d isord ers  and  a d e ter io ra tion  o f  their genera l 
p h ys ica l w e ll-b e in g . In so m e  g ro u p s  this n u m ber w as as h igh  as 
9 0 %  o f  the resp on d en ts .
M o s t  o f  th em  d irectly  attribute their p o o r  p h ysica l c o n d it io n  to  
the d isastrou s state o f  the lo ca l en v iron m en t. N e a r ly  8 0 %  o f  the re­
sp on d en ts  m e n tio n e d  a s ign ifican t decrease in  the lo ca l e n v iro n m e n ­
tal co n d it io n s  o v er  the past d eca d e . T h e y  b la m ed  this o n  the in d u s­
trial c o m p le x , the t o w n ’s a d m in istra tion  and  the to w n  residents. 
T h e  b u lk  o f  resp on d en ts  a lso  b la m ed  the p lants lo ca te d  in  the v ic in i­
ty  o f  their h ou ses. T h e  c o p p e r  sm elter (fro m  7 0 %  to  9 0 %  o f  the re­
sp o n d e n ts ), the asphalt p r o d u c t io n  fa c ility  and the a fo re m e n tio n e d  
restricted  zon es  a rou n d  the to w n  (w h ich  are d isch a rg in g  h eavy  m et­
als in to  the air) w ere  a lso  m e n tio n e d . G iven  this, it is n o t  surprising 
that 5 0 %  to  8 0 %  o f  the p e o p le  in  the va riou s  resp o n d e n t g rou p s  
said  that th ey  w ere  rea d y  to  p ro test  any  further e c o lo g ic a l d e ter io ra ­
tion .
In a d d it io n , every  re sp on d en t g ro u p  m e n tio n e d  so m e  degree o f  
d issa tis fa ction  w ith  the ex istin g  state o f  the en v iron m en t and  the e x ­
isting level o f  so c ia l secu rity  co n s id e r in g  their e x p o su re  to  h arm fu l 
e c o lo g ic a l c o n d it io n s . T h e  resp o n d e n t g rou p s  exp ressin g  the h ighest 
level o f  c o n ce rn  w ere  th ose  w h o  h ad  least a h igh  s c h o o l  e d u ca tio n  
cu rren tly  liv in g  in  the area w ith  y o u n g  ch ild ren . U p  to  2 0 %  o f  the 
resp on d en ts  re p o rte d  that th ey  d id  n o t  have s tron g  m arita l ties and 
1 7 %  attribu ted  this to  their sp o u se s ’ health  p ro b le m s  cau sed  b y  the 
p o o r  e c o lo g ic a l co n d it io n s  in  K arabash . T h e  su rvey  revea led  that 
m a n y  o f  the residents w h o  are o f  w o rk in g  age a n d /o r  in  their ch ild ­
bearin g  years in ten d  to  m o v e  fr o m  the K arabash  area.
T o  sum  u p , the su rvey  fin d in gs  su p p o rt  the p rev iou s  cla im s that 
the co m m u n ity  o f  K arabash  is liv in g  in an e c o lo g ic a l d isaster z o n e . 
T h is  resu lted  fro m  years o f  irresp on s ib le  en v iron m en ta l m a n a g e ­
m en t o n  b e h a lf o f  the lo ca l industries and  an im m o ra l e c o lo g ic a l 
p o l ic y  carried  o u t  b y  the lo ca l and  reg ion a l au thorities . H o w e v e r , it 
w o u ld  be  naive to  th in k  that K arabash  is u n iq u e  in  this regard . E x ­
tensive studies o n  the en v iron m en ta l p o lic ie s  carried  o u t  b y  the f o r ­
m er S oviet U n io n  and  co n te m p o ra ry  R ussia  a lso  h igh ligh t serious
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e c o lo g ic a l p ro b le m s . First o f  all, a co m p re h e n siv e  en v iron m en ta l 
p o lic y  w as  la ck in g  in  the S ov iet U n ion . T h e n  after o n e  w as  crea ted , 
it w as terrib ly  in e ffective  (see P orfiriev , fo r th c o m in g ). In the b ro a d e r  
p ersp ective , the K arabash  crisis serves as a g o o d  e x a m p le  o f  h o w  
tran sition a l societies  o fte n  d isregard  the sm aller c o m m u n it ie s ’ en v i­
ron m en ta l co n ce rn s  w h e n  sh ak y p o lit ica l, so c ia l and  e c o n o m ic  c o n ­
d ition s  exist. N o n -tra d it io n a l m eans and  m eth od s  need  to  be  im p le ­
m en ted  in o rd e r  to  c o p e  w ith  the e c o lo g ic a l crisis in K arabash .
Efforts to Cope with the Crisis
In co m p lia n ce  w ith  the 1 9 9 5  E n v iron m en ta l E xpertise  A c t  o f  the 
R u ssian  F ed era tion  (Z a k o n , 1 9 9 5 ) , the K arabash  and  reg ion a l a d ­
m in istra tion s p rep a red  a re p o rt  w ith  a n u m b er o f  a p p en d ixes  and  
su bm itted  these d ocu m e n ts  to  the federa l g o v ern m en t in  1 9 9 6 . T h e  
E n v iron m en ta l E xpertise  C o m m is s io n  (hereafter referred  to  as s im ­
p ly  the C o m m iss io n ) w as  e x p ected  to  ana lyze the su bm itted  m ateri­
al and  p r o p o s e  re co m m e n d a tio n s  to  the G o v e rn m e n t and  to  the 
P resident o f  R u ssia . T h ese  re co m m e n d a tio n s  strengthened  the a rgu ­
m en t o f  d ecla r in g  p art o f  K arabash  as an e c o lo g ic a l d isaster area 
and  d ecla rin g  the oth er  p art as an e c o lo g ic a l em ergen cy  area in 
co m p lia n ce  w ith  A rticles  58  and  59  o f  the am en d ed  1 9 9 1  E n v iro n ­
m enta l P ro te ct io n  A c t  o f  the R u ssian  F ed era tion . Such  a d ec la ra tion  
w o u ld  be  a c co m p a n ie d  b y  fu n d in g .
A rtic le  58  states:
In the R u ssian  F ed era tion  territory  an e c o lo g ic a l 
em ergen cy  area m ust be  d ecla red  w h ere  the n a tu ­
ral en v iron m en t has u n d e rg o n e  n egative  changes 
and  endangers o r  threatens h u m an  lives, the 
e cosy stem , o r  certa in  p lan t and an im al species.
In e c o lo g ic a l em ergen cy  areas all activ ities, w h ich  p r o ­
d u ce  an y  negative  e ffects u p o n  the n atural en v iron m en t 
m ust be  s to p p e d . A ctiv ities  b y  enterprises, in stitu tion s, 
o rg a n iza tion s , o r  eq u ip m en t usage w ith  adverse e ffects 
u p o n  h u m an  hea lth , the h u m an  gen etic  fu n d  o r  the n a tu ­
ral en v iron m en t m ust be  su sp en d ed , and  som e  type  o f  
natural resou rce  m a n ag em en t m ust be  im p lem en ted . In 
a d d it io n , ad equ ate  and  co m p re h e n siv e  m easures fo r  the
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re co v e ry  and  re p ro d u c t io n  o f  natural resou rces  m ust a lso  
be  im p lem en ted .
M easu res  fo r  b r in g in g  su ch  areas b a ck  to  an a c ­
cep ta b le  state m ust o b ta in  fu n d in g  p rim a rily  fr o m  
the respective  m in istries, agen cies, enterprises, in ­
stitu tion s, an d  o rg a n iza tion s  d irectly  resp on s ib le  
fo r  en v iron m en ta l d e te r io ra tion , industria l a c c i­
dents o r  disasters. L ik ew ise , federa l an d  reg ion a l 
fu n d s sh o u ld  a lso  be  a llo ca te d  (P araphrased  fro m  
Z a k o n ,  1 9 9 1 ).
A rtic le  5 9  states that:
In the R u ssian  F ed era tion  territory , an e c o lo g ic a l 
disaster area m ust be  d ecla red  w h ere  the natural 
en v iron m en t has u n d e rg o n e  deep  and  irrev oca b le  
ch an ges (becau se  o f  e c o n o m ic  o r  o th er  activ ities), 
w h ich  entail a s ign ifican t w o rse n in g  o f  h u m an  
hea lth , en v iron m en ta l d e te r io ra tion , d estru ction  o f  
a natural ecosy stem , o r  the d evasta tion  o f  flora  
and  fauna .
In areas d ecla red  an e c o lo g ic a l disaster, all e c o ­
n o m ic  agents have to  cease their o p e ra tio n s  (e x ­
cep t th ose  p ro v id in g  services to  the lo ca l p e o p le ).
T h e  co n s tru ct io n  an d  re co n stru ctio n  o f  any  n ew  
e c o n o m ic  fa c ility  is p ro h ib ite d . A ll types o f  natural 
resou rce  usage have to  be  co n s id e ra b ly  lim ited . 
A d e q u a te  an d  co m p re h e n siv e  m easures sh ou ld  be 
im p lem en ted  in  o rd e r  to  restore  the p r o d u c t io n  o f  
natural resou rces  an d  to  reestab lish  a sustainable 
natural en v iron m en t (P araphrased  fr o m  Z a k o n ,
1 9 9 1 ).
In a d d it io n , the extensive  data o n  the state o f  en v iron m en ta l and 
h u m a n  health  in the e c o lo g ic a l d isaster area w h ich  w as su bm itted  to  
the C o m m is s io n  w as used  to  dra ft the Federal T argeted  P rog ra m  
“ P rioritized  M ea su res  T aken  B etw een  1 9 9 6  and  2 0 0 0  fo r  R e h a b ili­
tating the E co lo g ica l D isaster A rea  an d  R e stor in g  the L o c a l R e s i­
d en ts ’ H ea lth  in the T o w n  o f  K a ra b a sh  in  the C h e lya b in sk  R e g io n .”
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T h e  C o m m is s io n  th o ro u g h ly  scru tin ized  the su bm itted  d o c u ­
m ents, v isited  K arabash  fo r  a fie ld  survey, and  m et w ith  the lo ca l 
residents to  d iscuss the ex istin g  s itu ation . T h e  C o m m is s io n  ca m e to  
the c o n c lu s io n  (w h ich  w as  fo rm e r ly  a p p ro v e d  b y  the M in ister  o f  
E n v iron m en ta l P ro te ct io n  and N a tu ra l R e sou rces ) that “ the resp ec­
tive in d ica tors  fo r  the ex istin g  state o f  p u b lic  health ; the level o f  
so il, su rface  and u n d e rg rou n d  w a ter  co n ta m in a tio n ; co n s p icu o u s  
n egative  g e o lo g ic a l ch an ges; and the d e te r io ra tio n  o f  the surface  
e c o lo g ic a l system s p ro v id e  g ro u n d s  fo r  con s id e r in g  K arabash  an 
e c o lo g ic a l d isaster a rea ”  (Z a k liu ch e n iy e , 1 9 9 6 ).
In a d d it io n , the C o m m is s io n ’s re co m m e n d a tio n s  p ro v id e d  tw o  
alternative p rog ra m s fo r  c o p in g  w ith  the crisis. O n e  o f  these su g ­
gested  a partia l re n o v a tio n  o f  the m ain  m eta llu rg ica l industria l c o m ­
p le x , w h ich  w o u ld  o n ly  address part o f  the en v iron m en ta l p ro b le m . 
T h e  p ro g ra m  w o u ld  a lso  in clu d e  re -eq u ip p in g  the c o m p le x  and  set­
ting up  n ew  treatm en t p lants to  p rocess  and  recycle  the industria l 
w aste  in c lu d in g  that co n ta in in g  h eavy  m etals. In a d d it io n , m easures 
w o u ld  be  m a d e  to  re con stru ct the ex istin g  treatm en t p lants and  fa ­
cilities, re -cu ltiva te  the so il, rep lant forests , and  m o n ito r  certa in  d is­
eases. T h e  co n s tru ct io n  o f  residentia l h ou ses fo r  5 0 0  fam ilies  r e lo ­
ca ted  fr o m  the h a za rd ou s  area a rou n d  the industria l c o m p le x  w as 
a lso  taken  up.
T h e  oth er  p ro g ra m  in c lu d ed  to ta lly  shutting d o w n  the h a z ­
a rd ou s  c o p p e r  sm elting  p r o d u c t io n  and  establish ing n e w  jo b s  fo r  
the lo ca l p e o p le . H o w e v e r , neither o f  the tw o  p ro p o s a ls  co n ta in ed  
any  co n cre te  estim ates a b o u t  the p ro je c te d  costs  and  o r  in fo rm a tio n  
a b o u t  the tech n ica l sp e c ifica tion s . It is assum ed that the p ro g ra m  
w o u ld  be  fu n d ed  b y  the n o n -fe d e ra l b u d g et. Such fu n d in g  w o u ld  
d o o m  su ch  p rog ra m s  fo r  fa ilu re  and  they w o u ld  never be  p ro p e r ly  
im p lem en ted .
N everth e less , the fa ct  that a sp ec ific  area w as  o f fic ia lly  d eclared  
an e c o lo g ic a l d isaster area fo r  the first tim e in  m o d e rn  R ussia  
sh ou ld  n o t  be  u n d erm in ed . In theory , w h e n  an area is d ecla red  a d is­
aster z o n e  b y  a gov ern m en ta l o r  presiden tia l d ecree , a fu n d ed  r e c o v ­
ery p ro g ra m  sh ou ld  be  im m ed ia te ly  lau n ch ed  (as is in  a cco rd a n ce  
w ith  the la w ). Y et the im p lem en ta tion  o f  n a tion a l disaster leg is la ­
t io n  is h in d ered  b y  fin a n cia l and  legal con stra in ts  in  R ussia .
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The Effectiveness of Crisis Management with Legal, 
Economic and Political Constraints
T h e  to w n  o f  K arabash  has run  in to  so m e  d ifficu lty  co n ce rn in g  the 
lo ca l c o p p e r  sm elter g iven  the fa ct  that the p r iva tiza tion  and  licen s­
ing  o f  su ch  facilities w ith in  the m eta llu rg ica l industria l c o m p le x  
w ere  carried  o u t  b y  co m p a n ie s  n o t  a ssocia ted  w ith  the to w n  (and  
som etim es n o t  even  w ith  the re g io n  o f  C h e lyab in sk ) either g e o ­
g ra p h ica lly  o r  adm in istratively . T h u s , K arabash  has fo u n d  itse lf in  a 
legislative v a cu u m  w ith  seriou s fin a n cia l and en v iron m en ta l p r o b ­
lem s becau se  o f  these e c o n o m ic  re fo rm s . T h ese  p ro b le m s  w ere  
w o rse n e d  b y  the in e ffective  en v iron m en ta l p o lic y  and  b y  the u n c o n ­
tro lla b le  p r iva tiza tion  p rocess  w h ich  la ck ed  co n s id e ra t io n  fo r  e c o ­
n o m ic  and  e c o lo g ic a l sustainability.
T o  so m e  exten t legislative g ro u n d s  w ere  estab lish ed  in  o rd e r  to  
preven t the ch a o t ic  and  co r ru p t  p riv a tiza tion  o f  h a za rd ou s  enter­
prises in  the P residentia l D ecree  N o  2 2 8 4  (dated  D e ce m b e r  2 4 , 
1 9 9 3 ) ca lled  “ T h e  State’s R o le  in  the P rivatiza tion  P rog ra m  fo r  P u b ­
lic and  M u n ic ip a l E nterprises in  the R u ssian  F e d e ra tio n ”  (and  m ore  
sp ec ifica lly  in  Item  6 .3 3  o f  this p ro g ra m ). T h is  d o cu m e n t gran ted  
the State P rop erty  C o m m itte e , the M in istry  o f  E n v iron m en ta l P ro ­
te c tio n  and  N atu ra l R e so u rce s , and  oth er  relevan t state agencies 
w ith  the a u th ority  to  d e v e lo p  and e n fo rce  rules co n ce rn in g  e c o lo g i ­
ca l standards in  ch em ica l and  h a za rd ou s  industries. A  specia l leg ­
islative act m ad e  it o b lig a to ry  to  c o m p ile  a list o f  su ch  industries. 
L ik ew ise , several oth er n e w  acts have been  in tro d u ce d . W o rth  sp e­
cia l m en tion in g  are tw o : the State P rop erty  C om m itte e  and  the M in ­
istry o f  Justice R e g u la tio n  (July 8 , 1 9 9 5 ) N o .  7 9 1 -p l  “ E co lo g ica l 
C on s id e ra tio n s  w h ile  P rivatizing P u b lic  and  M u n ic ip a l Enterprises 
and  O rg a n iz a tio n s ”  and  the O rd e r  o f  the M in istry  o f  E n v iro n m e n ­
tal P ro te ct io n  and  N a tu ra l R e sou rces  (N o v e m b e r  2 1 , 1 9 9 5 ) N o  4 6 9  
w ith  the sam e title. H o w e v e r , neither o f  these acts s ign ifican tly  in ­
flu en ced  the s itu a tion  at the a lread y  p rivatized  h a za rd ou s  enterpris-
A fter  the C o m m is s io n  released  its fin d in gs , there w ere  n o  legal 
p ro ce d u re s  fo r  establish ing fo rm a l rules fo r  in tera ction  b e tw een  the 
v a riou s  g ov ern m en t au th orities , the industries, and  the co m m u n ity  
m em b ers . T h is  has been  the case regard in g  the issue o f  co lle c tin g  
and  a llo ca tin g  fin an cia l resou rces  fo r  th ose  areas c o p in g  w ith  ex ist­
ing  crises.
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R egretfu lly , the R u ssian  g o v e rn m e n t has u n d e rg o n e  s ign ifican t 
su ccessive  changes s ince 1 9 9 6 : p arliam en tarian  and  presidentia l 
e lection s , an  esca la tion  o f  the arm ed  c o n flic t  in  C h ech n y a , terrorist 
b o m b in g s  in  a n u m b er o f  R u ssian  cities, and  oth er  ‘ h o t ’ p o lit ica l 
events. T h ese  events have tak en  the p u b lic ’s a tten tion  a w a y  fr o m  the 
creep in g  crisis in  K arabash .
T h e  C h e lya b in sk  reg ion a l ad m in istra tion  m a n a g ed  to  a lloca te  
so m e  fu n d s to  red u ce  the severity  o f  the K arabash  disaster. In a d d i­
t io n , so m e  new s a b o u t  K arabash  w as  s h o w n  o n  n a tion a l T V  in 
1 9 9 9  and  2 0 0 0  c la im in g  that K arabash  is the w o r ld ’s m o st  p o llu te d  
settlem ent. H o w e v e r , this m edia  a tten tion  d id  n o t  h elp  attract 
e n o u g h  interest to  gen erate  m o re  fu n d in g  fo r  K arabash .
Conclusion: Lessons from the Karabash Crisis
T h e  creep in g  crisis in  K arabash  is typ ica l in m a n y  w a ys  o f  m o d e rn  
R ussia  b o th  in  term s o f  crisis d e v e lo p m e n t and  crisis (m is m a n a g e ­
m ent. T h e  n a tion  has had  to  c o p e  w ith  a p ile  o f  seriou s p ro b le m s  
left beh in d  b y  the fo rm e r  S ov iet U n io n  . T h ese  p ro b le m s  have a c c u ­
m u lated  o v e r  the past d eca d e  resu lting in a n u m b er o f  defic ien cies  
and  lo o p h o le s . In the fo rm e r  S ov iet U n io n  a substantia l n u m b er o f  
K arabash -lik e  m o n o -in d u str ia l to w n s  w ere  estab lish ed  p rim a rily  fo r  
the needs o f  the to ta litarian  state. Such  settlem ents w ere  o rg a n ized  
in  o rd e r  to  serve the interests o f  the fed era l g ov ern m en t, an d  re g io n ­
al interests w ere  p r io r it ize d  b e fo re  lo c a l needs.
T h e  restructuring  o f  these m o n o -in d u str ia l t o w n s ’ e co n o m ie s  
and  the p r iva tiza tion  o f  their industries w ere  d o n e  w ith o u t  ad equ ate  
state p r o te c t io n  fo r  the e n v iron m en t and  h u m an  health . E ven  w h e n  
the lo c a l au thorities seem ed  to  be  ab le  to  c o n tr o l  the s itu ation , 
p ro b le m s  arose  a n y w a y  becau se  there w as  a la ck  o f  fo rm a l rules 
and  regu la tion s  co n ce rn in g  the re la tion sh ip  b e tw een  the federa l, re­
g io n a l an d  lo c a l au th orities  o n  fin a n cia l m atters. A s  a resu lt, b o th  
the lo ca l au thorities  and  the to w n  residents have b e c o m e  victim s.
In particu lar, co p p er-sm e ltin g  p r o d u c t io n  con tin u es  in  K arabash  
o n  a qu asi-lega l basis w ith  n o b o d y  rea lly  k n o w in g  w h o , h o w  and  
w h e n  m easures w ill be  im p lem en ted  to  dea l w ith  the e c o lo g ic a l  c o n ­
sequ en ces. R u ssian  an d  in tern ation a l exp er ien ce  has s h o w n  that v ic ­
tim s o f  a crisis (i.e. the a ffe cted  residents o r  the passive crisis a ctors) 
o fte n  e v o lv e  in to  active  crisis a ctors  or, in  oth er w o rd s , crisis agents.
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H o w e v e r  this is n o t  true in  the case o f  K arabash . T h o se  w h o  can  
w o r k  and  have savings have m o v e d  fr o m  K arabash  in  search  fo r  a 
better life ; w hereas the im p o v e r ish e d  w h o  are ill are stu ck  in 
K arabash  and  are, literally, d y in g  ou t. T h e  p u b ic  is u n a w are  o f  the 
crisis m an agem en t p lans o r  the a u th orities ’ in ten tion s.
T h e  fin d in gs  an d  analysis in  this case stu dy  p ro v id e  a so lid  
g ro u n d  fo r  referring  to  the K arabash  as a system ic creep in g  crisis. 
T h is  crisis is o u t  o f  c o n tr o l g iven  the fa ct  that n o  p o lit ica l o r  so c ia l 
agent is w illin g  to  take resp on s ib ility  fo r  the crisis. T h is  la ck  o f  re­
sp o n sib ility  and  co m m itm e n t in  K arabash  has b een  m u ch  m ore  
detrim en ta l than  the sh orta ge  o f  fu n d s and  co n cre te  k n o w le d g e  re­
ga rd in g  the en v iron m en ta l o r  e c o n o m ic a l co n se q u en ces .
T h e  p ro b le m s  in  K arabash  are sim ilar to  th ose  in  a n u m b er o f  
o th er  R u ssian  to w n s  and  cities. F or in stan ce , in  n orth ern  R u ssia , 
m in in g  to w n s  are s im p ly  a b a n d o n e d  w h e n  the m ines c lo se  and  all o f  
the en v iron m en ta l d am age  is just left beh in d . S o c io -e c o n o m ic  p r o b ­
lem s are e x a cerb a ted  b y  p o o r  en v iron m en ta l co n d it io n s  w h ich  c o n ­
sequ en tly  in ten sify  the cu m u la tive  adverse  effects  o n  a lo ca l c o m m u ­
n ity  in  genera l and  o n  p u b lic  health  in  particu lar.
A n  active  jo in t  e ffo r t  fr o m  the lo ca l p e o p le , the lo ca l au thorities , 
an d  the m anagers o f  the industria l enterprises ca n  u n d o u b te d ly  c o n ­
tribu te  to  a llev iating crises su ch  as the o n e  in  K arabash . Y et the cr i­
sis agents have n o t  yet co n s o lid a te d  their fo rce s  in  o rd e r  to  be  ab le 
to  w o r k  effectively . K arabash  is just o n e  ex a m p le ; there are m an y  
to w n s  scattered  a cross  R ussia  fa c in g  sim ilar p ro b le m s . C h a p a yev sk , 
a to w n  in  the V o lg a  R iv er  re g ion , is so c ia lly  and  e c o n o m ic a lly  d e ­
p en d en t u p o n  its ch em ica l industria l c o m p le x . A n o th e r  e x a m p le  is 
the to w n  o f  B a ikalsk , lo ca te d  o n  the sh ore  o f  L ake B aikal (the 
w o r ld ’s largest fresh  w ater reservoir  and  a u n iqu e e cosy stem  d e ­
c la red  a U N E S C O  w o r ld  heritage site), w h ich  is to ta lly  d ep en d en t 
u p o n  its p u lp  and  p ap er industry.
A ll o f  these cases co n tr ib u te  to  the lessons learned  in  crisis m a n ­
agem en t. W h e n  co m m e rc ia l p ro fits  d o m in a te  the p u b lic ’s basic  
needs an d  d isregard  the interests o f  fu ture gen era tion s  and  sustain ­
ab le  d e v e lo p m e n t, the en v iron m en t c learly  su ffers. In ev itab ly  s o c i­
e ty ’s e c o lo g ic a l cu lture  is lost, and  the p u b lic  losses to u ch  w ith  e c o ­
lo g ica l aw areness an d  is p a c ifie d  b y  em p ty  p rom ises . E ventually  this 
ca n  lead  to  e c o lo g ic a l d evasta tion  w ith  h o rr ify in g  co n se q u en ces .
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P o o lin g  togeth er  the e fforts  o f  the lo ca l residents, researchers, 
and  p ractition ers  w o u ld  h elp  raise p u b lic  aw areness and  w o u ld  help  
p reven t sim ilar p ro b le m s  fr o m  re o ccu rr in g  in  the fu ture. T h ese  e f­
forts  w o u ld  o n ly  be  e ffective  i f  co n s id e re d  co m p reh en siv e ly ; that is, 
pu t in to  a b ro a d e r  fra m e w o rk  fo r  so c ia l and  e c o n o m ic  d e v e lo p ­
m ent. T h is  w o u ld  m ea n  creatin g  n e w  jo b s  so  there is a real a lterna­
tive to  the h a za rd ou s  enterprises in  the m o n o -in d u str ia l tow n s.
T h is  strategy w o u ld  d e fin ite ly  have to  be  o p e ra tio n a l in  o rd e r  to  
ga in  the p u b lic ’s su p p ort. A ls o  co n cre te  k n o w le d g e , scien tific  su p ­
p o r t , and  the in v o lv e m e n t o f  all crisis a ctors  w o u ld  be  requ ired . A n y  
strategy is d o o m e d  fo r  fa ilu re  i f  it o n ly  con s id ers  the te ch n o lo g ica l 
issues o f  a t o w n ’s b a c k b o n e  industries and  i f  o th er  interests (sp e c ifi­
ca lly  th ose  o f  the co m m u n ity  g rou p s ) are d isregarded  o r  su p erfic ia l­
ly  addressed . T h e  needs, interests, va lu es, tra d ition s , and  so c ia l links 
o f  a c o m m u n ity  are the real d riv in g  fo r c e  o f  b o th  so c ia l and  e c o ­
n o m ic  d ev e lop m en t.
T h e  re stora tion  o f  c iv il s o c ie ty  and  its resp ective  institu tion s in  
R ussia  is u n d o u b te d ly  the m o st  s ign ifican t so c ia l ach ievem en t since 
to ta litarism  w as re jected  as a p u b lic  id e o lo g y . In this c o n n o ta t io n , 
the revival o f  lo ca l co m m u n ities  and  their c o n tin u e d  in v o lv em en t 
are a b so lu te ly  critica l. A ls o  e c o lo g y  issues m ust be  seriou sly  c o n s id ­
ered . U n fortu n ate ly , the p u b lic ’s e c o lo g ic a l aw areness is strik ingly  
lo w , and  the o ffic ia l en v iron m en ta l p o lic y  o f  the R u ssian  g o v e rn ­
m en t is t o o  a m b ig u ou s .
In sh ort, leg is la tion  in  R ussia  co n ce rn in g  en v iron m en t p r o te c ­
t io n  m ust be  im p ro v e d  and  im p lem en ted  e ffe ctive ly  in  a tim ely  fa sh ­
io n . C iv il s o c ie ty  (as w ell as the m ass m ed ia ) has an im p orta n t ro le  
to  p lay, especia lly  in  this tran sition a l phase. T h ere  m ust be  o n g o in g  
debates in  R ussia  regard in g  the va riou s  interests in  so c ie ty  (e n v iro n ­
m en ta l, e c o n o m ic , c iv il, and  socia l) and  crisis actors  need  to  be  p re ­
p ared  to  en cou n ter  su ch  va lue co n flic ts  w h en  a crisis arises. A  s o c ie ­
ty  in  tran sition  is o fte n  p la gu ed  b y  resou rce  con stra in ts  and  in fra ­
structural barriers; these are a lso  im p o rta n t con s id e ra tio n s  fo r  crisis 
a ctors , d e c is io n  m ak ers and  g o v ern m en t authorities . F u rth erm ore  
e c o lo g ic a l aw areness needs to  be  strengthened  in  the gov ern m en t in ­
stitu tion s, in  business an d  a m o n g  the genera l p u b lic .
A n d  lastly  (and  perh ap s m o st  im p orta n tly ) crisis a ctors , d e c is io n  
m ak ers and  g o v ern m en t au thorities have to  have the insight and  
k n o w le d g e  to  see a creep in g  crisis c o m in g . T h e  s itu a tion  in K ara-
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bash  d e v e lo p e d  s lo w ly  o v e r  a n u m b er o f  years. C risis a ctors , g o v ­
ern m en t au th orities , p o lic y  m akers, c o m m u n ity  m em bers, and  b u s i­
nesses m ust be  w illin g  to  w o r k  togeth er  as s o o n  as signs o f  a crisis 
ap p ear so  that a larger crisis (as the o n e  in  K arabash ) ca n  be  a v o id -
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C hapter 7  T he K u rs k  Subm arine A ccident: C o p in g  w ith V alue C o m p le x ity  and a C re d ib ility  C ris is
“ I am  w ritin g  b lin d . It’s 1 3 :1 5 . E v eryon e  fr o m  section  s ix , seven  and 
eigh t has m o v e d  to  section  n ine. W e  m a d e  that d e c is io n  becau se  
n o n e  o f  us can  escape. T h ere  are 2 3  p e o p le  h e re .”  W ritten  b y  R u ss­
ian  N a v y  Lt. C a p t. D m itry  K o lesn ik ov , the C o m m a n d e r  o f  K u rsk ’s 
tu rb in e  section  (Free Press N e w s  Services, 2 7  O c to b e r  2 0 0 0 ) .
Introduction
O n  A u g u st 12 , 2 0 0 0 , du rin g  som e  naval exercises  in  the Barents Sea 
the R u ssian  n u clear su bm arin e  “ K u rsk ”  sank  a fe w  m iles o f f  the 
n orth w estern  co a s t  o f  R u ssia . O ff ic ia l  in fo rm a tio n  a b o u t  the 
traged y  w as released  o n  A u g u st 14 . T h ere  w as m u ch  u n certa in ty  
co n ce rn in g  w h at h ad  cau sed  the tragedy. S om e sou rces  suggested  
that a m issile h ad  b lo w n  u p  inside K ursk  w h ile  others re p o rte d  an 
u n d erw ater  co ll is io n  w ith  an US su bm arin e . T en  days after the a cc i­
d ent, T h e  T o r o n to  Star (2 4  A u gu st 2 0 0 0 )  w ro te  that this crisis “ c o s t  
the R u ssian  g o v ern m en t the co n fid e n ce  o f  its p e o p le .”
Theory and Method
T h e  p u rp o se  o f  this case stu dy  is to  a p p ly  the cogn itiv e -in stitu tion a l 
a p p ro a ch  to  the K ursk  su bm arin e  a cc id en t. T h e  in ten tion  is to  stu dy  
the R u ssian  crisis m an ag em en t e ffo r t  as c lo se ly  as p o ss ib le . P rev iou s 
studies w ith in  C R iS M A R T  have p o in te d  to  the strengths as w ell as 
the w eakn esses o f  the cog n itiv e -in stitu tion a l a p p ro a ch . B y c lo se ly  
stu dy in g  the in d iv id u a ls  that p a rtic ip a ted  in  the crisis m an agem en t 
e ffo rts , researchers are ab le  to  better d escr ibe  the crisis d e v e lo p ­
m ent. T h e  in d iv id u a ls  w h o  m ad e  the d ecis ion s  are id en tified  and  in ­
terv iew ed , an d  h ereb y  p ro v id e  an authen tic  v iew  o f  the d e c is io n ­
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m ak in g  p rocesses. S om etim es, this is n o t  p o ss ib le  becau se  o f  secu ri­
ty issues a n d /o r  a la ck  o f  data.
T h e  m ateria l used in this case stu dy  con sists  m a in ly  o f  n ew s m e ­
dia co v e ra g e . T h e re fo re  the analysis is based  o n  statem ents m a d e  b y  
the k ey  a ctors  and  d escr ip tion s  o f  the events. T h is  has en ab led  us to  
co v e r  several aspects o f  the R u ssian  crisis m an ag em en t e ffo r t  w h ile  
o th er  issues w ere  left u n co v e re d  due to  em p irica l sh o rtco m in g s . T h e  
stu dy  beg ins w ith  the co u rse  o f  events fo l lo w e d  b y  an id e n tifica tion  
o f  the m ain  d e c is io n -m a k in g  o cca s io n s . T h erea fter, the crisis ep iso d e  
is stu d ied  fr o m  five  d ifferen t an a lytica l p ersp ectives . T h e  stu dy  is 
lim ited  to  the acute crisis phase w h ich  en d ed  w ith  the d e c is io n  to  
salvage the su bm arin e .
Several them es are d iscu ssed  th ro u g h o u t  this chapter. Firstly, is­
sues related  to  the clea d ersh ip ’ (i.e. fo cu s in g  o n  the crisis fr o m  the 
d e c is io n -m a k e rs ’ p ersp ective) are d iscussed . T h is  them e fo cu ses  p r i­
m arily  o n  h o w  the R u ssian  leadersh ip  dealt w ith  the h igh ly  negative  
a tm osp h ere  w h ich  ch aracter ized  the a fterm ath  o f  the a cc id en t. T h e  
them es ‘crisis c o m m u n ic a tio n  a n d  m ed ia  rela tio n s ’ an d  crep u ta tion  
crisis’ l o o k  at the crisis fr o m  a p u b lic  re la tion s p ersp ective . H ere  an 
o v e rv ie w  is g iven  o f  h o w  the R u ssian  m ed ia  co v e re d  the crisis, h o w  
the authorities  re sp o n d e d  to  this co v e ra g e , and  h o w  this resp on se  
w as  p erce iv ed  b y  the p u b lic  and  the m ed ia . T h ird ly , a tten tion  is g iv ­
en to  that w h ich  w e  ca ll ‘ th e v ic tim ’s p e r sp e c tiv e . ’ W h e n  a large- 
sca le  a cc id en t o ccu rs , it is im p era tive  that crisis m akers have the 
ab ility  to  deal w ith  the v ic tim s ’ relatives; this is a b so lu te ly  critica l in 
term s o f  p o lit ica l cred ib ility . T h e re fo re , w e  have stu d ied  h o w  the 
R u ssian  authorities  dealt w ith  this ch a llen ge . T h e  fo u r th  them e -  
cin tern a tion a liza tion ’ -  lo o k s  at the in tern ation a l d im en sion s  o f  the 
crisis. It fo cu se s  o n  the p o lit ica l ju d gm en ts  and  the d ifficu lties  in ­
v o lv e d  w ith  the o rg a n iza tio n  o f  in tern ation a l crisis m an ag em en t c o ­
o p e ra tio n . T h e  fifth  them e, w h ich  w e  ca ll cfr o m  crisis to  traum a,'1 
lo o k s  at the larger p ictu re  o f  the crisis. H ere  w e  are co n ce rn e d  w ith  
the ab ility  to  brin g  c lo su re  to  a trag ic  event and  the fa ctors  w h ich  
con tr ib u te  to  the d e v e lo p m e n t o f  a n a tion a l traum a. Finally, atten ­
tio n  is g iven  to  the issue o f  ‘ le a r n in g ’ It has o fte n  b een  argu ed  that 
crises serve as eye -op en ers  fo r  p o lic y  m akers and  that crises usually  
re in fo rce  the n eed  to  m ak e  re form s. W e  thus seek  to  exa m in e  to  
w h a t exten t the K u rsk  a cc id en t has led  to  o r  w ill lead  to  co n cre te  
ch an ges. S om e gen era l lessons are d ra w n  a b o u t  crisis m an agem en t
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in  R ussia  ba sed  o n  the fin d in gs  fr o m  this case stu dy ; these are p re ­
sented  in the co n c lu s io n .
Chronology of Events 
A u gu st 12
A t 2 3 :3 0  the R u ssian  su bm arin e  SSBN  K u rsk , fails to  re sp o n d  to  ra ­
d io  queries and  thus is d ecla red  as ’w r e c k e d .’ A  n ava l search -an d - 
rescue team  is sent o u t  to  lo ca te  an d  assist the vessel. N o  a d d itio n a l 
in fo rm a tio n  is k n o w n  a b o u t  the w h e re a b o u ts  o f  the vessel ( “ H o w  it 
w a s ,”  1 7  M a y  2 0 0 1 ) .
Five ships and  three o th er  su bm arin es are sent to  p ro v id e  help  to  
the 118  p e o p le  o n b o a r d  K ursk . T h e  n aval au th orities  h o p e  that they 
ca n  lift the su bm arin e  up  to  the su rfa ce  in  the n ex t fe w  h ou rs . N o  
o ff ic ia l  in fo rm a tio n  a b o u t  the traged y  is released  to  the p u b lic  in  the 
first tw o  days.
N o r w a y  an d  the U S A  are a lso  in  the Barents Sea at the tim e o f  
the in cid en t an d  n o te  so m e  unusual activity. A  N o r w e g ia n  seism ic 
research  institute and  a N o r w e g ia n  su rveillan ce  a ircra ft (an O r io n ) 
re p o rt  h earing  tw o  e x p lo s io n s  in the re g ion . N o r w a y  later co n firm s  
in the n a tion a l m ed ia  that it h ad  su rveillan ce  ships and  o n e  a ircra ft 
present in  the in tern ation a l w aters  o f  the Barents Sea w a tch in g  the 
R u ssian  N a v a l exercises  (Idas, 15 A u g u st 2 0 0 0 ) .  F u rth erm ore , tw o  
A m e rica n  su bm arin es , resid ing in the Barents Sea at the tim e, a lso  
register the b lasts. In a d d it io n  to  these registered  e x p lo s io n s , the 
R u ssian  m ilitary  a lso  re cord s  a th ird  b last fifteen  m inutes later c o m ­
ing  fr o m  the area w h ere  the K u rsk  w as  th ou g h t to  be  lo ca te d  
( “ H o w  it w a s ,”  1 7  M a y  2 0 0 1 ) .
A u gu st 13
R u ssian  ships hunt fo r  the m issing su bm arin e . E arly  in the m orn in g , 
at 4 :3 6 ,  a R u ssian  cru iser sp ots  K u rsk  o n  the seabed  -  1 2 0  m eters 
b e lo w . It is im p o ss ib le  to  establish  d irect co n ta c t  w ith  the K ursk  
crew . It is c lear that there has been  so m e  k in d  o f  p r o b le m  w ith  the 
eq u ip m en t o n b o a r d  K u rsk , since co n ta c t  can  n o t  be  estab lish ed .
A t  7 :0 0  am  R u ssian  P resident V la d im ir  Putin  is in fo rm e d  b y  the 
M in ister  o f  D e fe n ce  that K u rsk  has b een  fo u n d  o n  the b o t to m  o f  the 
sea an d  that attem pts to  rescue its c re w  have a lread y  b een  in itiated . 
T h e  first vessel fr o m  the R u ssian  N o rth e rn  Fleet is sent o u t  o n  a res­
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cu e  m iss ion . It arrives o n  site at 1 0 :0 0  am  and the first o f  t w o  fa iled  
attem pts to  reach  the w re ck e d  vessel w ith  a m in i-su b m a rin e  is in iti­
ated  at 1 8 :0 0 . T h e  m ilitary  s ta ff o n  the rescue m iss ion  hear signs o f  
life  inside the stran ded  su bm arin e ; SO S m essages are be in g  k n o ck e d  
o n  the su b m a rin e ’s hull ( “ H o w  it w a s ,”  17  M a y  2 0 0 1 ) .
T h e  R u ssian  N a v y  h o p e s  that they w ill be  ab le  to  lo w e r  a d iv in g  
bell d o w n  to  K ursk  and  b rin g  the c re w  up in  g ro u p s  o f  15 an d  2 0  
fr o m  the freez in g  w ater. But the first a ttem pt to  attach  the bell to  
the su bm arin e  fails. A n  a ttem pt is m a d e  to  re co n n e ct  p o w e r  and  
o x y g e n  su pplies , bu t that a lso  fails becau se  o f  b a d  w eather.
A u gu st 14
T h e  N a v y  p u b lic ly  a n n ou n ces  that an a cc id en t in v o lv in g  a R u ssian  
su bm arin e  has o c cu rre d  in the Barents Sea. O ffic ia ls  say that su rface  
vessels have ra d io  c o n ta c t  w ith  the su bm arin e  and  that o x y g e n  and  
p o w e r  lines have been  lin k ed  up to  the su bm arin e , and  in d ica te  a 
q u ick  rescue. N a v y  sp o k esm en  re p o rt  that K ursk  has been  cr ip p le d  
b y  “ tech n ica l fa u lts ”  and  that the c re w  d elibera te ly  a llo w e d  it to  
g lid e  in to  the seabed . O th er  statem ents su rface  c la im in g  that the 
K ursk  c re w  has n o t  re p o rte d  any  deaths o n b o a r d . O ffic ia ls  d en y  
that the b o w  o f  the su bm arin e  is f lo o d e d , and  asserts that there is 
n o  d a m age  to  the hull. N a v y  sp o k e sm a n  Ig or  D y g a lo  alleges that 
rescue w o rk e rs  are in  c o n ta c t  w ith  the crew . O ffic ia ls  a lso  d eclare  
that the N a v y  is lo w e r in g  a d iv in g  bell d o w n  to  K u rsk  in  o rd e r  to  
su p p ly  the su bm arin e  w ith  e lectric  p o w e r  and  o x y g e n  (C N N , 2 2  
A u g u st 2 0 0 0 ) .  T h e  Prim e M in ister  establishes a g o v e rn m e n t c o m ­
m iss ion  to  lo o k  in to  the m atter and  a p p o in ts  D e p u ty  Prim e M in ister  
Ilya K le b a n o v  to  h ead  it. K le b a n o v  im m ed ia te ly  g oes  to  S evero ­
m o rsk  and  is there A u g u st 14  and  15.
In the late even in g  o f  A u gu st 14  the h ead  o f  the N a v y , A d m ira l 
V la d im ir  K u ro y e d o v , tells the m ed ia  that he h op e s  the em ergen cy  
team s w ill be  ab le  to  b r in g  up the first o f  the o ffice rs  and  c re w  b e ­
fo re  m id n igh t. H e  says the entire o p e ra t io n  c o u ld  take up to  seven 
h ou rs . T h e  adm ira l a lso  c la im s that the su b m a rin e ’s p e r is co p e  is still 
up bu t that the n a v ig a tion  r o o m  is d a m a g ed , the ra iling  is d en ted  
and  the p ro te ctiv e  c o v e r  o v e r  the t w o  m issile tubes o n  the vessel’s 
r ight side are m issing . A ttem p ts  have been  m a d e  to  attach  the rescue 
cap su le  to  the su b m a rin e ’s ca rg o  h atch  bu t d ifficu lties  arise becau se  
K ursk  is lean in g  at a sharp  angle and  becau se  o f  the fierce  w eather.
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’ ’ T h e  ships are be in g  b lo w n  o f f  their a n ch ors . It is d ifficu lt  fo r  
the ships to  h o ld  co u rse . T h e  ships and  the cap su le  have to  be  d i­
rected  at a certa in  angle in  o rd e r  to  m in im ize  the s tron g  curren t. 
T h e  storm s have ca lm ed  d o w n  so m e w h a t, a lth ou g h  the w aves are 
still h igh . B ut the cu rren t is m o re  c ru c ia l”  rep orts  a R u ssian  naval 
sp ok esm a n  fr o m  the N o rth e rn  Fleet base in  S everom orsk .
A u gu st 15
T h e  N a v y  says rescue e fforts  are u n d e rw a y  w ith  u n d erw a ter  c a p ­
sules. U n co n firm e d  rep orts  c la im  that a d iv in g  bell c re w  has re p o rt ­
ed ly  heard  SO S m essages tap p ed  fr o m  inside the vessel in d ica tin g  
su rv ivors . B ad w eath er fo rce s  the R u ssian  rescuers to  su sp en d  their 
op era tio n s .
T h ere  are sp ecu la tion s  that an e x p lo s io n  in a to r p e d o  tu be  has 
cau sed  the vessel to  f lo o d .  T h e  British R o y a l N a v y  o ffe rs  to  h elp , 
bu t these o ffe rs  w ere  n o t  a ccep ted . E n viron m en ta lists  fear a rad ia ­
t io n  leak  fro m  the n u clear sub . T h e  N o rth e rn  Fleet steps up  its re­
sp on se  ca p a c ity  b y  sen d in g  fifteen  m o re  battlesh ips and  a fe w  o th er  
vessels to  the site ( “ H o w  it w a s ,”  17  M a y  2 0 0 1 ) .
A u gu st 16
R escu e  e fforts  co n tin u e . T o p  o ffic ia ls  g ive  c o n tra d ic to ry  rep orts  o n  
the state o f  K ursk  and  the ch an ces  o f  fin d in g  su rv ivors . R u ss ia ’s 
D e p u ty  Prim e M in ister  states there are n o  signs o f  life  in  the su b m a ­
rine. A ttem p ts  to  reach  the sub are h in d ered  b y  p o o r  visibility. A fte r  
in itia lly  refu sing  W estern  a id , M o s c o w  asks B ritain  and  N o r w a y  to  
send rescue su bm arin e  and  d ivers. A  rescue team  and  an  L R 5  m in i­
su bm arin e  are p u t u p o n  an a irp lane at P restw ick  A irp o r t . P u b lic  
cr itic ism  g ro w s  regard in g  h o w  the in cid en t is be in g  h a n d led  and 
P resident V la d im ir  P u tin ’s d e c is io n  n o t  to  in terrupt his v a ca tio n  in 
o rd e r  to  deal w ith  the crisis.
President Putin  gives the N a v a l c o m m a n d  a g o -a h e a d  to  seek 
fo re ig n  aid  in  the rescue m iss ion . T h e  R u ssian  N a v y  rep orts  that an 
a ttem pt to  d o c k  d iv in g  bells o n  the su bm arin e  has fa iled  d u e to  a 
stron g  b o t to m  cu rren t and  the p o s it io n  o f  the su bm arin e  ( “ H o w  it 
w a s ,”  17  M a y  2 0 0 1 ) .  R equ ests  fo r  help  are d irected  to  N o r w a y  and 
G rea t B ritain  (A fte n p o ste n , 16  A u gu st 2 0 0 0 ) .
D u rin g  an in fo rm a l m eetin g  w ith  m em bers  o f  the R u ssian  A c a d ­
em y o f  S ciences, R u ssian  Security  C o u n c il Secretary Sergei Iv a n o v
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and  D e p u ty  Prim e M in ister  Ilya K le b a n o v  b r ie f  President Putin  o n  
the rescue o p e ra t io n . A fte r  the m eetin g  President Putin  takes q u es­
tion s  fr o m  jou rn a lists . H e  m ak es his first p u b lic  statem ent a b o u t  the 
d ram atic  rescue o p e ra tio n . H e  d escribes the s itu a tion  as ’’ c r it ica l”  
fo r  the stran ded  su bm arin e  an d  the c re w  tra p p ed  inside. A fterw a rd s  
Sergei Iv a n o v  an d  P resident Putin  rem ain  in  S och i w h ere  they are 
v a ca tio n in g  and  K le b a n o v  returns to  the Barents Sea.
A u gu st 17
T h e  first session  o f  the gov ern m en ta l co m m itte e  lo o k in g  in to  
the causes o f  the a cc id en t takes p la ce . T h e  com m itte e  p lans to  c o n ­
sider the p re lim in ary  in fo rm a tio n  a b o u t  the causes o f  the tragedy. 
T h e  g o v ern m en t co m m is s io n  declares that K u rsk  c o llid e d  w ith  a n ­
oth er  o b je c t  desp ite  U .S. and  N o r w e g ia n  rep orts  o f  tw o  m assive e x ­
p lo s io n s  in  the re g io n  at the tim e the su bm arin e  w en t d o w n . British 
and  N o r w e g ia n  rescue crew s h ead  fo r  R ussia  b y  ship .
A u gu st 18
T h e  R u ssian  rescue cap su le  su ccessfu lly  reaches K u rsk ’s escape 
h a tch  fo r  the first tim e, bu t finds it t o o  b a d ly  d a m a g ed  to  d o c k . T h e  
R u ssian  g o v ern m en t rep orts  that a h uge e x p lo s io n  s h o o k  K u rsk , bu t 
says there is still qu ite  a b it o f  u n certa in ty  as to  w h a t triggered  it. 
P resident Putin  cuts his h o lid a y  in  S och i sh ort. Putin  b lam es the b a d  
w eath er fo r  the fa iled  rescue e ffo r t  and  cla im s that even  if  fo re ig n  
help  h ad  b een  a ccep ted  earlier it w o u ld  n o t  have m a d e  a d ifferen ce  
b ecau se  o f  the w eath er co n d it io n s . Putin  con fesses  that fr o m  the 
very  first d ay  he has s tron g  d o u b ts  a b o u t  the p o ss ib ility  o f  rescu in g  
the c re w  m em bers  and  that the ch an ces  o f  fin d in g  su rv ivors  is “ e x ­
trem ely  sm a ll”  (C N N , 2 2  A u gu st 2 0 0 0 ) .  B y sayin g  so  the President 
d e fen ds his p rev iou s  d e c is io n  to  rem ain  o n  v a ca tio n  an d  m aintains 
that his presen ce  w o u ld  o n ly  h am p er the rescue m iss ion . Putin  says, 
“ M y  first w ish  w as  to  fly  to  the re g io n  bu t I d e c id e d  n o t  to  g o  and  
a llo w e d  the experts  to  d o  their jo b s . ”
A u gu st 19
M ilita ry  leaders ad m it there is n o  lon g er  an y  realistic h o p e  o f  f in d ­
ing  the c re w  alive. O ffic ia ls  a ck n o w le d g e  that the d am ag e  to  the 
vessel is m assive , an d  c la im  that m o st  o f  the c re w  d ied  w ith in  the
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first fe w  m inutes. British and N o r w e g ia n  rescue team s arrive to  the 
site (C N N , 2 2  A u g u st 2 0 0 0 ) .
A u gu st 2 0
N o r w e g ia n  divers reach  an escape  h a tch  and  co n tra d ic t  R u ssian  
cla im s that it is t o o  b a d ly  d a m a g ed  to  o p e n . D e p u ty  M in ister  Ilya 
K le b a n o v  says a c re w  m em b er  w as inside the h a tch  and  that this 
w as  w h a t d isa b led  the a ir-pressure system . N o r w e g ia n  and  British 
d ivers say the h a tch  w as em p ty  (C N N , 2 2  A u gu st 2 0 0 0 ) .
A u g u st 21
N o r w e g ia n  divers say the sub  is f lo o d e d  and  that every on e  m ust be 
d ead . T h e  1 0 -d a y  o p e ra t io n  to  rescue the c re w  is ca lled  o f f .  T h e  first 
statem ents b y  the R u ssian  o ffic ia ls  assert there is n o  h o p e  o f  fin d in g  
su rv ivors  inside the su bm arin e . T h e  C h ie f o f  S ta ff fo r  the R u ssian  
N o rth e rn  Fleet, M ik h a il M o ts a k , states that “ o u r  w o rs t  e x p e c ta ­
tion s  are co n firm e d . A ll section s  are to ta lly  f lo o d e d  and  n o t  a single 
c re w  m em b er  is a liv e ”  (C N N , 21  A u gu st 2 0 0 0 a ) . O ffic ia ls  say the 
a cc id en t w as cau sed  b y  a c o llis io n  w ith  a fo re ig n  su bm arin e , “ p r o b ­
a b ly  B ritish .”  T h e y  allege that th ey  have fo u n d  part o f  the su b m a ­
rine ra iling  3 0 0  yards a w a y  fro m  the stran ded  sub. T h e  British M in ­
istry o f  D efen se  denies this saying that n o  British  su bm arin e  w as  in 
the area at the tim e o f  the in cid en t (C N N , 2 2  A u g u st 2 0 0 0 ) .  A d m i­
ral V y ach es lav  P o p o v , C o m m a n d e r  o f  the R u ssian  N o rth e rn  Fleet, 
a p o lo g iz e s  o n  R u ssian  te lev is ion  fo r  n o t  be in g  ab le  to  save the 
sa ilors. “ F org ive  m e. F org ive  m e becau se  I h a v e n ’t been  ab le  to  save 
y o u r  m e n ”  (C N N , 21  A u g u st 2 0 0 0 c ) .
A u g u st 2 2
P resident Putin  m eets the K ursk  C o m m a n d e r ’s w ife , Irina L yach in a , 
at the base in  M u rm a n sk  w h ere  K ursk  started its v o y a g e . H e  then 
co n so le s  the o th er  w ives  an d  relatives o f  the c re w  am id  g ro w in g  
fu ry  o v er  the tragedy. H e  p rom ises  to  raise the b o d ie s  o f  the sailors 
and  to  p a y  so m e  k in d  o f  c o m p e n sa tio n  to  the relatives. M in ister  o f  
D e fe n ce  (I. S ergeev), the h ead  o f  the N a v y  (A d m ira l V la d im ir  
K u r o y e d o v ) , an d  the co m m a n d e r  o f  R u ss ia ’s N o rth e rn  Fleet (V y a ch ­
eslav P o p o v )  h an d  in resig n ation  letters to  P resident Putin . T h e ir  
resign ation s are n o t  a ccep ted . Putin  states that he is against any  m il­
itary  dism issals until the cause o f  the disaster is d eterm in ed .
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A u gu st 23
R ela tives o f  the sa ilors m eet w ith  Ilya K le b a n o v  and  A d m ira l 
V la d im ir  K u ro y e d o v . In an in terv iew  o n  R u ssian  T V  President Putin  
d efen ds his g o v e rn m e n t and in d irectly  reveals his true a lleg iances in 
o rd e r  o f  p riority , ” 1 w ill be  w ith  the arm y. I w ill be  w ith  the fleet. I 
w ill be  w ith  the p e o p le .”
A u gu st 2 4
President Putin  returns to  M o s c o w  o n  A u gu st 2 4  w h ich  is a n ­
n o u n ce d  as the o ffic ia l d a y  o f  m o u rn in g  fo r  the K ursk  crew .
A u gu st 3 0
T h e  G o v e rn m e n t foresees  that the o p e ra t io n  to  raise the 1 8 ,0 0 0  to n  
w re ck  w ill start in  S eptem ber 2 0 0 1 . T h e  Federal P ro s e cu to r ’s o f f ic e  
and  the FSB (the d o m e stic  in te lligen ce  service) take o v er  the in vesti­
g a tio n  o f  the K u rsk  accid en t.
Decision-Making Occasions
T h e  p rocess  o f  id en tify in g  the critica l p ro b le m s  that fa ced  the d e c i­
s ion -m ak ers  m ust, u n a v o id a b ly , be  based  o n  so m e  su b jective  ju d g ­
m ents to  som e  d egree a c co rd in g  to  Stern (1 9 9 9 ), N o h rs te d t  (2 0 0 0 ), 
and  L in d g ren  ( fo r th co m in g ). A s n o te d , the la ck  o f  em p irica l ev id en ce  
m akes it im p o ss ib le  to  p ro v id e  an authen tic  v iew  o f  all o f  the p r o b ­
lem s the d ecis ion -m a k ers  h ad  to  c o p e  w ith  d u rin g  a crisis. T h e  ab ility  
to  in clu d e  the m o st  cr itica l issues varies fr o m  o n e  case to  another.
In this case , it w as n o t  p o ss ib le  to  get access to  o ffic ia l d o c u m e n ­
ta tion  and  in terv iew s, w h ich  are n ecessary  fo r  p ro v id in g  a realistic 
and  an accu rate  v ie w  o f  the p ro b le m s  and  issues raised  du rin g  the 
K ursk  crisis. L ik ew ise , it w as n o t  p o ss ib le  to  m ak e  an  in -d ep th  e x ­
a m in a tion  o f  the ava ilab le  a lternatives and  d iscu ssion s  lead in g  up  to  
an y  o n e  d ec is ion . It is p o ss ib le , h ow ever , to  p o in t  o u t  a n u m b er o f  
‘ im p etu ses ’ fa c in g  the resp on sib le  d ecis ion -m a k ers . T h ese  w ere 
p ro b le m s  w h ich  m o st  certa in ly  raised  the n ecessity  o f  a resp on se  
and  p o se d  the q u estion  “ W h a t  d o  w e  d o  n o w ? ”  (c .f. R osen th a l et 
al., 1 9 8 9 ). B ased o n  the ava ilab le  sou rces , w e  have id en tified  five  
such  o cca s io n s . T h ese  are listed in  T a b le  1. A lso  in c lu d ed  is in fo r ­
m a tio n  co n ce rn in g  the type  o f  un it(s) w h ich  su bsequ en tly  m ad e  
each  d ec is ion .
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T a ble 1 : D e c is io n -M a k in g  O c c a sio n s  a n d  D e c is io n -M a k in g  U nits  
Impetus (Decision-Making Problem)_______________________ Decision-Making Unit
1. “ The Kursk is missing!” Group
2. “ President Putin is informed” Individual
3. “ Accept offers for international assistance?” Group/individual
4. “ Call off the rescue operation?” Group (experts)
5. “ Salvage the wreck or declare it as a sea burial?” Group
1. T h e  K u rsk  is m issin g !
M a n y  crises start w ith  a su d d en  and  u n e x p ected  event w h ich  o fte n  
takes even  w e ll-p rep a red  d ec is ion -m a k ers  b y  surprise. T h is  is p re ­
c ise ly  h o w  the K u rsk  crisis started. O n e  can  im agin e  the sh o ck  that 
stru ck  the m ilitary  leadersh ip  as w e ll as the p o lit ic ia n s  in  the K rem ­
lin  w h en  the first in fo rm a tio n  a b o u t  the m issing  su bm arin e  sur­
fa ce d . K u rsk  w as o n e  o f  R u ssian  N a v y ’s m ost a d v a n ced  w e a p o n  
system s an d  it is lik e ly  that the a cc id en t w as u n ex p ected .
T h e  first m easure w as to  send  o u t  ships to  search  fo r  the m issing 
su bm arin e . T h is  w as d o n e  im m ed ia te ly  as s o o n  as co n ta c t  w ith  the 
sub  w as lost. T h e  N a v y  in itiated  the rescue o p e ra t io n , an d  the m ili­
tary  a lerted  the p o lit ica l leadersh ip . President Putin  w as in fo rm e d  
d u rin g  his v a ca tio n  in  S och i. It w as n o t  o n ly  a p ro b le m  fo r  the m ili­
tary  but it w as a lso  a p r o b le m  fo r  the p o lit ica l lead ersh ip , and  b o th  
w ere  e x p e cte d  to  re sp on d .
A s  m edia  rep orts  have in d ica ted , the m ilitary  leadersh ip  c o n ­
tro lled  the crisis. T h e  first days w ere  d o m in a te d  by  m ilitary  sp o k e s ­
m en  m a k in g  o p tim is tic  statem ents a b o u t  the ch an ces  o f  fin d in g  sur­
v iv ors . T h e  rescue c re w  w as cited  as sayin g  that there w ere  n o  
deaths. O ffic ia ls  d en ied  that the b o w  o f  the su bm arin e  w as f lo o d e d , 
stating there w as n o  d am ag e  d o n e  to  the hull. T h e  p o lit ica l lead er­
sh ip  rem ain ed  s o m e w h a t passive, at least ou tw a rd ly . T h ere  w ere  in ­
d ica tion s  that the p o lit ica l leaders w ere  m a in ly  co n ce rn e d  w ith  the 
p rosp ects  o f  the R u ssian  rescue o p e ra t io n . W as the R u ssian  N a v y  
ab le  to  m an age  the p r o b le m  o r  sh o u ld  R ussia  a ccep t in tern ation a l 
assistance?
2 . Putin  is in fo rm e d
W h e n  the a cc id en t h a p p en ed , President Putin  w as o n  v a ca tio n  in 
S och i near the B lack  Sea. W h e n  the in fo rm a tio n  reach ed  h im , he 
w as fa ce d  w ith  a p ro b le m  that a n u m b er o f  leaders th ro u g h o u t  the
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w o r ld  have e x p er ien ced : sh ou ld  he in terru pt his v a ca tio n  and  return 
to  M o s c o w , o r  stay in  S och ?  H e  d e c id e d  to  d o  the latter. A s the in ­
fo rm a tio n  a b o u t  the a cc id en t reach ed  the m ed ia , this d ec is io n  and  
the d elayed  d e c is io n  to  a cce p t  in tern ation a l assistance w ere  m et 
w ith  stron g  critic ism .
A fte rw a rd s , P resident Putin  said  that he m igh t h ave  a cted  d iffe r ­
en tly  if  he w o u ld  be  co n fro n te d  w ith  a sim ilar p ro b le m  again :
T h e  o n ly  th in g  w h ich  c o u ld  have been  d o n e  d ifferen tly  
w as . . .  p o ss ib ly  to  ca n ce l m y  m eetings, to  suspend  m y  
v a ca tio n  . . .  I c o u ld  have g o n e  b a ck  to  M o s c o w . But 
again , this w o u ld  have p u re ly  been  a P R  [p u b lic  re la ­
tion s] m easure, since P m  a lw ays in  c lo se  co n ta c t  w ith  the 
m ilitary  n o  m atter w h ere  I am  in  the w o r ld , . . .  F ro m  the 
P R  p o in t  o f  view , that w o u ld  h ave  lo o k e d  better. M a y b e  
yes it w o u ld  have lo o k e d  better. (C N N , 8 S eptem ber 
2 0 0 0 ) .
A d d itio n a lly , Putin  be lieved  fr o m  the very  start that there w as a slim  
ch a n ce  o f  saving the su bm arin e  crew . H e  used  this argu m en t to  d e ­
fen d  his lo w  p ro file . A n o th e r  argu m en t he used  in  his d efen se w as 
that his p resen ce  w o u ld  have h a m p ered  the rescue w o rk . “ I re ­
fra in ed , and  th ink  I d id  the right th in g  becau se  the arrival o f  n o n ­
specialists fr o m  an y  fie ld  at the d isaster area w o u ld  n o t  have h e lp ed  
the h ig h -ra n k in g  o ffic ia ls  and  m o re  lik e ly  w o u ld  have h a m p ered  the 
w o rk . E v eryon e  sh ou ld  k n o w  his p la c e ,”  Putin  said in  an in terv iew  
(C N N , 18 A u g u st 2 0 0 0 ) .  A fte rw a rd s , the m ed ia , relatives to  the 
crew , and  others cr itic ized  Putin  fo r  this d e c is ion .
S ince crises fo r  the m o st  part o c c u r  u n ex p ected ly , it is o fte n  n e c ­
essary to  spen d  at least so m e  tim e an d  en ergy  in  m o b iliz in g  a crisis 
resp on se  in  term s o f  ca llin g  in  the resp ective  d ec is ion -m a k ers , o p e n ­
ing  chann els  fo r  in fo rm a tio n  m an ag em en t and  so  o n . H is to ry  has 
s h o w n  that leaders som etim es are n o t  p h ys ica lly  present at these 
critica l p o in ts  in  tim e. Interestingly, w h en  such  a s itu ation  o ccu rs , 
leaders o fte n  m ak e  d ifferen t ju d gm en ts . T h ere  are exa m p les  w h en  
th ey  d ec id e  to  in terru pt their cu rren t u n dertak in gs and  jo in  the d e c i­
s io n -m a k in g  g ro u p  d ea lin g  w ith  the p ro b le m  (c .f . Sundelius et al., 
1 9 9 7 ). In con tra st, o th er  leaders h ave  d e c id e d  to  co n tin u e  w ith  their 
o th er  u n d ertak in gs . A s the K u rsk  a cc id en t and  a n u m b er o f  o th er
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crises have illustrated , su ch  d ecis ion s  can  be critica l in  term s o f  le ­
g it im a cy  and  p o lit ica l trust.
3 . A c c e p t  o ffe rs  fo r  in tern ation a l assistance?
F airly  q u ick ly  after the in fo rm a tio n  a b o u t  the a cc id en t w as  d is­
c lo se d , several gov ern m en ts  co n ta c te d  M o s c o w  and  o ffe re d  to  help  
the R u ssian  authorities  w ith  the rescue o p e ra t io n . O ffe rs  cam e fro m  
the U .S ., G rea t B ritain , N o r w a y , and  S w eden . A t  the press c o n fe r ­
ence o n  A u gu st 15 , Ilya K le b a n o v  said  that R ussia  c o u ld  h an d le  the 
o p e ra t io n  o n  its o w n . A t  the sam e tim e he exp ressed  his gratitude 
o n  b e h a lf o f  the R u ssian  g o v ern m en t to  th ose  cou n tries  fo r  o ffe r in g  
their assistance. M o s c o w ’s o ffic ia l requ est fo r  British assistance 
ca m e o n  A u gu st 16 . T h e  U K  M in is try  o f  D e fen se  b eg a n  d e p lo y m e n t 
early  A u gu st 16  w ith o u t  k n o w in g  w h eth er  M o s c o w  w o u ld  a ccep t 
its o f fe r  fo r  h elp . T h is  assistance in c lu d ed  a British rescue team  o f
2 0  p e o p le  (w h o  w ere  o n  sta n d by) an d  a British rescue vessel (an 
L R 5  su bm arin e  ). H o w e v e r , the rescue vessel c o u ld  n o t  reach  the 
scen e b e fo re  Saturday, A u g u st 19.
In a d d it io n  to  the British  m in i-su b m a rin e , a team  o f  deep -sea  
d ivers fr o m  N o r w a y  arrived  o n  the even in g  o f  A u gu st 19  to  the 
scen e in  the Barents Sea w h ere  K ursk  h ad  g o n e  d o w n . R u ssian , 
British and  N o r w e g ia n  experts  d iscussed  the d iv in g  p lan s. First, the 
N o rw e g ia n s  w ere  ex p e cte d  to  g o  d o w n  to  assess the d am ag e  d o n e  
to  the ex it h atch . B rita in ’s L R 5  m in i-su b m a rin e  w as  then  e x p ected  
to  d o c k  K ursk  o n  S unday m o rn in g .
O n  A u g u st 2 0  the N o r w e g ia n  divers reach ed  the escape h atch  
and  co n tra d icte d  the R u ssian  cla im s that it w as  t o o  d a m a g ed  to  
o p e n . T h e  n ex t d a y  the N o r w e g ia n  d ivers d isco v e re d  that the su b ­
m arin e  w as  f lo o d e d  and it w as  assu m ed  that every on e  inside w as  
d ead . R ea r  A d m ira l E inar S k org en , h ead in g  the 1 2 -p e rso n  team  o f  
N o r w e g ia n  and  British  d ivers, said  the rescue o p e ra t io n  w as  g o in g  
’’ s lo w ly .”  H e  a d d e d , ’’ T h ere  are a lo t  o f  p e o p le  tak in g  part in  the 
d e c is io n -m a k in g  p rocess  and  so m e  o f  th em  m igh t n o t  have the p r o ­
fess ion a l q u a lifica tion s  to  u nderstand  the con se q u e n ce s  o f  the d e c i­
s ion s  th ey  th ink  sh ou ld  be  m a d e .”
T h e  p ro b le m  o f  a ccep tin g  o ffe rs  fo r  in tern ation a l assistance w a s, 
clearly, a d e c is io n -m a k in g  p ro b le m  o f  h istorica l p r o p o r t io n s . R u ss­
ian  m ilitary  units had  after the end o f  the C o ld  W ar p artic ip a ted  in 
jo in t  m ilitary  o p e ra tio n s  w ith in  the fra m e w o rk  o f  the PFP, bu t never
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had  W estern  m ilitary  o r  civ ilian  o p era tion s  b een  carried  o u t  in  a c r i­
sis s itu ation  o n  R u ssian  territory.
M o s t  likely, a n u m b er o f  fu n d a m en ta l values w e re  o n  the line as 
the R u ssian  leaders tried  to  o rga n ize  the rescue o p e ra t io n . I f the 
p o lit ic ia n s  w o u ld  have im m ed ia te ly  a ccep ted  in tern ation a l h elp , this 
c o u ld  have been  in terpreted  as a sign  o f  d isb e lie f in  the R u ssian  m il­
ita ry ’s cap ab ilities . S ince K ursk  w as  a tech n ica lly  a d v a n ced  w e a p o n  
system , R u ssian  leaders c o u ld  a lso  have been  co n ce rn e d  a b o u t  
gran tin g  fore ig n ers  access to  the area.
O b serv ers  have a lso  specu la ted  that the ap p ea ra n ce  o f  fo re ig n  
ships in  the area -  w ith  in co m p a tib le  te c h n o lo g y  an d  crew s sp ea k ­
ing  d ifferen t languages -  w o u ld  have b een  a b ig  n u isan ce  fo r  the 
R u ssians. T h is  c o u ld  s im p ly  have been  p erce iv ed  as an  o b s ta c le  (see 
C N N , 18 A u g u st 2 0 0 0 ) .  O th er  sou rces  in d ica te  that the R u ssian  
leadersh ip  be liev ed  that a ccep tin g  fo re ig n  assistance earlier w o u ld  
n o t  have m ad e  a d ifferen ce  becau se  the harsh  w eath er w o u ld  have 
a n y w a y  in terfered  w ith  the rescue o p e ra t io n  (C N N , 2 2  A u gu st 
2 0 0 0 ) .  T h e  intensity  o f  this va lue c o n flic t  c o u ld  p ro v id e  a p lau sib le  
e x p la n a tio n  to  the fa ct  that the d e c is io n  to  a cce p t  in tern ation a l as­
sistance w as  d ragg ed  ou t.
4 . C a ll o f f  the rescu e  o p e ra t io n ?
D esp ite  the w eath er  an d  the d ifficu lty  o f  a ttach in g  a cap su le  to  the 
su bm arin e  at a dep th  o f  m o re  than  1 5 0  m eters (5 0 0  feet), rescuers 
w ere  aw are  o f  the n eed  to  act sw iftly. O n  A u gu st 14  the sp ok esm a n  
said  that o x y g e n  w as  ru n n in g  o u t  and  the so u n d  o f  ta p p in g  c o m in g  
fr o m  the su bm arin e  w as getting  w eaker. ” O f  co u rse , the o x y g e n  is 
ru n n in g  lo w . P eop le  just n eed  to  lie o r  sit d o w n ,”  the sp ok esm a n  
said.
O n  A u g u st 16  R u ssian  N a v y  D e p u ty  C h ie f, A d m ira l A le x a n d e r  
P o b o i ,  said there c o u ld  be  e n o u g h  o x y g e n  inside the K ursk  fo r  the 
c re w  to  survive  tw o  to  three w eek s . But o x y g e n  eq u ip m en t c o u ld  
have been  d estroyed  o r  d a m a g ed . D e p u ty  Prim e M in ister  Ilya K le ­
b a n o v  (the h ead  o f  the g o v ern m en t c o m m is s io n  that rev iew ed  the 
rescue e ffo rt) sa id , ‘ ’ T h ere  h ave  been  n o  sou n d s  fo r  qu ite  a lo n g  
t im e”  fr o m  inside the K ursk . H e  stressed, h ow ever , that it w as t o o  
early  to  d ra w  an y  co n c lu s io n s  a b o u t  the crew .
S u bsequ en t to  this, a m ilitary  sp ok esm a n  to ld  C N N  that co n ta c t  
had  been  m a d e  earlier w ith  the su bm arin e  w h e n  the su bm arin e  c a p ­
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sule, w h ich  w as  attem ptin g  to  rescue the sa ilors  inside, h ad  actua lly  
c o m e  in to  p h ysica l co n ta c t  w ith  the hull o f  the su bm arin e . Y et these 
c la im s w ere  q u e stion a b le , s ince ap p aren tly  there h ad  n o t  been  any 
p h ysica l co n ta c t  w ith  the su bm arin e  hull due to  the ro u g h  w eath er 
co n d it io n s .
A t  the sam e tim e the In terfa x  N e w s  A g e n cy  q u o te d  the C h ie f o f  
the R u ssian  N avy , A d m ira l V la d im ir  K u ro y e d o v , as saying that 
there w as su ffic ien t o x y g e n  in  the su bm arin e  to  last until A u g u st 2 5 . 
T h e  d ay  b e fo re  (A u gu st 15) the adm ira l h ad  said  that the o x y g e n  
w as  ex p e cte d  to  run  o u t o n  A u g u st 18 . D esp ite  the g lo o m y  assess­
m en t o ffe re d  b y  m a n y  exp erts, the su b m a rin e ’s designer, Ig or  B ara­
n ov , to ld  the R u ssian  Itar-Tass n ew s ag en cy  o n  A u g u st 16  that the 
c re w  sh o u ld  be  ab le  to  survive a b o a rd  the K ursk  fo r  a n oth er  tw o  
days. T h is  raised  h op e s  that a rescue o p e ra t io n  c o u ld  be  su ccessfu lly  
ca rried  o u t  o n  A u g u st 18 o r  A u g u st 19.
T h e  crisis reach ed  a ch illin g  c lim a x  o n  A u gu st 19 w h e n  m ilitary  
leaders ad m itted  there w as n o  lon g er  any  realistic h o p e  o f  fin d in g  
the m en  alive. In a so m b e r  a n n ou n cem en t, M ik h a il M o ts a k , to ld  the 
R u ssian  n a tion  in  a specia l te lev is ion  b ro a d ca s t, “ O u r  w o rs t  fears 
have c o m e  tru e .”  H e  d escr ib ed  the traged y  as “ the gravest disaster 
k n o w n  in the h is tory  o f  the R u ssian  su bm arin e  fle e t”  bu t said  res­
cu e  e fforts  w o u ld  con tin u e .
O n  te lev is ion  M o ts a k  d escr ib ed  h o w  the m en  in the fro n t  p art o f  
the vessel d ied  instantly  in  the huge e x p lo s io n  that sent the 1 8 ,0 0 0  
to n  su bm arin e  to  the b o t to m  o f  the Barents Sea. “ M o s t  likely, the 
w h o le  fro n t  section  w as  f lo o d e d  and  the c re w  in th ose  section s  d ied  
w ith in  the first fe w  m inutes o f  the a c c id e n t ,”  M o ts a k  said . T h e  first 
v ictim s w o u ld  have in c lu d ed  the ca p ta in  and  a lm ost all o f  the sen ior  
o ffice rs . T h e  su b m a rin e ’s c o n tr o l  cen ter w o u ld  have then  been  c o m ­
p lete ly  d isab led .
M o ts a k  revea led  that the R u ssian  h igh  c o m m a n d  h ad  c o n s id e r ­
a b ly  m o re  in fo rm a tio n  a b o u t  the c o n d it io n  o f  th ose  sa ilors  w h o  had  
su rv ived  the b last than  h ad  b een  p re v io u s ly  th ou g h t. S urvivors w ere  
still h am m erin g  m essages o n  the hull o f  the su bm arin e  4 8  h ou rs  a f­
ter h itting the o ce a n  flo o r , he sa id , and  a p p eared  to  have been  
tra p p ed  in  air p o ck e ts  in  the b a ck  o f  the vessel. M o ts a k  d escr ib ed  
h o w  the stran ded  seam en  b a n g ed  desperate ly  in  an attem pt to  w a rn  
rescuers that w ater w as  leak in g  in  an d  s lo w ly  d ep riv in g  th em  o f  
o x y g e n  and  in creasin g  the air pressure.
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C learly , this event m eets all the criteria  o f  a classica l crisis d e c i­
s io n -m a k in g  p ro b le m . T h e  lives o f  the c re w  w ere  in  o b v io u s  dan ger 
b ecau se  tim e w as ru n n in g  o u t , an d , as the co n flic t in g  statem ents re ­
veal, there w as m u ch  u n certa in ty  co n ce rn in g  the p oss ib ility  that 
a n y on e  c o u ld  have su rvived  the a cc id en t. T h is  p ro b le m  is a re cu r­
rent o n e  in  crisis d e c is io n -m a k in g . In m a n y  large-sca le  accid en ts  
w h ere  h u m an  lives are at stake, the first and  m o st  acute p ro b le m  is 
to  m o b iliz e  all ava ilab le  resou rces  and  to  orga n ize  a rescue o p e r a ­
t ion . D e cis io n -m a k e rs  even tu ally  reach  a p o in t  w h en  they are fo r c e d  
to  ca ll o f f  the search  fo r  su rv ivors . T h is  type  o f  d e c is io n  requires 
tech n ica l in fo rm a tio n , exp ert a d v ice  and  an accu rate  assessm ent o f  
the s itu a tion  (c .f. M u r k  and R u g a m , 1 9 9 9 ).
5 . Salvage the w re ck  o r  d ecla re  it as a sea b u ria l?
A s the acu te  crisis phase en d ed , the R u ssian  leadersh ip  w as fa ce d  w ith  
an oth er  critica l d e c is io n -m a k in g  d ilem m a . S h ou ld  o n e  attem pt to  
raise the su n ken  su bm arin e  at an e n o rm o u s  co s t  and g ive  the sa ilors  a 
p ro p e r  fu n era l o r  sh ou ld  the w re ck  be d ecla red  as a bu ria l at sea? 
Statem ents in d ica te  that the R u ssian  authorities in  late O c to b e r  
th ou g h t a b o u t  ca n ce lin g  the sa lvag in g  o p e ra t io n . ” If the analysis o f  
the s itu a tion  inside the su bm arin e  sh o w s  the presen ce  o f  t o o  m u ch  
dan ger and  t o o  h igh  a risk  fo r  the d ivers , I, as C h ie f C o m m a n d e r  o f  
the N a v y , w ill be  fo r c e d  to  give the o rd e r  to  ca n ce l the o p e r a t io n ,”  
A d m ira l V la d im ir  K u r o y e d o v  said  in  a statem ent o n  O c to b e r  2 0 . T h e  
attem pts to  re co v e r  the b o d ie s  w ere  h alted  o n  N o v e m b e r  7 , 2 0 0 0 . A t 
this p o in t , a to ta l n u m b er o f  12  b o d ie s  h ad  been  p u lled  fr o m  the 
w reck . T h e  d e c is io n  to  a b a n d o n  the e fforts  to  re co v e r  the rem ain in g  
b o d ie s  w as m a d e  after the d iv in g  c re w  d eem ed  the risks to  be  t o o  h igh . 
T h e  d ivers risked  p u n ctu rin g  their suits o r  air tubes i f  they ven tu red  
furth er (C N N , 7  N o v e m b e r  2 0 0 0 ) .  O n  N o v e m b e r  2 2 , the R u ssian  au ­
th orities  d ecla red  that an attem pt to  salvage the su n ken  su bm arin e  
w o u ld  be  in itiated  d u rin g  the su m m er o f  2 0 0 1 .
O b v io u s ly , an attem pt to  raise K ursk  w as an ex trem ely  c o m p li ­
ca ted  p ro je c t . It w o u ld  be  co s t ly  and  tech n ica lly  d ifficu lt  (see C N N , 
16  July 2 0 0 1 ) .  T h is  p ro je c t  w as, like the rescue o p e ra t io n , p lan n ed  
to  be  a jo in t  in tern ation a l o p e ra t io n . Y et, this p ro b le m  w as o v e r ­
s h a d o w e d  b y  d iffe r in g  o p in io n s  fr o m  the experts  and the c r e w ’s re l­
atives. E xperts w ere  co n ce rn e d  that an attem pt to  raise K u rsk  fro m  
the b o t to m  o f  the sea c o u ld  d a m age  the n u clear rea ctors  o n b o a rd
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even tu a lly  resu lting in  an en v iron m en ta l disaster. S om e relatives had  
the o p in io n  that the c re w  sh ou ld  rem ain  at the b o t to m  o f  the sea 
w hereas others s tron g ly  d isagreed  (D agen s N yh eter, 2 7  O c to b e r  
2 0 0 0 ) .
T h e  R u ssian  g o v e rn m e n t d e c id e d  that the K u rsk  w o u ld  be  
b ro u g h t  u p  fr o m  the sea an d  b ro u g h t  to  lan d  in  o rd e r  to  b u ry  the 
d ead  sa ilors, to  d eterm in e w h a t cau sed  the a cc id en t, and  to  salvage 
the eq u ip m en t w h ich  h ad  n o t  b een  d a m a g ed . T h is  in c lu d ed  the n u ­
clear re a ctor  o n  b o a r d  the vessel. T h e  rea son , fo r  n o t  w a n tin g  to  
leave the su bm arin e  w h ere  it w as, w as in  part that the n u clear rea c­
to r  c o u ld  p o se  a threat to  the e c o lo g y  s ince the w re ck  w as in a fre ­
qu en tly  u tilized  and  fa ir ly  in tensively  tra ffick e d  p art o f  the Barents 
Sea ( “ K u rsk  raising o p e ra t io n  to  be  the su b ject o f  an on lin e  press 
c o n fe r e n c e ,”  2 5  M a y  2 0 0 1 ) .
S im ilar issues arose  in  the a fterm ath  o f  the E ston ia  ferry  ca tas­
tro p h e  in  1 9 9 4  (see H asper, 1 9 9 9 ). W h e n  the issue o f  w h eth er o r  
n o t  to  salvage the ferry  a rose , it w as in ten sively  d ebated  a m o n g  the 
relatives and  p o lit ic ia n s . In co m p a r is o n , the sam e issue w as n o t  as 
h eav ily  d ebated  in R u ssia . Such  issues shed ligh t o n  the typ e  o f  va l­
ue c o m p le x ity  w h ich  co n fro n ts  crisis d ecis ion -m a k ers . T o u g h  d e c i­
s io n -m a k in g  p ro b le m s  d o  n o t  o n ly  o c c u r  d u rin g  the acu te  phase o f  a 
crisis bu t a lso  in  the a fterm ath .
Analysis
LEADERSHIP
C ritic ism  to w a rd s  President Putin , o th er  p o lit ic ia n s , and  the m ilitary  
leadersh ip  is p r o b a b ly  the m o st  d ebated  d im e n s io n  o f  the K u rsk  a c ­
c id en t. Prim arily, the R u ssian  leadersh ip  w as b la m ed  fo r  the s lo w  
an d  u n co o rd in a te d  resp on se  to  the a cc id en t. S om e critics  argu ed  
that i f  the leaders h ad  re sp o n d e d  m o re  q u ick ly  b y  a ccep tin g  in terna­
tion a l assistance, so m e  o f  the c re w  m em bers  c o u ld  have been  res­
cu ed . A d d ition a lly , the au thorities w ere  severely  cr itic ized  fo r  n o t  in ­
fo rm in g  the relatives and  the p u b lic  a b o u t  the latest d eve lop m en ts . 
O n ce  in fo rm a tio n  w as a n n o u n ce d , it o fte n  p ro v id e d  co n flic t in g  
v iew s o f  w h a t h ad  h a p p en ed  an d  the ch an ces  o f  fin d in g  s o m e b o d y  
alive.
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T h ese  types o f  a llegation s  are very  c o m m o n  in the trans-crisis 
stage and  esp ecia lly  in  the a fterm ath  o f  crisis s itu ation s. S om eth in g  
g oes  w r o n g , and  the p o lit ica l estab lish m en t, the m ed ia , and the p u b ­
lic search  fo r  sca p eg oa ts . In these s itu ation s, it is very  c o m m o n  that 
to p -le v e l d ec is ion -m a k ers  are the on es  that are held  resp on sib le . T h e  
effects  o f  these s o -ca lle d  ‘ b la m e -g a m e s ’ m a y  be  d isastrou s fo r  in d i­
v idu a l leaders as w e ll as fo r  g o v ern m en t orga n iza tion s . In div iduals  
m a y  lose  their jo b s  and o rg a n iza tion s  m a y  lo se  their cred ib ility . 
T h ese  negative  events can  a lso  e ro d e  p o p u la r  c o n fid e n ce  in  the state 
m a ch in ery  as a w h o le  (see B oven s and  H a rt, 1 9 9 6 ; B oven s et al.,
1 9 9 9 ).
Studies have s h o w n  that the m ed ia  has b e c o m e  in creasin g ly  cr it­
ica l in  its co v e ra g e  o f  p o lit ica l life . T h is  is n o t  o n ly  the case in  the 
W est bu t a lso  a trend  w h ich  ch aracterizes  the n e w ly  established  
d em o cra c ie s  in  E astern E u rop e . In regard  to  p o p u la r  su p p o rt  fo r  
n e w  d e m o cra c ie s , there are in d ica tion s  that p e o p le ’s attitudes t o ­
w a rd s  the reg im e are vo la tile  and  d ep en d  h eav ily  u p o n  the re g im e ’s 
p e r fo rm a n ce  (M ish ler  and  R o s e , 1 9 9 9 ). A  reg im e ’s resp on se  to  ca ta ­
s tro p h ic  events can  th ere fore  be  very  s ign ifican t. I f the resp on se  is 
d eem ed  in ad equ ate  o r  u n su ccessfu l, there c o u ld  be  seriou s negative  
con se q u e n ce s  fo r  the very  fo u n d a t io n  o f  d e m o cra t ic  g ov e rn a n ce . In 
o th er  w o rd s , im p o rta n t d e m o cra t ic  values m a y  be o n  the line du rin g  
a crisis w h e n  the robu stn ess  o f  an in stitu tion  is pu t to  test. F rom  
this p ersp ective , the w a y (s ) leaders c o p e  w ith  cr itic ism  can  be cr iti­
ca l in o rd e r  to  m ain ta in  o r  restore  p u b lic  c o n fid e n ce  in the state.
T h is  w ill n o t  be  sp e c ifica lly  exa m in ed  in this chapter. R ather, 
this ch ap ter  fo cu ses  o n  h o w  the R u ssian  leadersh ip  dealt w ith  the 
h ig h ly  negative  a tm osp h ere  w h ich  ch aracter ized  the a fterm ath  o f  
the K ursk  acc id en t. P rev iou s studies have p o in te d  o u t  a n u m b er o f  
tactics  leaders, in  gen era l, resort to  in  o rd e r  to  a v o id  b lam e.
But first, it is in teresting to  see that President P u tin ’s a ction s  had  
co n s id e ra b le  s y m b o lic  value. In crises, the p o lit ica l o rd er  and  sta b ili­
ty  is pu t o n  the line. T o  deal w ith  the ch a llen ge  o f  k eep in g  fa ith  in 
the robu stn ess  o f  the state, it is a b so lu te ly  cr itica l that leaders and 
oth er  state representatives are ab le  to  co m m u n ica te  w ith  the genera l 
p u b lic . T h is  ca n  be d o n e  in  a n u m b er o f  w a ys . A b o v e  all, it has been  
argu ed  that it is especia lly  im p o rta n t to  be  active  -  verb a lly  and 
p h ys ica lly  (H art, 1 9 9 3 ).
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P u tin ’s d e c is io n  to  co n tin u e  his v a ca tio n  d u rin g  the first fe w  
days after the in c id en t p ro v e d  to  have a s ign ifican t im p a ct  o n  the 
m a n ag em en t o f  the crisis. D u e  to  em p irica l sh o r tco m in g s , o n e  can  
o n ly  specu la te  P u tin ’s th ou gh ts  at that tim e. W ith  som e  certainty, 
h ow ever , it seem s rea son a b le  to  assum e that Putin  m is ju d ged  the 
p o w e r  o f  the R u ssian  m edia  and a lso  p o ss ib ly  the severity  o f  the sit­
u a tion . T h is  is a g o o d  e x a m p le  o f  the types o f  p ro b le m s  fa c in g  tran ­
sition a l cou n tries . T o d a y  in  R u ssia  there are still m a n y  institu tion s 
h o ld in g  o n  to  the o ld  S ov iet heritage. T h ese  institu tion s have n o t  
been  ty p ica lly  a ffected  b y  ou ts id e  fo rce s , but n o w  the in creasin g ly  
w estern ized  p u b lic  has m o re  in flu en ce . Several ob servers  have c o m ­
p ared  P u tin ’s a ction s  w ith  G o r b a c h e v ’s resp on se  to  the C h e rn o b y l 
disaster in  1 9 8 6 . In the C h e rn o b y l case , G o rb a c h e v  w a ited  18 days 
b e fo re  co m m e n tin g  u p o n  the disaster (T h e  R ussia  Jou rn a l, 19 A u ­
gust 2 0 0 0 ; C N N , 18 A u gu st 2 0 0 0 ) .
Putin  p erh aps rea lized  that his p resen ce  at the scene o f  the a cc i­
den t o r  in  the K rem lin  du rin g  the first fe w  days o f  the ca tastrop h e  
w o u ld  n o t  have h e lp ed  facilita te  the rescue o p e ra t io n . In fa ct, he ar­
gu ed  that he th o u g h t he w o u ld  have h a m p ered  the rescue w o rk  
(C N N , 18 A u gu st 2 0 0 0 ) .  W h a t  he m o st  certa in ly  m isju d ged  w as the 
s y m b o lic  value o f  tak in g  a m o re  active  ro le  in  the in itial stage o f  the 
crisis. L o n g  after the ca ta strop h e , Putin  ad m itted  this w as a m istake 
and  based  o n  cu rren t o b serv a tion s  it appears as i f  he has p r o b a b ly  
learn ed  fr o m  it (see C N N , 8 S eptem ber 2 0 0 0 ) .  H o w e v e r , at the tim e 
w h en  critic ism  and basica lly  the w h o le  state apparatus (in clu d in g  
the m ilitary  and  the p o lit ica l establish m en t) w ere  in ten sively  against 
h im , he resorted  to  a m o re  defen sive  strategy.
R esea rch  has s h o w n  that leaders have a w h o le  rep erto ire  o f  re­
spon ses  to  fa ll b a ck  u p o n  in  a s itu ation  w h ere  th ey  are p u t un der 
n egative  pressure. T h ese  in clu d e  rh etorica l as w ell as b eh a v iora l a c ­
tion s . N on -a rg u m e n ta tiv e  tactics  in v o lv e  rem ain in g  silent and 
a v o id in g  an sw erin g  critica l qu estion s . It has been  p r o p o s e d  that “ in 
a fu lly  d e v e lo p e d  libera l d e m o cra cy , w ith  attentive n ew s m edia  and 
active  p o lit ica l representatives, p o lic y  m akers w ill s o o n e r  o r  later 
have to  resort to  tactics  o f  a rather argu m en tative  nature and d e fen d  
th em selves”  (B oven s et a l., 1 9 9 8 :1 2 8 ) .  T h e  fin d in gs  fr o m  the K ursk  
case suggest that this o b se rv a tio n  is a lso  va lid  in  fa ir ly  n e w  estab ­
lished  and  d e v e lo p in g  d em o cra c ie s . A s the critic ism  grew , Putin  and 
his co llea gu es  w ere  fo r c e d  to  use an argu m en tative  resp on se .
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T h ese  tactics  c o u ld  be  p la ced  o n  a co n tin u u m  w ith  argum ents 
d en y in g  the negative  even t o n  o n e  side and  p u b lic  excu ses  o n  the 
other. A fte r  be in g  silent d u rin g  the first c o u p le  o f  days, President 
Putin  and  oth er  m em bers  o f  the R u ssian  leadersh ip  m a d e  use o f  a 
n u m b er o f  su ch  tactics . Particu larly , the pattern  B oven s et al. ca ll 
‘ rep en ta n ce ’ is p rom in en t. T h is  in clu d es  m ak in g  p u b lic  excu ses and  
p ro m is in g  fin an cia l c o m p e n sa tio n  fo r  dam ages.
• P o p o v , the C o m m a n d e r  o f  the R u ssian  N o rth e rn  Fleet, a p o l­
o g iz e d  o n  R u ssian  te lev is ion  fo r  “ n o t  savin g  the sa ilo rs ”  
(C N N , 21  A u g u st 2 0 0 0 ) .
• P u tin ’s o w n  adviser a ck n o w le d g e d  that the President sh ou ld  
have tak en  a d ifferen t co u rse  o f  a c t io n  and  the adviser t o o k  
fu ll resp on s ib ility  fo r  this ‘ m istak e ’ (C N N , 2 4  A u g u st 2 0 0 0 ) .
• Putin  h im se lf t o o k  fu ll resp on sib ility  fo r  the a cc id en t in  ar­
gu in g  that “ I am  resp on s ib le  fo r  it and feel gu ilty  fo r  this 
tra g e d y ”  (D e tro it  Free Press, 2 4  A u g u st 2 0 0 0 ) .
• T h e  G o v e rn m e n t d e c id e d  that the m ilitary  sh o u ld  fin a n cia lly  
lo o k  after the fam ilies b y  p ro v id in g  th em  w ith  co m p e n sa tio n  
w o rth  US $ 7 0 0 0  -  ro u g h ly  an average 10 year in co m e  
(C N N , 2 3  A u g u st 2 0 0 0 ) .
It is a lso  c o m m o n  in  fa iled  crisis m a n ag em en t that a fe w  o f  the k ey  
a ctors  o ffe r  to  resign . T h is  strategy is o fte n  u tilized  du rin g  crises, yet 
these resign ation  letters are a lm ost a lw ays re fu ted  as ev id en t in  a 
fe w  E ston ian  case studies (see Stern and  N o h rs te d t , 1 9 9 9 ). T h e  
sam e th ing h a p p en ed  in  the a fterm ath  o f  the K u rsk  traged y  w h en  
three sen ior  o ffic ia ls  -  D efen se  M in ister  Ig or  Sergeyev, N a v y  C h ie f 
V la d im ir  K u r o y e d o v  and  the C o m m a n d e r  o f  the R u ssian  N o rth e rn  
Fleet V y a ch es la v  P o p o v  -  o ffe re d  to  resign . Putin , h ow ever , refu sed  
to  a cce p t  their resign ation s.
CRISIS C O M M U N IC A T IO N  A N D  M ED IA RELATION S
P rev iou s research  has s h o w n  that o n e  o f  the m o st  d ifficu lt  tasks c r i­
sis d ec is ion -m a k ers  have to  c o p e  w ith  is to  co o rd in a te  the f lo w  o f  
in fo rm a tio n . E ven  th o u g h  the f lo w  o f  in fo rm a tio n  d ram atica lly  in ­
creases d u rin g  a crisis, there are a lso  exa m p les  w h ere  in fo rm a tio n  is 
a lm ost to ta lly  m issing . D u e  to  these d ifficu lties , it is o fte n  p r o b le m ­
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atic to  m ak e  w e ll-e d u ca te d , th o u g h tfu l d ecis ion s . In these s itu ation s, 
the e lem ent o f  u n certa in ty  is c learly  evident.
But the aspect o f  in fo rm a tio n  m an agem en t is n o t  o n ly  a b o u t  d e ­
c is io n -m a k e rs ’ access to  in fo rm a tio n . T h is  them e a lso  en com p asses  
h o w  d ec is ion -m a k ers  co m m u n ica te  w ith  each  other, the m ed ia , the 
w id e r  p u b lic  and  oth er  au d ien ces. M a n y  studies in d ica te  that the 
ab ility  to  su ccessfu lly  reso lv e  a crisis s itu a tion  very  m u ch  d ep en d s 
u p o n  h o w  the p r o b le m  is fo rm u la te d  and  co m m u n ica te d  to  the s o ­
cia l and  p o lit ica l en v iron m en t. L eg itim a cy  and  p o lit ica l su p p o rt  
very  m u ch  h in ge  u p o n  the ab ility  to  c o n tr o l  the extern a l f lo w  o f  in ­
fo rm a tio n . F rom  this p ersp ective , the n ew s m ed ia  is a k ey  actor.
P rev iou s studies o n  crisis m an ag em en t in  E astern E u rop ea n  c o u n ­
tries p ro v id e  co n flic t in g  ev id en ce  o n  the b eh a v ior  o f  the n ew s m edia  
an d  its im p a ct o n  crisis m an agem en t e ffo rts . In so m e  cou n tries  (e .g . 
E ston ia ) the n ew s m ed ia  has e v o lv e d  in to  a p o w e r fu l w a tc h d o g  that 
appears to  be very  aggressive du rin g  a crisis. Several cases fr o m  the 
E ston ian  c o n te x t  revea l that p o lit ica l and  bu reau cra tic  c o n flic ts  o fte n  
are fu e led  b y  intensive and  critica l m ass m ed ia  co v e ra g e  (Stern and 
N o h rs te d t , 1 9 9 9 ). In con tra st, exp erien ces  fr o m  oth er  cou n tries  in  the 
re g io n  (e .g . L atvia) s h o w  that the n ew s m ed ia  has h ad  less o f  an im ­
p a ct  o n  crisis d e v e lo p m e n t. C ases fr o m  Latvia in d ica te  that p reva ilin g  
eth ic tensions seem  to  be the m ost c o n s p icu o u s  d riv in g  fo r c e  (Stern 
an d  H a n sen , 2 0 0 0 ) .  It is w id e ly  k n o w n  that the m ed ia  w as  a p o w e r fu l 
a c to r  du rin g  the K u rsk  a cc id en t. T h is  analysis takes a c lo se r  lo o k  in to  
h o w  this ro le  w as  p la yed  and  h o w  it a ffe cted  the d e v e lo p m e n t o f  the 
crisis.
T h e  K ursk  traged y  rece ived  substantia l g lo b a l m edia  cov e ra g e . 
H o w e v e r , jou rn a lists  w ere  n o t  g iven  access to  the area near the a c c i­
d ent; the o n ly  e x ce p t io n  bein g  the state te lev is ion  ch an n el R T R . A ll 
o f  the o th er  te lev is ion  ch an n els  w ere  d ep riv ed  o f  the o p p o r tu n ity  to  
f o l lo w  the rescue o p e ra t io n  d irectly  at the scen e. A c c o r d in g  to  the 
n ew sp a p er  Izvestia 4 this w as a d irect o rd er  fr o m  President Putin .
N e w sp a p e rs  o w n e d  b y  the p o w e r fu l m edia  ty c o o n s  B oris  B ere­
z o v sk y  and  V la d im ir  G u sin sk y  p o rtra y e d  the K rem lin  as gu ilty  fo r  
the co n fu se d  and  feeb le  rescue o p e ra t io n . ” If the c re w  o f  the K ursk  
is n o t  saved , the rep u ta tion  o f  the R u ssian  g o v ern m en t w ill be lost 
b e y o n d  h o p e ”  w as  a h ead lin e  in  the B e re zo v sk y -o w n e d  n ew sp a p er  
N e za v is im a ya  G a zeta . T h e  d a ily  n ew sp a p er  M o s k o v s k y  K o m s o m o -  
lets, w h ich  su p p o rte d  M o s c o w  M a y o r  Y u ry  L u zh k ov , p u b lish ed  a
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fro n t-p a g e  p h o to  o f  Putin  in  a nava l u n ifo rm ; a sn ide rem in d er that 
the P resident h ad  spen t a n igh t o n  an a to m ic  su bm arin e  in A p r il 
1 9 9 9  and pra ised  the su bm arin e  fleet sayin g  it w as  R u ss ia ’s fu ture 
m ilitary  s tro n g h o ld . T h e  n e w sp a p er  Izvestia _ ran a fro n t-p a g e  p ic ­
ture w ith  the c re w  o f  the K ursk  un der the h ead lin e: ’ ’ T h e  Price o f  
N a t io n a l Pride —  H u m a n  L iv e s .”
T h e  te lev is ion  c o m p a n y  T V  6 , c o n tro lle d  b y  B erezovsk y , aired  a 
sp ecia l p ro g ra m  d e v o te d  to  the K ursk  traged y  o n  A u g u st 1 6 -1 7 .  
T h e  p ro g ra m  w as  live and  T V  v iew ers w ere  en co u ra g e d  to  discuss 
their o p in io n s  o n  the a u th orities ’ ab ility  to  save the su bm arin e  crew . 
Y e g o r  T o m k o , the s ix ty -fiv e  year o ld  fo rm e r  co m m a n d e r  o f  the 
a to m ic  su bm arin e  unit, said  the o n ly  rea son  fo r  the traged y  w as  an 
e x p lo s io n  in  the fro n t  co m p a rtm e n t  o f  the su bm arin e . H e  a lso  said , 
’ ’ o n ly  o n e  th ird  o f  the c re w  c o u ld  p o ss ib ly  still be  alive -  th ose  p e o ­
p le  w h o  w ere  in the b a ck  p art o f  the su b m a rin e .”
O th er  v iew ers had  d ifferen t o p in io n s . N in ety -e ig h t p ercen t o f  
the St. P etersburg te lev is ion  au d ien ce  cr itic ized  the G o v e rn m e n t fo r  
n o t  a ccep tin g  tech n ica l help  fr o m  fo re ig n  states earlier; fo u r  days 
h ad  b een  los t  becau se  o f  the d elayed  d e c is io n . ” It is n ecessary  to  use 
all p oss ib le  m eans to  save the c r e w ”  w as  a w id e ly  a ccep ted  n o t io n . 
S ix ty -fo u r  p ercen t o f  the au d ien ce  w as  sure the N a v y  leadersh ip  w as 
n o t  revea lin g  the real reason s fo r  the traged y  and h ad  d ece ived  the 
p u b lic  b y  using the m ass m ed ia  to  c o n c e a l their o w n  resp on sib ility  
fo r  the a cc id en t. ’ ’ T h e y  o n ly  th in k  a b o u t  the stripes o n  their sh o u l­
d er.”  F o r ty -fo u r  p ercen t o f  the au d ien ce  lo o k e d  n egative ly  u p o n  the 
fa ct  that K le b a n o v  w a s  absent the first fe w  days. “ H e  and Putin 
sh ou ld  n o t  be  re la x in g  in  S och i, b u t sh ou ld  be  d irectin g  the a d m i­
ra ls .”
T h ese  ob se rv a tio n s  a b o u t  the R u ssian  m ed ia  co v e ra g e  o f  the in ­
c id en t are qu ite  sim ilar to  p rev iou s  studies a b o u t  crisis m an agem en t 
in  the B altic States. D ra w in g  u p o n  case studies a b o u t  crises in  E sto ­
nia and  L atv ia , Stern and H an sen  (2 0 0 1 : 3 4 9 ) c o n c lu d e  that:
W h erea s  o ld  gu ard  p o lit ic ia n s  in  state socia list  cou n tries  
c o u ld  c o u n t  o n  a d o c ile  and su p p ortiv e  m ed ia , p u b lic  ser­
vants in  the n e w  d e m o cra c ie s  are in creasin g ly  c o n fro n te d  
w ith  an aggressive, co m m e rc ia lly  or ien ted  and  critica l 
m ed ia , w h ich  takes its ‘w a tc h d o g ’ ro le  very seriously. 
Strategies (su ch  as ‘ c o v e r  u p s ’ o f  m istakes) w h ich  m igh t 
have been  ex trem ely  e ffective  un der the o ld  system  have
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the p oten tia l to  b a ck fire  d ra m a tica lly  if  jou rn a lists  m a n ­
age to  get w in d  o f  the em barrassin g  in fo rm a tio n  anyw ay.
T h is  o b se rv a tio n  seem s very  va lid  in  ligh t o f  the K u rsk  acc id en t. 
N e w sp a p e rs  and  televised  m ed ia  h ad  an im p o rta n t ro le  to  p la y  fo r  
p u b lic  o p in io n , as d em on stra ted  b y  the au d ien ce  surveys. A ls o , on e  
ca n  see that the m ed ia  fo rm e d  its o w n  o p in io n  co n ce rn in g  the su c­
cess o r  fa ilure o f  the a u th orities ’ e ffo rts  (see fo r  e x a m p le  T h e  R ussia  
J ou rn a l, 19  A u gu st 2 0 0 0 ) .  G iven  the lim ited  a m o u n t o f  o ff ic ia l  d o c ­
u m en ta tion  and  eye-w itn ess rep orts  fr o m  th ose  in d iv id u a ls  w h o  p a r­
tic ip a ted  in  the R u ssian  crisis resp on se  to  the K ursk  a cc id en t, w e  
ca n n o t  d o  an yth in g  bu t specu la te  a b o u t  the strategies the R u ssian  
au th orities  h ad  w h e n  co n fro n t in g  the n a tion a l an d  in tern ation a l m e ­
dia.
B ased o n  statem ents m ad e  b y  d ifferen t state o ffic ia ls  co n ce rn in g  
the la ck  o f  c o o r d in a t io n  and  the la ck  o f  in fo rm a tio n  a b o u t  the 
K u rsk  in cid en t, o n e  c o u ld  co n c lu d e  w ith  so m e  certa in ty  that the 
R u ssian  authorities  w ere  relatively  u n p rep ared  fo r  the d ram atic  m e ­
dia co v e ra g e  su rrou n d in g  the event. P ossib ly , th ey  un derestim ated  
the p o w e r  o f  the n e w  m ed ia . T h e  q u estion  is, then , w h eth er the 
R u ssian  leaders and  authorities  have learn ed  an yth in g  fr o m  the 
K u rsk  a cc id en t in  re trosp ect.
In S w eden , fo r  ex a m p le , there is a g r o w in g  trend  that p o lic y  
m ak ers engage in  ‘m ed ia  tra in in g ’ p rog ra m s. T h a t is, th ey  w o r k  
c lo se ly  w ith  jou rn a lists  in  o rd e r  to  p repare  fo r  fu tu re  m ed ia  storm s. 
S ince the ro le  o f  the n ew s m edia  in  tran sition a l states clearly  f o l lo w  
the w estern  tren d , it rem ains to  be  seen if  p o lic y  m akers realize the 
need  fo r  be in g  better p rep a red  to  m eet a critica l m ed ia  in  the fu ture. 
H o p e fu lly , the K u rsk  a cc id en t serves as an eye-open er.
TH E  V IC T IM S ’ PERSPECTIVE: C O M M U N IC A T IN G  W IT H  
TH E  RELATIVES
O n e  asp ect that has n o t  rece ived  m u ch  a tten tion  in the stu dy  o f  c r i­
sis m an ag em en t is w h a t on e  c o u ld  ca ll ‘ the v ic tim s ’ p e rsp ectiv e .’ 
M a n y  p ro b le m s  that d ecis ion -m a k ers  fa ce  in tim es o f  a crisis are 
m ateria l in nature. T h e y  m a y  be  fa ce d  w ith  the ch a llen ge  o f  q u ick ly  
m o b iliz in g  resou rces , to  fin d  ad  h o c  so lu tion s  to  p ro b le m s  that had  
p re v io u s ly  been  o v e r lo o k e d , o r  fo r c e d  to  m ak e  sacrifices  in term s o f
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m o n e y  and  p o lit ica l prestige. But they a lso  have to  co m m u n ica te  
and  take care  o f  the v ictim s and  their relatives w h o  have been  a f­
fe cted  d irectly  b y  the disaster o r  a cc id en t. T h is  ch a llen ge  has s h o w n  
to  be  a b so lu te ly  critica l in  term s o f  cred ib ility . S ince the m edia  w ill 
fo cu s  a great deal o f  their co v e ra g e  o n  in terv iew s w ith  relatives and  
v ictim s, the w a y  au th orities  c o n fr o n t  them  w ill be  im p o rta n t (H art, 
1 9 9 3 ). It is im p orta n t that they s h o w  sym p a th y  and  h u m a n  c o m p a s ­
s io n  as w ell as u n d erstan d  the p o lit ica l sy m b o lism  o f  the event.
T h e  K ursk  traged y  w as n o  e x c e p t io n  in  this respect. S ince the 
n ew s m ed ia  d id  n o t  have access to  a n y  co n cre te  in fo rm a tio n  a b o u t  
the a cc id en t d u rin g  the first c o u p le  o f  d ays, they fo cu se d  m o st  o f  
their a tten tion  o n  the relatives. S ince the relatives w ere  g iven  sparse 
and  som etim es co n flic t in g  in fo rm a tio n  a b o u t  the a cc id en t and  the 
p ro sp ects  o f  savin g  the crew , the m ed ia  co v e ra g e  w as rather critica l 
(see C h a r lto n , 23  A u gu st 2 0 0 0 ) .  T h e  m ed ia  cr itic ized  the au thorities 
fo r  n o t  s h o w in g  e n o u g h  co n ce rn .
T h e  a n x ie ty  o f  the fam ilies w ith  lo v e d  on es  serv ing in  the N o r t h ­
ern  Fleet w as intense becau se  n o n e  o f  th em  h ad  b een  to ld  e x a ctly  
w h o  w as o n b o a r d  the sh ip . ” It is rea lly  a g o n iz in g  fo r  the fam ilies to  
h ave to  w a it like th is ,”  sa id  o n e  o f  the relatives. ’ ’ S ubm arines have 
ro ta tin g  sh ifts, so  there c o u ld  be  p o ten tia lly  h u n dred s o f  sa ilors  o n  
the K ursk . But neither the fam ilies o f  th ose  [crew  m em bers] a ctu a lly  
o n b o a r d , n o r  the fam ilies o f  th ose  co n c e iv a b ly  o n b o a r d  are be in g  
to ld  the tru th .”
L u dm ila  M ily u tin a , w h o se  so n  A n d re i w as a b o a rd  the K u rsk , said  
that w h en  she ca lled  a g o v ern m en t h o t  line fo r  in fo rm a tio n  o n  the d is­
aster, she w as to ld , ‘ ’ G o  to  M u rm a n sk  an d  ask the jo u rn a lis ts .”  T h e  
w ife  o f  the K ursk  C o m m a n d e r  said  that she w as w a itin g  patiently, bu t 
an x iou sly , fo r  n ew s a b o u t  her h u sb a n d . “ P eop le  ta lk  a lo t  bu t I to ld  
m y se lf that I shall o n ly  listen to  w h at is o ffic ia lly  r e p o r te d .”  G alina 
B elayeva , w h o  w as less patien t, w en t to  M u rm a n sk  b e fo re  h ea d in g  to  
K u rsk ’s h o m e  base in  V e d y a y e v o . “ W h a t  ca n  I k n o w  apart fr o m  that 
m y  h u sb a n d  is d y in g  th e re ,”  she to ld  rep orters  try ing  to  h o ld  b a ck  her 
tears. “ Let them  save m y  h u sb a n d , the father o f  m y  ch ild re n .”
O n  A u gu st 18 the list o f  th ose  actu a lly  o n b o a r d  K u rsk  at the 
tim e o f  the a cc id en t w as released . T h is  list w as n o t  m ad e  p u b lic  b y  
the R u ssian  N a v y , rather b y  the M o s c o w  n ew sp a p er  K o m s o m o ls k a -  
ja  P ra vd a . T h e  n ew sp a p er  said  that it h ad  o b ta in e d  the list b y  b r ib ­
ing  a to p  R u ssian  N a v y  o ffic ia l w ith  a b o u t  $ 6 5 0 .
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M a n y  o f  the w ives  and  parents o f  the K ursk  sa ilors h ad  c o m e  to  
M u rm a n sk  lo o k in g  fo r  in fo rm a tio n  and  h o p in g  fo r  so m e  k in d  o f  
rescue. O n  A u gu st 18 several o f  the fam ilies  w ere  g iven  the ch a n ce  
to  ta lk  w ith  o ffic ia ls  a b o u t  the ca ta strop h e  fo r  the first tim e. A  
m eetin g  b e tw een  the g o v ern m en t c o m m is s io n  and the relatives o f  
the c re w  m em bers  w as o rg a n ize d , b u t it q u ick ly  b e ca m e  heated . 
S om e o f  the w ives  w ere  ye llin g , and  so m e  w ere  even  sw earin g . T h e y  
w ere  d em a n d in g  to  k n o w  w h y  the R u ssian  o ffic ia ls  h ad  w a ited  so  
lo n g  b e fo re  ask ing fo r  ou ts id e  help .
A t  a m eetin g  w ith  President Putin  o n  A u gu st 2 2 , so m e  o f  the rel­
atives requ ested  that the p la n n ed  m em o ria l be  ca n ce lled . T h eir  rea ­
so n  b e in g  that th ey  refu sed  to  m o u rn  their lo v e d  on es  until their 
b o d ie s  h ad  been  retrieved  fr o m  the w re ck . N everth eless, a b o u t  150  
o f  the 5 5 0  relatives gath ered  at the K u rsk ’s h o m e  base in  V id y a e v o , 
sa iled  o u t  to  the site o f  the w re ck  in  the Barents Sea, and  th rew  
w rea th s  and flo w e rs  in to  the w ater.
T h e  R u ssian  a u th orities ’ in ab ility  to  p ro p e r ly  deal w ith  the rela ­
tives can  p artia lly  be  exp la in ed  b y  the S oviet lega cy  w h ich  still h ea v ­
ily  in flu en ces m a n y  aspects o f  the R u ssian  state. A s  n o te d  a b o v e , it 
seem s like the m ilitary  b a s ica lly  c o n tro lle d  h o w  the p ro b le m  w as 
p erce iv ed ; that is they largely  fra m ed  the p ro b le m . A n  in d ica tio n  o f  
this w as  the relatively  s lo w  p o lit ica l rea ction . T h e  w ars  in  C h ech n ya  
have illustrated  that the R u ssian  m ilitary  is restrictive w ith  sharing 
in fo rm a tio n  w ith  relatives. T h e  exp erien ces  fr o m  C h ech n ya  and the 
K u rsk  traged y  suggest that the m ilitary  lack s the a p p rop ria te  ch a n ­
nels fo r  ad equ a te ly  co m m u n ica tin g  w ith  v ic tim s ’ relatives. O r  at 
least there has been  a b ig  gap  b e tw e e n  the in fo rm a tio n  the a u th o r i­
ties have a ctu a lly  shared , and  the typ e  and  a m o u n t o f  in fo rm a tio n  
that the relatives have ex p e cte d  and  d em a n d ed .
IN T E R N A T IO N A L IZA T IO N
O fte n  crisis m a n ag em en t at the n a tion a l level con ta in s  in tern ation a l 
aspects. In the case o f  s o c io -p o lit ica l c o n flic t , it is c o m m o n  that 
states, especia lly  sm all on es , turn  to  in tern ation a l a ctors  fo r  su p ­
p o rt. T h e  la ck  o f  in fo rm a tio n  and  op era tive  skills can  trigger at­
tem pts to  ra lly  in tern ation a l su p p ort. A s p rev iou s  crisis exp erien ces  
have s h o w n , this can  in clu d e  anyth ing  fr o m  in fo rm a tio n  sharing to
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c o o p e r a t io n  b e tw een  op era tive  units. In a g lo b a liz e d  w o r ld , such  
in itiatives can  be e x p ected  to  be  m o re  c o m m o n p la c e  in the fu ture.
T h e  K ursk  a cc id en t w as  fr o m  the very  b eg in n in g  a crisis w ith  in ­
tern ation a l im p lica tion s . A s  s o o n  as the in fo rm a tio n  a b o u t  the a c c i­
dent reach ed  the n ew s m ed ia , the C N N  sy n d ro m e  a p p eared  and n ew s 
w as  ca b le d  all a cross  the w o r ld . Presum ably , this pu t a d d itio n a l p res­
sure o n  the R u ssian  m ilitary  and  p o lit ica l leadersh ip  w h ich  w as  a l­
read y  u n ab le  to  orga n ize  a c o o rd in a te d  in fo rm a tio n  m an agem en t a p ­
paratus du rin g  the first fe w  days o f  the crisis. T h is  is d em on stra ted  b y  
the fa ct  that m an y  statem ents co n tra d icte d  each  other.
Y et, there w ere  a lso  o th er  in tern ation a l elem ents d u rin g  the 
K ursk  crisis. In tern ation a l p layers w ere  in v o lv e d  at tw o  p o in ts  in 
the crisis. First, they p la yed  a critica l ro le  in the first phase o f  the 
crisis w h e n  the rescue o p e ra t io n  w as  b e in g  o rg a n ized . S econ d , in ter­
n a tion a l a ctors  w ere  a lso  in v o lv e d  in p lan n in g  the sa lvag in g  o p e r a ­
tion .
T h e  in tern ation a l in v o lv em en t d u rin g  the first phase ca n  be  seen 
as part o f  a w id e r  trend  ch a ra cter iz in g  crisis m an agem en t in  a g lo b ­
al w o r ld . W h e n  large-sca le  trau m atic events occu r, oth er states are 
relatively  q u ick  to  d em on stra te  their solidarity . T h ese  reaction s  
range fr o m  p u b lic  statem ents m a d e  b y  p o lit ica l leaders to  d irect p a r ­
tic ip a tio n  in  the acute crisis resp on se . T h e  d e c is io n  to  a ccep t fo re ig n  
aid  o f  d ifferen t k in ds is, h ow ever , a d ifficu lt  on e . P o licy  m akers 
m ust be  co n v in ce d  that the n a t io n ’s resou rces  are in su ffic ien t and  
that fo re ig n  assistance w o u ld  increase the possib ilities  o f  resp o n d in g  
m o re  effectively . T h is  s itu a tion  c o u ld  p oten tia lly  ev o lv e  in to  a d iff i ­
cu lt va lue co n flic t . O n  the o n e  h an d , p o lic y  m akers m ay  realize that 
the n a tion a l crisis m an agem en t org a n iza tion s  are very  eager to  deal 
w ith  the s itu ation  o n  their o w n . O n  the oth er  h a n d , there m ay  be 
a ctors  that d em a n d  the m o b iliz a t io n  o f  all p o ss ib le  resou rces . A d d i­
tiona lly , there m a y  be great u n certa in ty  co n ce rn in g  the costs  and  the 
ch an ces  o f  success w ith  b o th  alternatives. N atu ra lly , su ch  a d ilem m a 
is h igh ly  stressfu l fo r  th ose  in d iv id u a ls  w h o  m ust q u ick ly  d ec id e  the 
best alternative.
Seem ingly, this w as  the k in d  o f  s itu a tion  President Putin  and his 
a d v isors  fa ced  du rin g  the K ursk  crisis. A n  analysis o f  the statem ents 
m ad e  b y  the R u ssian  m ilitary  o ffic ia ls  ind icates  that they very  m u ch  
be lieved  that a su ccessfu l rescue o p e ra t io n  c o u ld  be  co n d u c te d  w ith ­
in just a c o u p le  o f  days. S im ultaneously , the p u b lic ’s d em an d s  to  a c ­
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cep t in tern ation a l assistance g re w  stron ger every  day. In this situa­
t io n , Putin  seem ed  to  have h ad  great co n fid e n ce  in  the R u ssian  m ili­
tary  an d  its cap ab ilities .
In tern ation a l a ctors  w ere  a lso  p ro m in e n t in  the se co n d  phase o f  
the d isaster du rin g  the o rg a n iza tio n  o f  the sa lvag in g  o p e ra t io n . A n  
assessm ent w as m ad e  that it w as n o t  p o ss ib le  to  brin g  the K u rsk  to  
sh ore  so  the R u ssian  g o v ern m en t lo o k e d  fo r  an in tern ation a l p a rt­
ner o r  co n tra c to r  w h ich  c o u ld  help  salvage the w re ck  (T svetk ov a , 
18 June 2 0 0 1 ) .
T h ere  are fe w  co m p a n ie s  o r  agencies in  the w o r ld  that have the 
ca p a c ity  to  d o  this k in d  o f  c o m p le x  and  tech n ica lly  a d v a n ced  o p e ra ­
t io n . H a llib u rto n  N o r g e  A /S  (based  in  N o r w a y )  w as the first c o m ­
p a n y  w h ich  the R u ssian  representatives started  n eg otia tin g  w ith  
(N u m m erlin , 2  July 2 0 0 1 ) .  T h is  w as the sam e deep -sea  d iv in g  c o m ­
p a n y  that h ad  sent several N o r w e g ia n  divers to  R ussia  after n ew s o f  
the a cc id en t an d  w h o  h ad  o p e n e d  the h a tch  o n  the K ursk  du rin g  the 
rescue o p e ra t io n . T h e  R u ssian  representatives d e c id e d  n o t  to  sign  a 
co n tra c t  w ith  H a llib u rto n  after the initial n eg o tia tion s  an d  p rep a ra ­
to ry  w o rk . Instead they d e c id e d  to  sign  a co n tra c t  w ith  the D u tch  
c o m p a n y  M a m m o e t-S m it  In tern ation a l. S om e o f  the R u ssian  jo u r ­
nalists w ere critica l and  suggested  that the break  w ith  H a llib u rto n  
w as a resu lt o f  the fa ct  that the R u ssians fo u n d  o u t  that the c o m p a ­
n y  w as A m e r ica n -o w n e d ; w hereas the R u ssian  representatives ar­
gu ed  that the tim eline p resented  by  H a llib u rto n  d id  n o t  suit them . 
T h e  D u tch  c o m p a n y  h ad  p ro m ise d  a m o re  sa tis fa ctory  tim e sch e d ­
ule fo r  sa lvag in g  the w re ck  a c co rd in g  to  the R u ssian  au thorities 
( “ K ursk  ra ising o p e ra t io n  to  be the su b ject o f  an  o n lin e  press c o n ­
fe re n ce ,”  2 5  M a y  2 0 0 1 ) .
T h e  N o r w e g ia n  g o v ern m en t h ad  a s tron g  interest in  assessing 
the e c o lo g ic a l d am ag e , in  ch e ck in g  the ra d ia tion  level and  in  seeing 
to  that the R u ssians re m o v e d  the n u clear m ateria l fr o m  the sea in  a 
safe m an n er (Ivanov , 7  A u gu st 2 0 0 1 ) .  T h e  N o r w e g ia n  g ov ern m en t 
requ ested  to  p articip a te  in  sa lvag in g  the w re ck  an d  a lso  exp ressed  a 
desire to  be there m o n ito r in g  the ra d ia tio n  levels in  the w ater and 
air du rin g  the actua l to w in g  and  liftin g  o f  the w re ck  (Ivanov , 7  A u ­
gust 2 0 0 1 ) .  T h is  request cam e after the N o r w e g ia n  R a d ia t io n  P ro ­
te c tio n  A g e n cy  w h ich  exp ressed  co n ce rn s  that ra d ia tio n  c o u ld  leak  
du rin g  the p r o p o s e d  liftin g  an d  to w in g  o f  the w re ck . T h e  N o r w e ­
g ian  C risis C o u n c il o n  N u cle a r  A cc id e n ts  h ad  d e v e lo p e d  the N o r w e ­
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gian  preparedn ess p lan  fo r  the sch edu led  sa lvag in g  o f  the K ursk  
(N u m m elin , 2  July 2 0 0 1 ) .
T h e  R ussians d ec lin ed  the N o r w e g ia n s ’ request fo r  d irect p a rtic ­
ip a tio n  in  the liftin g  an d  to w in g  p ro ce d u re  and  referred  th em  to  the 
D u tch  c o m p a n y  (w h ich  w as in ch arge  o f  the o p e ra tio n ) fo r  p erm is ­
s ion  to  m easure any p o ss ib le  ra d ia tion . T h e  G en era l D esign er o f  the 
R u b in  M a rin e  E n gineering  B ureau , the N o r w e g ia n  C o n su l to  R u s ­
sia, a representative  o f  the R u ssian  D efen se  M in istry , and the R u ss ­
ian  A to m ic  S u p erv isor  had  a m eetin g  w h ere  it w as rea ffirm ed  that 
the N o rw e g ia n s  w a n ted  to  p articip a te  in  the sa lvag ing  o p e ra t io n  
and  to  m easure the ra d ia tion  levels w ith  their o w n  instrum ents. T h e  
R u ssians argu ed  that n o t  all cou n tr ies , w h ich  h ad  an interest in  the 
o p e ra t io n , w o u ld  be  a llo w e d  o n  site. T h e y  p r o p o s e d  that the N o r ­
w eg ian s rea ch  an agreem en t w ith  the D u tch  c o m p a n y  o n  w h eth er o r  
n o t  they c o u ld  set up  m easu rin g  eq u ip m en t at the site. T h e  D u tch  
c o m p a n y  w as the o n ly  fo re ig n  p a rtic ip a n t that the R ussians a llo w e d  
o n  site, b u t the R ussians w ere  n o t  o p p o s e d  to  the N o rw e g ia n s  n e g o ­
tiating a separate deal w ith  the D u tch  c o m p a n y  a b o u t  p a rtic ip a tin g  
in  the o p e ra t io n  (Ivan ov , 7  A u g u st 2 0 0 1 ) .
A fte r  a m eetin g  b e tw een  N o r w e g ia n  and  R u ssian  representatives 
in  M u rm a n sk  (the design ated  h a rb o r  fo r  the K ursk  in v estiga tion ), 
the R ussians agreed  to  a llo w  the N o r w e g ia n  state o ffic ia ls  to  be 
present in the Barents Sea to  w itn ess the sa lvag in g  o f  the K ursk  and  
to  r e co rd  ra d ia tion  levels d u rin g  the o p e ra tio n . Further n eg o tia tion s  
and  p la n n in g  w ere  m ad e  b e tw een  ch em ica l and  ra d ia tion  specialists 
fr o m  the R u ssian  N a v y  and  N o r w e g ia n  d ip lom a ts . T h e  N o rw e g ia n  
specialists w ere  to  op era te  fr o m  o n e  o f  the R u ssian  N o rth e rn  Fleet 
ships. A t  the tim e o f  the agreem en t the N o r w e g ia n  C o n su l-G e n e ra l 
w e lco m e d  the o p p o r tu n ity  to  m o n ito r  events b o th  b e fo re  and  after 
the lift. H e  asserted that the N o rw e g ia n s  d eem ed  the risk  o f  en v i­
ron m en ta l p o llu t io n  to  be  sm all, b u t that the area w as  o f  specia l 
e c o n o m ic  im p o rta n ce  to  N o r w a y  and  that the N o r w e g ia n  p u b lic  
n eed ed  to  be  reassured  that it w as n o t  b e in g  threatened  b y  an en v i­
ron m en ta l disaster ( “ N o r w e g ia n  experts  set fo r  site ra d ia tion  
c h e c k s ,”  19  S eptem ber 2 0 0 1 ) .
T h ere  is ev id en ce  that in tern ation a l crisis m an ag em en t c o o p e r a ­
tio n  m a y  n o t  a lw ays u n fo ld  sm ooth ly . T h e  o rg a n iza tio n  o f  the in ter­
n a tion a l K u rsk  rescue o p e ra t io n  d id  n o t  u n fo ld  w ith o u t  c o m p lic a ­
tion s . Prim arily, there seem s to  have b een  som e  d isagreem ents b e ­
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tw een  the R u ssian  units op era tin g  at the scen e and  the N o r w e g ia n  
an d  British  rescue team s. W h e n  the N o r w e g ia n  and  the British 
team s arrived  at the scen e , a n u m ber o f  p ro b le m s  arose . M r. N 0 SS (a 
m em b er  o f  the N o r w e g ia n  c o m p a n y  op era tin g  the m in i su bm arin e) 
c la im ed  that, “ W h e n  w e  g o t  to  the area, I th ink  it w as  a ro u n d  1 8 0 0  
C E T  o n  Saturday. W e h ad  to  w a it  until 0 6 0 0  C E T  o n  S u n day until 
w e  g o t  c learan ce  fr o m  the R u ssian  o f f ic ia ls ”  (C N N , 21  A u gu st
2 0 0 0 ) .  O th er  rep orts  in d ica te  that there w ere  in fo rm a tio n  m a n a g e ­
m en t p ro b le m s  w h ich  ren d ered  the w o r k  d ifficu lt . F or  ex a m p le , the 
N o rw e g ia n s  argu ed  there w as so  m u ch  in co rre ct  data that th ey  felt 
it th reatened  the sa fety  o f  the d ivers.
O th er  in fo rm a tio n  a lso  suggests that the o p e ra t io n  w as  c o m p li ­
ca ted  b y  the la ck  o f  lead ersh ip . A  British  o ffic ia l o n  site rep orted  
that n eg o tia tion s  w ith  the R u ssians h ad  been  ex trem ely  s low . A ls o , 
he p o in te d  to  so m e  ten s ion  b e tw een  the British  and  the R u ssian  
team s regard in g  the R u ssian  leadersh ip .
A g a in , o n e  ca n  o n ly  specu la te  the reason s fo r  these p ro b le m s . It 
appears as i f  the R u ssian  actors  at the scen e w ere  n o t  su ffic ien tly  
p rep a red  to  take care o f  the N o r w e g ia n  and  British units as they ar­
rived . T h is  c o u ld  be  su p p o rte d  b y  the fa ct  that the N o rw e g ia n s  
c o u ld  n o t  in itiate their w o r k  im m ed ia te ly  u p o n  arrival to  the area. 
H y p oth etica lly , the in fo rm a tio n  ch an n els  b etw een  the R u ssian  a c ­
tors  w o rk in g  at the scen e and the R u ssian  m ilitary  a n d /o r  R u ssian  
p o lit ica l leadersh ip  d id  n o t  w o r k  p roperly . P erhaps the R u ssian  o p ­
era tion a l units d id  n o t  have clear ord ers  fr o m  a b o v e  a b o u t  the o r ­
g a n iza tion  o f  the jo in t  rescue o p e ra tio n .
O bservers  in  the fie ld  o f  crisis m an agem en t have stressed the 
ro le  o f  ‘ in terop era b ility ,’ w h ich  m a in ly  co n ce rn s  the ab ility  to  o r ­
gan ize  e ffe ctive  o p e ra tio n s  b e tw een  m ilitary  and  c iv ilian  au thorities 
(L u n d gren , 1 9 9 8 ). T h e  fin d in gs  fr o m  the K u rsk  resp on se  suggest 
that the essence o f  in terop era b ility  sh ou ld  be  co n s id e re d  in  a w id e r  
p ersp ective . In ord er  to  be  ab le  to  re sp o n d  e ffe ctiv e ly  to  large-sca le  
crises, gov ern m en ts  m ust be  ab le  to  q u ick ly  o rg a n ize  jo in t  in tern a ­
tion a l e ffo rts . A s  ev id en t in  the K u rsk  case , this is o fte n  p ro b le m a tic  
in  m a n y  regards. P o litica l barriers, p ro b le m s  o f  lan gu age and  te ch ­
n ica l d ifficu lties  m ust be  re m o v e d  b e fo re  a large-sca le  o p e ra t io n  can  
be  o rg a n ized  and  su ccessfu lly  im p lem en ted . T h u s , in terop era b ility  
requ ires c iv ilia n -m ilita ry  c o o p e r a t io n  in an in tern ation a l co n te x t .
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F R O M  CRISIS T O  T R A U M A
In the literature o n  crisis m an agem en t it has b een  argu ed  that the a b il­
ity to  red u ce  the a m o u n t o f  u n certa in ty  related  to  the causes o f  a d is­
astrou s event is a b so lu te ly  critica l in  ord er  to  red u ce  the lo n g -te rm  
e m o tio n a l im p a ct o f  that event. H ere  u n certa in ty  d oes  n o t  m ean  the 
a m o u n t o f  in fo rm a tio n  n eed ed  to  m ak e  accu ra te  d ecis ion s  du rin g  the 
acu te  ph ase  o f  a crisis; in stead , it is im p orta n t to  fin d  the elem ents 
lead in g  up to  the even t w h ich  su bsequ en tly  evo lv es  in to  a crisis (see 
Stern and  H a n sen , 2 0 0 0 ) .  A  rev iew  o f  the m ed ia  co v e ra g e  reveals that 
there are a great n u m b er o f  th eories  w h ich  flo u r ish  in  the press du rin g  
the first fe w  days fo l lo w in g  an in cid en t (see fo r  e x a m p le  C N N , 21  A u ­
gust 2 0 0 0 d ; C N N , 2 9  A u g u st 2 0 0 0 ; C N N , 9 S eptem ber 2 0 0 0 ; C N N , 
9 N o v e m b e r  2 0 0 0 ; C N N , 21  N o v e m b e r  2 0 0 0 ) .
A t  the A u gu st 1 5 th press co n fe re n ce , Ilya K le b a n o v  said  that e x ­
ternal exa m in a tion s  o f  the hull o f  K ursk  h ad  revea led  ” a very 
strange p ic tu re ”  o f  its dam ages. T h e  D e p u ty  Prim e M in ister  to ld  the 
press, " A ll  version s o f  the a cc id e n t ’s causes are p o ss ib le . T h ere  is a 
p ro b a b ility  -  and  this is o n ly  o n e  o f  the p o ss ib le  version s -  that the 
su bm arin e  m igh t have run  in to  a W o r ld  W ar II m in e .”  A t  the sam e 
tim e, all o th er  p o ss ib le  causes w ere  a lso  b e in g  co n s id ered .
K le b a n o v  said  that the a cc id en t o ccu rre d  w h e n  the su bm arin e  
w as  p e r fo rm in g  so m e  exercises. H e  a d d ed , ’’ But so  far w e  ca n n o t 
say an yth in g  fo r  certa in  a b o u t  the causes o f  the a c c id e n t .”  T h e  
K ursk  n u clear su bm arin e  w as  o n e  o f  the latest su bm arin es o b ta in ed  
b y  the R u ssian  N avy . K le b a n o v  em p h asized  that there m ust have 
b een  ’’ very  seriou s re a so n s ”  fo r  su ch  an a cc id en t to  take p la ce . 
’’ G en era lly  sp ea k in g , the s itu a tion  is u n u su a l,”  he a d d ed . M e d ia  re ­
p o rts  in  M o s c o w  c la im ed  that K u rsk  c o u ld  have b een  in v o lv e d  in  a 
c o ll is io n  w ith  an oth er  n a t io n ’s su bm arin e , p o ss ib ly  an A m e rica n  
vessel w h ich  m a y  have been  in  h id in g  in the deep  N o r w e g ia n  fjo rd s . 
T h e  U n ited  States adm itted  that tw o  o f  its subm arines h ad  been  in 
the area at the tim e o f  the in cid en t o n  Saturday, a lth ou g h  the U .S. 
insisted that they had  n o t  been  in v o lv e d  in  the K u rsk  a cc id en t. N o r ­
w a y  a lso  insisted  that n o n e  o f  its subm arines h ad  b een  in v o lv e d  in 
the in cid en t.
T h e  U .S. su bm arin es m o n ito r in g  the R u ssian  N a v y  exercises 
n o te d  tw o  e x p lo s io n s  w h e n  the K u rsk  w en t d o w n . T h e  s e co n d  e x ­
p lo s io n  w as  m u ch  larger than  the first, a c co rd in g  to  U .S. o ffic ia ls . 
T h e  R u ssian  N a v y  refu sed  to  c o n firm  the rep orts  fr o m  the U .S. o f f i ­
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cia ls a b o u t  the tw o  e x p lo s io n s . R u ssian  o ffice rs  d id  say, h ow ever , 
that a single e x p lo s io n  in  the to r p e d o  co m p a rtm e n t at the fro n t  o f  
the su bm arin e  ap p aren tly  cau sed  K ursk  to  sink.
In his first p u b lic  statem ent after the in cid en t, the C o m m a n d e r  
o f  R u ss ia ’s N o rth e rn  Fleet (V ya ch eslav  P o p o v )  said  K ursk  h ad  been  
cr ip p le d  b y  an e x p lo s io n  inside o n e  o f  the su b m a rin e ’s c o m p a r t ­
m ents, w h ich  c o u ld  have b een  triggered  b y  a co ll is io n  w ith  an u n ­
sp ecified  o b je c t .
O n  A u g u st 1 7  a state te lev is ion  co rre s p o n d e n t  re p o rte d  ’’ very 
seriou s d a m a g e ”  to  the fro n t  section  o f  K u rsk  after v iew in g  v id e o  
fo o ta g e  tak en  b y  so m e o n e  in  the deep -sea  rescue cap su le . T h e  R u ss­
ian  N a v y  said  the film  o f  the sunken  sub suggested  an e x p lo s io n  hit 
K u rsk  and  the vessel ap p eared  to  be  sin k in g  furth er in to  the m u d . 
Ilya K le b a n o v  said  there w as a ’’ terrify in g  h o le ”  o n  the s ta rb oa rd  
side o f  the su bm arin e . H e  a d d ed  that experts  rev iew in g  days o f  res­
cu e  e fforts  to  save K u rsk  be liev ed  the su bm arin e  h ad  hit ‘ ’ a h u ge , 
h eavy  o b je c t .”
‘ ’A  rather b ig  part o f  the c re w  w as  in  the part o f  the b o a t  that 
w as  h it b y  the ca ta strop h e  w h ich  d e v e lo p e d  at ligh tn in g  s p e e d .”  T h e  
fo o ta g e  sh o w e d  e n o rm o u s  d am age  to  the fro n t  h a lf o f  the su b m a ­
rine that w o u ld  have sent the vessel to  the b o t to m  in se co n d s , N a v y  
o ffic ia ls  said . T h e  c o n tr o l  r o o m , w h ere  m ost o f  the cre w m e n  w o u ld  
have been  w o rk in g , w as  b e lo w  the co n n in g  to w e r ; thus, m ost likely  
m a n y  o f  the sa ilors w o u ld  n o t  have h ad  tim e to  escape w h e n  the 
su bm arin e  w en t d o w n .
A t  the press co n fe re n ce  o n  A u g u st 19 , the C h ie f o f  the N o rth e rn  
Fleet gen era l sta ff, V ice  A d m ira l M ik h a il M o ts a k , m et w ith  the m e­
dia and fo r  the first tim e gave details o f  w h a t m a y  have cau sed  the 
a cc id en t. T h e  first theory , he said , w as  that there h ad  been  som e 
k in d  o f  c o llis io n . “ It is very  p o ss ib le  that the cause o f  the a cc id en t 
w as  a stron g  d y n a m ic  b lo w  w h ich  c o u ld  have been  cau sed  b y  sever­
al fa c to r s .”  T h e  s e co n d  th e o ry  specu la ted  m assive f lo o d in g  fo l lo w e d  
b y  an e x p lo s io n  in  o n e  o f  the su b m a rin e ’s fro n t  co m p a rtm en ts . T h e  
th ird  th e o ry  -  and  the o n e  that M o ts a k  said  he m ost s tron g ly  b e ­
lieved  -  in v o lv e d  a m ine fr o m  W o r ld  W ar II. M o t s a k ’s b ro a d ca s t  re­
vea led  that the R u ssian  N a v y  h ad  d isco v e re d  s ix  such  m ines in  the 
last seven  years. “ I ca n n o t  e x c lu d e  this o p t io n ,”  he sa id , “ p a rticu ­
larly  becau se  the in itial e x p lo s io n  (o n  the su bm arin e) w as  cau sed  b y  
o n ly  1 0 0 k g  o f  e x p lo s iv e s , and  the su bm arin e  d oes  n o t  have such
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sm all w a rh ea d s  o n  its to rp e d o e s . D u rin g  the a cc id en t, at least three 
o r  fo u r  o f  the su b m a rin e ’s to rp e d o e s  e x p lo d e d  w ith  the fo r c e  o f  on e  
o r  tw o  ton s  o f  T N T , w h ich  f lo o d e d  the entire b o w  (fron t) section  
and  instantly  k illed  h a lf o f  the c r e w .”
In sum , since the first d ay  o f  the traged y  a large n u m b er  o f  th e o ­
ries have flou r ish ed  in  the n ew s m ed ia . O ff ic ia l  representatives have 
m a d e  several c o n tra d ic to ry  statem ents co n ce rn in g  the causes o f  the 
disaster. T h is  and  the great u n certa in ty  a rou n d  the causes led  to  a 
n a tion a l traum a. T h e  su ccessfu l sa lvag in g  o p e ra t io n  c o u ld , even tu ­
ally, p reven t this fr o m  h ap p en in g . R e cen t in fo rm a tio n  fr o m  the in ­
v estiga tion  a lso  p rov id es  co n flic t in g  ev id en ce . C lues in d ica te  that 
m o st  likely  a m issile fr o m  inside the su bm arin e  triggered  an e x p lo ­
s ion  w h ich  k illed  the crew . O n  the oth er  han d  “ skeptics say, h o w e v ­
er, that i f  any c lu e  c o u ld  be  fo u n d , it w o u ld  be  lo ca te d  in  the su b m a ­
r in e ’s m an g led  first co m p a rtm e n t, w h ich  w as left beh in d  w h e n  the 
K ursk  w as  ra ise d .”  (T h e  M o s c o w  T im es, 2 6  O c to b e r  2 0 0 1 ) .  It re­
m ains to  be  seen , then , i f  fu rth er analysis su cceed s  to  establish  w h a t 
a ctu a lly  cau sed  the a ccid en t.
L E A R N IN G
Crises freq u en tly  serve as ey e -op en ers  fo r  p o lic y  m akers and  h ig h ­
ligh t the n eed  fo r  ch an ge . T h e y  p ro v id e  “ w in d o w s  o f  o p p o r tu n ity ”  
fo r  adm in istrative  and  p o lit ica l leaders to  ca rry  o u t  in stitu tion a l and 
p o lic y  ch an ges (K in g d o n , 1 9 8 4 ; K eeler, 1 9 9 3 ). But crises a lso  fre ­
qu en tly  p r o d u ce  ch an ges in  co g n it iv e  sch em es. P o licy  m akers m ay  
get a co m p le te ly  n e w  u n d ersta n d in g  o f  p ro b le m s  as w e ll as n e w  s o ­
lu tion s  to  these p ro b le m s  (Sundelius et al., 1 9 9 7 ; Stern, 1 9 9 7 ).
In estab lish ed  d e m o cra c ie s , these processes  usually  take som e  
tim e b e fo re  th ey  can  be  im p lem en ted . T h e  in n o v a tio n , d e v e lo p m e n t 
and  im p lem en ta tion  o f  n e w  rules, rou tin es , law s and  o rg a n iza tion a l 
structures m ust pass th ro u g h  a n u m b er o f  filters b e fo re  they b e c o m e  
reality. C on sequ en tly , it m a y  take som e  tim e b e fo re  the first traces 
o f  cr is is -in d u ced  re form s em erge. In con tra st to  this pattern , it has 
been  p r o p o s e d  that tran sition a l societies  have a ten d en cy  o f  h yper­
learn in g  and  in stitu tion a l volatility . T h a t is, p o lit ica l elites and  a d ­
m in istrative leaders m a y  fa ir ly  ra p id ly  d e c id e  o n  exten sive  re form s. 
T h e  em p irica l fin d in gs  are, h ow ever , d u b io u s . S om e tran sition a l 
cou n tries  ( fo r  e x a m p le  E ston ia ) have q u ick ly  im p lem en ted  re form s
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in  the w a k e  o f  crises w h ile  o th er  cou n tries  (su ch  as P o la n d , Latvia 
an d  R ussia) have been  d a w d lin g  (see Stern and  N o h rs te d t , 1 9 9 9 ; 
Stern and  H a n sen , 2 0 0 0 ; Stern and  B ynander, fo r th c o m in g ; Faleev, 
A k im o v  and  P orfiriev , this v o lu m e ).
It has b een  p r o p o s e d  that n egative  fe e d b a ck  w ill in crease the lik e ­
l ih o o d  o f  exten sive  cr is is -in d u ced  ch a n g e  (B aum gartner and  Jones, 
1 9 9 3 ). A s  the p re v io u s  parts o f  the analysis have s h o w n , the p u b lic ’s 
reaction s  to  the R u ssian  a u th orities ’ resp on se  to  the K ursk  a cc id en t 
w ere  h igh ly  critica l. O n e  c o u ld  thus, o n  th eoretica l g ro u n d s , e x p e ct  
that this w o u ld  fa cilita te  substantia l re form -in itia tives  o n  b e h a lf  o f  
the R u ssian  leadersh ip .
In the w a k e  o f  the K ursk  tragedy, w e  have seen a n u m b er o f  in ­
d ica tion s  that several lead in g  a ctors  have p u sh ed  fo r  re fo rm . Just 
days after the a cc id en t, several R u ssian  m ilitary  sp o k esm en  p o in te d  
o u t  the n eed  to  re fo rm  the R u ssian  A rm e d  F orces . Putin  -  the R u ss­
ian  A rm e d  F orces  C o m m a n d e r  in C h ie f -  h ad  talks w ith  R u ssian  o f ­
ficia ls  a b o u t  a re fo rm  p ro g ra m  fo r  the A rm e d  F orces . E ven  th ou g h  
m a n y  details rem ain , a d ec is io n  w as said  to  have been  m a d e  b y  
Putin  h im se lf in fa v o r  o f  the im p lem en ta tion  o f  the p ro g ra m  (C N N , 
12  A u gu st 2 0 0 0 ) .  In a d d it io n , the rep lacem en t o f  the 63  y ea r-o ld  
D efen se  M in ister  (Igor  Sergev) w ith  the m u ch  y o u n g e r  Sergir Iv o n o v  
(the fo rm e r  Security C o u n c il Secretary resp on s ib le  fo r  the d e v e lo p ­
m en t o f  the R u ssian  A rm e d  F orces  R e fo rm ) is a lso  a clear sign  that 
the o ld  S oviet apparatus is s lo w in g  b e in g  rep laced .
A n o th e r  ex a m p le  is that the D u m a  v o te d  in fa v o r  o f  a dra ft that 
w o u ld  e x p a n d  the m ilita ry ’s b u d g et in S eptem ber 2 0 0 0 . T h e  dra ft 
w as  rev ised  to  e x p a n d  the m ilita ry ’s b u d g et fr o m  1 4 6  b illio n  rubles 
to  2 0 6  b illio n  rub les . O th er  e ffo rts  have been  m a d e  to  in crease the 
m ilita ry ’s b u d g et as w e ll. T h e  D e fe n ce  M in istry  and  lead in g  D u m a 
fa ctio n s  d em a n d ed  a m ilitary  b u d g et con s istin g  o f  3 .5  p ercen t o f  the 
G D P , w h ich  w o u ld  b rin g  the m ilitary  b u d g et up to  2 7 0  b illio n  
rub les . A ls o , sh ortly  after return ing  fr o m  his visit to  S e v erom orsk  in 
late A u gu st, Putin  m et w ith  the M in ister  o f  F in ance (A lex e i K udrin ) 
to  see if  m o re  m o n e y  c o u ld  be  a llo ca ted  to  the A rm e d  F orces  (T h e 
R ussia  Jou rn a l, 2  S eptem ber 2 0 0 0 ) .
A d d ition a lly , these are ch an ges in  in d iv id u a l co g n it iv e  sch em ata . 
A n  o b se rv a tio n  in p o in t  is P resident P u tin ’s p erson a l exp er ien ce  
fr o m  the P R  fia sco . A s  n o te d  a b o v e , he c la im ed  a fterw ard s that he 
p r o b a b ly  w o u ld  have acted  d ifferen tly  if  fa ce d  w ith  the sam e ch a l­
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lenge again  (see d e c is io n -m a k in g  o c c a s io n  n o . 2 ) . T h e  statem ents he 
has m a d e  clearly  in d ica te  that he p erson a lly  learned  fro m  this crisis 
exp er ien ce . H e  p la u s ib ly  rea lized  w h a t ro le  the m ed ia  in  m o d e rn  
R ussia  p lays in  esca latin g  a tragic  a cc id en t in to  a p o lit ica l cred ib ility  
crisis. T h e  exp erien ces  fr o m  K u rsk  m a y  p o ss ib ly  in flu en ce  h im  to  
act s o o n e r  and  m o re  d ecis ive ly  the n ex t tim e a sim ilar crisis o ccu rs . 
H is  resp on se  to  the tragic  events o f  S eptem ber 11 , 2 0 0 1 , in  the U SA  
serve as a v iv id  exa m p le .
T h e  q u estion , o f  co u rse , is i f  these and  o th er  ch an ges w ill w a r ­
rant a m o re  e ffe ctive  crisis resp on se  in  R ussia  and  elsew h ere . C lea r­
ly, this w ill d ep en d  u p o n  a n u m b er o f  fa c to rs . T h e  K u rsk  case illus­
trates that fu ture R u ssian  crisis m anagers m ust be ab le  to  c o p e  w ith  
u n e x p e cte d  and tech n ica lly  c o m p le x  p ro b le m s . T h e  ab ility  to  re ­
s p o n d  sw iftly  and  e ffe ctiv e ly  to  su ch  ch a llen ges necessitates an arse­
nal o f  exp ertise , k n o w le d g e , and  resou rces . T h ere  are so m e  in d ica ­
tion s  that steps have been  taken  to  strengthen  these cap ab ilities . F or 
e x a m p le , the in crease in subsid ies to  the m ilitary  c o u ld  be o n e  d e c i­
s ion . T h is  c o u ld  result in the d e v e lo p m e n t o f  certa in  tech n ica l 
eq u ip m en t w h ich  w as  la ck in g  at the tim e o f  the K ursk  acc id en t. Y et, 
there are va riou s  barriers in  the w a y  as w e ll. S trategic p lans have to  
pass th ro u g h  a lo n g  ch a in  b e fo re  th ey  can  be fu lly  im p lem en ted . 
A n d  still, it is n o t  certa in  that these im p rov em en ts  w ill be e n o u g h  to  
m eet fu ture crises w h ich  are never rep etition s  o f  the past.
Conclusions
W h e n  the su bm arin e  K u rsk  sank  to  the b o t to m  o f  the Barents Sea 
o n  A u gu st 12 , 2 0 0 0 , it m ark ed  the b eg in n in g  o f  w h a t can  be ch a r ­
acterized  as o n e  o f  the m o st  seriou s crises that m o d e rn  R u ssian  has 
ever ex p e r ie n ce d . T h e  a cc id en t p u t m o d e rn  R u ssian  institu tion s to  
an acu te  test. W h a t  is p r o b a b ly  the m o st  strik ing exp er ien ce  fro m  
the a cc id en t is h o w  the disaster q u ick ly  sp illed  in to  the va riou s  sec­
tors  o f  R u ssian  society . It started  as a m ilitary  o p e ra t io n  bu t q u ick ly  
e v o lv e d  in to  a p o lit ica l ch a llen ge . K u rsk  w as  o n e  o f  the m o st  m o d ­
ern  n u clear w e a p o n  system s that the R u ssian  fleet h ad  at its c o m ­
m an d  and  the a cc id en t w as  certain ly, at least initially, ex p er ien ced  as 
a m a jo r  b lo w  to  the R u ssian  m ilitary. A  tech n ica lly  ad va n ced  
w e a p o n  h ad  been  d estroy ed  and the p erson n e l o p e ra tin g  it had  been  
k illed . A fte r  a large -sca le  a cc id en t, the first fe w  days are usually  f o ­
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cu sed  o n  saving lives. T h e  R u ssian  authorities  fa iled  w ith  their p u b ­
lic  re la tion s p o licy , and  the rescue o p e ra t io n  q u ick ly  esca lated  in to  a 
p o lit ica l leg itim a cy  p ro b le m . T h e  a cc id en t d e v e lo p e d  in to  a fu ll­
b lo w n  p o lit ica l cred ib ility  crisis.
T h is  case stu dy  in clu d es an in -d ep th  in vestiga tion  o f  the a cc i­
dent fro m  a crisis m an ag em en t p ersp ective . It w as an a lyzed  in a 
b r o a d  m an n er in  o rd er  to  in crease the u n d ersta n d in g  o f  the c o m ­
p lex ities  in v o lv e d  in large-sca le  crises like the K u rsk  a cc id en t. T h e  
aim  beh in d  this w as to  b r id ge  the gap  b e tw een  th eory  an d  p ractice . 
E xp erien ces  fr o m  h istorica l crises can  help  p repare  fu ture crisis d e c i­
s ion -m a k ers  fo r  fu ture ch a llen ges. A  fe w  im p orta n t lessons can  be 
d ra w n  fro m  the K ursk  tragedy.
T h e  first fin d in g  co n ce rn s  the d yn a m ics  o f  crisis d eve lop m en t. 
T h e  crisis w as first p r im a rily  co n s id e re d  a m ilitary  p ro b le m . T h e  
m ed ia  cov e ra g e  o f  the a cc id en t h ad  an aggressive n egative  ton e  to  it, 
an d  the p ro b le m  q u ick ly  sh ifted  to  the R u ssian  p o lit ica l leadersh ip . 
T h e  leaders w ere  b la m ed  fo r  n o t  a ctin g  d ecis ive ly  and  they h ad  to  
spen d  m u ch  tim e and  en ergy  o n  assessing the d am age. O u r  analysis 
suggests that this esca la tion  w as en ab led  b y  three in terrelated  fa c ­
tors . First, the m ilitary  an d  the p o lit ica l au thorities  d id  n o t  s h o w  
e n o u g h  sym p a th y  o r  respect to  the relatives. T h e  au th orities  d id  n o t  
share m u ch  in fo rm a tio n  w ith  the n ew s m ed ia , and  thus the m edia  
fo cu se d  m u ch  a tten tion  o n  this. S econ d , the m ed ia  w as very  n eg a ­
tive th ro u g h o u t  the crisis. T h e y  p la yed  a critica l ro le  in  the events 
w h ich  e v o lv e d  a ro u n d  the R u ssian  attem pts to  rescue the crew . 
T h ird ly , there are in d ica tion s  that the au thorities w ere  n o t  su ffi­
c ien tly  p rep a red  -  neither strateg ica lly  (p o lit ica lly ) n o r  op era tiv e ly  -  
to  c o p e  w ith  the crisis. T h e y  la ck ed  the n ecessary  eq u ip m en t to  ca r ­
ry  o u t  a su ccessfu l rescue o p e ra t io n  and  a lso  the p o lit ica l p rep a red ­
ness to  an ticipate  the critic ism  w h ich  ch aracter ized  the p u b lic  d e ­
bate.
A n o th e r  fin d in g  in  this case stu dy  co n firm s  h o w  the sh a d o w s  o f  
the past can  in flu en ce  crisis m an agem en t. M a n y  o f  o u r  o b serv a tion s  
suggest -  in  line w ith  p rev iou s  studies o n  crisis m a n a g em en t in  tran ­
sition a l societies  -  that the p o lit ica l an d  adm in istrative  heritage, to  
so m e  degree, in flu en ced  the w a y  the crisis w as h an d led . It has been  
p r o p o s e d  that the need  to  m ak e  q u ick  an d  au th orita tive  d ecis ion s  
an d  to  exercise  stron g  lead ersh ip  o fte n  co m p e te  w ith  d e m o cra tic  
values such  as op en n ess , tran spa ren cy  and  p a rtic ip a tio n  in  the p o lit ­
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ica l p rocess  (c .f. Stern an d  H a n sen , 2 0 0 0 ) .  F indings fr o m  this stu dy  
o n  the K u rsk  disaster seem  to  suggest that these needs a lso  c o u ld  be 
seen as in terrelated  rather than  co m p e tin g  fo rce s . It seem s like p u b ­
lic  d em an d s fo r  op en n ess  p reced ed  state a c t io n  o n  several o cca s io n s . 
T h is  w as  p articu la rly  ev id en t in  the p rocess  that led  to  the a cce p t­
an ce  o f  in tern ation a l assistance.
W h e n  w e  speak  a b o u t  the sh a d o w s  o f  the past, w e  a lso  have in 
m in d  the o rga n iza tion a l/a d m in istra tive  cu ltu re  w h ich  in flu en ces  the 
crisis resp on se . S om e o f  the a ction s  and  b e h a v io r  ob se rv e d  du rin g  
this crisis c o u ld , h y p oth etica lly , be  ex p la in ed  b y  fa ctors  inherent in  
ten a ciou s  o rg a n iza tio n a l and  adm in istrative  cu ltures. W e  n o te d , fo r  
e x a m p le , that the au thorities sh o w e d  lim ited  exp er ien ce  in  their 
ab ility  to  take p ro p e r  care  o f  the v ic tim s ’ relatives. T h is  c o u ld  be  e x ­
p la in ed  b y  the la ck  o f  rou tin e  a n d /o r  p repared n ess to  m eet these 
types o f  ch a llen ges. It is n o t  the la ck  o f  e x p er ien ce  (i.e ., ca tastrop h es  
in v o lv in g  a large n u m ber o f  v ictim s) b u t rather the la ck  o f  a specia l 
cu ltu re  and  a clear p o licy . A n o th e r  ex a m p le  is President P u tin ’s late 
ap p ea ra n ce  in  the crisis. G o rb a c h e v  w as  a lso  late in  getting  in v o lv e d  
w ith  the 1 9 8 6  C h e rn o b y l crisis. T h ese  fin d in gs  su p p o rt  p rev iou s  
p r o p o s it io n s  that “ the sh a d o w s  o f  a u th or ita r ia n ism ”  in flu en ce  crisis 
d e c is io n -m a k in g  in co n te m p o ra ry  R ussia  as a tran sition a l state.
O u r  fin a l c o n c lu d in g  o b se rv a tio n  co n ce rn s  the in tern ation a l d i­
m en s ion  o f  the crisis. In tern ation a l au d ien ces and  a ctors  a ffected , 
yet in  d ifferen t w a y s , the d e v e lo p m e n t and  the m a n ag em en t o f  the 
crisis. It is in teresting to  see, fo r  ex a m p le , h o w  the U .S. p la yed  tw o  
c o n flic t in g  ro les  in  the crisis. First, the U .S. w as  o n e  o f  the cou n tries  
w h ich  fa ir ly  q u ick ly  o ffe re d  to  assist the R u ssian  au th orities  w ith  
the rescue o p e ra t io n . A ls o , the US p ro v id e d  R ussia  w ith  va riou s  
types o f  in te lligen ce . But a lso , the US p la yed  the ro le  o f  a sca p eg oa t. 
T h e  p o ss ib ility  that K u rsk  h ad  c o llid e d  w ith  an A m e rica n  su b m a ­
rine w as fr o m  the very  on se t a p lau sib le  th e o ry  that so m e  R u ssian  
o ffic ia ls  su p p o rte d  o ffic ia lly .
P u tin ’s d e c is io n  to  a cce p t  British and  N o r w e g ia n  assistance w as 
a rem ark ab le  step i f  lo o k e d  at in  a w id e r  h istorica l p ersp ective . 
M o s t  likely, this w as  a very  d ifficu lt  d e c is io n  to  m a k e , p erh ap s n o  
less d ifficu lt  than  to  jo in  the U S A  in  the in tern ation a l an ti-terrorist 
c o a lit io n  after the trag ic  S eptem ber 1 1 th events. B ased o n  the fa ct  
that the m ilitary  in itiated  a large-sca le  rescue o p e ra t io n  w ith o u t  
h av in g  the n ecessary  eq u ip m en t, it seem s as i f  this o p e ra t io n  w as  a
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m atter o f  p ride  fo r  the m ilitary  lead ersh ip . In con tra st to  th is, the 
m ed ia  q u ick ly  started to  q u estion  w h y  the au thorities had  n o t  a c ­
cep ted  in tern ation a l assistance. Putin  thus h ad  to  nav igate  betw een  
a p ro file -se e k in g  m ilitary  and  a critica l p u b lic  w h ich  su p p orted  the 
im m ed ia te  in v o lv em en t o f  fo re ig n  experts. T h e  in tensity  o f  the c o n ­
flict  betw een  these tw o  p o s it io n s  c o u ld  be a p lau sib le  e x p la n a tio n  as 
to  w h y  the d e c is io n  p rocess  d ragg ed  on . Y et, w e  a lso  ob se rv e d  that 
the jo in t  rescue o p e ra t io n  w as o v e rs h a d o w e d  b y  several p ro b le m s  -  
tech n ica lly  and  linguistically . T od a y , R ussia  freq u en tly  engages in 
jo in t  in tern ation a l exercises and such  e fforts  w o u ld  h o p e fu lly  c o n ­
tribu te  to  o v e r c o m e  such  p ro b le m s  in  the future.
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Transitional Crisis Management
B o r t s  P o r f t r t e v  a n d  L tna  Sv e d t n
T h e  d e m o c r a t i c  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s ,  w h i c h  h a v e  o c c u r r e d  i n  R u s s i a  
o v e r  t h e  p a s t  1 5  y e a r s ,  h a v e  d r a m a t i c a l l y  c h a n g e d  t h e  e x i s t i n g  p o l i t ­
i c a l  r e g i m e  i n c l u d i n g  i t s  i n s t i t u t i o n a l ,  l e g i s l a t i v e  a n d  e c o n o m i c  p i l ­
l a r s .  T h e  v e r y  p r o c e s s  o f  t h i s  t r e m e n d o u s  a n d  p a i n f u l  t r a n s i t i o n  i n ­
v o l v e d  c r i t i c a l  c h a l l e n g e s  t o  t h e  r e s i l i e n c e  o f  t h e  n a t i o n ’s  n e w l y  e s ­
t a b l i s h e d  a n d  e m e r g i n g  p o l i t i c a l  a n d  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  
v a l u e s  a n d  s o c i a l  n o r m s .  T h e s e  c h a l l e n g e s  h a v e  a l s o  b e e n  a s s o c i a t e d  
w i t h  i n c r e a s e d  r i s k s  a n d  c r i s e s  i n  t h e  v i t a l  s o c i e t a l  a n d  p o l i t i c a l  d o ­
m a i n s .
T h e  c h a p t e r s  o f  t h i s  v o l u m e  p a r t i c u l a r l y  f o c u s e d  o n  h u m a n  a n d  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  s a f e t y ,  p u b l i c  o r d e r  a n d  e c o n o m i c  d e v e l o p m e n t  i s ­
s u e s ,  w h i c h  a r e  a l l  c r i t i c a l  f o r  t h e  s u r v i v a l  o f  a n y  p o l i t i c a l  r e g i m e .  
T h e  d a t a  ( a l t h o u g h  n o t  a l w a y s  e x h a u s t i v e )  i n  t h e  c h a p t e r s  r e v e a l s  
h o w  t h e  e s t a b l i s h e d  a n d  e m e r g i n g  i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  c o n t e m p o r a r y  R u s ­
s i a  h a n d l e d  s p e c i f i c  c r i s e s  i n  k e y  a r e a s .  T h e s e  f i n d i n g s  p r o v i d e  t h e  
o p p o r t u n i t y  f o r  t e s t i n g  t h e  h y p o t h e s e s  a n d  p r o p o s i t i o n s  p r e s e n t e d  i n  
t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  t h i s  v o l u m e .
T h e  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  o f  t h e s e  i n i t i a l  h y p o t h e s e s  a n d  p r o p o s i t i o n s  t o  
t h e  R u s s i a n  c o n t e x t  w o u l d  m e a n  t r a n s f o r m i n g  t h e m  i n t o  t h e o r e m s .  
T h e  f a i l u r e  t o  f i n d  a d e q u a t e  p r o o f  o r  e v i d e n c e  t o  s u p p o r t  t h e s e  
p r o p o s i t i o n s  s h o u l d  n o t  l e a d  t h e  r e a d e r  t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  i n ­
v a l i d .  R a t h e r  t h e y  c a l l  f o r  m o r e  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  c r i s i s  r e s e a r c h  a n d  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  b o t h  i n  R u s s i a  a n d  i n  o t h e r  t r a n s i t i o n a l  p o l i t i e s .
From Hypotheses to Theorems: Propositions 
Revisited
T H E  IN ST IT U T IO N A L  E R O SIO N  H Y PO TH ESIS
P r o p o s i t i o n  1 :  A s  t r a n s i t i o n a l  s o c i e t i e s  m o v e  f r o m  o n e  c r i s i s  m a n ­
a g e m e n t  r e g i m e  t o  a n o t h e r  t h e  e r o d e d  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  f r a m e w o r k s  a r e  
e x t r e m e l y  s t r a i n e d . T h u s  c i v i l  s o c i e t y  a n d  p u b l i c  i n s t i t u t i o n s  b e c o m e  
i n c r e a s i n g  m o r e  v u l n e r a b l e  t o  u n p r e d i c t a b l e  a n d  n e g a t i v e  e v e n t s .
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T h e  d a t a  p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h i s  v o l u m e ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  i n  t h e  c h a p t e r  
a b o u t  c r i s i s  p o l i c y  i n  R u s s i a ,  p r o v i d e s  i n s i g h t  o n  t h e  s h i f t  w h i c h  o c ­
c u r r e d  i n  t h e  1 9 9 0 s  a n d  i n  t h e  n e w  c e n t u r y  i n  R u s s i a .  T h e r e  w a s  a  
s h i f t  f r o m  c e n t r a l i z e d  c r i s i s  p l a n n i n g  a n d  c r i s i s  r e s p o n s e  t o  a  m o r e  
d e c e n t r a l i z e d  m o d e l .  T h e r e  w a s  a l s o  a  s h i f t  f r o m  a  s t r o n g  m i l i t a r y  
o r i e n t a t i o n  ( f o c u s i n g  o n  w a r t i m e  t h r e a t s  w i t h  t h e  c i v i l  d e f e n s e  a s  a n  
o r g a n i c  p a r t  o f  t h e  M i n i s t r y  o f  D e f e n s e )  t o  p e a c e t i m e  p l a n n i n g  w i t h  
c i v i c  a n d  q u a s i - c i v i l i a n  i n s t i t u t i o n s  p r e v a i l i n g  o n  t h e  c r i s i s  m a n a g e ­
m e n t  s c e n e .
T h i s  m a j o r  c h a n g e  c o m p l i e s  w i t h  t h e  g e n e r a l  t r e n d s  i n  d e v e l o p ­
i n g  a n d  e s t a b l i s h e d  d e m o c r a c i e s ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  i n  E u r o p e  ( s e e  P o r ­
f i r i e v ,  2 0 0 1 b ) .  H o w e v e r ,  t h i s  p r o c e s s  i n  R u s s i a  w a s  i n s t i g a t e d  b y  t h e  
i n s t a n t  c o l l a p s e  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  w h i c h  r e s u l t e d  i n  a  s u d d e n  r e ­
d u c t i o n  o f  t e r r i t o r y  a n d  p o p u l a t i o n .  T h i s  a b r u p t  c h a n g e  l e d  t o  i n s t i ­
t u t i o n a l  e r o s i o n .  T h e  c r i s e s  d i s c u s s e d  i n  t h e  m e d i a  r e p o r t  ( C h a p t e r  
3 )  s h o w  t h a t  t h e  n o r m s ,  r u l e s  a n d  v a l u e s  w h i c h  e x i s t e d  f o r  d e c a d e s  
i n  t h e  f o r m e r  S o v i e t  U n i o n  ( i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  i n d u s t r i a l  a n d  e t h n i c  r e l a ­
t i o n s )  w e r e  a b o l i s h e d  o r  l o s t  t h e i r  b i n d i n g  c h a r a c t e r .  T h e y  w e r e  r e ­
p l a c e d  b y  a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  w h i c h  w e r e  a l i e n  t o  t h e  p u b l i c  c o n s c i e n c e ,  o r  
w e r e  s i m p l y  n o t  r e p l a c e d  a t  a l l .  T h i s  c r e a t e d  s o c i e t a l  f r i c t i o n ,  d i s ­
h a r m o n y ,  f r u s t r a t i o n  a n d  m a r g i n a l i z a t i o n .  T h r o u g h o u t  t h i s  v o l u m e  
i t  i s  m e n t i o n e d  t h a t  t h e  n e w  i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  E M E R C O M  a n d  e s p e ­
c i a l l y  U S E P E  s t i l l  h a v e  a  l o t  o f  w o r k  a h e a d  o f  t h e m  i n  r e g a r d  t o  d e ­
v e l o p i n g  a n  e s t a b l i s h e d  a n d  f u l l y  e f f e c t i v e  c r i s i s  m a n a g e m e n t  s t r u c ­
t u r e .
T h e  c a s e  s t u d i e s  o n  t h e  C h e r n o b y l ,  K a r a b a s h  a n d  N e f t e g o r s k  
d i s a s t e r s  v i v i d l y  d e m o n s t r a t e  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a  h i g h  d e g r e e  o f  s t r a i n  o n  
t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  f r a m e w o r k ,  a n d  p a r t i c u l a r l y  o n  t h o s e  p a r t s  w o r k ­
i n g  d i r e c t l y  w i t h  c r i s i s  m a n a g e m e n t .  F o r  i n s t a n c e ,  C h e r n o b y l  o c ­
c u r r e d  j u s t  w h e n  l a r g e - s c a l e  p o l i t i c a l  a n d  e c o n o m i c  c h a n g e s  ( p e r e ­
s t r o i k a )  w e r e  t a k i n g  p l a c e  i n  t h e  f o r m e r  S o v i e t  U n i o n .  T h i s  c o i n c i ­
d e n c e  h a d  a  c o n s i d e r a b l y  n e g a t i v e  i m p a c t  u p o n  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  a n d  
p a c e  o f  e c o n o m i c  d e v e l o p m e n t .  S o m e  R u s s i a n  e c o n o m i s t s  b e l i e v e  
t h a t  t h e  1 9 8 6  r a d i a t i o n  d i s a s t e r  w a s  o n e  r e a s o n  f o r  t h e  d e v a s t a t i n g  
e c o n o m i c  s l o w  d o w n  i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  d e c a d e .  T h e  d i s a s t e r  p u t  a d d i ­
t i o n a l  s t r a i n  o n  t h e  f e d e r a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  e c o n o m i c  a n d  
s o c i a l  r e f o r m s .
I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  s y s t e m  i n  t h e  f o r m e r  S o v i e t  
U n i o n  n e v e r  c o n s i d e r e d ,  a n d  t h u s  w a s  n o t  p r e p a r e d  t o  d e a l  w i t h ,
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t h e  p r o b l e m  o f  c a r i n g  f o r  t h o u s a n d s  o f  d i s a s t e r  v i c t i m s  o v e r  s e v e r a l  
y e a r s .  A  s y s t e m  w a s  e s t a b l i s h e d  f o r  n u m e r o u s  w a r  v e t e r a n s  b u t  n o t  
f o r  p e o p l e  s u f f e r i n g  f r o m  p e a c e t i m e  c r i s e s .  T h e r e  w a s  n o  n a t i o n a l  
l e g i s l a t i o n  c o n c e r n i n g  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  a n d  b e n e f i t s  f o r  c i v i l i a n  v i c ­
t i m s .  C o m p e n s a t i o n  h a s  b e e n  i s s u e d  t o  t h e  C h e r n o b y l  v i c t i m s  o n  a n  
i n d i v i d u a l  b a s i s .  T h o u s a n d s  o f  C h e r n o b y l  l i q u i d a t o r s  w e r e  d i s a b l e d  
o r  h a d  s e r i o u s  h e a l t h  p r o b l e m s  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  a c c i d e n t ,  a n d  t h i s  
p u t  t h e  i n f l e x i b l e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  a n d  l e g i s l a t i v e  s y s t e m s  u n d e r  g r e a t  
p r e s s u r e .  T h e  f e d e r a l  g o v e r n m e n t s  o f  t h e  c o l l a p s i n g  S o v i e t  U n i o n  
a n d  t h e  e m e r g i n g  R u s s i a  F e d e r a t i o n  h a d  t o  i n t r o d u c e  n e w  l a w s  a n d  
r e g u l a t i o n s .  L i k e w i s e ,  t h e y  h a d  t o  e s t a b l i s h  n e w  a g e n c i e s  t o  t a k e  
o v e r  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  l o n g - t e r m  s o c i o - e c o n o m i c  a n d  m e d i c a l  a i d  
f o r  t h e  a f f e c t e d  r e s c u e  w o r k e r s .  I n  t u r n ,  t h o u s a n d s  a n d  t h o u s a n d s  o f  
r e s c u e  w o r k e r s  u n s a t i s f i e d  w i t h  t h e  p a c e  a n d  a m o u n t  o f  a i d  p r o v i d ­
e d  o r g a n i z e d  a  m o v e m e n t  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e i r  v i t a l  i n t e r e s t s ,  w h i c h  
a d d e d  a d d i t i o n a l  s t r a i n  t o  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  f r a m e w o r k .
T h e  K a r a b a s h  e x p e r i e n c e  o c c u r r e d  a f t e r  c h a n g e s  w e r e  m a d e  t o  
t h e  c r i s i s  r e g i m e .  T h e  p l a n t ’s  t o p  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  t h e  r e g i o n a l  a n d  
l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  w e r e  o p e n  t o  w o r k i n g  w i t h  N G O s  ( l i k e  t h e  G r e e n  
m o v e m e n t  a n d  o t h e r  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  g r o u p s ) ,  w h i c h  w a s  n o t  c o m ­
m o n  d u r i n g  t h e  o l d  r e g i m e .  P r o d u c t i o n  c o n t i n u e d  w h i c h  o n l y  a g g r a ­
v a t e d  t h e  e c o l o g i c a l  c r i s i s  a n d  l i t t l e  w a s  d o n e  t o  i m p r o v e  t h e  r e s i ­
d e n t s ’ s o c i o - e c o n o m i c a l  c o n d i t i o n s  a n d  t h e  c i t y ’s  d e p e n d e n c y  o n  t h e  
m o n o - i n d u s t r y .  P o l i t i c a l  p r e s s u r e  f r o m  t h e  N G O s  r e s u l t e d  i n  t h e  
f a c t  t h a t  t h e  a r e a  w a s  o f f i c i a l l y  d e c l a r e d  a n  e c o l o g i c a l  d i s a s t e r .  T h e  
o l d  r e g i m e  f a i l e d  t o  c o n s i d e r  c r i s i s  p r e v e n t i o n  a n d  c r i s i s  m a n a g e ­
m e n t  i s s u e s .  F u r t h e r m o r e  p r i v a t i z a t i o n  p u t  a d d i t i o n a l  s t r a i n s  o n  
e c o n o m i c  d e v e l o p m e n t  a n d  c r i s i s  p o l i c y  i n  R u s s i a .  T h i s  c o m p l i c a t e d  
t h e  e x i s t i n g  c o n f l i c t  b e t w e e n  e c o n o m i c  a n d  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p r i o r i t i e s .
T h e  N e f t e g o r s k  e a r t h q u a k e  q u i c k l y  d e m o n s t r a t e d  t h e  w e a k n e s s  
o f  t h e  U S E P E  ( t h e  n e w  c i v i l  d e f e n s e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  f r a m e w o r k ) ,  s i n c e  
t h e  e a r t h q u a k e  h a d  w i p e d  o u t  t h e  l o c a l  r e s p o n s e  t e a m s .  S u c h  v u l ­
n e r a b i l i t y  i l l u s t r a t e s  t h e  n e e d  f o r  g o o d  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  c o o r d i n a t i o n  
b e t w e e n  n e i g h b o r i n g  a n d  h i g h e r - l e v e l  r e s p o n s e  u n i t s .  A n o t h e r  i n s t i ­
t u t i o n a l  v u l n e r a b i l i t y  r e v e a l e d  b y  t h e  e a r t h q u a k e  d i s a s t e r  w a s  t h e  i s ­
s u e  o f  c r i s i s  c o m m u n i c a t i o n .  T h e  c r i s i s  r e s p o n s e  w a s  t o t a l l y  d e p e n d ­
e n t  u p o n  a  f u n c t i o n i n g  t e l e p h o n e  s y s t e m ,  b u t  t h e  e a r t h q u a k e  h a d  
c u t  t h e  t e l e p h o n e  l i n e s .  T h e r e  w a s  n o  b a c k - u p  p l a n .  T h e  c u t  i n  t h e  
c o m m u n i c a t i o n  n e t w o r k  h a d  t r a g i c  c o n s e q u e n c e s .
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T h e  r e m o t e n e s s  o f  t h e  r e g i o n  ( i . e .  a n  i s l a n d )  w a s  a l s o  o n e  m o r e  
f a c t o r  c o n t r i b u t i n g  t o  c r i s i s  v u l n e r a b i l i t y .  A  k e y  p r o b l e m  w a s  g e t t i n g  
r e s o u r c e s  t h e r e  o n c e  i t  h a d  b e c o m e  a p p a r e n t  w h a t  h a d  h a p p e n e d  
a n d  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  t h e  d i s a s t e r .  T h i s  p r o b l e m  e x i s t e d  s i n c e  t h e  o l d  
r e g i m e ’s  m o d e l  o f  c e n t r a l i z e d  c r i s i s  r e s p o n s e  h a d  n o t  y e t  b e e n  t r a n s ­
f o r m e d  i n t o  t h e  n e w  U S E P E  f r a m e w o r k .  A s  a  r e s u l t ,  t h e  r e s p o n s e  
w a s  d e l a y e d  a n d  h a d  t o  b e  i n  p a r t  r e p l a c e d  b y  a d  h o c  s o l u t i o n s  a n d  
v o l u n t a r y  i n i t i a t i v e s .  T h i s  i n i t i a l  v o l u n t e e r  r e s p o n s e  w a s  p e r f o r m e d  
m a i n l y  b y  t h e  v i c t i m s  t h e m s e l v e s  a n d  i t  w a s  c r u c i a l  i n  t h e  f i r s t  t h i r ­
t y - s i x  h o u r s  b e f o r e  e x t e r n a l  h e l p  a r r i v e d .
T h e  c a s e  a n a l y s e s  i n  t h i s  v o l u m e  a n d  t h e  o v e r v i e w  o f  t h e  U S E P E  
d e v e l o p m e n t  ( s e e  P o r f i r i e v ,  2 0 0 1 a )  s u p p o r t  t h e  c l a i m  t h a t  t h e  n e w  
r e g i m e ’s  c r i s i s  p o l i c y  h a s  b e e n  s t r a i n e d  b y  e x c e s s i v e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
b u r d e n s  a n d  a  s e v e r e  s h o r t a g e  o f  f u n d s .  I t  i s  e v i d e n t  i n  R u s s i a  t h a t  
t h e  r e g i m e  s h i f t  f r o m  a n  o l d  h i e r a r c h i c a l  a n d  c e n t r a l i z e d  c r i s i s  m a n ­
a g e m e n t  s y s t e m  t o  a  m o r e  d e c e n t r a l i z e d  o n e  ( w h i c h  u t i l i z e s  p u b l i c ,  
p r i v a t e  a n d  m i x e d  i n i t i a t i v e s )  h a s  b e e n  p r o b l e m a t i c  i n  c r i s i s  m a n ­
a g e m e n t .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  t h i s  s h i f t  a n d  t h e  c o n s e q u e n c e s  i t  
h a s  o n  c r i s i s  d e v e l o p m e n t  a n d  c r i s i s  m a n a g e m e n t  d e p e n d  l a r g e l y  u p ­
o n  t h e  d e g r e e  o f  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  r i g i d i t y :  t h e  e s s e n c e  o f  o u r  n e x t  h y ­
p o t h e s i s .
T H E  IN ST IT U T IO N A L  RIG ID ITY  H Y PO TH ESIS
P r o p o s i t i o n  2 :  I n  t r a n s i t i o n a l  p o l i t i e s  t h e  p e r s i s t e n c e  o f  l o n g  e x i s t i n g  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e s  a n d  i n s t i t u t i o n s  ( a t  t h e  m e s o -  a n d  m i c r o - l e v ­
e l s  i n  s o c i e t y  a n d  g o v e r n m e n t )  r e s u l t  i n  a  r e s i s t a n c e  t o  c h a n g e  t o  t h e  
b a s i c  f o u n d a t i o n s  o f  t h e  m a c r o - p o l i t i c a l  a n d  m a c r o - e c o n o m i c  l e v e l s .  
T h i s  p r e c i p i t a t e s  c r i s i s  c o n d i t i o n s  a n d  r e s t r i c t s  t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  
c r i s i s  p o l i c y .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  p o l i c i e s  a n d  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r a c t i c e s  o f  
c e r t a i n  r e g i o n a l  W e s t e r n  i n s t i t u t i o n s  ( i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  t h e  E U  a n d  N A ­
T O )  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  e x p e r i e n c e  s t r e s s - i n d u c i n g  t e n s i o n  b e t w e e n  d o m e s ­
t i c  a n d  W e s t e r n  n o r m s  a n d  p r a c t i c e s .
T h i s  h y p o t h e s i s  s t a t e s  t h a t  o l d  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r a c t i c e s  i n  t r a n s i ­
t i o n a l  s o c i e t i e s  a n d  g o v e r n m e n t  p e r s i s t ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  a t  t h e  m i c r o -  
a n d  m e s o -  l e v e l s ,  d e s p i t e  o t h e r  c h a n g e s .  P r o p o n e n t s  o f  t h e  o l d  
r e g i m e  i n  t h e  c r i s i s  m a n a g e m e n t  s t r u c t u r e ,  g o v e r n m e n t  o r  s o c i e t y  a t  
l a r g e  c a n  e v e n  m a k e  d r a m a t i c  a t t e m p t s  t o  c h a l l e n g e  o r  d e s t a b i l i z e  
t h e  n e w  r e g i m e .
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T h e  C h e r n o b y l  l i q u i d a t o r s ’ c a s e  g i v e s  p e r h a p s  t h e  m o s t  c o n v i n c ­
i n g  a n d  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  e x a m p l e  o f  t h i s .  T h e  s t r u g g l e  b e t w e e n  t h e  
l i q u i d a t o r s  a n d  t h e  n a t i o n a l  g o v e r n m e n t  ( S o v i e t  g o v e r n m e n t  u n t i l  
1 9 9 1  a n d  t h e n  t h e  R u s s i a n  g o v e r n m e n t  t h e r e a f t e r )  c h a l l e n g e d  t h e  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  a n d  j u d i c i a l  n o r m s ,  a n d  t h e  p r o c e s s e s  a n d  s t r u c t u r e s  
w h i c h  w e r e  t y p i c a l  f o r  t h e  f o r m e r  S o v i e t  c r i s i s  p o l i c y  a n d  h a d  b e e n  
t r a n s f e r r e d  t o  t h e  R u s s i a n  F e d e r a t i o n .  T h e  s t a t e  s y s t e m  w a s  u n a b l e  
t o  m a n a g e  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  i s s u e s  a n d  t h i s  r e v e a l e d  t h a t  t h e  l e g a l  s y s ­
t e m  w a s  p o w e r l e s s ,  o r  a l t e r n a t i v e l y  t h a t  t h e  s t a t e  c o u l d  n o t  i m p l e ­
m e n t  i t s  o w n  p o l i c y .  T h e  s t a t e  w a s  i n f l e x i b l e ,  u n a b l e  t o  c o o r d i n a t e  
o p e r a t i o n s ,  a n d  p l a g u e d  b y  b u r e a u c r a t i s m .
T h e  s t a t e  e m p l o y e e s  a n d  a g e n c i e s  s u r v i v e d  t h e  d r a s t i c  c h a n g e s  i n  
t h e  p o l i t i c a l  a n d  e c o n o m i c  s p h e r e s ,  a n d  w e r e  s i m p l y  t r a n s f e r r e d  
f r o m  t h e  o l d  r e g i m e  t o  t h e  n e w .  T h i s  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  p e r s i s t e n c e  
o f  r i g i d i t y  i n  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  s y s t e m  a s  a  w h o l e .  T h e s e  o r g a n i z a ­
t i o n s  h a d  n e v e r  d e a l t  w i t h  s u c h  i s s u e s .  U n s u r p r i s i n g l y ,  t h e  a d m i n i s ­
t r a t i v e  s y s t e m  w a s  i n d i f f e r e n t  a n d  u n i n t e r e s t e d  i n  t h e  c o n c e r n s  
r a i s e d  b y  t h e  C h e r n o b y l  r e s c u e  w o r k e r s .
T h e r e  w a s  a  c l e a r  c o n f l i c t  b e t w e e n  t h e  o l d  b u r e a u c r a t i c  s t r u c ­
t u r e s  a n d  p r o c e d u r e s ,  a n d  t h e  r e s c u e  w o r k e r s ’ n e e d s .  T h e  l i q u i d a ­
t o r s  q u i c k l y  u n d e r s t o o d  t h a t  t h e  G o v e r n m e n t  w a s  n o t  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  
t h e i r  c o n c e r n s ,  s o  t h e y  o r g a n i z e d  s p e c i a l  N G O s  t o  f i g h t  f o r  t h e i r  
r i g h t  t o  s o c i a l  b e n e f i t s .  N G O s  r e p r e s e n t  a  n e w  e l e m e n t  i n  t h e  
e m e r g i n g  c r i s i s  m a n a g e m e n t  s t r u c t u r e  i n  R u s s i a ,  b e c a u s e  t h e y  a r e  
m o r e  g e a r e d  t o w a r d s  a  d e c e n t r a l i z e d  s y s t e m .  A  n u m b e r  o f  a c t o r s  
( i n c l u d i n g  p r i v a t e  a c t o r s )  p l a y e d  a n  i m p o r t a n t  r o l e  i n  t h e  s t r u g g l e  
b e t w e e n  t h e  f e d e r a l  g o v e r n m e n t  ( m a c r o - l e v e l ) ,  t h e  r e g i o n a l  a u t h o r i ­
t i e s  ( m e s o - l e v e l ) ,  a n d  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l s  w h o  w e r e  a f f e c t e d  b y  C h e r ­
n o b y l  d i s a s t e r  ( m i c r o -  a n d  m e s o - l e v e l s ) .
A s  f o r  t h e  s e c o n d  p a r t  o f  t h i s  p r o p o s i t i o n  ( c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  t e n ­
s i o n  b e t w e e n  d o m e s t i c  a n d  W e s t e r n  n o r m s ) ,  n o n e  o f  t h e  s t u d i e s  i n  
t h i s  v o l u m e  s p e c i f i c a l l y  a d d r e s s e d  t h i s  i s s u e .  T h u s ,  i t  n e e d s  f u r t h e r  
i n v e s t i g a t i o n .  H o w e v e r ,  a t  t h e  s u p e r f i c i a l  l e v e l  t h e r e  a r e  a  f e w  e x a m ­
p l e s  w h i c h  s u p p o r t  t h e  p r o p o s i t i o n .  R u s s i a  h a s  s o m e  i n t e n t i o n s  o f  
j o i n i n g  t h e  E U  a s  m e n t i o n e d  b y  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  o f  R u s s i a  i n  h i s  m e e t ­
i n g  w i t h  t h e  F r e n c h  P r e s i d e n t  i n  S t .  P e t e r s b u r g  i n  e a r l y  J u l y  2 0 0 1 .  
E U  m e m b e r s h i p  w o u l d  r e q u i r e  c o n f o r m i n g  t o  c e r t a i n  p r i n c i p l e s .  
O n e  s u c h  t o p i c  w o u l d  b e  t h e  d e a t h  p e n a l t y  i s s u e ,  w h i c h  i s  s t r o n g l y  
f o r b i d d e n  a c c o r d i n g  t o  E U  p o l i t i c a l  a n d  h u m a n i t a r i a n  v a l u e s .  I n
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R u s s i a ,  t h i s  i s s u e  r a i s e s  a n  i n c r e a s i n g  a n d  i n t e n s i v e  d e b a t e  a m o n g  
t h e  f e d e r a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  ( t h e  P r e s i d e n t ,  t h e  G o v e r n m e n t  a n d  t h e  P a r ­
l i a m e n t ) ,  t h e  p u b l i c  a n d  c l e r i c a l  c i r c l e s .  P u b l i c  o p i n i o n  p o l l s  r e v e a l  
t h a t  t h e  R u s s i a n  m a j o r i t y  i s  i n  f a v o r  o f  t h e  d e a t h  p e n a l t y ,  a n d  t h e  
N a t i o n a l  C r i m i n a l  C o d e  a n d  E x e c u t i o n  P r a c t i c e  i s  s u p p o r t e d  b y  a  
s i g n i f i c a n t  p a r t  o f  t h e  S t a t e  D u m a  a n d  t h e  R u s s i a n  O r t h o d o x  
C h u r c h .  T h i s  i s  i n  s h a r p  c o n t r a s t  w i t h  t h e  p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  R u s s i a n  
P r e s i d e n t ,  w h o  o f f i c i a l l y  v o i c e d  h i s  d i s p l e a s u r e  w i t h  t h e  l e a d e r s  o f  
t h e  S t a t e  D u m a  i n  J u l y  2 0 0 1  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h i s  i s s u e .  T h e  P r e s i d e n t  
i s ,  h o w e v e r ,  s u p p o r t e d  b y  m a n y  o f  t h e  R u s s i a n  d e m o c r a t i c  m o v e ­
m e n t s  a n d  E U  l e g i s l a t i o n  w h i c h  s t r i c t l y  p r o h i b i t s  t h i s  k i n d  o f  p u n ­
i s h m e n t .  T h i s  i s  j u s t  o n e  e x a m p l e  o f  t h e  d i s c r e p a n c y  b e t w e e n  d o ­
m e s t i c  o p i n i o n s  a n d  W e s t e r n  n o r m s  a n d  v a l u e s .  O t h e r  h o t  t o p i c s  
w o u l d  b e  t h e  h u m a n  r i g h t s  i s s u e  i n  C h e c h n y a ,  i n d u s t r i a l  s a f e t y ,  a n d  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  s t a n d a r d s .
T H E  U N D E R -IN ST IT U T IO N A L IZ A T IO N  H Y PO TH ESIS
P r o p o s i t i o n  3 :  A s  t r a n s i t i o n a l  s o c i e t i e s  m o v e  t o w a r d s  a  W e s t e r n  
s t y l e  d e m o c r a c y  a n d  m a r k e t  e c o n o m y ,  t h e r e  w i l l  b e  a  s t r u g g l e  t o  
o v e r c o m e  t h e  e x i s t i n g  u n d e r - i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n  a n d  t h e r e  w i l l  b e  
i n c r e a s e d  p o l i t i c i z a t i o n  a n d  m e d i a z a t i o n  o f  c r i s e s  a n d  c r i s i s  p o l i c y .
T h i s  h y p o t h e s i s  a s s u m e s  t h a t  t h e  p e r c e p t i o n  o f  a  c r i s i s  b e c o m e s  
i n c r e a s i n g l y  s h a p e d  b y  t h e  m e d i a  a n d  t h u s  b e c o m e s  a  p o l i t i c a l  i s s u e .  
I t  a l s o  i m p l i e s  t h a t  a  m o r e  o p e n  m e d i a ,  r e a l  o r  i m a g i n e d  s h i f t s  i n  t h e  
c r i s i s  m a n a g e m e n t  r e g i m e ,  a n d  t h e  s o c i o - e c o n o m i c  s i t u a t i o n  c o u l d  
g e n e r a t e  i n c r e a s e d  p u b l i c  e x p e c t a t i o n s  o n  t h e  G o v e r n m e n t  t o  m a n ­
a g e  c r i s e s  b e t t e r .
T h e  c a s e  s t u d i e s  i n  t h e  v o l u m e  p r o v i d e  a b u n d a n t  p r o o f  o f  t h e  
i n c r e a s i n g  o p e n n e s s  a n d  c o v e r a g e  o f  c r i s e s  a n d  c r i s i s  m a n a g e m e n t  
i s s u e s  b y  t h e  m e d i a  i n  R u s s i a ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  w h e n  t h i s  i s  c o m p a r e d  
w i t h  t h e  f o r m e r  S o v i e t  U n i o n .  D u r i n g  t h e  S o v i e t  t i m e s  t h e  m o t t o  
w a s ,  “ N o  v i c t i m s ,  n o  d e s t r u c t i o n . ”  N o  d e t a i l s  w e r e  p r o v i d e d  a b o u t  
m a j o r  n a t u r a l  o r  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  d i s a s t e r s  i n  t h e  o f f i c i a l  m e d i a  a n d  
t h e r e  w e r e  n o  i n d e p e n d e n t  i n f o r m a t i o n  s o u r c e s .  A c c i d e n t s  a t  m i l i ­
t a r y  s i t e s  a n d  d u r i n g  m i l i t a r y  o p e r a t i o n s  w e r e  a l m o s t  n e v e r  m a d e  
p u b l i c  b y  S o v i e t  p o l i t i c i a n s  o r  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  m e d i a .
C o n t r a r y  t o  t h a t  t r a d i t i o n ,  c o v e r a g e  o f  t h e  s u n k e n  K u r s k  s u b ­
m a r i n e  b e a r s  w i t n e s s  t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  n e w  c r i s i s  r e g i m e  i s  i n d e e d
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m o r e  r e c e p t i v e .  I t  i s  n o w  e a s i e r  f o r  t h e  n e w s p a p e r s  a n d  T V  s t a t i o n s  
t o  r e p o r t  o n  c r i s e s ,  i n c l u d i n g  m a j o r  d i s a s t e r s  d u r i n g  s t r a t e g i c  m i l i ­
t a r y  m i s s i o n s .  F i v e  b o o k s  a n d  h u n d r e d s  o f  n e w s p a p e r  a r t i c l e s  w e r e  
p u b l i s h e d  i n  R u s s i a  w i t h i n  j u s t  o n e  y e a r  a f t e r  t h e  K u r s k  t r a g e d y .  
C h e r n o b y l ,  w h i c h  w a s  o n e  o f  t h e  m o s t  p u b l i c i z e d  e v e n t  d u r i n g  t h e  
S o v i e t  e r a ,  d o e s  n o t  e v e n  b e g i n  t o  c o m p a r e .  N o w a d a y s ,  t h e  m e d i a  i s  
a n  i m p o r t a n t  s o u r c e  o f  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  s i n c e  t h e  G o v e r n m e n t  a n d  
i t s  r e s p e c t i v e  a g e n c i e s  a r e  s t i l l  q u i t e  r e l u c t a n t  t o  g i v e  t h e  p u b l i c  a c ­
c e s s  t o  g o v e r n m e n t  d o c u m e n t s .  T h e  b a c k - s i d e  t o  t h e  n e w  c r i t i c a l  
m e d i a  c o v e r a g e  i n  R u s s i a  i s  t h a t ,  l i k e  i n  W e s t e r n  c o u n t r i e s ,  j o u r n a l ­
i s t s  t e n d  t o  f i l l  i n  t h e  b l a n k s  w i t h  w h a t e v e r  t h e y  f e e l  f i t .  T h u s ,  s o m e  
o f  t h e  r e p o r t i n g  o n  c r i s e s  h a s  b e e n  q u i t e  r h e t o r i c a l  a n d  s e n s a t i o n a l ­
i z e d .  T h i s  h a s  i n c r e a s e d  t h e  r i s k  o f  t h e  m e d i a  b e c o m i n g  a  c r i s i s  g e n ­
e r a t o r  i n  i t s e l f  ( s e e  C h e r k a s h i n ,  2 0 0 1 :  3 6 - 4 4 ) .
S o m e  i n t e r e s t i n g  o b s e r v a t i o n s  i n  c o n j u n c t i o n  t o  t h e  c r i s i s  p o l i t i ­
c i z a t i o n  a n d  m e d i a t i z a t i o n  h y p o t h e s i s  a r e  t h e  s t u d i e s  o n  t h e  N e f t e ­
g o r s k  e a r t h q u a k e  a n d  t h e  K a r a b a s h  e c o l o g i c a l  d i s a s t e r .  P r e s s i n g  e c o ­
l o g i c a l  s i t u a t i o n s  a n d  n a t u r a l  d i s a s t e r s  w e r e  n e v e r  s e r i o u s l y  c o n s i d ­
e r e d  b y  t h e  S o v i e t  p o l i t i c a l  r e g i m e .  H o w e v e r ,  v a r i o u s  a c t o r s  h a v e  
p u s h e d  t h e s e  i t e m s  f u r t h e r  u p  o n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  a g e n d a .  M o s t  o f  t h e s e  
a c t o r s  h a v e  b e e n  i n v o l v e d  i n  p r o m o t i n g  e c o l o g i c a l  a w a r e n e s s  a n d  i n  
p o i n t i n g  o u t  e c o l o g i c a l  t h r e a t s  ( w h i c h  a r e  b e c o m i n g  r e c o g n i z e d  a s  
c r i s e s ) .
T h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  N G O s  a n d  o t h e r  p r i v a t e  g r o u p s  i s  a  s i g n  o f  t h e  
s h i f t  i n  c r i s i s  r e g i m e  w h i c h  i s  m o r e  r e c e p t i v e  a n d  o p e n  t o  t h e  m e d i a  
a n d  t h e  p u b l i c .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  o t h e r  g r o u p s  ( o t h e r  t h a n  t h e  f e d e r a l ,  
s t a t e ,  r e g i o n a l  o r  l o c a l  g o v e r n m e n t s )  a r e  g r o w i n g  i n  i n f l u e n c e .  T h e  
o f f i c i a l  m e d i a  c o m p e t e s  w i t h  t h e  n e w  i n d e p e n d e n t  i n f o r m a t i o n  
s o u r c e s .  A t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e ,  m o u n t i n g  p o l i t i c i z a t i o n  o f  e v e r y d a y  a n d  
c r i s i s  e v e n t s  ( e s p e c i a l l y  t h o s e  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  p r o p e r t y  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  
a n d  e l e c t i o n s )  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  s u c h  s o u r c e s ,  p r i m a r i l y  a t  t h e  
l o c a l  a n d  r e g i o n a l  l e v e l s .  B y  b e i n g  b e t t e r  i n f o r m e d ,  t h e  p u b l i c  i s  e m ­
p o w e r e d  a n d  c a n  c o n c r e t e l y  c l a i m  c e r t a i n  d e m a n d s  f r o m  t h e  a u t h o r ­
i t i e s .
T h e  m e d i a  s t u d y  r e v e a l e d  t h a t  t h e  R u s s i a n  m e d i a  c a n  p u t  m o r e  
p r e s s u r e  o n  t h e  c r i s i s  d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s  b y  c r i t i c a l l y  r e p o r t i n g  c r i s e s  
a n d  c r i s i s  m a n a g e m e n t .  W h e t h e r  t h e  m e d i a  a c t u a l l y  s u c c e e d s  i n  t h i s  
a i m  i s  s t i l l  u n c l e a r  s i n c e  l i t t l e  o r  n o  i n f o r m a t i o n  w a s  p r o v i d e d  d i ­
r e c t l y  f r o m  t h e  d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  m e d i a  r e p o r t s  c r e a t e
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e x p e c t a t i o n s  a m o n g  t h e  p u b l i c  a n d  t h u s  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  e s c a l a t i n g  
t h e  c r i s i s .
T h e  p e r s i s t e n c e  o f  t h e  C h e r n o b y l  l i q u i d a t o r  p r o b l e m  h a s  i n  p a r t  
r e s u l t e d  f r o m  l o o p h o l e s  i n  t h e  c r i s i s  r e c o v e r y  p o l i c y ,  b u t  a l s o  i n  p a r t  
b y  i n c r e a s e d  p u b l i c  s c r u t i n y  a n d  p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  T h e  v i c t i m s  a n d  t h e i r  
f a m i l i e s  h a v e  b e e n  a b l e  t o  t a k e  t h e i r  c l a i m s  r e g a r d i n g  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  
a n d  g o v e r n m e n t  c o m p e n s a t i o n  t o  c o u r t . 26 I s s u e s  l i k e  w o r k m e n ’s 
c o m p e n s a t i o n  f o r  d i s a s t e r s  c a n  n o w  b e  p u r s u e d  t h r o u g h  t h e  l e g a l  
s y s t e m  i n  t h e  n e w  r e g i m e .
T h i s  s t r u g g l e  h a s  b e e n  a  r e a c t i o n  t o  t h e  s t a t e ’s  f a i l u r e  t o  p r o v i d e  
p r o p e r  m e d i c a l  c a r e  f o r  t h e  C h e r n o b y l  v i c t i m s  w h o  s a c r i f i c e d  t h e i r  
h e a l t h  f o r  t h e  c o u n t r y .  T h e  v a l u e s  o f  a  c a r i n g  g o v e r n m e n t ,  s o l i d a r i t y  
a n d  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  n a t i o n a l  h e r o e s  a r e  v a l u e s  w h i c h  w e r e  d e e p l y  e n ­
t r e n c h e d  i n  t h e  o l d  S o v i e t  s y s t e m .  T h e s e  v a l u e s  p e r s i s t  i n  m a n y  w a y s  
i n  c o n t e m p o r a r y  R u s s i a .
D e s p i t e  t h e  c h a n g e s  m a d e  o v e r  t h e  p a s t  t e n  y e a r s  a f t e r  t h e  d i s s o ­
l u t i o n  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n ,  t h e r e  i s  s t i l l  n e e d  f o r  i m p r o v e m e n t .  
M a n y  s e c t o r s  h a v e  i n  f a c t  w i t n e s s e d  a  d r a m a t i c  d e c r e a s e  i n  t h e  
n u m b e r  o f  s e r v i c e s  a v a i l a b l e ,  a s  w e l l  i n  s a f e t y  a n d  s e c u r i t y .  T h e  g o v ­
e r n m e n t  a t  a l l  l e v e l s  m u s t  b e  a b l e  t o  c o p e  b e t t e r  w i t h  c r i s e s  i n  t h e  
f u t u r e .  T h e  p e o p l e  i n  K a r a b a s h  f e l t  t h a t  t h e y  r e c e i v e d  l e s s  h e l p  f r o m  
t h e  G o v e r n m e n t  t h a n  t h e y  h a d  e x p e c t e d  i n  r e s p o n s e  t o  t h e i r  e c o l o g i ­
c a l  c o n c e r n s  a b o u t  t h e  c i t y  m i n i n g  p r o d u c t i o n .  T h e r e  w a s  a n  e x p e c ­
t a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  c i t y ’s  d e p e n d e n c y  u p o n  t h e  m o n o - i n d u s t r y  w o u l d  b e  
r e p l a c e d  o r  i n  s o m e  w a y  m i n i m i z e d  ( i . e .  t h e  o w n e r s h i p  o f  t h e  p l a n t  
a n d  i t s  f u t u r e  o p e r a t i o n s ) .  W h e n  t h e  G o v e r n m e n t  s h o w e d  t h a t  i t  
w a s  n o t  i n  a n y  d i r e c t  w a y  g o i n g  t o  t a k e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  c u r ­
r e n t  e c o l o g i c a l  s t a t e  i n  a n d  a r o u n d  t h e  c i t y  n o r  i n t e r v e n e  i n  t h e  p r i ­
v a t i z a t i o n  p r o c e s s  o f  t h e  p l a n t ,  t h e  p l a n t  w o r k e r s  r e v o l t e d .
I n  a  s e n s e ,  t h e  o b j e c t i o n s  o f  t h e  p l a n t  w o r k e r s  a n d  t h e  l o c a l  r e s i ­
d e n t s  c o n c e r n e d  t h e  n e w  g o a l s  a n d  a i m s  o f  t h e  c r i s i s  m a n a g e m e n t  
r e g i m e  w i t h  n e w l y  i d e n t i f i e d  p r o b l e m  a r e a s  a n d  n e w  p r o c e s s e s  f o r  
m a n a g i n g  t h e m .  A t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e  t h e  p l a n t  w o r k e r s  a n d  t h e  l o c a l  r e s ­
i d e n t s  f e l t  t h e r e  w a s  a  l a c k  o f  a d e q u a t e  p r o b l e m  s o l v i n g .  T h e i r  l i v i n g  
c o n d i t i o n s  c h a n g e d  v e r y  l i t t l e .  T h e  p e o p l e  o f  K a r a b a s h  d i d  n o t  p e r ­
26 In part, of course, the persistence of the liquidator issue has to do w ith the real medical problems of 
those who were affected, especially the children. This is by no means a m atter of lesser importance. 
O n the contrary, these im portant issues and the failure of the system to provide adequate medical care 
to  these people are at the very heart of the problem.
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c e i v e  t h e  G o v e r n m e n t  a s  t a k i n g  i t s  p a r t  o f  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  T h i s  c a s e  
s h o w s  h o w  t h e  n e w  r e g i m e  h a s  f a i l e d  t o  b e  p r o p e r l y  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d .  
S o m e  s i g n i f i c a n t  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  i s s u e s  a r e  s t i l l  u n r e s o l v e d ,  a n d  t h i s  
i n  p a r t  h a s  l e d  t o  t h e  p l a n t  w o r k e r s ’ p r o t e s t s  a n d  a  s e c o n d  c r i s i s .
T H E  IN ST IT U T IO N A L  O V E R ST R A IN  A N D  STALEM ATE
H Y PO TH ESIS
P r o p o s i t i o n  4 :  O v e r s t r a i n e d  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  u n i t s  i n  t r a n s i t i o n a l  
s o c i e t i e s  i n c r e a s i n g l y  e x p e r i e n c e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s t a l e m a t e  r e s u l t i n g  i n  
p o o r  d e t e c t i o n  s k i l l s ,  d e l a y e d  c r i s i s  p r e v e n t i o n  a n d  i n e f f e c t i v e  c r i s i s  
r e s p o n s e .  I n  t u r n  t h i s  w i l l  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  n u m b e r  
a n d  s e v e r i t y  o f  c r i s e s .  W i t h  m o u n t i n g  c r i s i s  p o l i t i c i z a t i o n ,  c r i s i s  
m a n a g e r s  w i l l  t e n d  t o  f o c u s  o n  a c u t e  c r i s e s  r a t h e r  t h a n  o n  c r e e p i n g  
c r i s e s ,  a n d  f o c u s  o n  s h o r t - t e r m  p o l i t i c a l  a n d  e c o n o m i c  i s s u e s  a t  t h e  
e x p e n s e  o f  l o n g - t e r m  s o c i a l  a n d  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o n c e r n s .
E v e n  t h o u g h t  t h i s  h y p o t h e s i s  i s  p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h i s  v o l u m e ,  o n e  
c o u l d  e a s i l y  f i n d  e v i d e n c e  f o r  i t  i n  p r e v i o u s  C R i S M A R T  p u b l i c a ­
t i o n s .  I t  m a y  b e  t h a t  t h e  R u s s i a n  c o n t e x t  p r o v i d e s  s o m e  o f  t h e  m o s t  
c o n v i n c i n g  t e s t i m o n y  t o  t h e  p r o p o s i t i o n .
T h e  i n c r e a s e d  c o m p l e x i t y  a n d  s e v e r i t y  o f  c r i s e s  i n  R u s s i a  s t e m  
f r o m  t h e  l e g a c y  o f  c e n t r a l i z e d  p l a n n i n g  a n d  t h e  e x c e s s i v e  m i l i t a r y  
b u d g e t  i n  t h e  f o r m e r  S o v i e t  U n i o n ,  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  p r o b l e m s  a s s o c i a t ­
e d  w i t h  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  f r o m  a  t o t a l i t a r i a n  r e g i m e  t o  a  m o r e  d e m o ­
c r a t i c  a n d  m a r k e t - o r i e n t e d  o n e .  F o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h e  p o o r  c o n s t r u c t i o n  
o f  r e s i d e n t i a l  b u i l d i n g s  i n  t h e  l a t e  1 9 6 0 s  a n d  e a r l y  1 9 7 0 s  a m p l i f i e d  
t h e  i m p a c t  o f  t h e  N e f t e g o r s k  d i s a s t e r .  T h e  b u i l d i n g  c o d e s  a n d  c o n ­
s t r u c t i o n  p r a c t i c e s  w e r e  c l e a r  p r o d u c t s  o f  c e n t r a l i z e d  p l a n n i n g .  
S t a n d a r d i z e d  c o n s t r u c t i o n  p r a c t i c e s  w e r e  i m p l e m e n t e d  w i t h  l i t t l e  o r  
n o  r e g a r d  t o  g e o g r a p h i c a l  v a r i a t i o n s  o r  s p e c i a l  c i r c u m s t a n c e s .
T h e  s t a t e  i n d u s t r i a l  a n d  c o n s t r u c t i o n  c o m p a n i e s  c o u l d  h a v e  
m i n i m i z e d  t h e  i m p a c t  o f  t h e  N e f t e g o r s k  a n d  K a r a b a s h  d i s a s t e r s  i f  
t h e y  h a d  n o t  t r i e d  t o  e c o n o m i z e  o n  c o n s t r u c t i o n  c o s t s  a n d  o c c u p a ­
t i o n a l  s a f e t y .  T h i s  w a s  v e r y  t y p i c a l  f o r  t h e  f o r m e r  S o v i e t  p o l i t i c a l  
a n d  e c o n o m i c  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  ( s e e  P o r f i r i e v ,  1 9 9 8 ) .  I n  t h e  C o l d  W a r  
e r a ,  h u g e  f u n d s  w e r e  a l l o c a t e d  t o  a r m s  a n d  t o  s u p p o r t i n g  a l l i e s ,  a n d  
t h i s  m e a n t  c u t t i n g  c o r n e r s  i n  i n d u s t r i a l ,  o c c u p a t i o n a l  a n d  e n v i r o n ­
m e n t a l  s a f e t y  w h i c h  i n  t u r n  s i m p l y  c r e a t e d  m o r e  f a v o r a b l e  c o n d i ­
t i o n s  f o r  t h e  b u l k  o f  t h e  c r i s e s  s c r u t i n i z e d  i n  t h i s  v o l u m e .  A t  t h e
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s a m e  t i m e ,  t h e s e  c o n d i t i o n s  w e r e  a g g r a v a t e d  b y  r e c u r r e n t  s o c i a l  a n d  
e c o n o m i c  h a r d s h i p s  a n d  p o l i t i c a l  d i s t u r b a n c e s .  T h i s  a d d e d  t o  t h e  
c o m p l e x i t y  a n d  s e v e r i t y  o f  s p e c i f i c  c r i s e s  a n d  t h e  m a n a g e m e n t  o f  
t h e m .
F o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h e  r e s c u e  w o r k e r s  r e s p o n d i n g  t o  t h e  N e f t e g o r s k  
e a r t h q u a k e  a n d  t h e  K u r s k  a c c i d e n t  h a d  l i t t l e  s u c c e s s  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  
s h o r t a g e  o r  t o t a l  l a c k  o f  r e s c u e  e q u i p m e n t  a n d  s p e c i a l  u n i t s .  E M E R ­
C O M  a n d  t h e  D e f e n s e  M i n i s t r y  h a d  s c a r c e  f u n d s  f o r  t h e s e  t y p e s  o f  
o p e r a t i o n s .  I n  t u r n ,  t h e  s h o r t a g e  o f  f u n d i n g  l e d  t o  a  d e f i c i t  i n  t h e  
f e d e r a l  b u d g e t ,  w h i c h  w a s  h i t  h a r d  b y  t h e  d e e p  e c o n o m i c  r e c e s s i o n  
i n  t h e  1 9 9 0 s .
I n  1 9 9 5  w h e n  t h e  N e f t e g o r s k  e a r t h q u a k e  o c c u r r e d ,  E M E R C O M  
h a d  t o  r e s p o n d  t o  m o r e  t h a n  1 , 5 0 0  e m e r g e n c i e s  w h i c h  a l l  r e q u i r e d  
r e s o u r c e s .  I n  2 0 0 0  w h e n  t h e  K u r s k  s u n k ,  t h e  D e f e n s e  M i n i s t r y  h a d  
t o  s h a r e  i t s  s c a r c e  r e s o u r c e s  w i t h  a  n u m b e r  o f  o t h e r  l e s s  s e r i o u s  m i l ­
i t a r y  a c c i d e n t s  a n d  r o u t i n e  o p e r a t i o n s .  A l m o s t  a t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e  a s  
t h e  K u r s k  d i s a s t e r ,  E M E R C O M  a n d  a  f e w  o t h e r  m i n i s t r i e s  w e r e  
c o p i n g  w i t h  a  t e r r o r i s t  a t t a c k  a n d  a  m a j o r  f i r e  a t  t h e  T V  t o w e r  i n  
M o s c o w .
T h e  c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  e x t e r n a l  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  a n d  i n t e r n a l  o v e r ­
l o a d  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  c o m p l i c a t e d  t h e  c r i s i s  m a n a g e m e n t  i n  t h e s e  c a s e s .  
T h i s  c o m b i n a t i o n  s t r a i n e d  t h e  e x i s t i n g  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  f r a m e w o r k  a n d  
U S E P E ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  w a s  p u t  i n t o  a  d e a d l o c k  p o s i t i o n .  C o n s e q u e n t ­
l y ,  t h i s  k e y  n a t i o n a l  s y s t e m  f o r  t h e  p r e v e n t i o n  o f  a n d  r e s p o n s e  t o  
n a t u r a l  a n d  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  d i s a s t e r s  w a s  f o r c e d  t o  f o c u s  o n  a l r e a d y  
a c t i v e  c r i s e s  r a t h e r  t h a n  t r y i n g  t o  a n t i c i p a t e  a n d  p r e v e n t  p o t e n t i a l  
c r i s e s .  S o m e  o f  t h e  c r i s e s  f a i l e d  t o  b e  d e t e c t e d  e a r l y  o r  w e r e  d e t e c t e d  
t o o  l a t e ,  a n d  t h u s  t h e  c r i s i s  r e s p o n s e  w a s  o f t e n  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d e l a y e d .  
I n  t h e  N e f t e g o r s k  c a s e ,  a  p o o r  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  n e t w o r k  a n d  t h e  r e ­
m o t e n e s s  o f  t h e  a r e a  e x a c e r b a t e d  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  a n d  r e s u l t e d  i n  a  m a ­
j o r  d e l a y  i n  t h e  c r i s i s  r e s p o n s e .
T h i s  h a s  h a d  t w o  a d v e r s e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  n a t i o n a l  c r i s i s  
p o l i c y .  F i r s t  o f  a l l ,  c r i s i s  p r e v e n t i o n  a n d  m i t i g a t i o n  c a p a c i t y  h a v e  
b e e n  r e d u c e d .  O n c e  h i t  b y  a  c r i s i s ,  c r i s i s  m a n a g e m e n t  s y s t e m s  a r e  
o f t e n  i n j u r e d  a n d  n e e d  t i m e  t o  h e a l .  T h u s  i n  t h e  s h o r t - t e r m ,  t h e r e  i s  
a  h i g h e r  r i s k  f o r  c r i s i s  r e c u r r e n c e  a n d  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  v u l n e r a b i l i t y .  
C h a p t e r  2  ( t h e  s u m m a r y  o n  t h e  l e g i s l a t i v e  a n d  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  f r a m e ­
w o r k  i n  R u s s i a n  c r i s i s  p o l i c y )  a n d  C h a p t e r  4  ( t h e  N e f t e g o r s k  c a s e  
s t u d y )  p r o v i d e  c o n c r e t e  s t a t i s t i c a l  d a t a  t o  s u p p o r t  t h e s e  c l a i m s .
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T h e  s e c o n d  c o n s e q u e n c e  o f  t h e  e x c e s s i v e  s t r a i n  u p o n  t h e  c r i s i s  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  f r a m e w o r k  h a s  b e e n  t h e  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  o n  s h o r t - t e r m  
s o c i a l  a n d  e c o n o m i c  i s s u e s  r a t h e r  t h a n  o n  l o n g - t e r m  s o c i a l  a n d  e n v i ­
r o n m e n t a l  c o n c e r n s  w h i c h  o f t e n  d e v e l o p  i n t o  c r e e p i n g  c r i s e s .  O n e  
c a n  a l s o  c o m p a r e  t h e  r e l a t i v e  s t r e n g t h  o f  t h e  e m e r g e n c y  m a n a g e ­
m e n t  p o l i c y  w i t h  t h e  n a t i o n a l  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p o l i c y ,  w h i c h  i s  r e l a ­
t i v e l y  w e a k .  I n  t h e  1 9 9 0 s  t h e  f e d e r a l  b o d y  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  e n v i r o n ­
m e n t a l  i s s u e s  w a s  d i m i n i s h e d  f r o m  a  m i n i s t r y  t o  a  c o m m i t t e e  
( a g e n c y ) ,  a n d  t h e n  i n  2 0 0 0  i t  w a s  p u s h e d  u n d e r  t h e  F e d e r a l  M i n ­
i s t r y  o f  N a t u r a l  R e s o u r c e s .  C l e a r l y  t h e  e m p h a s i s  o n  R u s s i a ’s  e n v i ­
r o n m e n t a l  p o l i c y  i s  o n  r e s o u r c e  d e v e l o p m e n t  r a t h e r  t h a n  o n  t h e  p r e ­
v e n t i o n  o f  e x c e s s i v e  e x p l o i t a t i o n  a n d  o n  c o n s e r v a t i o n .
T H E  BUREAU-POLITICS H YPO TH ESIS
P r o p o s i t i o n  5 :  T r a n s i t i o n a l  p o l i t i e s  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  e x p e r i e n c e  a  h i g h  
f r e q u e n c y  a n d  a  h i g h  i n t e n s i t y  o f  b u r e a u c r a t i c  p o l i t i c a l  b e h a v i o r  in  
‘n o r m a l ’ a n d  c r i s i s  s i t u a t i o n s .
T h i s  v o l u m e  d o e s  n o t  c o n s i d e r  a n y  f i n a n c i a l  c r i s e s ,  w h i c h ,  p e r ­
h a p s ,  p r e s e n t  t h e  b e s t  l a b o r a t o r y  f o r  t e s t i n g  t h i s  h y p o t h e s i s  ( a s  t h e  
E s t o n i a n  v o l u m e  i l l u s t r a t e d ) .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e  d a t a  a v a i l a b l e  i n  t h e  
R u s s i a n  c a s e  s t u d i e s  m o r e  o r  l e s s  s u p p o r t s  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  a  c l o s e  r e l a ­
t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  c r i s e s  a n d  b u r e a u - o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c s .
F o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h e  m e d i a  c o v e r a g e  o f  t h e  K u r s k  a c c i d e n t  c l e a r l y  
r e v e a l e d  t h e  a m b i g u i t y  b e t w e e n  t h e  v a r i o u s  a c t o r s  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  
c r i s i s  r e s p o n s e  a n d  t h e  c r i s i s  c o m m u n i c a t i o n .  T h e  p u b l i c  w a s  g i v e n  
a  n u m b e r  o f  d i f f e r e n t  a n d  c o n f l i c t i n g  e x p l a n a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  s u b m a ­
r i n e  a c c i d e n t .  S i m i l a r  d i s c r e p a n c i e s  a p p e a r e d  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  p o s s i b i l i ­
t i e s  f o r  r e s c u i n g  t h e  K u r s k  c r e w  a l i v e  ( f o r  d e t a i l s  s e e  C h e r k a s h i n ,  
2 0 0 1 ) .  I n  p a r t  t h i s  d i s c r e p a n c y  e v o l v e d  f r o m  t h e  u n c e r t a i n t y  s u r ­
r o u n d i n g  t h e  a c c i d e n t  a n d  t h e  d i v e r s i t y  o f  t h e  u n i t s  i n v o l v e d  i n  t h e  
m i l i t a r y  e x e r c i s e  a n d  i n  t h e  r e s c u e  o p e r a t i o n .  O n l y  t o  a  c e r t a i n  e x ­
t e n t  d o e s  i t  r e f l e c t  u n d e r l y i n g  i n t r a - g o v e r n m e n t a l  a n d  i n t r a - o r g a n i -  
z a t i o n a l  t e n s i o n s .  T h e  k e y  c r i s i s  d e c i s i o n s  w e r e  t a k e n  a d  h o c  u n d e r  
h e c t i c  c o n d i t i o n s  w h i c h  p r o v i d e d  p l e n t y  o f  r o o m  f o r  b u r e a u c r a t i c  
m a n e u v e r i n g  b y  s p e c i f i c  a c t o r s .  T h i s  a d d e d  a  s e c o n d  d i m e n s i o n  f a c ­
t o r  t o  t h e  a l r e a d y  p r o b l e m a t i c  c r i s i s  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  a n d  s i m p l y  e x ­
a c e r b a t e d  t h e  c r i s i s  i n  t h e  e y e s  o f  t h e  p u b l i c ,  b o t h  i n  R u s s i a  a n d  i n ­
t e r n a t i o n a l l y .
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A  c r u c i a l  q u e s t i o n  a t  t h i s  p o i n t  i s  t o  w h a t  e x t e n t  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n a l  
s t a t e  o f  R u s s i a  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  b u r e a u - o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  a n d  b u r e a u - p o ­
l i t i c a l  b e h a v i o r  o f  t h e  a c t o r s  i n  r e s p o n d i n g  t o  a  p a r t i c u l a r  c r i s i s .  B u ­
r e a u c r a t i c  m a n e u v e r i n g  w a s  q u i t e  t y p i c a l  i n  t h e  f o r m e r  S o v i e t  U n i o n  
a n d  i s  n o  l e s s  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  i n  o t h e r  e s t a b l i s h e d  d e m o c r a c i e s .  R e ­
s p o n s i b l e  o f f i c i a l s  o r  i n s t i t u t i o n s  t r y  t o  s h i f t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  o t h e r  
c r i s i s  a c t o r s ,  p r i m a r i l y  t o  j o u r n a l i s t s  o r  p o l i t i c a l  o p p o n e n t s .  O r g a n i ­
z a t i o n a l  a n d  p o l i t i c a l  b e h a v i o r ,  i n  t e r m s  o f  b l a m i n g  a n d  s e e k i n g  
s c a p e g o a t s ,  i s  c o m m o n  f o r  h i e r a r c h i c a l  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  a n d  s o c i a l  s y s ­
t e m s .
W e  b e l i e v e  t h a t  a t  l e a s t  t w o  f a c t o r s  a r e  p r e s e n t  d u r i n g  t h e  t r a n s i ­
t i o n a l  p r o c e s s  a n d  s h o u l d  b e  h i g h l i g h t e d  a s  c o n d u c i v e  t o  b u r e a u ­
c r a t i c  p o l i t i c s .  O n e  o f  t h e s e  i n v o l v e s  t h e  m a j o r  p o l i t i c a l  c h a n g e  w i t h  
a  n e w  p r e s i d e n t  t a k i n g  t h e  w h e e l .  S / h e  i s  s u r r o u n d e d  b y  a  m i x  o f  
n e w  p e o p l e  a n d  p a r t  o f  t h e  o l d  t e a m  f r o m  t h e  p r e v i o u s  a d m i n i s t r a ­
t i o n ,  w h o  u s e  d i f f e r e n t  p r i n c i p l e s  a n d  m e t h o d s  f o r  c r i s i s  c o m m u n i ­
c a t i o n .  T h i s  a f f e c t s  t h e  t y p e  a n d  r a t e  o f  c r i s i s  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  e s p e ­
c i a l l y  w h e n  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e  c r i s i s  a c t o r s ,  t h e  m e d i a  a n d  
p u b l i c  i s  a l r e a d y  p r o b l e m a t i c .  T h i s  i s  f u r t h e r  c o m p l i c a t e d  b y  t h e  i n ­
t e r n a t i o n a l  c o m m u n i t y ’s  i n v o l v e m e n t  i n  c r i s i s  m a n a g e m e n t .  P s y c h o ­
l o g i c a l  p r e s s u r e  a n d  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  i n n o v a t i o n s  c a n  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  
r o u t i n e  b u r e a u - p o l i t i c a l  m a n e u v e r i n g .
T h e  s e c o n d  f a c t o r  i s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h e  c h a n g i n g  d e g r e e  o f  
o p e n n e s s  i n  t h e  n e w  r e g i m e  a n d  t h e  m e d i a t i z a t i o n  o f  c r i s i s  p o l i c y .  
T h e  i n t e n s i t y  o f  t h e  n e w  i n d e p e n d e n t  i n f o r m a t i o n  s o u r c e s  ( s e e k i n g  
m o r e  t r a n s p a r e n c y  i n  o f f i c i a l  c r i s i s  r e p o r t s )  h a s  s o m e t i m e s  f o r c e d  r e ­
s p o n s i b l e  o f f i c i a l s  a n d  i n s t i t u t i o n s  t o  t h i n k  a b o u t  c r e a t i n g  a  s a f e  
w a y  o u t .
A s  t h e  C h e r n o b y l  l i q u i d a t o r  c a s e  s h o w s  s u c h  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  b e ­
h a v i o r  d o e s  n o t  o n l y  o c c u r  i n  c r i s e s  b u t  i n  p o s t - c r i s i s  ‘n o r m a l ’ c o n ­
d i t i o n s  a s  w e l l .  B u r e a u c r a t i c  t r i c k s  w e r e  u s e d  t o  p o s t p o n e  o r  e v e n  
d e n y  t h e  o f f i c i a l  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  t h e  l i q u i d a t o r s ’ r e c r u i t m e n t  f o r  r e s ­
c u e  s e r v i c e s  i n  t h e  d i s a s t e r  a r e a .  A n o t h e r  p l o y  o f  t h e  f e d e r a l  g o v e r n ­
m e n t  w a s  t o  d e n y  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  a n d  b e n e f i t s  t o  
t h e  C h e r n o b y l  r e s c u e  w o r k e r s  a n d  t h e i r  f a m i l i e s .  T h e  f e d e r a l  g o v ­
e r n m e n t  a l s o  t r i e d  t o  s h i f t  t h i s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  t h e  l o w e r - l e v e l  a u ­
t h o r i t i e s  a n d  t o  t h e  N G O s .
L i k e w i s e ,  t h e  m e d i a  s u r v e y  d i s c l o s e s  a  n u m b e r  o f  e x a m p l e s  o f  
s o p h i s t i c a t e d  b u r e a u - o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  m a n e u v e r i n g  c o n c e r n i n g  p r o p ­
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e r t y  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n .  T h e  s u r v e y  r e v e a l e d  t h a t  t h e  e x i s t i n g  p o l i t i c a l -  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  s y s t e m  i s  r e l a t i v e l y  s o f t  a n d  c a n  f r e q u e n t l y  c h a n g e  
t h e  d i v i s i o n s  o f  l a b o r ,  r o u t i n e s ,  a n d  p r a c t i c e s  f o r  i n t e r a g e n c y  c o o r d i ­
n a t i o n .  O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  t h e  s u r v e y ’s  d i s c u s s i o n  o n  t h e  b u r e a u -  
p o l i t i c a l  i s s u e s  o f  p r o p e r t y  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  i n  R u s s i a  c o n f i r m s  t h a t  t h e  
“ n e w  g r o u p  s y n d r o m e ”  o p e r a t e s  a t  t h e  p o l i c y  r e g i m e  l e v e l  w h e r e  
c o n f l i c t s  e a s i l y  e s c a l a t e  i n t o  p o w e r  s t r u g g l e s .  T h i s  i s  a  s t r o n g  c h a r ­
a c t e r i s t i c  f o r  a  t r a n s i t i o n a l  p o l i t y .
O V E R L E A R N IN G  A N D  REFLEXIVE IN ST IT U T IO N A L  
C H A N G E  H Y PO TH ESES
H y p o t h e s i s  6 :  T r a n s i t i o n a l  s o c i e t i e s  in  c r i s i s  c o n d i t i o n s  t e n d  t o ­
w a r d s  r e f l e x i v e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  c h a n g e  a n d  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  v o l a t i l i t y .
H y p o t h e s i s  7 :  I n  t r a n s i t i o n a l  ( a s  o p p o s e d  t o  e s t a b l i s h e d )  d e m o c ­
r a c i e s  t h e r e  i s  a  h i g h  r i s k  t h a t  c r i s e s  w i l l  g e n e r a t e  s o - c a l l e d  ‘d o u b l e  
l o o p ’ a n d ! o r  ‘t h i r d  o r d e r ’ l e a r n i n g  b u t  t h e r e  i s  e v e n  a  g r e a t e r  r i s k  f o r  
o v e r l e a r n i n g .
I n  c o n t r a s t  w i t h  t h e  e a r l i e r  f o r m u l a t e d  p r o p o s i t i o n ,  t h e s e  t w o  
r e c e i v e  l i t t l e  o r  n o  s u p p o r t  i n  t h i s  v o l u m e .  R u s s i a  h a s  m o r e  i n  c o m ­
m o n  i n  t h i s  r e g a r d  w i t h  L a t v i a  t h a n  E s t o n i a  ( s e e  S t e r n  a n d  H a n s e n ,  
2 0 0 0 ) .
T h e  o v e r v i e w  o f  e m e r g e n c y  m a n a g e m e n t  p o l i c y  i n  R u s s i a  a n d  
t h e  C h e r n o b y l  l i q u i d a t o r  c a s e  i l l u s t r a t e s  t h a t  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  c h a n g e s  
a r e  o c c u r r i n g  i n  t h e  n a t i o n a l  c r i s i s  p o l i c y .  E M E R C O M ’s  d e v e l o p ­
m e n t  a n d  t h e  n o t a b l e  c h a n g e s  i n  i t s  s t r u c t u r e  a n d  f u n c t i o n s  a s  a  
s t a t e  a g e n c y  o v e r  t h e  p a s t  d e c a d e  a r e  e v i d e n c e  o f  t h i s .  T o  a  g r e a t  e x ­
t e n t  t h e s e  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s  w e r e  b u i l t  o n  p a s t  e x p e r i e n c e s  a n d  t h e  
l e s s o n s  l e a r n e d  f r o m  t h e m .  F o r  i n s t a n c e ,  i n  1 9 9 1 - 1 9 9 3  t h e  H e a d  o f  
E M E R C O M  w a s  o r d e r e d  t o  s t e p  t o  i n  a n d  m a n a g e  t h e  c o n f l i c t  i n  
N o r t h e r n  O s s e t i a  a n d  I n g u s h e t i a  a l t h o u g h  t h i s  h a s  n e v e r  b e e n  t h e  
f u n c t i o n  o r  t h e  i n t e n t i o n  o f  E M E R C O M .  A n o t h e r  e x a m p l e  o f  i n s t i ­
t u t i o n a l  c h a n g e  i s  w h e n  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  n a t i o n a l  a g e n c y  o n  h y d r o ­
m e t e o r o l o g i c a l  s e r v i c e  w a s  i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n t o  E M E R C O M  b u t  t h e n  
s h o r t l y  t h e r e a f t e r  s e p a r a t e d  f r o m  i t .
I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  m e d i a  s u r v e y  a n d ,  t o  a  l e s s e r  e x t e n t ,  t h e  
K a r a b a s h  e c o l o g i c a l  d i s a s t e r  s t u d y  d i s c l o s e  e v e n  m o r e  d r a m a t i c  
v a r i a t i o n s  i n  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  f r a m e w o r k  f o r  t h e  e c o n o m i c  d e v e l o p ­
m e n t  p o l i c y .  T h e  r a p i d  a n d  c o n t r o v e r s i a l  s w i n g  t o  t h e  m a r k e t  e c o n ­
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o m y  p r e c i p i t a t e d  t h e  e m e r g e n c e  o f  m u l t i p l e  n e w  s t r u c t u r e s ,  e . g .  t h e  
M i n i s t r y  o f  T a x e s  a n d  F e e s ,  t h e  t a x  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  t h e  F e d e r a l  A n t i ­
M o n o p o l y  C o m m i s s i o n ,  a n d  a  c o m m i s s i o n  f o r  b a n k r u p t c y  i s s u e s .  
A t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e ,  t h i s  s w i n g  f a c i l i t a t e d  t h e  r e - e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  
N G O s  ( l i k e  l a b o r  a n d  s t r i k e  c o m m i t t e e s  a n d  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  n e w  o r ­
g a n i z a t i o n s  l i k e  t h e  G r e e n  m o v e m e n t ) .
T h e s e  e x p e r i e n c e s  r e v e a l  t h a t  s u c h  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s  c a n  b e  i n t e r ­
p r e t e d  a s  r e f l e x i v e  c h a n g e s  r a t h e r  t h a n  r e s t r u c t u r i n g  a s  s e e n  i n  E s t o ­
n i a  o r  P o l a n d .  F o r  i n s t a n c e ,  b e t w e e n  1 9 9 4  a n d  2 0 0 0  E M E R C O M  
u n d e r w e n t  s i g n i f i c a n t  b u t  i n c r e m e n t a l  r e o r g a n i z a t i o n .  T h i s  f o l l o w e d  
a  s h i f t  i n  d i s a s t e r  p o l i c y  f r o m  e m e r g e n c y  r e s p o n s e  i n  t h e  e a r l y  
1 9 9 0 s ,  t o  e m e r g e n c y  p r e p a r e d n e s s  a n d  m o r e  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  r e ­
s p o n s e  i n  t h e  m i d  1 9 9 0 s ,  t o  a  d i s a s t e r  m i t i g a t i o n  a n d  r i s k  r e d u c t i o n  
p o l i c y  i n  t h e  l a t e  1 9 9 0 s  i n t o  t h e  e a r l y  p a r t  o f  2 0 0 0 .  T h e  s a m e  
p r o c e s s  h a s  o c c u r r e d  a t  t h e  I n t e r i o r  M i n i s t r y ,  w h i c h  h a s  c o p e d  w i t h  
t h e  s h a r p  i n c r e a s e  i n  o r g a n i z e d  c r i m e  b y  c r e a t i n g  s p e c i a l  t a s k  f o r c e s  
(.s p e t s n a z ) . I n  t h i s  m i n i s t r y  s u c h  c h a n g e s  h a v e  b e e n  m o r e  f r e q u e n t  
t h a n  i n  E M E R C O M ,  w h i c h  h a s  b e e n  m o r e  a f f e c t e d  b y  c h a n g e s  i n  
t h e  t o p  m a n a g e m e n t  r a t h e r  t h a n  c h a n g e s  i n  t h e  c r i m e  r a t e  a l o n e .
W e  b e l i e v e  t h a t  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  v o l a t i l i t y  a c t u a l l y  e x i s t s  a n d  i s  i m ­
p o r t a n t ,  b u t  a t  l e a s t  i n  t h e  R u s s i a ’s  c o n t e x t  w e  c a n  n o t  a t t r i b u t e  i t  t o  
t h e  t r a n s i t i o n a l  p r o c e s s .  T h e  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  f r a m e w o r k  i s  m o r e  
s i g n i f i c a n t  s i n c e  i t  i s  s h a p e d  b y  s p e c i f i c  h i s t o r i c a l  d e v e l o p m e n t s  a n d  
t h e  s p e c i f i c  c u l t u r e  ( i n c l u d i n g  p o l i t i c a l  c u l t u r e )  o f  t h e  p o l i t y .  A l ­
t h o u g h  m o d e r n  R u s s i a  i s  n o  l o n g e r  a  t o t a l i t a r i a n  a n d  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  
s o c i e t y ,  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  s y s t e m  h a s  p r e s e r v e d  i t s  s t r o n g  h i e r a r c h i c a l  
s t r u c t u r e  w i t h  t h e  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  o f  p o w e r  i n  t h e  h a n d s  o f  t h e  t o p  
a u t h o r i t i e s .  T h i s  c r e a t e s  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  r e l a t i v e l y  e a s y  s t r u c t u r a l  a n d  
f u n c t i o n a l  c h a n g e s ,  a n d  t h e  r e p l a c e m e n t  o f  t h e  t o p  m a n a g e m e n t  i n  
a n y  s p e c i f i c  m i n i s t r y  o r  s t a t e  o r g a n i z a t i o n .  T h i s  i s  e v e n  m o r e  s o  i n  
f e d e r a l  c r i s i s  p o l i c y ,  w h i c h  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  R u s s i a n  C o n s t i t u t i o n  
a n d  o t h e r  f e d e r a l  l a w s  i s  t h e  e x c l u s i v e  p r e r o g a t i v e  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t .  
I f  s / h e  f a v o r s  s u c h  c h a n g e s  a n d  r e p l a c e m e n t s  ( a s  w a s  t h e  c a s e  w a s  
w i t h  t h e  f i r s t  R u s s i a n  P r e s i d e n t ) ,  t h e y  w i l l  i m p l e m e n t e d  a n d  t h i s  w i l l  
m a k e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  v o l a t i l i t y  m o r e  o r g a n i c  a n d  p e r s i s t e n t .
R e f l e x i v e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  c h a n g e  d u r i n g  o r  a f t e r  c r i s e s  i s  n o t  e v i ­
d e n t  i n  R u s s i a .  L i k e w i s e ,  s i g n s  o f  o v e r l e a r n i n g  d o  n o t  s e e m  t o  b e  
p r e s e n t .  C o n s i d e r i n g  t h e  f i n d i n g s  i n  t h e  c a s e  s t u d i e s  i n  t h i s  v o l u m e ,  
o n e  c o u l d  c l a i m  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  m o r e  u n d e r - l e a r n i n g .  T h i s  m e a n s  t h a t
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f e w ,  i f  a n y ,  l e s s o n s  a r e  d r a w n  f r o m  e a r l i e r  c r i s e s .  T h e  N e f t e g o r s k  
e a r t h q u a k e  a n d  t h e  K a r a b a s h  e c o l o g i c a l  d i s a s t e r  e x e m p l i f y  t h i s .  
T h i s  a l s o  m e a n s  t h a t  n o  s u p e r f i c i a l  c h a n g e s  a r e  m a d e  i n  t h e  i n s t i t u ­
t i o n a l  f r a m e w o r k ,  a t  l e a s t  n o t  w i t h i n  t h e  c o u n t r y ’s  c r i s i s  p o l i c y .
T h e  C h e r n o b y l  l i q u i d a t o r  c a s e  m o s t  v i v i d l y  i l l u s t r a t e s  t h i s  p o i n t .  
T h e  i n a d e q u a c y  o f  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  i n s t i t u t i o n s  t o  p r o v i d e  s o c i a l  
s e r v i c e s  t o  t h o u s a n d s  o f  r e s c u e  w o r k e r s  a f t e r  t h e  r a d i a t i o n  d i s a s t e r  
t r a n s f o r m e d  i n t o  a  c r e e p i n g  c r i s i s .  T h e  g o v e r n m e n t a l  b o d i e s  w e r e  
i n d i f f e r e n t ,  s o  t h e  l i q u i d a t o r s  o r g a n i z e d  N G O s  t o  f i g h t  f o r  t h e i r  i n ­
t e r e s t s .  V i c t i m s  o f  s u b m a r i n e  a c c i d e n t s  h a d  s i m i l a r  e x p e r i e n c e s .  D u e  
t o  t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s ’ l a c k  o f  c o n c e r n ,  t h e  r e l a t i v e s  s e t  u p  s p e c i a l  c o m ­
m i t t e e s  a n d  c l u b s  t o  h e l p  t h e i r  c a u s e .  S o m e  n o t a b l e  c h a n g e s  w e r e  
o b s e r v e d  a f t e r  t h e  K u r s k  t r a g e d y .  I n  S e p t e m b e r  2 0 0 0  t h e  n e w  P r e s i ­
d e n t  o f  R u s s i a  d e c l a r e d  a  s p e c i a l  a i d  p r o g r a m  f o r  t h e  v i c t i m s ’ r e l a ­
t i v e s .  T h i s  w a s  i m p o r t a n t  f r o m  t h e  v i e w p o i n t  o f  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  s i n c e  
r e l a t i v e l y  l a r g e  c o m p e n s a t i o n s  w e r e  g r a n t e d .  I t  p r o v i d e d  l e g i t i m a t e  
s t a t u s  f o r  t h e  v i c t i m s ,  a n d  t h e  G o v e r n m e n t  a c c e p t e d  f o r m a l  r e s p o n ­
s i b i l i t y  f o r  i t s  p a r t  i n  t h e  t r a g e d y .  H o w e v e r ,  t h i s  s t e p  d i d  n o t  m a k e  
t h e  s i t u a t i o n  l e s s  c o n t r o v e r s i a l .
R e c e n t  e x p e r i e n c e s  i n  r e c o v e r i n g  f r o m  t h e  d e v a s t a t i n g  f l o o d s  i n  
Y a k u t i a  a n d  t h e  2 0 0 1  t e r r o r i s t  a t t a c k s  i n  t h e  U S A  r e v e a l  t h a t  t h e  
p u b l i c  h a s  i n  m a n y  w a y s  l e a r n e d  m u c h  m o r e  a b o u t  h o w  t o  d e a l  
w i t h  a  c r i s i s  t h a n  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  h a v e .  C o n t r a r y  t o  
t h e  h y p o t h e s i s  t h a t  i n  t r a n s i t i o n a l  p o l i t i e s  g o v e r n m e n t s  h a v e  n o t  
h a d  e n o u g h  t i m e  o r  e x p e r i e n c e  t o  b e c o m e  e n t r e n c h e d  i n  t h e i r  p o l i t i ­
c a l  a n d  b u r e a u c r a t i c  p o s i t i o n s ,  t h e  R u s s i a n  a c t o r s  m o r e  o r  l e s s  r e ­
t a i n e d  t h e i r  o l d  p o s i t i o n s ,  b u t  t h e y  w e r e  n o t  o p e n  t o  c r i t i c a l l y  e v a l u ­
a t i n g  t h e i r  p r a c t i c e s  o r  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  a r r a n g e m e n t .  T h i s  s e r v e s  a s  
o n e  m o r e  a r g u m e n t  t h a t  i n  r i s k  s o c i e t i e s  e s t a b l i s h e d  h i s t o r i c a l ,  c u l ­
t u r a l  a n d  s o c i a l  c o r e  f a c t o r s  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  p a c e  o f  p o s t - c r i s i s  r e f l e x ­
i v e  c h a n g e  a n d  l e a r n i n g  f r o m  c r i s e s  m o r e  s o  t h a n  t h e  a c t u a l  p r o c e s s  
o f  t r a n s i t i o n .
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B a s e d  o n  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  o n - g o i n g  r e s e a r c h  ( n o t  o n l y  i n  R u s s i a  b u t  
a l s o  i n  m a n y  o f  t h e  o t h e r  n e w  d e m o c r a c i e s ) ,  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  i d e n t i f y  
a  n u m b e r  o f  c o m m o n  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  f o r  t r a n s i t i o n a l  c o u n t r i e s  r e ­
g a r d i n g  t h e  f r e q u e n c y  a n d  s e v e r i t y  o f  n a t i o n a l  a n d  t r a n s n a t i o n a l  
c r i s e s .  T h e  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  p o l i t i c a l ,  i n s t i t u t i o n a l ,  a n d  s o c i o - c u l t u r a l  
e l e m e n t s  i n  s u c h  c o u n t r i e s  a r e  u n s t a b l e .  I n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n ,  t h e  
s h a d o w  o f  a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m ,  d i s c r e p a n c i e s  a n d  c o n f l i c t s  b e t w e e n  
p u b l i c  v a l u e s  a n d  n o r m s ,  i n t r a -  a n d  i n t e r c o m m u n i t y  s t r a i n  ( i n c l u d ­
i n g  e t h n i c  t e n s i o n s ) ,  a n d  t h e  c h a n g i n g  r o l e  o f  t h e  m e d i a  a r e  a l l  s i g ­
n i f i c a n t  f a c t o r s .  L i k e w i s e ,  e c o n o m i c  p r o b l e m s  r e s u l t  i n  s p e n d i n g  
c u t s  a n d  i n f r a s t r u c t u r a l  d e c a y .
SO C IO -C U LTU R A L A N D  PO L IT IC O -IN ST IT U T IO N A L
C H A N G E
A l l  t r a n s i t i o n a l  s o c i e t i e s  b y  d e f i n i t i o n  a r e  e v o l v i n g  f r o m  s t a t e  s o c i a l ­
i s m  t o w a r d s  v a r i o u s  f o r m s  o f  l i b e r a l  d e m o c r a t i c  s t a t e s  a n d  s o c i e t i e s .  
S o m e  o f  t h e s e  p o l i t i e s  i n c l u d e  t h e  B a l t i c  c o u n t r i e s  ( E s t o n i a ,  L a t v i a  
a n d  L i t h u a n i a )  w h i c h  h a v e  m a d e  a  t r a n s i t i o n  f r o m  S o v i e t  o c c u p a ­
t i o n  t o  t h e  r e s t o r a t i o n  o f  n a t i o n a l  s o v e r e i g n t y  a s  i n d e p e n d e n t  s t a t e s .  
T h e s e  p r o f o u n d  s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l  c h a n g e s  p o s e  g r e a t  c h a l l e n g e s  t o  t h e  
n e w  d e m o c r a c i e s .
F i r s t ,  t h e  p u b l i c  v a l u e s  a n d  n o r m s  r o o t e d  i n  t h e  s o c i e t i e s  o f  t h e  
f o r m e r  S o v i e t  U n i o n  r e p u b l i c s  w e r e  d e p r e c i a t e d  o r  r e p l a c e d  b y  n e w  
o n e s .  T h e r e  w a s  a  s h i f t  f r o m  a  t o t a l i t a r i a n  a n d  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  s t a t e  t o  
a  d e r e g u l a t e d  a n d  l i b e r a l  ( p e o p l e - o r i e n t e d )  p u b l i c  p o l i c y .  T h i s  p r o ­
v i d e d  f o r  m o r e  l o c a l  c o n t r o l  a n d  i n d i v i d u a l  f r e e d o m s  i n c l u d i n g  p r i ­
v a t e  p r o p e r t y ,  e n t r e p r e n e u r s h i p  a n d  s o c i a l  m o v e m e n t s .  T h e s e  v a l u e s  
w e r e  a l m o s t  i m m e d i a t e l y  a c c e p t e d  b y  t h e  y o u n g e r  g e n e r a t i o n s  w h o  
h a d  f e w e r  a t t a c h m e n t s  t o  t h e  o l d  p o l i t i c a l  r e g i m e .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e s e  
r a d i c a l  c h a n g e s  c a m e  i n t o  c o n f l i c t  w i t h  t h o s e  w h i c h  h a d  g i v e n  p r i o r ­
i t y  t o  p u b l i c  a n d  c o l l e c t i v e  i n t e r e s t s  o v e r  i n d i v i d u a l  r i g h t s / p r e f e r ­
e n c e s .  T h e s e  p r e f e r e n c e s  d o m i n a t e d  b e f o r e  a n d  a r e  s t i l l  d e e p l y  e n ­
27 This section builds and expands upon the concluding chapter in Stern and Hansen (2000), and the 
constructive comments of Paul t’H art.
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t r e n c h e d  i n  t h e  m a s s  c o n s c i o u s n e s s  o f  t h e  o l d e r  g e n e r a t i o n s .  J u s t  
t w o  d e c a d e s  a g o  t h e y  l i v e d  a b s o l u t e l y  d i f f e r e n t  l i v e s ;  t h e y  h a v e  l o s t  
t h e i r  s o c i a l  o r i e n t a t i o n  a n d  f i n d  t h e m s e l v e s  n o w  i n  a n  u n f a m i l i a r  s o ­
c i a l  a n d  p o l i t i c a l  e n v i r o n m e n t .
S e c o n d l y ,  t h e  o l d  i n s t i t u t i o n s  a n d  r e g u l a t o r y  a r r a n g e m e n t s  h a v e  
b e e n  d i s c a r d e d  o r  i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n t o  a  r a d i c a l l y  c h a n g e d  p o l i t i c a l  
a n d  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  c o n t e x t .  T h e  d e - l e g i t i m i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  o l d  r e g i m e  i n  
m a n y  c a s e s  h a s  b e e n  s o  p r o f o u n d  t h a t  l a r g e  a r e a s  o f  l e g i s l a t i o n  a n d  
l e g a l  p r a c t i c e  h a v e  b e e n  c o m p l e t e l y  s c r a p p e d .  T h e  “ l a i s s e z - f a i r e  Z e i t ­
g e i s t ”  p l a n - b a s e d  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  s t r u c t u r e s  h a v e  n o t  b e e n  p r o m p t l y  
r e p l a c e d  w i t h  r e g u l a t o r y  b o d i e s  c o m m o n  i n  t h e  W e s t .  T h e s e  b o d i e s  
t y p i c a l l y  m o d e r a t e  a n d  m i t i g a t e  m a r k e t  f a i l u r e s  o f  v a r i o u s  k i n d s .  
T h e  h i g h l y  s e g m e n t e d  a n d  u n e v e n  p r o c e s s  o f  l e g a l  a n d  p o l i t i c a l  r e ­
f o r m  h a s  c r e a t e d  p o l i t i c o - e c o n o m i c  i n s t a b i l i t y  ( S t e r n  a n d  H a n s e n ,  
2 0 0 0 :  3 4 8 ) .
IM PLICATIO NS FO R  CRISIS DEVELO PM EN T: T H E  IM PACT
OF E T H N IC  T E N SIO N S
T r a n s i t i o n a l  p r o c e s s e s  i n v o l v e  s o c i a l  n o r m s  a n d  v a l u e  c o n f l i c t s ,  l e g ­
i s l a t i o n  a n d  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  g a p s ,  a n d  i m b a l a n c e s ;  a l l  o f  w h i c h  h a v e  
p a r a m o u n t  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  c r i s i s  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  c r i s i s  p o l i c y .  I n  
t e r m s  o f  c r i s i s  d e v e l o p m e n t ,  t h e s e  h a v e  o f t e n  c r e a t e d  a  f e r t i l e  e n v i ­
r o n m e n t  f o r  t h e  i n c u b a t i o n  o f  n e w  c r i s e s  o r  h a v e  s t i m u l a t e d  d o r ­
m a n t  c r e e p i n g  o r  s l o w - b u r n i n g  c r i s e s .
T h e  b a n k i n g  c r i s e s  i n  L a t v i a  a n d  E s t o n i a ,  p r o p e r t y  r e d i s t r i b u ­
t i o n  i n  v a r i o u s  i n d u s t r i e s ,  a n d  i s s u e s  r e g a r d i n g  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  a n d  
b e n e f i t s  f o r  r e s c u e  w o r k e r s  i n  R u s s i a  e x e m p l i f y  t h i s .  S i m i l a r l y ,  r e ­
d e f i n i n g  t h e  c r i t e r i a  f o r  c i t i z e n s h i p  ( w h i c h  a f f e c t e d  p r i m a r i l y  R u s s ­
i a n  c o m m u n i t i e s  a b r o a d )  i n  c o n j u n c t i o n  t o  t h e  n a t i o n a l  r e s t o r a t i o n  
o f  L a t v i a  a n d  E s t o n i a  b e c a m e  t h e  s o u r c e  o f  m a n y  e t h n i c  c o n f l i c t s  
a n d  a t t r a c t e d  a  l o t  o f  d o m e s t i c  a n d  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a t t e n t i o n .
H i g h  l e v e l s  o f  e t h n i c  t e n s i o n ,  w h i c h  s e p a r a t e  m a j o r i t y  a n d  m i ­
n o r i t y  g r o u p s ,  a r e  a  s t r i k i n g  f e a t u r e  o f  m a n y  t r a n s i t i o n a l  p o l i t i e s .  
D r a m a t i c  r e l o c a t i o n  i n i t i a t i v e s  d u r i n g  t h e  S o v i e t  e r a  l a r g e l y  c o n ­
t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e s e  e t h n i c  t e n s i o n s  a n d  s t i l l  r e m a i n s  a  t h o r n y  i s s u e  i n  
m a n y  p o s t - S o v i e t  c o u n t r i e s .  T h e  c h a n g i n g  s o c i a l ,  e c o n o m i c  a n d  p o ­
l i t i c a l  s t a t u s  o f  t h e s e  e t h n i c  g r o u p s  p o s e s  m a j o r  c h a l l e n g e s  i n  m a n y  
t r a n s i t i o n a l  s t a t e s .  C e r t a i n  n a t i o n a l  i d e n t i t i e s  w e r e  s t r o n g l y  d e - e m -
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p h a s i z e d  d u r i n g  t h e  S o v i e t  e r a  b u t  h a v e  b e e n  e m b r a c e d  b y  t h e  n e w l y  
i n d e p e n d e n t  f o r m e r  S o v i e t  r e p u b l i c s .  I n  s o m e  o f  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  ( e . g .  
i n  L a t v i a ) ,  t h e  s t a t u s  o f  R u s s i a n  m i n o r i t i e s  h a s  b e e n  p l a c e d  i n  
d o u b t .
A t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e ,  q u e s t i o n a b l e  f e d e r a l  l e g i s l a t i o n  w i t h i n  R u s s i a  
p r o m o t e s  t h e  s t r u g g l e  o f  v a r i o u s  e n t i t i e s  i n  o b t a i n i n g  a  l a r g e r  p i e c e  
o f  s o v e r e i g n t y .  H e n c e ,  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  a n d  e c o n o m i c  s h i f t s  i n  t h e  1 9 9 0 s  
i n c r e a s e d  e t h n i c  t e n s i o n s .  T h i s  h a s  b e e n  t h e  c a s e  i n  t h e  C a u c a s u s  r e ­
g i o n  o f  R u s s i a .  E t h n i c  t e n s i o n s  d e v e l o p e d  i n  1 9 9 9  b e t w e e n  t h e  
K a r a c h a i s  a n d  t h e  C i r c a s s i a n s  d u r i n g  r e g i o n a l  e l e c t i o n s .  A  p o l i t i c a l  
c o n f r o n t a t i o n  d e v e l o p e d  a n d  t h e r e  w a s  a  h i g h  r i s k  o f  t h e  r e p u b l i c  
s p l i t t i n g  u p .  A n o t h e r  e x a m p l e  o f  e t h n i c  t e n s i o n  w a s  t h e  d i s p u t e  b e ­
t w e e n  I n g u s h e t i a  a n d  N o r t h e r n  O s s e t i a  i n  1 9 9 1 w h i c h  e s c a l a t e d  i n t o  
a n  a r m e d  c o n f l i c t .  A s  f o r  t h e  r e g i o n a l  w a r  i n  C h e c h n y a ,  t h e  r e b e l  
l e a d e r s  c o n s i d e r  i t  t o  b e  a n  i n t e r e t h n i c  w a r  f o r  i n d e p e n d e n c e .  H o w ­
e v e r  i t s  d e e p  h i s t o r i c a l  r o o t s  h a v e  a c t u a l l y  v e r y  l i t t l e  t o  d o  w i t h  t h e  
e t h n i c  f a c t o r  b u t  r a t h e r  i s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h e  c o n f r o n t a t i o n  b e ­
t w e e n  p o l i t i c a l  a n d  e c o n o m i c  g r o u p s  ( i n c l u d i n g  s e v e r a l  c r i m i n a l  e l e ­
m e n t s ) .
R ESO U R C E SCARCITY A N D  IN FR A ST R U C T U R A L  DECAY AS
CRISIS FACTORS A N D  CRISIS M A N A G E M E N T
C O N ST R A IN T S
T h e  s o c i o - c u l t u r a l  a n d  s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s  i n  t h e  t r a n s i ­
t i o n  t o  a  m o r e  d e m o c r a t i c  s o c i e t y  a r e  e x a c e r b a t e d  b y  r e s o u r c e  c o n ­
s t r a i n t s  a n d  i n f r a s t r u c t u r a l  d e c a y .  T h e s e  p r o d u c e  c r i s i s  c o n d i t i o n s  
a n d  r e d u c e  t h e  c r i s i s  m i t i g a t i o n  p o t e n t i a l  o f  t r a n s i t i o n a l  p o l i t i e s .
U r b a n i z a t i o n  i s  p l a c i n g  i n c r e a s i n g  d e m a n d s  o n  t h e  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  
o f  l a r g e  c i t i e s  w h i l e  a t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e  t h e  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  i s  a g i n g  a n d  
i s  i n  d e s p e r a t e  n e e d  o f  m a j o r  i n v e s t m e n t .  T h i s  i s  a  g l o b a l  t r e n d  a n d  
h o l d s  t r u e  i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  t h e  l e v e l  o f  i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  o r  d e m o c r a t i ­
z a t i o n  i n  a n y  g i v e n  c o u n t r y .  E x a m p l e s  a r e  t h e  b l a c k o u t s  i n  A u c k ­
l a n d ,  N e w  Z e a l a n d ;  i n  B u e n o s  A i r e s ,  A r g e n t i n a ;  a n d  i n  t h e  P r i m o r s ­
k i  r e g i o n  i n  t h e  F a r  E a s t  o f  R u s s i a .  H o w e v e r  i n  m a n y  o f  t h e  n e w  
d e m o c r a c i e s ,  t h i s  p r o b l e m  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  a c u t e .  T h e  f o r m e r  S o v i e t  
p r a c t i c e s  i n  c o n s t r u c t i o n  a n d  u r b a n  p l a n n i n g  o f t e n  f a i l e d  t o  m e e t  
t h e  m o d e r n  s t a n d a r d s  f o r  s a f e t y  a n d  p e r f o r m a n c e .  T h e  N e f t e g o r s k  
e a r t h q u a k e  d i s a s t e r  i s  t e s t i m o n y  o f  t h i s .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  t h e  i n f r a s t r u c ­
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t u r a l  i n t e r - d e p e n d e n c y  o f  t h e  f o r m e r  S o v i e t  U n i o n  h a s  c o m p l i c a t e d  
t h i s  p r o b l e m .  I n  m a n y  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  r e p u b l i c s ,  t h e  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  w a s  
d e v e l o p e d  a s  p a r t  o f  t h e  l a r g e r  S o v i e t  b l o c .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  E s t o n i a  
s h a r e s  c o m m o n  w a t e r  a n d  e l e c t r i c  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e s  w i t h  R u s s i a ,  
w h i c h  h a s  l e d  t o  m a n y  c o n f l i c t s  ( R a u d h e i n ,  2 0 0 0 ) .
T o  m a k e  m a t t e r s  w o r s e ,  s u c h  s t r u c t u r e s  h a v e  n o t  b e e n  p r o p e r l y  
m a i n t a i n e d .  T h i s  i s  l a r g e l y  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  s h o r t a g e  o f  f u n d s .  M a n y  
o f  t h e  n e w  d e m o c r a c i e s  a r e  h a n d i c a p p e d  b y  a  s e v e r e  s h o r t a g e  o f  f i ­
n a n c i a l  r e s o u r c e s .  P o l i t i c a l  a n d  e s p e c i a l l y  e c o n o m i c  r e s o u r c e s  a r e  
s t r e t c h e d  t h i n l y .  G i v e n  t h e s e  l i m i t a t i o n s ,  p o t e n t i a l l y  a v o i d a b l e  c r i s e s  
o c c u r  s i n c e  i n v e s t m e n t s  i n  p r e v e n t a t i v e  m e a s u r e s  h a v e  b e e n  r e d u c e d .  
R e s o u r c e  s c a r c i t y  w a s  c e r t a i n l y  a  c o n t r i b u t i n g  f a c t o r  i n  t h e  
K a r a b a s h  e c o l o g i c a l  d i s a s t e r  a n d  t h e  C h e r n o b y l  l i q u i d a t o r  d i s p u t e .  
D e f i c i e n c i e s  i n  p r e p a r e d n e s s  a r e  o f t e n  r e v e a l e d  a f t e r  c r i s e s  o c c u r .  
T h e y  m a y  b e  h a r d  t o  r e m e d y  o n  a n  a d  h o c  b a s i s  w h e n  t h e r e  i s  a l ­
r e a d y  s o  l i t t l e  s l a c k  i n  t h e  s y s t e m  ( c f .  C y e r t  a n d  M a r c h ,  1 9 6 3 ;  
L e v i n t h a l  a n d  M a r c h ,  1 9 8 1 ;  M e y e r ,  1 9 8 2 ) .
IM PLICATIO NS FO R  CRISIS M A N A G E M E N T :
A U T H O R IT A R IA N  REFLEX
S o c i o - c u l t u r a l  a n d  p o l i t i c a l  t e n s i o n s  a n d  r e s o u r c e  c o n s t r a i n t s  c o m e  
t o  t h e  f o r e  d u r i n g  a  t r a n s i t i o n  p r o c e s s .  S e c u r i t y  a n d  s a f e t y  p o l i c i e s  
a r e  w e a k e n e d  a n d  t h u s  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  f r a m e w o r k ,  s t a n d a r d s  a n d  
w o r k  p e r f o r m a n c e  s u f f e r .  T h i s  l o w e r s  t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  p r e v e n t a ­
t i v e  m e a s u r e s  a n d  t h e  r e s p o n s e  t o  c r i s e s  w h i c h  w e r e  o t h e r w i s e  d e a l t  
w i t h  i n  a  t i m e l y  a n d  a p p r o p r i a t e  m a n n e r  b y  t h e  o l d  r e g i m e  ( f o r  e x ­
a m p l e ,  n a t u r a l  d i s a s t e r s  a n d  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  a c c i d e n t s ) .  I n  g e n e r a l ,  c r i ­
s i s  m a n a g e m e n t  i s  p l a g u e d  b y  t h e  p e r s i s t e n c e  o f  t h e  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  
r e f l e x .  C r i s e s  o f t e n  c a l l  f o r  q u i c k  a n d  a u t h o r i t a t i v e  d e c i s i o n s  a n d  
s t r o n g  l e a d e r s h i p  w h i c h  c o m p e t e  w i t h  d e m o c r a t i c  v a l u e s  s u c h  a s  
o p e n n e s s ,  t r a n s p a r e n c y ,  a n d  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  p r o c e s s .  A  
c e r t a i n  d e g r e e  o f  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  a c t i o n  c a n  b e  o b s e r v e d  i n  c r i s i s  c o n ­
d i t i o n s  i n  m a n y  e s t a b l i s h e d  d e m o c r a c i e s ;  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  d e c l a r i n g  a  
s t a t e  o f  e m e r g e n c y  c u r t a i l s  c i t i z e n s ’ i n d i v i d u a l  r i g h t s  a n d  c o n c e n ­
t r a t e s  p o w e r  i n  t h e  h a n d s  o f  c r i s i s  m a n a g e r s .
N e w  d e m o c r a c i e s  h a v e  o n l y  r e c e n t l y  s u c c e e d e d  i n  r e d i s t r i b u t i n g  
p o l i t i c a l  p o w e r  i n  a  m o r e  d e m o c r a t i c  f a s h i o n  a n d  i n  s e c u r i n g  c i v i l  
a n d  p o l i t i c a l  r i g h t s .  I n  e m e r g e n c i e s ,  t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s  i n  t h e s e  n e w
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d e m o c r a c i e s  a r e  m o r e  s k e p t i c a l  a b o u t  r e l i n q u i s h i n g  t h o s e  r i g h t s .  
C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  p o l i t i c a l  a n d  b u r e a u c r a t i c  a c t o r s  a r e  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  
r e s o r t  t o  t o p - d o w n  m e t h o d s  w i t h i n  t h e  e x i s t i n g  h i e r a r c h i c a l  a n d  
c e n t r a l i z e d  s y s t e m s  d u r i n g  a  c r i s i s  ( H a r t ,  R o s e n t h a l  a n d  K o u z m i n ,  
1 9 9 3 ) .
I n  t h i s  c o n t e x t ,  i t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  n o t e  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  m a r t i a l  
l a w  ( o n e  o f  t h e  m o s t  t a n g i b l e  a n d  v i v i d  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  r e f l e x e s  u s e d  
d u r i n g  a  c r i s i s  s i t u a t i o n ) .  H o w e v e r  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  m a r t i a l  l a w  d i d  
n o t  e l i m i n a t e  t h e  u s e  o f  c o u n t e r - t e r r o r i s t  m e a s u r e s  d u r i n g  t h e  r e ­
g i o n a l  w a r s  i n  C h e c h n y a .  I t  d i d ,  h o w e v e r ,  p r o v i d e  a  b a s i s  f o r  c o n ­
s i d e r i n g  t h i s  a s  a  c r i s i s  c o n d i t i o n ,  w h i c h  f a c i l i t a t e d  t h e  e x c e s s i v e  u s e  
o f  a u t h o r i t a t i v e  m e a s u r e s  w i t h  s e r i o u s  v i o l a t i o n s  t o  h u m a n  r i g h t s .  
Y e t  a t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e ,  d r a c o n i a n  m e t h o d s  f o r  d e a l i n g  w i t h  t e r r o r i s m  
i n  F r a n c e  o r  G r e a t  B r i t a i n  h a v e  l a r g e l y  b e e n  a c c e p t e d  a s  a p p r o p r i a t e  
a n d  l e g i t i m a t e .
T H E  C H A N G IN G  R O LE OF T H E  M E D IA  IN  CRISIS
M A N A G E M E N T
I n  m a n y  W e s t e r n  c o u n t r i e s ,  t h e  p a s t  f e w  d e c a d e s  h a v e  b e e n  c h a r a c ­
t e r i z e d  b y  a  q u a l i t a t i v e l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  v i g i l a n c e  a n d  
p o w e r  o f  t h e  m e d i a  w i t h i n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  s p h e r e  ( B l u m e r  a n d  G u r e -  
v i t c h ,  1 9 9 5 ;  E d e l m a n ,  1 9 8 8 ) .  W h e r e a s  t h e  p o l i t i c i a n s  i n  t h e  f o r m e r  
s t a t e - c o n t r o l l e d  s o c i a l i s t  c o u n t r i e s  c o u l d  c o u n t  o n  a  d o c i l e  a n d  s u p ­
p o r t i v e  m e d i a ,  p u b l i c  s e r v a n t s  i n  t h e  n e w  d e m o c r a c i e s  a r e  i n c r e a s ­
i n g l y  c o n f r o n t e d  w i t h  a n  a g g r e s s i v e ,  c o m m e r c i a l l y - o r i e n t e d ,  a n d  
c r i t i c a l  m e d i a ,  w h i c h  t a k e s  i t s  ’w a t c h d o g ’ r o l e  v e r y  s e r i o u s l y .
S t r a t e g i e s  ( s u c h  a s  c o v e r i n g  u p  m i s t a k e s ) ,  w h i c h  m i g h t  h a v e  
b e e n  e x t r e m e l y  e f f e c t i v e  i n  t h e  o l d  r e g i m e ,  h a v e  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  t o  
b a c k f i r e  d r a m a t i c a l l y  i f  j o u r n a l i s t s  m a n a g e  t o  g e t  w i n d  o f  t h e  e m ­
b a r r a s s i n g  i n f o r m a t i o n .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  t h e  o f f i c i a l s  f i r s t  r e p o r t e d  t h e  
C h e r n o b y l  r a d i a t i o n  d i s a s t e r  t h r e e  d a y s  a f t e r  t h e  f a c t  a n d  t h e r e  w e r e  
m u l t i p l e  e f f o r t s  t o  c o v e r  u p  o r  r e s t r i c t  p u b l i c  a c c e s s  t o  t h e  d a t a  o n  
t h e  r e s c u e  w o r k e r s ’ h e a l t h .  L i k e w i s e ,  s o m e  o f  t h e  R u s s i a n  o f f i c i a l s  
t r i e d  t o  d e l a y  o r  t w i s t  t h e  f a c t s  i n  t h e  e a r l y  r e p o r t s  a b o u t  t h e  K u r s k  
t r a g e d y .  S i m i l a r l y ,  o n e  c a n  r e c o l l e c t  n u m e r o u s  a n a l o g i e s  i n  G r e a t  
B r i t a i n ,  J a p a n  a n d  U S A  c o n c e r n i n g  m a j o r  a c c i d e n t s  a t  n u c l e a r  p o w ­
e r  p l a n t s ,  a n d  i n  G e r m a n y  a n d  I t a l y  c o n c e r n i n g  c h e m i c a l  a c c i d e n t s .  
A n d  r e c e n t l y  t h e r e  w a s  a n  a c c i d e n t  i n v o l v i n g  a  J a p a n e s e  p a s s e n g e r
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v e s s e l  w h i c h  c r a s h e d  a n d  s u n k .  O f t e n  c o v e r - u p s  a n d  d e l a y s  g r e a t l y  
d a m a g e  t h e  l e g i t i m a c y  o f  t h e  i n v o l v e d  o f f i c i a l s  a n d  o f t e n  e s c a l a t e  
t h e  e v e n t  f r o m  a  l o c a l  i n c i d e n t  t o  a  n a t i o n a l  c r i s i s .
T h e  c a s e s  d i s c u s s e d  i n  t h e  E s t o n i a n ,  L a t v i a n  a n d  R u s s i a n  v o l ­
u m e s  r e v e a l  t h a t  d e s p i t e  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  m e d i a t i z a t i o n  i s  m u c h  m o r e  
p r e v a l e n t  i n  t r a n s i t i o n a l  s o c i e t i e s  t h a n  i n  m o r e  e s t a b l i s h e d  d e m o c r a ­
c i e s ,  t h i s  t r e n d  h a s  i n c r e a s i n g l y  f o r c e d  m a n y  o f f i c i a l s  a n d  d e c i s i o n ­
m a k e r s  t o  d e m o n s t r a t e  a  g r e a t e r  a w a r e n e s s  o f  t h e  c o n t e m p o r a r y  
m e d i a  g a m e .  A s  a  r e s u l t ,  o f f i c i a l s  a n d  d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s  t e n d  t o  u s e  a  
m o r e  o p e n  a n d  p r o a c t i v e  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  s t r a t e g y  a n d  m o r e  r i g o r ­
o u s  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  m e a s u r e s .  H o w e v e r ,  s o m e t i m e s  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  
t o o l s  o f  m e d i a  m a n i p u l a t i o n  ( e . g .  p u r c h a s i n g  o f  n e w s p a p e r  c o m p a ­
n i e s )  h a v e  b e e n  u s e d  t o  d i m i n i s h  t h e  m e d i a ’s  p o w e r .
H o w e v e r  t h e r e  i s  o n e  p o s i t i v e  i m p a c t  o f  t h e  o l d  r e g i m e  w h i c h  
s h o u l d  n o t  b e  o v e r l o o k e d .  I n s t i t u t i o n a l  r i g i d i t y  i n  c e r t a i n  r e s p e c t s  
c a n  j u s t  a s  w e l l  b e  i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  h e a l t h y  c o n s e r v a t i s m .  I r o n i c a l l y  
s o m e  o f  t h e  o l d  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  m e a s u r e s ,  w h i c h  w e r e  i m p l e m e n t e d  a t  
t h e  e x p e n s e  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  d e m o c r a c y ,  a c t u a l l y  m a y  h a v e  h e l p e d  t o  
a v o i d  s o m e  d e v a s t a t i n g  c r i s e s .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  t o u g h  m e a s u r e s  a g a i n s t  
a i r p l a n e  h i j a c k i n g s  w e r e  i n t r o d u c e d  d u r i n g  t h e  S o v i e t  e r a  b y  s p e c i a l  
a n t i - t e r r o r i s t  t a s k  f o r c e s  w h i c h  a r e  s t i l l  a c t i v e  t o d a y  i n  R u s s i a .  T h e s e  
m e a s u r e s  h a v e  o f t e n  b e e n  c a l l e d  u n d e m o c r a t i c  a n d  e x c e s s i v e ;  h o w ­
e v e r ,  t h e  t r a g i c  e v e n t s  o n  S e p t e m b e r  1 1 ,  2 0 0 1 ,  i n  t h e  U S A  c o u l d  
h a v e  p o s s i b l y  b e e n  p r e v e n t e d  b y  s u c h  “ u n d e m o c r a t i c ”  m e a s u r e s .  
S o m e t i m e s  t o u g h  m e a s u r e s  a n d  t i g h t  c o n t r o l  a r e  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  n e w  
a n d  e s t a b l i s h e d  d e m o c r a c i e s .
I n  s h o r t ,  t h e  f i n d i n g s  o n  t r a n s i t i o n a l  c r i s i s  m a n a g e m e n t  i n  t h i s  
v o l u m e  m e s h  t h e o r y  a n d  p r a c t i c e  a n d  a r e  i m p o r t a n t  i n  t w o  s i g n i f i ­
c a n t  w a y s .  R e s e a r c h e r s  h a v e  a  g o o d  f o u n d a t i o n  f o r  s t u d y i n g  r e a l  
t i m e  c r i s e s  a n d  c r i s i s  m a n a g e m e n t  i n  t r a n s i t i o n a l  p o l i t i e s .  A t  t h e  
s a m e  t i m e ,  p r a c t i t i o n e r s  c a n  k e e p  c r i s i s  m a n a g e m e n t  p o l i c y  i n  p a c e  
w i t h  n a t i o n a l  d e v e l o p m e n t  a n d  w o r l d  t r e n d s .
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